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Dedication
This book is dedicated to our families, who tolerated us spending
much time in front of computers writing this instead of engaging in
direct human interaction.

Preface
We don’t want to come across as David Downers,1 but it is hard to 1 The phrase ‘Debbie Downer’ refers
to someone whose negative attitude
depresses or discourages others.
examine the state of American transport and land use planning
without a large dose of cynicism about motives, and skepticism
about claims and priorities.
Transport engineering and land use planning are technical fields
nominally grounded in rational thought. Yet level-headed analysis
and calculations haven’t led to healthy and financially sustainable
transport and land use systems. Part of what we see as the problem
is a focus on mobility over accessibility. This focus prioritizes
vehicular flows and speed over people and proximity. Our shared
goals should not be how to maximize how much people and things
travel about. Rather, our goals should be about how can society
make it as easy as possible to reach opportunities and activities. A
second part of the problem is privileging expansion over preservation.
In a world where transport is new with few roads and no transit
service, expansion is the critical phase of development; but in
today’s world of mature networks, preservation is so much more
important. We identify numerous problems, but the solutions are
difficult to implement. That is not, we believe, because they are not
good ideas, but rather because the institutions that make decisions
are incapable of implementing them.
This book is called A Political Economy of Access for a reason. Our
political economy analysis explains how access is shaped by law,
culture, and governance. The issues we raise are not new, either. It
was a century ago when Frederick Law Olmstead, Jr. said:
There has been a decided tendency on the part of official street
planning to insist with quite needless and undesirable rigidity upon
fixed standards of width and arrangement in regard to purely local
streets, leading inevitably in many cases to the formation of blocks
and lots of a size and shape ill adapted to the local uses to which they
need to be put.2 2 (Olmsted 1910).
This quote introduces many of our concerns. First, streets and
road networks are more than just thoroughfares. They actively
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shape the location and function of the built environment, support or
deter alternatives to automobility and substantially affect public
safety. Second, in a system where transport networks and land
regulations are designed and built separately, there are mismatched
incentives. The most efficient road may contradict the needs of great
places. Speed is not necessarily a characteristic of great cities – other
than maybe Indianapolis, no city brags about being a raceway.
Third, rigid roadway design is a hallmark of a focus on mobility.
The road itself is simply a conduit through which one passes, and
the quality of destinations is diminished. Lastly, these are just some
of the well-known problems that have persisted a century later, yet
we have spent far less effort trying to understand why we keep
building cities that many consider undesirable.
An additional issue is that transport systems require
coordination across actors. The car you own is worthless without
roads, and the capital and expertise required to build and maintain
cars very much differs from the expertise needed for roads.
Certainly, some self-contained transport systems exist, such as
elevators or airport trams, but these do not scale to cities overall.
The question remains how to integrate infrastructure, traffic flow,
and land development. This book advocates for coordination
through prices, so people can account for the full cost of the actions
of themselves and others when making decisions, whether as a
traveler, developer, planner, or elected official.
The current state of transport and land use systems raises further
concerns. New technologies are changing transport in fundamental
ways. App-based services offer new taxi-type alternatives, which
compete with and complement existing travel modes. These
services are backed by deep-pocketed investors and despite their
popularity are, as of this writing, not actually profitable.3 But there3 These firms might not be actually
as popular as their inflated valuations
suggest, either. The US Bureau of Labor
Statistics shows the gig economy had
fewer workers in 2017 than 2016, and the
2017 National Household Travel Survey
shows that fewer than one-half of one
percent of trips are by taxi or app-based
service nationally.
is little doubt that such services will persist in some form once the
money runs out. If the history of taxicabs is any guide, a new era of
regulation will protect Uber, Lyft, and others from their demise.
In early 2018 electric scooters were
introduced in a dozen cities in the US.
As of this writing we don’t know if
these will even exist when you read this,
will be ubiquitous, or if they will be
replaced by yet another novel mode of
transport like motorized rollerblades or
heelies (shoes with wheels in them).
Private firms have reoriented transport planning priorities, for
good and bad. Not long ago long-range transport plans largely set
the course for policy and investment decades ahead. Now
everything from streetcars for real estate development to
ridesharing through dockless bikesharing and, the flavor of the
week, electric scooters, are undermining the slow predictability of
policy. With automated vehicles peeking over the horizon, the
conventional approach to transport planning may be obsolete as no
one knows what innovations and unintended side effects
automation will bring.
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The internal combustion engine is likely nearing the end of its
century of dominance, as well, to be replaced by electric drivetrains.
This is a much bigger issue than just a propulsion system. These
engines use fuel, which is taxed to pay for infrastructure across the
US and in some other countries, and taxed for general revenue
elsewhere. A shift to electricity affects the core relationship between
user fees and public spending. New sources of revenue will have to
be developed, including road tolls, road access charges, parking
fees, and other sources. Of course, a loss of motor fuel taxes also
will affect who pays for infrastructure. The role of the federal
government (at least in the United States) will likely diminish as
federal fuel taxes decline. This devolution of authority (which is
happening in Western countries) pushes local and state or
provincial governments to raise their own revenues. Voters will be
asked to approve new taxes and fees, which introduces many
concerns, including whether voters are adequately informed to
assess the value of any package of taxes and spending.4 4 There is also concern about how many
people actually vote. In the US voting
is voluntary and about half of eligible
voters actually cast ballots for federal
elections, turnout is much lower for local
races. Australia has compulsory voting
and regularly has voter turnout of over
90 percent.
Transport referenda are generally popular with the public as
more than 70 percent usually pass in the United States. But voters
often don’t know the true details of what they are voting on.
California has led the way in voter-led projects, including their
high-speed rail (HSR) project that voters passed with 52.6% of the
votes in 2008.5 This despite well-publicized concerns, proponents 5 California Proposition 1A approved
the issuance of $9.95 billion of general
obligation bonds to help fund an 800
mi (1300 km) high-speed train under
the supervision of the California High-
Speed Rail Authority. In 2019, Governor
Newsom conceded the project only
has funding to complete a section in
the Central Valley from Bakersfield to
Merced (Lazo 2019). Beyond that the
future of the project is unclear.
promised a train that would connect the state, “[C]arrying up to 117
million passengers annually by 2030, with the capacity to also carry
high-value, lightweight freight.”6 Since then, the timeline has been
6 (California High-Speed Rail Authority
2008).
extended, the scope scaled back, forecast recanted, and the costs
have increased dramatically – at one point to nearly $100 billion.
Stations have been delayed or cancelled, and now the train is
promoted as a commuter service to open up housing markets away
from the extremely expensive coastal cities. The project is
substantially different from what voters were sold, and a very
passive aggressive solution to the state’s housing affordability crisis.
We expect more projects like this.
Lastly, the political economy of access must address issues of race
and social justice. New transit investments tend to favor wealthier,
whiter communities. Bicycle advocacy is dominated by young, white
men,7 as are the technology companies developing micromobility 7 (Hoffmann 2016).
services and microtransit and taxi apps. As once young, white men
ourselves, there is nothing wrong with that, but we have learned it is
but one perspective of many. Access to new systems raises privacy
concerns (though most people don’t really act like they care about
privacy – see Facebook behavior, for instance, where people willingly
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share all kinds of details about their lives seemingly unconcerned
about how those data are used).
Through this book, the value we wish to promote is access.
Access is the ability for people and firms to interact, whether
through employment, production, consumption or sales. As we
explain in the next chapters, access is a value that differs from
mobility. Where mobility improvements are a hallmark of recent
decades of transport policy, our focus on mobility has led to auto
dominated infrastructure that offers few other options about how to
get around. With a focus on access, we can orient transport policy
to connecting people to places they want to be rather than
accommodating driving at the expense of everything else.
So why should you read another book about transport and land
use policy? (Especially since one of us has already written on this
topic?)8 This book differs in that we won’t focus on empirical8 See (Garrison and Levinson 2014;
Levinson 2002; Levinson and Krizek
2017).
arguments – we present political arguments. We argue the political
aspects of transport policy shouldn’t be assumed away or treated as
a nuisance. Political choices are the core reasons our cities look and
function the way they do. There is no original sin that we can undo
that will lead to utopian visions of urban life.
As Americans,9 we give extra attention to the US – which in our9 Though David Levinson currently lives
in Australia. view trails the developed world in the quality of its transport and
land use systems, but take many examples from outside the US to
illustrate why the problems in the US are political, and not
structurally embedded in the nature of transport or land use, and
thus solvable.
The book begins by introducing and expanding on the idea of
Accessibility. Then we proceed through several major parts:
Infrastructure Preservation,10 Network Expansion,11 Cities,12 and10 §I.
11 §II.
12 §III.
Institutions.13 Infrastructure preservation concerns the relatively
13 §IV.
short-run issues of how to maintain and operate the existing surface
transport system (roads and transit). Network expansion in contrast
is a long-run problem, how to enlarge the network, or rather, why
enlarging the network is now so difficult. Cities examines how we
organize, regulate, and expand our cities to address the failures of
transport policy, and falls into the time-frame of the very long-run,
as property rights and land uses are often stickier than the concrete
of the network is durable. In the part on Institutions we consider
things that might at first blush appear to be short-run and
malleable, are in fact very long-run. Institutions seem to outlast the
infrastructure they manage.
Many of the transport and land use problems we want to solve
already have technical solutions. What these problems don’t have,
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and what we hope to contribute, are political solutions. We expect
the audience for this book to be practitioners, planners, engineers,
advocates, urbanists, students of transport, and fellow academics.
While we may come across as overly critical at times, we write in the
spirit of improving transport and land use policy through a focus on
access. Since accessibility is what we think is important, and wish
to promote, we argue for and are willing to accept trade-offs that
advocates of more building or a particular travel mode may not.
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Accessibility
Figure 1.1: Eighteenth century
print of the Hyde Park Turnpike
toll gate, London.
According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign1 has only 1 The ‘sovereign’ here means the political
leader.three duties to attend to ...
First, the duty of protecting the society from violence and invasion
...
secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member
of society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it
... and,
thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works
and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of
any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain;
because the profit would never repay the expense to any individual or
small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more
than repay it to a great society. – Adam Smith
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1.1 The duty of the sovereign
In his 1776 book Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith2 puts his finger on2 The quotes in this chapter are from
(Smith 1776). See also Metschies (2001)
for further discussion of Adam Smith’s
comments on transport.
a number of buttons. He identifies three “Duties of the Sovereign,”
shown in the opening quote, the most relevant of which is the third,
concerning “erecting and maintaining certain public works.”
Access is socially produced. Public works like roads reduced
travel time by reducing distances and by increasing speeds. This is
the mobility half of the accessibility problem. In western countries
transport networks are regulated or owned by the public sector,
which has assumed the role of Smith’s ‘sovereign.’ The other half of
accessibility is what can be reached. This is the activity that takes
place on land. In western countries, this is largely in the hands of
the private sector.3 A developer not only gains value for himself by3 Governments regulate land
development and thus can influence
access on this half as well.
developing, but also increases access for everyone else.
This chapter introduces access as efficiency4 and access as equity54 §1.2.
5 §1.3. in sequence before turning to the motivation6 for the book.
6 §1.4.
1.2 Access as efficiency
Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense
of carriage, put the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a
level with those in the neighbourhood of the town. They are upon
that account the greatest of all improvements. They encourage the
cultivation of the remote, which must always be the most extensive
circle of the country. They are advantageous to the town, by breaking
down the monopoly of the country in its neighbourhood. They are
advantageous even to that part of the country. Though they introduce
some rival commodities into the old market, they open many new
markets to its produce. Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good
management, which can never be universally established but in
consequence of that free and universal competition which forces
everybody to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defence. It is not
more than fifty years ago that some of the counties in the
neighbourhood of London petitioned the Parliament against the
extension of the turnpike roads into the remoter counties. Those
remoter counties, they pretended, from the cheapness of labour,
would be able to sell their grass and corn cheaper in the London
market than themselves, and would thereby reduce their rents, and
ruin their cultivation. Their rents, however, have risen, and their
cultivation has been improved since that time. – Adam Smith
Smith’s quote, from Chapter 11 of Wealth of Nations, notes how
transport (roads and canals in his day) created value. While his
view was largely agrarian and shaped by seasonal shipments of
commodities, the logic applies to contemporary metropolitan
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regions and their daily flows of goods and labor. Transport creates
value because it extends the market, and thus increases the division
of labor, specialization, and economies of scale.
In cities, firms aim to exploit economies of agglomeration and
improve productivity and output by locating near customers,
workers, suppliers, and even competitors, while trying to reduce the
combined costs of land and travel. Individuals and families aim to
achieve proximity to their work, shops, and other activities and
amenities while simultaneously obtaining more house and lot for
the money. This tension between centralizing and decentralizing
forces keeps the city from collapsing into a black hole or flying
apart at the edges. However, the balance between these two forces
changes over time as technology, demographics, socio-economics,
and other preferences change. In recent decades, these changes have
led to many US cities becoming larger in population, but larger still
in area.7 7 (Marshall 2007).
As firms choose locations, they select metropolitan regions to be
near activities, things, organizations, and people they find important,
and select locations within metropolitan areas for similar reasons,
trading off benefits and costs of those locations. Residents are no
different. Location choice is a set of trade-offs. Those trade-offs
depend on the location pattern given by placement of other activities,
and the transport networks used to reach them. Transport networks,
often publicly provided, convey value to land by enabling access to
key activities.
People are willing to pay more for locations with better locations
where more activities can be easily reached.8 Streets, highways, and 8 (Iacono and Levinson 2017).
transit systems, however, are not free. Further, the resources
provided to support transport have diminished in real terms in the
United States,9 leading to a degradation in quality. This reduces 9 (Pew Charitable Trusts 2014) (Figure 7).
their value as people will avoid traveling on bad roads or decrepit
buses. However, capturing the property value created by access to
destinations provided by transport networks, and using that
captured value to invest in the operations, maintenance, and in
some cases expansion of those networks is a win-win solution
waiting to be reached. We think of this as a virtuous cycle:
infrastructure creates access, access creates value, value can be
captured, and captured value can fund infrastructure, an idea we
elaborate in value capture.10 10 §16.
The Division of Labor is Limited by Accessibility
As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of
labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent
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of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. When
the market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to
dedicate himself entirely to one employment, for want of the power to
exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which
is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce
of other men’s labour as he has occasion for. – Adam Smith
30 min
20 min
10 min
Figure 1.2: Cumulative
opportunity accessibility. No
jobs are available in less than
10 minutes, 2 jobs within 20
minutes, and 1 additional job
within 30 minutes.
The bigger the market, the more specialized producers can be.
And the bigness of the market depends on transport (how far you
can reach) as well the intensity with which space is used (density of
activity). In modern language, Smith observed that the size of the
economy depends on accessibility.11
11 The most commonly used accessibility
measure (Hansen 1959) is given below.
Ai =
J
Â
j=1
Oj f (Cij) (1.1)
To apply this in practice, the function
of costs needs to be specified. For
simplicity we present the cumulative
opportunities formulation. The idea is
illustrated in Figure 1.2.
f (Cij) =
(
1 if Cij < t
0 if Cij   t
(1.2)
where: Ai is access at point i, Oj are the
opportunities at point j, Cij is the cost of
travel between i and j, and f is a function
that transforms costs.
Accessibility measures the efficiency of the city in its primary role:
enabling people to reach other people, places, and things. In short,
accessibility is the ease of reaching valued destinations.12 A place that
12 The concept has been well-described in
the literature, and there are numerous
definitions (Handy and Niemeier 1997;
Kwan and Weber 2003; Geurs and
Van Wee 2004; Scott and Horner 2008;
Ottensmann and Lindsey 2008).
is accessible is easily reached. A place that has high accessibility
is a great jumping off point to go elsewhere quickly. The places
that we value are varied, but typically include work, shop, school,
entertainment, and recreation. Firms value access to suppliers, labor
talent, and their end markets.
Mobility versus accessibility. Those not steeped in the jargon
(and some who are) often conflate mobility and accessibility.
Mobility measures the ease of moving on the network, and is often
captured by network speed or the travel time index (the ratio of
actual (congested) travel time to the best possible, or freeflow
time),13 a standard way of defining congestion across networks. Yet
13 Travel time index (TTI) is given by:
TTI = tct f
where:
tc is the congested travel time and
t f is the freeflow travel time.
mobility only addresses half the problem, movement on the
network. It does not address where people are going. A simple
example illustrates the problem with considering only mobility.
Compare Manhattan and Manitoba. In Manitoba there is a high
network speed, there is virtually no congestion, and a travel time
index of approximately 1. The population of Manitoba, an area of
649,950 km2,14 is almost 1.2 million people,15 of which about three
14 250,950 mi2.
15 (Health Information Management
Branch 2008).
out of four live in metropolitan Winnipeg. In contrast consider the
island of Manhattan, an area of 61.56 km2,16 (over 19,000
16 33.77 mi2.
Manhattans could fit in Manitoba) and a resident (night-time)
population of 1.6 million. Clearly the island is heavily congested, it
takes a relatively long time to travel a given distance. The travel
time index for New York City as a whole is 1.37, among the top five
cities in the US. Manhattan alone would be higher still. This means
it takes about 37% longer to travel with traffic than without, and of
course the freeflow speeds are lower in Manhattan than Manitoba.
But because the population and employment are so high, there are
many more destinations one can reach in the same amount of time.
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In a half-hour drive from the center of Manhattan, one can reach
millions of jobs.
From the densest part of Manitoba, the center of Winnipeg, one
could reach about 400,000 jobs. Manhattan is roughly 10 times as
accessible as Winnipeg despite speeds that are at best half as fast.
Compared to a random point in Manitoba, it is thousands of times
more accessible. This value is reflected in land prices.17 The 17 As of 2010, monthly rents in Midtown
Manhattan were just under $645/m2
($60/ f t2). In Winnipeg rents were
about $150/m2 ($14/ f t2). The rent in
Winnipeg is in Canadian dollars, the
exchange rate varies.
difference in rent is not as great as the difference in accessibility, but
that is due to the cost of the structure itself (as opposed to the land)
which is largely fixed (though still may be higher in New York than
the Prairie Provinces).
The transport problem is often posed as a mobility problem, for
instance: How can we move quickly on networks? Concerns about
congestion are often brought to the fore.18 Hyperbolic words like 18 The Urban Mobility Indicators report
is the most widely cited of these reports
(Schrank and Lomax 2009).
‘gridlock’19 are often thrown around in the media, though literal
19 The term gridlock was popularized by
transport engineer Sam Schwartz, who
used it during a transit strike in 1980 to
describe conditions. The earliest use of
the term to describe traffic was the early
1970s.
gridlock, as shown in Figure 1.3 is uncommon.
A widely cited study finds that congestion in the Twin Cities
region increased from 1995 to 2005, with annual delay per peak
traveler rising from 31 to 43 hours/year.20 In contrast, another
20 (Schrank and Lomax 2009).
study21 finds the same Twin Cities region was more accessible in
21 (Levinson et al. 2017).
2005 than 1995, more jobs could be reached in the same amount of
time despite the rise in congestion.
How can we explain these two seemingly divergent outcomes?
There are several possibilities. On the mobility side these relate to
additional roadway capacity and more intense use of faster roads in
2005 and 1995. On the land use side, these relate to the relative
location of jobs and housing. Starting on the mobility side, it is
possible that average network speed can rise as does congestion.
Table 1.1 illustrates this.
In this example, the average speed before was 28 km/h.22 The 22 17 mph. The units don’t actually
matter.speed drops on both links, yet, in the after case, the system average
speed has risen to 30. This is because the share of travelers on each
link has changed. This example illustrates what happens manyfold
as more and more travelers (and more importantly, a greater share
of travelers) switch to faster suburban highways from congested
Link 1 Link 2
Speed Before 55 25
(km/h) After 40 20
Flow Before 10% 90%
(Share of traffic) After 50% 50%
Table 1.1: Example: Two Facility
System. Adapted from Levinson
and Kumar (1994b).
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urban arterials. While both roads got worse, the relatively faster
route attracted more travelers.
So why would the share of travelers using each link change? The
decentralization of employment, which grew in the suburban ring
while being essentially static in the center city, is the driving force
behind these seeming paradoxes of higher travel speeds despite
higher congestion, and more importantly, greater accessibility
despite rising congestion. Moreover, there were small changes in
relative residential location – this period saw the number of people
residing in downtown Minneapolis increase from approximately
zero to about 30,000 – clearly more of the region’s new residents
moved into suburban locations. This convergence of accessibility (or
flattening of the city) is illustrated by improved job/worker balance
as shown in Figure 12.2, and indicates that locators (especially
employers) respond to accessibility determined by network
configuration and pre-existing land use (especially residential) to
site their own organizations in a way to keep transport costs for
their workers in check (and thus reduce the wage required to attract
good employees).
Figure 1.3: Stylized image of
Gridlock.
Mobility complements accessibility. Mobility-focused
transport policies are not the enemy of accessibility-focused
policies. Mobility improvements can complement accessibility. For
governments, it is a matter of understanding the trade-offs between
density and mobility, which affects overall accessibility. Figure 1.4
has a y-axis as density, and x-axis as mobility, where the Northeast
corner would be high access: high density multiplied by high
mobility.
This system behaves differently by mode. For transit networks,
cities arrange themselves on a line from the southwest to the
northeast (a positive feedback loop between supply and demand).
For auto networks, cities arrange on a line from the southeast to the
northwest (a negative feedback loop between congestion and
demand). Using data one could place specific cities on the graph.
One expects places like New York and Hong Kong in the northeast
corner, most US cities in the southeast corner, small
developing-world cities without widespread adoption of modern
automobile or transit technology in the southwest corner. Poor, but
dense cities without good transport networks lie in the upper
northwest corner.
Accessibility is an economic good,23 but it is not a good without23 §A.
costs such as congestion, and there are limits to how much people
are willing to pay for access. It may also suffer from diminishing
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returns, where beyond a point each additional unit of accessibility is
worth less and less.
1.3 Access as equity
If we agree that more access is generally better than less access,
especially after accounting for all the benefits and all the costs
associated with access, then we want our transport - land use
systems to efficiently produce access. The more efficiently we
produce access, the more access we can have per dollar spent. Of
course, access per dollar is but one measure of efficiency. To
maximize access provided per dollar, only the investments that
carry very high access per dollar returns should be pursued. This
would result in smaller networks than we have now. Hong Kong is
built around this principle in many respects, where the transit
owner and operator is also a real estate developer, so transit and
land for development are constrained to ensure high densities and
lots of ridership. From an efficiency perspective, this works well,
and people travel from around the world to marvel at how well the
Rail + Property model works. But Hong Kong is also consistently
ranked as the least affordable city in the world.24
24 (US Department of Housing and
Urban Development 2018).
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Equity is also an important objective. In an absolute sense, there
is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. The most economically
efficient investments from a social productivity sense do not
necessarily benefit the least well-off, and certainly don’t benefit
everyone equally. For instance, it is clear that rich people have a
higher economic value of time than poor people in the conventional
ways of measuring such things, which depend on willingness to
pay to save time. Investing public funds to reduce the travel time of
wealthy people (which increases their accessibility) tends to pencil
out25 more than investing those funds for poor people.25 By pencil out we mean expected
benefits from time savings exceed costs
required for investment.
Departments of Transportation, with their political leadership, insist
that value of time for all individuals making a particular kind of
trip be considered equal in evaluations.26 This is an assumption to26 (Rogoff 2014).
support equity over efficiency. While we can argue that our
measures of efficiency and productivity are broken, we do so
primarily because we do not like the implications of the outcomes.
A system change that increases access for someone without
worsening access for others in an absolute sense is a net
improvement.27 Paradoxically, however, this change may also27 Referred to as a ‘Pareto improvement’
in the economics literature. worsen equity by some definitions, which considers the relative
differences between groups. There are many different measures of
equity, which makes even discussing equity in transport difficult.2828 (Palmateer and Levinson 2017;
Martens et al. 2012). Should we promote equality of opportunity (everybody has the
same chance) or equality of outcome (everybody gets the same
thing)?
Humans are social animals, and relative status is as important
to many people as absolute wealth, at least above some minimum
standard of living. We are on a hedonic treadmill.29 While this drives29 The phrase ‘hedonic treadmill’ refers
to the idea that people have a relatively
stable level of happiness, and events
can’t effect this much. You need to keep
walking just to stay in place, but even if
you run, you don’t get any farther.
progress as people innovate and compete to improve their own lot in
life, relative status should not drive public policy. Someone always
must be first and someone else is always last, and while people may
be more absolutely equal, there is also always a difference in rank.
So long as the least well-off gain access in absolute terms, we argue
that we should think of it as an improvement.
1.4 Why A Political Economy of Access?
Policy making takes place in a political and administrative system that
is fragmented to the point of chaos. – Douglas Yates3030 (Yates 1977) p.34.
Developing a city of high accessibility is a massive coordination
problem. So, at the simplest level, access is improved through
coordinated transport and land use actions. In an unregulated,
competitive, free market, prices act to perform that coordination
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Figure 1.5: Rational planning
and decision making model.
This is not how decisions are
actually made.
function. Cities are far from perfect free markets, as they have
significant aspects of spatial monopoly and are highly regulated to
control externalities. To the extent policies affect actions in the
intended way, this means access improves where access promoting
policies are adopted and access diminishing policies are not. But it
is not so easy.
A common framework used to analyze planning is through the
differences between the public sector and private markets. As a
binary choice this distorts the mixed nature of urban systems.
Transport and land use co-develop (or mutually decline) through
the actions of public and private actors. At a basic level of analysis,
public sector responses are due to some type of market failure (or
market responses are due to government failure, depending on your
perspective). In transport and land use, market failure often takes
the form of negative externalities (congestion, emissions, noise,
crashes, etc.) or inefficient supply of infrastructure.
There is no shortage of research that explores the relationships
between transport and land use. These studies are nearly all about
effects or outcomes, such as the effect of residential or employment
density on transit ridership, does bike infrastructure increase the
amount of cycling, does transit make us healthy (or short)?31 31 (Ermagun and Levinson 2017).
Collectively, these studies are what happens if a certain set of
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interventions are made in certain types of places. We know far less
about how to make things happen. The ‘how’ question is one of
politics rather than transport expertise or need.
We see many scholars (and others) look at problems and propose
intuitive sounding solutions, especially in the context of seemingly
uncoordinated governance and institutions. For instance, a
proffered solution to fragmented, city-by-city land use policy is
state level planning – the assumption being that the outcomes
under unified governance will be necessarily better than the status
quo. This sounds reasonable, so to curb urban sprawl in the 1990s
over a dozen states implemented statewide growth management
regulations. The idea – following the theory stated above – was that
local land use regulations lacked coordination to minimize
environmental harms and other effects of sprawl, so state mandates
would supersede and improve local decisions. These state efforts
were successful politically in that they were adopted, but they had
no effect on reducing the rate of suburban sprawl.32 So the politics32 (Anthony 2004).
worked but the policy didn’t – a familiar refrain.
Today we regulate land use in a way that was unknown in Adam
Smith’s time. Smith was writing before the railroad and the
industrial revolution, before zoning, the elevator, the high rise, the
internal combustion engine, the automobile, the modern road, or
even the United States. Of course, we also intensively use land far
more than was common in all but the worst slums of 1776 (the
largest city in the 13 colonies at the time of US independence was
Philadelphia with 40,000 people). Our networks are far more
comprehensive and faster than Smith could imagine, though in the
US they have seen few improvements in speed for decades.
To understand how things are done, we need to look at how
decisions are made. From a cursory glance at the state of the world,
it is obvious that classical expectations of rational decision making,
as shown in Figure 1.5, are not a reliable description of policy
making. We can see the political economy of access in action
through coalition building for investment. Within any region,
developing a coalition in support of road projects is relatively
straightforward. Roads are popular because roads are ubiquitous.
Transit coalitions, by contrast, are much more difficult to assemble.
Transit investment requires regional (or higher) coalitions to
support the extremely high costs of construction, but since rail
transit costs so much to provide, the total mileage built is small.
Even with the dramatic increase in light rail transit (LRT) systems
over the past three decades, there are still only about 1,500 km of
total light rail track in the US, compared with approximately 9,000
accessibility 33
km of track in Europe. In contrast, the City of Melbourne alone has
250 km of tram track, (which is a mix of what the US would call
light rail and streetcar) but that serves under 5% of work trips per
day in the region,33 even relatively extensive transit networks are 33 Overall transit share in Melbourne is
higher, as it includes trains and bus.not as influential as they seem. To appeal to voters regionally,
transit coalitions have to be built around benefits to drivers more
than benefits to riders.34 Thus, regional coalitions promote mobility 34 (Manville and Cummins 2015).
improvements (faster travel speeds) rather than accessibility
improvements.
US streetcar systems,35 which generally promote economic 35 §11.
development and property values over mobility or accessibility, are
another interesting coalition. Streetcar coalitions bring together
transit advocates – some of whom will support any transit
investment – real estate interests and local economic development
proponents. These projects are, in nearly all cases, transport projects
that are developed apart from the existing transit agencies.
Portland, Cincinnati, Atlanta, Kansas City, and others developed
streetcar systems managed by non-profit corporations. Though the
regional transit agency may be contracted to operate the system in
some cases, streetcar systems are designed with separate sources of
revenue to support development and operations to achieve
economic development goals rather than access.36 36 (King and Fischer 2016).
When the primary goal is to generate political support rather than
improve accessibility, then any policy will do. This is roughly the
way things are – the US has politically stable transport and land
use policies. The problem is that these stable policies get our cities
wrong, and many of us would like to see changes that improve cities
for the better. If our goal is to improve access, and it is, the political
coalitions needed to move forward politically are different than those
that favor the status quo.
So have we learned anything since Adam Smith? In short, we
have learned a lot, but we too often relearn37 basic lessons rather 37 §14.3.
than gain new knowledge.
In post-nomadic societies, transport in the absence of
development, and development in the absence of mobility are
equally pointless. Transport connects people with their destinations.
These things are all well known, yet we continue to struggle with
actually building cities with these principles in mind. This gap
between the normative (what we know we should do) and the
positive (what we actually do) comprises our the deficit of
knowledge about the Political Economy of Access. So when trying to
understand the political economy of access, we need to combine
these historically siloed38 fields.
38 Stovepiped, for our industrial, rather
than agrarian, readers; sandboxed for our
information age friends.

Part I
Infrastructure Preservation
The problems of the surface transport system are well known. In
this part we discuss the challenges of preserving, maintaining, and
operating the existing system. In an economic sense, this can be
considered the short-run problem, as we are keeping the network
fixed.

2
Hierarchy of Needs
Safety
Infrastructure Preservation
 Land 
Development
Access
Mobility
and Connectivity
Environment
Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of
Infrastructure Needs.
Borrowing from psychologist Abraham Maslow who formulated
the Hierarchy of Needs for humans,1 the ‘Hierarchy of 1 (Maslow 1943).
Infrastructure Needs’ (Figure 2.1) offers a useful organizational
framework for considering the priorities of transport investment to
promote accessibility. In this part of the book, we focus on the idea
of Preservation. In the next part we outline a ‘Hierarchy of
Infrastructure Wants’ associated with Network Expansion.2 2 §II.
Environment. At the base of the hierarchy we place environment.
Without breathable air, edible food, drinkable water, or a habitable
climate, nothing else matters. This includes the challenge of climate
change. The air pollution you breathe is the consequences of failure
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to solve a collective-action problem. The pollution emitted by a
tailpipe or smokestack is an economic externality3 not largely borne3 §7.
by those responsible, and not aimed at you. It is pumped into the
air, mixed with everyone else’s pollution, diluted with clean air, and
makes everyone worse off. The Global Burden of Disease study
estimates 36 deaths per 100,000 persons per year in the United
States are due to air pollution, associated with increased rates of
heart attacks and other diseases. Projects that can reduce these
social costs will generally be underfunded by the private sector or
public agencies without some specific support. Property markets do
not work well for air pollution, and courts are a terribly inefficient
mechanism to try to sort out pollution damages. This leaves us with
inefficient though not ineffective regulations to deal with pollution.
The key point is that the full cost of travel by automobile exceeds
the private cost borne by individual travelers by a significant
amount. While environment has always been an existential need, at
the outset of the automobile era it was considered something
beyond the influence of humans. The US government and public
has since learned otherwise, and in addition to what has long been
known about air pollution and health effects, recognizes that there
is a risk of assuming the climate is independent of society.4 Some4 (Reidmiller et al. 2018).
solutions are discussed in the chapter on Pollution.55 §8.
Infrastructure Preservation. Without infrastructure (and the
vehicles that avail themselves of it), we must resort to walking
across the unimproved earth or swimming the waterways. If it is
not preserved, at a fundamental level, infrastructure ceases to be.
America’s transport infrastructure is getting older faster than we are
rebuilding it, and so is deteriorating. Solutions are discussed in the
chapters on Road Revenues6 and Subsidy.76 §3.
7 §4.
Safety. At the next level of the hierarchy are safety and security. If
people do not feel safe, they will avoid travel by that mode. We see
this in urban transit, aviation, and in adverse weather. Over 30,000
Americans die in road crashes8 annually, and more than a million8 §7.7.
people globally.9 No new product with that kind of safety problem9 (World Health Organization 2015).
would be permitted on the market in any modern country. Though
a vast improvement over previous years, it remains far too many,
and one of the highest unaddressed costs of transport. People
overestimate their safety by car (and underestimate their safety by
other modes), perhaps because they feel in control. Most safety
progress will occur due to vehicle improvements and changes in
driver behavior (and ideally taking the driver out of the loop with
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vehicle automation), but safety can be enhanced through select
infrastructure improvement projects. Safety is intertwined with
justice. The expression ‘driving while black’,10 while not officially a 10 §22.
crime on the books, has nevertheless remained a de facto offense in
many parts of the United States, and has come to signify the racial
discrimination faced by some members of society while driving (or
walking or biking), with an increased likelihood of being pulled
over, cited, arrested, or killed by police whose nominal task is to
provide safety.
Mobility and Connectivity. Despite, and in part because of,
the Interstate Highway System, great cities often experience great
congestion.11 The traffic congestion you face is caused by other 11 The book Great Cities and Their Traffic
came out in 1978 (Thomson 1978).people. Those people did not think about the delay they imposed
on you when they chose to travel. They didn’t even know about
you, since they were already on the road before you were. They are
ahead of you in the traffic stream. Similarly as a driver, you,
obliviously, impose congestion on those who follow. This is also a
classic collective-action problem. Cars consume enormous amounts
of space when they are in motion, but also when they are parked.
We know how to address these problems. Specific solutions are
discussed in the chapters on Congestion12 and Pricing.13 12 §5.
13 §6.
Land and Economic Development. Moving people faster and
more directly, in order to expand accessibility, is the primary
mission of state-level transport agencies. In most of the English
Common Law countries, organizing land use is the remit of local
planning and economic development agencies. In contrast, in places
like Japan and Hong Kong, decisions are jointly made. Transport,
while necessary, is insufficient on its own to induce developers to
create places. Land and economic development at a site, which
includes building at higher densities and the spatial reallocation of
activities, requires the transport network to connect with other
economic activities. Promoters often cite economic development as
a reason for transport investment by the public sector. We suggest
that if promoters believe in their project, they, not the government,
should be liable for the risk that project fails to perform as expected,
just as they would reap the benefits if it were to succeed. This topic
is complex enough to warrant a part of its own: Cities.14 14 §III.
Accessibility. At the top we locate Accessibility,15 discussed at the 15 §1.
outset of the book, the ability to reach valued destinations. This is the
primary purpose of transport: why travel but to get somewhere? It is
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the product of the two factors immediately below it on the Pyramid:
Mobility and Connectivity along with Land Development, and thus
depends on infrastructure, people’s feelings of safety and security
using it, and an environment in which to operate.
2.1 The nature of need
Lots of numbers are thrown around about ‘need’ for road funding.
The National Cooperative Highway Research Program16 finds an16 (Cambridge Systematics 2006) (Table
A1). annual need of $188.4 billion in 2007 dollars to maintain existing
highway infrastructure, of which $109.8 billion is capital and the
remainder ($78.6 billion) is operations and maintenance costs. The
National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study
Commission also has estimates which are higher,17 and the ASCE17 (National Surface Transportation
Policy and Revenue Study Commission
2008).
Report Card says about surface transport (roads, bridges, and
transit) “We are facing a funding gap of about $94 billion a year
with our current spending levels.”18,19 These numbers are of course18 ASCE is the American Society of Civil
Engineers, a professional association.
19 (ASCE 2013).
different, but all very similar, especially given the large span of
years over which they have been reported. There is a reason they
are similar; they derive from the same source.
The root source of most of these ‘need’ numbers are various runs
of the Federal Highway Administrations Highway Economic
Requirements System (HERS, and later HERS-ST),20 HERS is20 See (TRB Transportation Economics
Committee 2018) which has been
evaluated by GAO (US General
Accounting Office 2001a;b).
probably the best available system for systematically building up an
‘engineering’ estimate of needs, based on the condition of
individual links in their database. While it is the best available,
HERS is far from perfect. As the description says
The program is noteworthy for its ability to conveniently perform
sensitivity analyses in order to test whether the solution of
recommended investments is robust to changing system goals and
underlying parameters. Note that HERS does not reallocate traffic to
reflect highway improvements. However, traffic growth induced by
improved capacity and operating conditions is included, with half the
estimated user benefits counted for induced traffic21 consistent with21 §14.
consumer surplus principles. (FHWA, 2002d).
As with anything, the output depends on the inputs. If traffic is
expected to grow, the need for additional capacity resulting from
this kind of comparative statics analysis will be higher than if traffic
is expected to be flat. The forecasts are exogenous, this is not a
transport planning model. And while ‘induced demand’ is sort of
included, unless it is analyzing network flows, it can’t really be. If a
link upstream of the link in question is improved, it will induce
additional traffic both upstream and downstream (and reduce traffic
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on competing links). This induced traffic is due to rerouting,
switching time-of-day or day-of-week, switching modes, making
longer trips, and making trips that would not otherwise have been
made, among other sources, and over the long term by encouraging
new development. A network analysis is required.
HERS is far better for assessing pavement quality issues (for which
links are separable) than level of service issues (for which they are
not). To be fair, the more recent analysis conducted for ASCE tries to
address this question in part by looking at a national Freight Analysis
Framework (FAF) network, and assigning (and reassigning) traffic
to account for rerouting. But the FAF uses a really crude sketch
network, and the equilibration assumptions are not clearly laid out,
and how the level of demand itself responds to travel times is not
accounted for.22 22 (American Society of Civil Engineers
and Economic Development Research
Group 2011) p.34.
So using the HERS estimates for preservation is sounder than
using the estimate for ensuring the same Level of Service (LOS).
These two numbers are often combined and conflated. They should
not be.
There is also undoubtedly some arbitrariness in pavement
performance standards, bridge conditions, and other infrastructures
as well, though we doubt it rises to the level of arbitrariness of
highway LOS. 23 23 California recently abandoned LOS for
project evaluation. (Newton and Curry
2014).
There are ‘needs’ to make sure the highway system does not
eventually crumble into dust, and there are ‘needs’ to ensure it
maintains the same level of service. As we may have learned from
Sesame Street, one of these ‘needs’ is not like the other. Estimates of
need are likely overstated, both for reasons of methodology and due
to motivated reasoning.
2.2 The state of infrastructure
Figure 2.2: Weak Bridge:
Hammersmith Bridge, London.
Source: Jeremy Keith. Used
under Creative Commons
License
Let’s ask two questions:
• Is existing infrastructure in good shape? [Yes or No]
• Should existing infrastructure be in good shape? [Yes or No]
The answers to these questions might indicate an answer to the
question of whether infrastructure requires more funding.
The first question is empirical, and so depends on what standard
you apply to ‘good shape.’ There are empirical ways to assess road
quality, one is the roughness index (assessed by running a vehicle
with a trailing wheel, the cumulative vertical movement of the
trailing wheel per unit distance is a measure of roughness). Clearly
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Figure 2.3: Normative and
Positive Infrastructure.
Infrastructure should be in:
Good Shape Bad Shape
Infrastructure 
is in:
Good Shape (1) Do nothing (2) Cut funding
Bad Shape (3) Raise funding (4) Do nothing
some roads are smoother than others. New roads tend to be
smoother than older roads. Roads before snow plowing are
smoother than roads after snow plowing.
You may believe infrastructure is in good shape, or you may not.
Hopefully everyone agrees on the physical measurements, such as
road roughness. However, the assessment of whether a given level
of roughness is ‘good’ or ‘poor’ is subjective. Nevertheless, the more
worn out the road (the rougher it is, the more ruts it has, and so on),
the more expensive it is to restore, and the more likely people will
assess it as ‘poor’ rather than ‘good.’
The second question is normative: should infrastructure be in
good shape (relative to its existing state)? Some advocates for
non-auto modes of transport have argued that the worse roads are,
the more people will switch modes. Neighborhood activists also
argue against smooth roads as a way of discouraging traffic (a
natural form of traffic calming).24 Underfunding of buses has been24 The Old Cedar Avenue Bridge in
Bloomington, Minnesota was not
maintained for years, and the neighbors
loved it because they used it for walking
and cycling and such. Then the state
wanted to fix the bridge and improve
the road, which the neighbors initially
opposed. (Castleman 2016; Otárola
2016).
used to support rail transit.
Suppose there were signs on each bridge saying whether or not it
was ‘structurally deficient,’ similar to Figure 2.2. Would this
encourage people to take investment seriously?
Or would people reroute around structurally deficient bridges and
get into more crashes, with a net increase in fatalities, given that the
likelihood of dying on a bridge collapse is quite small compared to
other causes of death.
So combining the answers to these two questions we have Figure
2.3, with the natural policy prescription regarding funding in the
appropriate cell, assuming money is required to maintain or rebuild
infrastructure.
Given that the number of people who actually believe
infrastructure should be in bad shape is small, the main debate is
between (1) and (3). Given not many people would say
infrastructure is in good shape in most urban areas, raising funds
for infrastructure, should be as they say, a no-brainer.
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2.3 Infrastructure triage
The United States has been falling behind on infrastructure
maintenance for decades. If this continues, a form of infrastructure
triage may be required, shuttering the least important (or most
expensive) facilities to devote resources to those that can be
retained. The country is just beginning a serious conversation about
systematic, and ideally graceful, highway infrastructure triage,25 25 (Kurutz 2017).
but there are elements of this already occurring: In recent years
counties in at least 27 states have converted once paved low volume
rural roads to less expensive to maintain (but slower to drive on)
gravel as they can no longer afford to maintain the pavement,26 26 (Louwagie 2011; Etter 2010; Martin
2009; Batheja 2013; Overstreet 2010;
Kalamazoo Gazette staff 2010; Marshall
2016).
reducing the number of bridges, or plowing less in the winter, all of
which increase travel time and thus reduce accessibility.27
27 (Nyamaah and Hitzhusen 1985;
Hamlett and Baumel 1990).
Some cities have closed and deconstructed freeways (including
New York’s West Side Highway, San Francisco’s Embarcadero and
Central Freeways, Milwaukee’s Park East Freeway, and Portland’s
Harbor Drive freeway) both because of physical obsolescence and a
desire to improve the urban environment. The first three examples
also had catastrophic failure and the cost of rebuilding versus
conversion to boulevard-type facilities was seen as too great, in part
because traffic wasn’t as bad after collapse as feared. Due to the
effects of climate change, we should expect more facilities to fail,
especially in coastal areas prone to flooding. North Carolina, for
instance, is debating the future of their Outer Banks, which are
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barrier islands in the Atlantic Ocean. During Hurricane Irene in
2011, NC 12, the only road serving the popular tourist area, washed
out in multiple places. It was replaced with ferries until a
replacement was built, but concerns remain that the new bridge is
vulnerable to future floods, and the islands themselves are shifting
and washing away.
Moreover, the historical record is clear from older modes, as seen
in Figure 2.4, railroads peaked at just over 400,000 route km28 in the28 250,000 route mi.
1910s, and declined to less than half that by 2000 (while ton-miles of
freight continued to increase). Similarly rail transit, canals, and
turnpikes all saw rise and falls. Even with select abandonment,
revenue is required to keep local streets and roads operating for
decades to come. Proper management of roads with scarce
resources may require some abandonment and reversion, but it also
requires revenue to maintain and expand critical links.
2.4 Report cards
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is a professional
society that represents many civil engineers. They produce an annual
report card that says the US needs more infrastructure spending, and
so should hire more civil engineers. This is entirely predictable even
without knowing the state of US infrastructure, they could hardly
call for the opposite. In fact, the ASCE’s report card29 gives both29 (ASCE 2017).
roads and water a ‘D’ letter grade. ASCE calls for $170 billion in
annual road spending split between repair and operation of existing
roads and expanding highways. Are roads and water both as bad as
a ‘D’ grade? They write:
At the dawn of the 21st century, much of our drinking water
infrastructure is nearing the end of its useful life. There are an
estimated 240,000 water main breaks per year in the United States.
Assuming every pipe would need to be replaced, the cost over the
coming decades could reach more than $1 trillion, according to the
American Water Works Association (AWWA). The quality of drinking
water in the United States remains almost universally high, however.
Even though pipes and mains are frequently more than 100 years old
and in need of replacement, outbreaks of disease attributable to
drinking water are rare.
To be sure 240,000 sounds like a big number, but it is less than
1 break per 1000 people in the US. (Of course water mains serve
more than 1 person, but that count of failures includes many, many
small ones for each one that gets on the news). Certainly drinking
water in the US could be better somehow, and Flint is a tragedy,30
30 In 2016 a federal emergency was
declared for the city of Flint, Michigan
after it was discovered that the drinking
water was contaminated with lead
due to poor treatment and old pipes.
Treatment was improved and pipes were
replaced, and the city’s water was below
acceptable thresholds by the end of 2017.
The contamination could and should
have been avoided.
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but almost everyone in the US turns on the tap and gets clean water
instantly. The water is safe, and so almost no one in the US dies from
contaminated drinking water anymore. A 90+/100 usually scores an
A. The environmental engineers are to be commended. They have
been so good, they almost put themselves out of a job.
So let’s grant that over the next 100 years all the pipes need to be
replaced due to potential failures (broken mains, leakages, etc.).
And let’s grant that would be $1 trillion (ignoring
inflation/discounting etc). This seems a lot, like about
$3000/person. But that’s still only $10 billion/year (or
$30/person/year) which is $2.50 per person per monthly water bill
for capital replacement, or $0.10/day/person, which seems
eminently doable, and is the responsibility of local water utilities.
If you think it needs to be done in 50 years, double it. This hardly
constitutes a crisis. In medical terms, the condition is chronic, not
acute.
About roads, ASCE writes:
Forty-two percent of America’s major urban highways remain
congested, costing the economy an estimated $101 billion in wasted
time and fuel annually. While the conditions have improved in the
near term, and Federal, state, and local capital investments for road
infrastructure increased to $91 billion annually, that level of
investment is insufficient and still projected to result in a decline in
conditions and performance in the long term. Currently, the Federal
Highway Administration estimates that $170 billion in capital
investment would be needed on an annual basis to significantly
improve conditions and performance. We have several caveats"
• The phrase “conditions and performance” means maintaining
highway LOS, not just pavement surface quality.
• This is for unpriced roads. If roads were properly priced,
congestion would go down significantly. Pricing31 also raises 31 §6.
revenues.
• It makes no assumption about more efficient use of roads from
autonomous vehicles, let alone what vehicles might look like in
the future. While they are not deployed yet, over the expected
lifetime of new infrastructure, they will be. It takes a particular
type of ostrich to just ignore this.
• Again they don’t make the case as to why this (or any of it) is
a federal rather than state and local responsibility. They do say
“federal, state, and local” need to come up with the money, and
they are indifferent to which (green is green).32 But it matters in 32 US currency is historically green.
practice.
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Table 2.1: International
Roughness Index and Bridge
Sufficiency Index.
International Roughness Bridge Sufficiency Index
Index (per lane-km)
Very Good <0.95 80-100%
Good 0.95-1.5 60-80%
Fair 1.5-2.7 40-60%
Poor 2.7-3.5 20-40%
Very Poor >3.5 <20%
• It appears $101 billion in annual wasted time and fuel is supposed
to be solved by $170 billion in annual investment.
• While $101 billion sounds like a lot of time and money, this is
of course a Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) Urban Mobility
Report estimate.33 It is a little over $300/person/year, or less than33 (Schrank et al. 2012).
$1/day/person, or less than $0.25/trip, which is again annoying
and perhaps needlessly wasteful, but hardly a crisis.
So yes, Roads get scored a ‘D,’ and this is probably more apt than
water, and we could do better, but we do not think the solutions are
what ASCE seems to think they are.
So what does a ‘D’ even mean?
”POOR: AT RISK The infrastructure is in poor to fair condition and
mostly below standard, with many elements approaching the end of
their service life. A large portion of the system exhibits significant
deterioration. Condition and capacity are of significant concern with
strong risk of failure.”3434 The rubric is given at (ASCE 2017).
If we provided our students with a grading rubric that vague
they would rightly complain. ‘Good’ and ‘fair’ (and so on)
conditions are labels for specific performance levels in each
infrastructure (roads, bridges, others). They tend to be defined
according to specific reasonably objective performance levels for a
specific technology (for example pavement roughness for pavement,
bridge conditions for bridges). We have questions:
• How is a ‘good’ road compared to a ‘good’ bridge?
• When ASCE says ‘many,’ how many?
• When they say ‘a large portion,’ what share?
• When they say ‘strong risk of failure,’ how strong?
If a bridge were known to have even a one in a thousand chance
of failing tomorrow, it would be closed immediately by the
Professional Engineer in charge. A bridge failure is very different
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than a road failure (and pavement condition failure is different from
level of service failure).35 35 Bridge closure actually happens fairly
frequently. One example is the Vilas
Bridge between Vermont and New
Hampshire. The bridge was closed
without warning in 2009 despite daily
traffic of about 5000 cars. It has not
been replaced, nor has it fallen. Vermont
continues to press for rehabilitation, but
New Hampshire owns 93% of the bridge
and is not terribly interested in paying
to repair a bridge that primarily benefits
Vermonters.
Not all roads are in poor to fair condition. Many are brand new.
Many elements are, in fact, nearing end of life, but of course, many
should be, that is what is meant about managing across the lifecycle.
It would be terribly inefficient if everything opened in the same year
and then failed exactly 50 years in the future. When we know where
a facility is on the life-cycle, at some appropriate point we make a
repair/replace/abandon decision.
It is straight-forward to grade individual elements in a given
technology: An ‘A’ vs a ‘D’ bridge is perhaps a meaningful
comparison if it represents the same objective elements.36 How are 36 Also note that scoring a report card
grade of ‘A’ (and maybe ‘B’ or ‘C’) is
overbuilding for anything but a brand-
new infrastructure.
bridges averaged across the system?37 One could certainly have an
37 We all know how to do an average,
but there are many ways to do averages,
and they usually should be weighted
somehow.
average bridge or average road, but those are always fine, usually
people talk about the share of bridges which are ‘structurally
deficient’ (or ‘functionally obsolete’) or in ‘poor condition.’38
38 For bridges, see (Associated Press
2013) or this similar bridge tool by
T4 America (Transportation for America
2015).
2.5 Infrastructure heal thyself
So what is the problem?
Perhaps people believe infrastructure will heal itself. We should
investigate technologies that can do the latter (self-annealing roads
would be great), and there is in fact some good research in this
direction.39 But we are not there yet. 39 (Gallego et al. 2013; Qiu et al. 2009;
Qian et al. 2009; García 2012; Xu et al.
2018).
Alternatively, perhaps people do not believe the money will be
well-spent – so the more fundamental problem is the lack of
confidence about spending.40 40 This is the credible commitment
problem, which explains some of
the public opposition to road pricing
(Manville and King 2013).
This distrust is general, but especially emerges when decisions
are politicized. ‘Bridges to Nowhere,’41 while a small-part of actual
41 The expression ‘Bridge to Nowhere’
gained currency in American politics
as it was used to criticize the Gravina
Island Bridge in Alaska. To its belated
credit, Congress ultimately cancelled the
project. (Associated Press 2007).
transport funding, garner much of the attention. Pothole fillers not
doing their job get media, those actually filling potholes do not.42
42 Unless they are politicians creating
potholes to fill them. (Marinucci 2005).
Because these are public sector investments, they garner much more
attention than private sector utilities. Some telephone company
employees have loafed at some point in their careers, without
making the news.43
43 In fact some telephone company
employees have listened in on private
phone calls for fun, while purportedly
for service quality.
This leads to the conclusion that the problem with raising funds
is the public and political nature of transport funding.To analyze the
politics, we can break transport investment into ’needs’ and ’wants’,
and how the two are conflated, which we address in part IV44 of the 44 §IV.
book.

3
Road Revenues
Figure 3.1: Hibbs Bridge on
Snicker’s Gap Turnpike. Source:
Wikimedia Commons.
It is easy to claim that streets and highways are deficient and
need more money. It is much harder to agree on what a financially
sustainable model should look like. The history of funding roads is
one of trade-offs between user fees, general taxation and efforts of
privatization. The original user fees were road and bridge tolls.
3.1 From Snicker’s Gap to funding gap
The first toll road in the US, the Snicker’s Gap Turnpike opened in
1786, connecting Alexandria, Virginia with its hinterlands. This
launched an era of toll-road building, mostly for intercity routes, in
the United States which lasted through the second half of the 19th
century.1 Toll-roads were never very profitable, but often broke 1 (Klein and Fielding 1992).
even, and were sponsored in many cases by local elites as an
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economic development mechanism rather than with the intent of
making riches. Local landowners would capture some of the
benefits of the accessibility these new routes created, and in turn,
helped fund them.
Still, most roads, and most streets, were untolled, and not very
improved. With the advent of the canal and then the railroad22 The Erie Canal opened in 1825. The
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad broke
ground in 1829.
providing much better service than land transport could,
long-distance turnpikes began a decline, though turnpikes feeding
into railroads remained in many places through the 19th century.33 (Klein and Majewski 1992).
The turn of the 20th century saw the emergence of the automobile
which, coupled with the Good Roads Movement,4 redefined surface4 The Good Roads Movement originated
by the booming bicyclist community in
the late 19th century.
transport. Roads would naturally be more expensive if they had to
be smooth, strong, and straight for cars, buses, and trucks. Local
roads continued to be funded mainly out of general revenue (which
is the property tax in most places). More important roads would be
supported by state governments.
Since 1919, when Oregon first adopted the gas tax5 as a means of5 For simplicity we are using the
common US terms ‘gas’ and ‘gasoline’
for ‘petroleum’ or the more general
‘fuel’. We also note that in the US
gasoline and diesel are taxed at different
rates.
funding roads, the ‘user pays principle’ has been an important
foundation of debates about transport funding. Yet we in the US
have never had anything like 100% user funding, local roads have
generally not been user-funded, particularly since the 20th century
and the decline of turnpikes. Purely local streets are generally paid
for through property taxes. Dedicated funding for state and federal
sources are mostly from gas taxes now, but the share of total
spending from gas taxes has been dropping.
In 1956, the Federal gas tax was raised from $0.01 to $0.03 to
fund the Interstate Highway System and establish its pay-as-you-go
funding mechanism, the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). The money in
the HTF was dedicated to roads.6 Later a Mass Transit Account was6 The terms hypothecated, ring-fenced, and
earmarked are often used synonymously
to describe the HTF, and just mean the
funds are dedicated.
added which diverted road user funds to pay for transit projects.
Federal gas taxes were raised periodically in the Interstate era,
though, as of this writing, have not been raised at the federal level
since 1993, as shown in Figure 3.2.7 This despite a growing US7 With the wonkish aside that in 1998
some federal gas tax funds were reverted
from deficit reduction back to the HTF.
population, growing US GDP, and rising costs of maintenance.
Between 2013 and 2017, 26 states raised their gas taxes.88 (Quinton 2017).
To be clear, reliance on general revenue to fund roads does not
mean it is impossible for roads and highways to be financially self-
sustainable. It is in fact very possible for many of them, and for roads
collectively. Instead it is because politicians don’t want to raise taxes,
and because everyone else – each constituent – (rationally) wants a
free ride. However, at some point, as the state but not the federal
governments realize, the political costs of terrible roads outweigh
the political costs of raising taxes.
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Figure 3.2: US Federal Gas Tax
History.
US Federal road funding is broken.9 9 This responds to debates on the issue
of how to fund transport. For some
additional context see (Drum 2015)
responding to (Pethokoukis 2015).
1. Since the mid-2000s the Highway Trust Fund has seen spending
in excess of revenue.10
10 (Urban Institute and Brookings
Institution 2018).2. We spend on new projects while giving short-shrift to
maintenance and reconstruction.
3. We suffer congestion,11 which is avoidable with road pricing. 11 §5.
4. User fees fall far short of infrastructure and social costs,12 of 12 §7.
transport.
5. We use pay-as-you-go financing to pay for projects that are
supposed to last decades.
6. We invest in projects that have poor benefit/cost ratios (BCR), and
prioritize badly.
7. We plan and invest as if transport technology and behavior will
never change.
8. Roads, and especially federally funded roads, are not generally
a public good.13 They may be private, or club, or common-pool 13 §A.
resource or public, depending on their architecture. The Interstate
is both excludable and rivalrous, making it a classic ‘private good’
which happens to be publicly provided.
9. Investment decisions are made at the wrong level of government,
too far from the the locus of day-to-day involvement in transport.
The idea of subsidiarity14 is ignored. 14 §17.1.
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Figure 3.3: Gas Tax Dynamics.
3.2 How the gas tax may fail
While the state of the system is bad enough in the present, it is also
vulnerable to future shocks.
Electrification
As we argue elsewhere,15 the gas tax will eventually come to an end15 (Levinson and Krizek 2018).
if only due to the transition towards vehicle electrification. Figure 3.3
illustrates the issue.
Things that are unsustainable do not sustain. Imagine all
gasoline vehicle users pay for all transport costs. Imagine total
expenses are $100,000,000 and the total number of users are
1,000,000, and all gasoline powered cars get 7.84 L/100km.16 In that16 30 mpg.
case, when all vehicles are gasoline powered, the gas tax will be
$0.0792/L,17 in line with current levels. Now imagine, only half of17 $0.30/gal.
all cars pay the gas tax, the tax doubles to $0.1585/L18 to cover18 $0.60/gal.
costs, still quite tolerable, but as the gas tax rises, the number of
gasoline powered cars should be expected to fall. Figure 3.3 shows
the expected gas tax based on the above assumptions with a varying
number of gasoline powered cars on the road. Note especially this
is a log-log scale. At 50,000 cars with gasoline engines (95%
non-gasoline powered.), the tax jumps to $1.58/L19 but the last19 $6.00/gal, above European levels.
gasoline-powered car has to pay $79,200/L.20 Obviously this is20 $300,000/gal.
unsustainable.
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The move away from the gas tax is a positive feedback system that
will accelerate. A replacement is required. This is road pricing21 21 §6.
using location technology.22 22 (Zhang et al. 2009; McMullen et al.
2010).
State opt-outs
Just as individuals effectively opt out of the gas tax when they drive
electric vehicles, a bill was introduced by Senate Republicans that
would have allowed states to opt out of the federal highway
program.23 While this is unlikely to actually happen, consider this 23 (Utt 2011).
thought experiment.
Imagine the Highway Trust Fund were the only source of federal
revenue to states, and it were fully funded from fuel taxes. Let’s
assume half the states are donor states, and pay in more than they
get back, and half are donee states, and get back more than they put
in.24 24 The real world is more complex. The
US Federal Gas Tax used to be the
primary source of the Highway Trust
Fund, so this was once true, but now
most states are donee states because in
recent years, Congress has topped up
the Trust Fund with general revenue to
enable more to be spent on highways
than was collected in fuel taxes.
• Day 1: All (25) the donor states opt out. There are now 25 states
in the gas tax pool. In this new pool, half the states are donor
states, half are donee. The funds had to be recalibrated based on
the smaller pool.
• Day 2: All (say 13) of the new donor states opt out. There are now
(let’s say 12) states left in the pool. Half the states are donor states,
half are donee. The HTF allocation again had to be recalibrated
based on the smaller pool.
• Day 3: All (6) the donor states opt out. There are now 6 states left
in the pool. Rinse and repeat.
• Day 4: All (3) the donor states opt out. There are now 3 states left
in the pool. One more time.
• Day 5: All (1) the donor states opt out. There are now 2 states left
in the pool. One last time.
• Day 6: All (1) donor states opt out. There is only 1 state left in the
pool. The federal government eliminates the gas tax program.
Opt-out of cross-subsidies leads inevitably to
elimination of cross-subsidies. Taxes cannot be optional.
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Figure 3.4: Fix-it-First. Source:
(Kahn and Levinson 2011).
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step in properly allocating the scarce resource of peak-period 
road capacity. We anticipate prices will vary with demand, so 
peak tolls would be higher than off-peak.
There are a number of reasons to move toward pricing, which 
this proposal facilitates. First is simply revenue. The revenue 
collected using the gas tax has been declining and will continue 
to decline with increased fuel efficiency and electrification of 
the fleet. Some alternative source of funds is required, and a 
user fee is a reasonable selection here, as pricing is the most 
direct user fee. Second is allocation of scarce road space. By 
charging a different amount at different times and locations, a 
price signal is sent to travelers about when and where to travel 
to account for the congestion they impose on others. Prices in 
the off-peak would be lower than prices in the peak, thereby 
encouraging many travelers who have flexibility about when to 
travel to choose a different period. Surprisingly, most trips at 
the peak hour are not work trips (FHWA 2007a). This suggests 
significant discretion on the part of travelers about time of 
travel, and a great deal of promise for general time-of-day 
FIGURE 6
Flowchart of Resources in the “Fix It First” Proposal 
Note: This is a flowchart of resources in the “Fix it First” proposal, which show how the funds from the the Highway Trust Fund are distributed by formula to states who repair, rehabilitate, replace 
and enhance existing facilities infrastructure. Use of those facilities generates user fees (gas taxes now, perhaps vehicle mileage taxes in the future) that are added to the Highway Trust Fund.
road pricing. Third, the value of shorter travel time depends 
on the traveler and the nature of his or her trip. A network of 
HOT lanes that guarantee travel times offers a solution to the 
problem now faced with lack of choices in travel.
There is increasing cumulative international experience with 
area congestion charges in cities ranging from London, to 
Stockholm, to Singapore, and HOT lanes are becoming more 
common in the United States (e.g., SR-91 and I-15 in California, 
I-394 in Minnesota, and the Katy Freeway in Texas). Such 
programs are generally popular and reduce congestion. For 
example, the city of Stockholm introduced a toll system 
for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its 
permanent adoption (Harsman and Quigley 2010). In this 
vote, 52 percent of the Stockholm voters approved continuing 
the system. Evidence from HOT lanes suggests they are more 
popular after than before they are opened, and that they are 
just as popular among low-income groups as they are among 
and high-income groups (though in general they are used 
somewhat more by those with higher incomes) (Zmud 2008).
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Kahn and Levinson’s Fix It First, Expand It Second, Reward It Third: A
New Strategy for America’s Highways25 ddr ssed setti g priorities for25 (Kahn and Levinson 2011).
the road sector in addition to what to do with expenditures. The
Ob m administ ation cited it,26 so while it is perhaps nov l, a d26 (National Economic Council and
the President’s Council of Economic
Advisers 2014).
definitely a good idea, this is hardly some radical notion; it is only
innovative within the confines of federal policy discussions. This
section summarizes that proposal for federal transportation
priorities.
. . .
Fix-it-first. At the national level, policymakers should dedicate
existing federal highway user fees to preserve the National Highway
System network. While some funds now go to that purpose, a large
share of funds goes instead to highway expansion and new transit
projects, neither of which rise to same level of national justification.
To retain today’s transport revenue sources, ensure the funds are
directed to appropriate national aims.
It is more important to maintain the existing network than to
expand it, since (a) transport planners have already done the work
of finding the best routes on which to build roads, and (b)
Americans have built lives and communities around the existing
network. Projects that ensure existing links remain open thus have
higher benefit/cost ratios than speculative new roads (often built
only because proponents can spend other people’s money rather
than their own).
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The Interstate is Mature
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42,795 miles (68,912 km)
Figure 3.5: The lifecycle of the
Interstate Highway System.
Highway Block Grants would be a way to pursue this approach
while significantly reducing the active federal role in surface
transport. Money raised in metropolitan areas would be returned to
the area in which it was generated, to be allocated locally to
preserve and maintain (but not expand) the National Highway
System. Similarly, revenues collected outside of metro areas would
be returned to states to distribute to projects outside metro areas.
No other strings would be attached; states and metro areas would
have autonomy within these limited guidelines to make their own
spending decisions.
The priority of public (federal, state, and local) investment in
transport should be on repair because most of the system is built
out, and travel demand is largely flat, so there’s not a major need
for expansion nationally, despite calls from the Highway and
Trucking lobbies. The median age of an Interstate highway link in
the US is about 50 years old now, and the expected lifespan of such
links was on the order of 50 years, as shown in Figure 3.5. While
certainly some links have been rebuilt, many if not most bridges are
the originals. Most of the infrastructure around 10 years from now
is there now, and to ensure it is there ten years from now road
agencies must reconstruct, restore, or repair and maintain it.
From a life-cycle perspective, the problems highways face aren’t
those of growth but of maturity, and maintenance is foremost, and
discovering and developing new technologies to replace the old.
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More significantly, the states should be addressing this. They can
prioritise investments and repairs locally, they knowwhere the issues
are, and they’re the beneficiaries. States know how much they need
to spend locally to satisfy the local risk-reward, benefit-cost ratio.
The federal government allocates things by formula and that means
there’s a major inefficiency there.
In the 2013 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama
announced a Fix-it-First plan as part of his transport agenda.2727 (Global Construction Review 2013).
President Obama called for $50B in new funds. No one really
knows the amount of money that is enough, it depends on
standards (what is good enough), how repairs are done, what
timespan is being considered, and so on. What President Obama
proposed, for instance was about the equivalent of one year’s
federal spending on roads. So it would be adding 10% more over 10
years. It’s not trivial, but it’s not going to solve the problem, either.
We are happy the idea has legs, and even if the final plan was not
the same as what we proposed, moving policy in the right direction
is the whole point of policy briefs.
Both proposals identified the same problem, existing
infrastructure is aging and without additional resources will
deteriorate further.
There is room for debate as to who should fund this
infrastructure, but given the Federal government believed
constructing an Interstate Highway System was of national interest,
and paying for a National Highway System is of national interest,
and that there are existing funds which are largely returned to the
states proportional to where the revenue is generated, keeping
existing revenue sources in the short term is consistent with broader
policies and is politically prudent (it is easier to maintain an
existing tax than to fight 50 fights in 50 state legislatures about
raising new taxes to pay for the same roads).
As authors playing economists, we are required by the economist’s
guild to say ‘We should also have congestion charges.’2828 §6.
. . .
Fix-it-first focuses on the problem of Infrastructure Preservation,29 the29 §I.
topic of this part of the book. The next two items: Expand-it-Second and
Reward-it-Third relate to Network Expansion,30 the subject of part II of the30 §II.
book, and are described here for coherence.
. . .
Expand-it-Second. President Obama also proposed a National
Infrastructure Bank, ours was a more limited Highway Bank where
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borrowers would need to repay funds through from project
beneficiaries (user charges or land value capture). Ours was a
self-sustaining, independent Government Sponsored Enterprise.
These are reasonably similar ideas, earlier ideas for an
Infrastructure Bank have included grant-making powers, our view
(and what appeared to be the Obama Administration’s view) is that
the Bank should lend money, and expect repayment, with interest,
and should thus expect to be revenue positive over the long haul.
The Administration also proposed enacting America Fast
Forward Bonds, and implementing the Transportation
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program.
Implementing TIFIA is of course current law, so that is not really a
new initiative. TIFIA does many similar things to the proposed
Highway Bank, but it is lodged within USDOT rather than
independent. It is also not well funded.
The Brookings report did not have any particular viewpoint on
bonds, except to the extent Kahn and Levinson envisioned the
Highway Bank selling Bonds based on portfolio of projects (much
like how mortgages were once bundled before financial
deregulation) to raise funds, and imagine that similar tax benefits
can be used. The market in the end will limit the availability of
funds for self-liquidating projects. So rather than bond investors
being paid from individual projects, they would be paid from a
bundle of projects, lowering risk and interest payments. Many
communities have difficulties participating in the municipal bond
market, since, especially small communities, do this infrequently,
while the professionals on Wall Street know many angles.31 31 Brookings’ Hamilton Project has
another proposal on Municipal Bonds.
(Ang and Green 2011).
Reward-it-Third. The Highway Bank would require benefit/cost
analysis. Outperforming projects would get an interest rate subsidy
from the Highway Performance Fund (basically funded by the
profits of the Highway Bank) to reward ex post the lower actual risk.
This would help encourage jurisdictions to under-sell their projects
(under-estimating demand and over-estimating costs) so that they
can outperform, rather than the current strategy of over-selling the
projects (over-estimating demand and under-estimating costs) to get
initial funding.
. . .
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There are three primary reasons to tie user charges to new 
capacity. 
•  First, we seek to ensure there is a source of revenue from 
beneficiaries, and users are the foremost beneficiaries of 
any project. Tying costs to the people who benefit from 
using new infrastructure is both a more fair and a more 
efficient way to finance new capacity. There are many ways 
to ensure goals of equity. We discuss some examples in 
“Questions and Concerns” below.
•  Second, we seek to use pricing as an instrument to 
manage capacity. With demand-varying road prices, some 
discretionary travelers will switch from the peak to the 
off-peak travel periods. Since (as noted above) most travel 
in the peak is non-work-related, there is good reason to 
believe that even small differences in the price by time of 
day will have large effects on congestion. 
•  Third, by pricing selected facilities (or selected lanes) 
to ensure free-flow conditions (thereby creating the 
same vehicular throughput as congested conditions at a 
faster speed, overall a win-win), we can provide facilities 
(and ultimately a network) that allows travelers to pay 
extra and thereby avoid congestion, introducing choice, 
and addressing the reliability problems we raised in 
the Introduction above. These routes, now in limited 
deployment as HOT lanes, can see much wider use, 
but require new capacity in places to be able to bypass 
bottlenecks. HOT lanes benefit more than just motorists: 
they can also be used to provide rapid bus transit networks 
throughout metropolitan areas. These express buses will 
face freely flowing travel conditions throughout the peak 
period, and thus have a time advantage over buses running 
on surface streets and cars not paying the toll.
FIGURE 7
Flowchart of Resources in the “Expand It Second” and “Reward It Third” Proposals
Note: This is a flowchart of resources in the “Expand It Second” and “Reward It Third” proposals, which show how the funds from the FHB are distributed to projects based on ability to repay, 
and funds from the Highway Performance Fund are given in the form of interest rate subsidies to projects that exceed performance standards after they open. The project generates benefits, 
which are capitalized in user fees, value capture, or general tax revenue, to repay loans. The FHB repays investors, while profits go to the Highway Performance Fund.
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and Levinson 2011).
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A brief history of the idea ‘fix-it-first’
Great Artists Steal. – Pablo Picasso (attributed)
The term ‘fix-it-first’ has been in circulation for a few years. We
do not know the first reference, though we can trace it to at least
2002, but it has taken off since August 1, 2007, the date of the
collapse of the I-35W Mississippi River Bridge in Minneapolis. The
bridge collapse was due to a design flaw that went undiscovered for
four decades coupled with poor construction practices that
exacerbated loadings immediately above the undersized gusset
plate. While the proximate cause of the bridge collapse was not lack
of maintenance, the collapse was revelatory in numerous ways
about the state of that and other bridges. The bridge was known to
be structurally deficient in other ways, and was fracture critical (a
failure at a single point could result in failure of the structure as a
whole). Many other bridges also had such problems.
Other notable users of the phrase include:
• Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney32 32 (Grabauskas 2009).
In January 2003, just days after being sworn in as Governor of
Massachusetts, Mitt Romney stood alongside a structurally
deficient bridge on Route 2 and said: ‘Fix-it-first!’
• National Governors Association33 33 (Lambert 2004).
• National Resources Defense Council34 34 (Benfield 2008).
• Governor’s Institute35 35 (Governors’ Institute 2009).
• DCist36 36 (Peppard 2007).
• US PIRG37 37 (US PIRG 2007).
• Sierra Club38 38 (Sierra Club 2009).
• Environmental Defense39 39 (Defense 2010).
• EPA40 40 (Schor 2010).
• Transportation 4 America41 41 (David 2011).
• The White House, 2012 Budget42 42 (US Office of Management and Budget
2011).
Adopts a ‘Fix-it-First’ approach for highway and transit grants,
which will emphasize improving the condition of existing
infrastructure. Consolidates 55 highway programs into five, to give
States and localities greater flexibility to direct resources to their
highest priorities and simplify operations.

4
Subsidy
Figure 4.1: Financially
Sustainable Transit, Pacific Fair
Mall, Gold Coast, Queensland,
2000. With fares like these, it
must make money. Photo by D.
Levinson.
Should government subsidize transport? If government
subsidizes transport, should it subsidize producers or consumers? If
a government gave money to consumers, they could spend it on
what they want, paying for a service, which if it covers operating
costs, could lead to more investment. If it gave money directly to
producers, they spend it on more supply. Which leads to a better
outcome?
Let’s think about the word ‘subsidy’ for a moment. Below are a
few examples.
1. If I buy a ticket on a train, and it pays my share of both the fixed
and variable elements of the full cost of the trip, am I subsidizing
the train? [No]
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2. If my mom buys the ticket for me, is she subsidizing the train or
subsidizing me? [me]
3. If my employer buys the ticket for me, is it subsidizing the train
or subsidizing me? [me]
4. If a store buys the ticket for me, is it subsidizing the train or
subsidizing me? [me]
5. If I buy a ticket which pays the marginal cost of my trip, but not
the fixed cost, and my mom pays the difference, is she subsidizing
me or the train? [the train]
6. If I buy a ticket which pays the marginal cost of my trip, and my
city pays the fixed cost, is the city subsidizing me or the train?
[the train]
7. If I buy a ticket which pays the marginal cost of my trip and the
state pays the fixed cost, is the state subsidizing me or the train?
[the train]
8. If I buy a ticket which pays the marginal cost of my trip, and the
federal government pays the fixed cost, is the federal government
subsidizing me or the train? [the train]
9. If the state gives me money and I buy a ticket which pays for the
full cost of the train, is the state subsidizing me or the train? [me]
American Heritage dictionary says:
sub·si·dy n.
• Monetary assistance granted by a government to a person or group
in support of an enterprise regarded as being in the public interest.11 The etymology comes from the Latin
word subsidere meaning “to settle down,
stay, remain.” Dictionaries imply that subsidy is primarily from a government.
You can then decide what is government: Family? Homeowners
association? City, state, and federal certainly apply.
This is relevant in transport accounting. For instance Amtrak, a
publicly-owned corporation, gets a subsidy (which it calls ‘funding’)
from the federal government.2 If it were to declare that subsidy to be2 (Amtrak 2014).
revenue, it would earn a ‘profit.’ (Apparently it once did, but does
so no longer). Amtrak also gets subsidies from state governments. It
does declare those subsidies to be revenues. If you think about it as
providing a service to the states, this makes sense. Any contractor to
the state which charges in exchange for a service books that revenue
as income. So in Amtrak-accounting, state-supported services are
‘passenger-related’ revenue, but federal support is not.
We advocate reframing3 current US practice in transit subsidies3 §19
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away from thinking of transit agencies as money-losing, and instead
towards an organization providing services for users. Hopefully
most of those users are passengers. It also would provide service
for governments that want a particular service that users cannot pay
for directly. The government would not be subsidizing the transit
agency, it would be subsidizing users of the service by paying
someone to provide the service. The difference in thinking is subtle,
but important.
4.1 Car subsidies
Figure 4.2: car2go in Minnesota.
Photo by D. Levinson.
In the United States (similar to many other nations), drivers do not
pay enough for transport. As a result, drivers use too much and have
misleading anchors about what prices ‘should’ be. When drivers are
shown and charged the actual cost of things, they are surprised, and
not a little bit disgruntled. They also often change their behavior.
Car2go is a carsharing company that has a presence in some US
cities. We illustrate comparing their charges with costs of ownership.
car2go vs. private costs of auto ownership. Why should a
car2go ride be $0.38/min?4 We don’t pay $0.38/min to ride our own 4 Note, rates vary by city, rates have
changed since this was first written.cars, or transit, do we?
When driving our cars, we pay out-of-pocket for gasoline.5 At 5 At prices of about $0.92/L (inclusive of
taxes), ($3.50/gal) and 6.72 L/100km, (35
mpg) we pay just $0.061/km ($0.10 mi)
out-of-pocket.
48km/h,6 we pay $0.05/min (assuming no variation in fuel
6 30 mph
economy).
Much of the other $0.33/min is paying for what we perceive to
be the fixed costs of vehicle ownership: the cost of the vehicle itself,
insurance, maintenance, and repairs.
• The cost of the vehicle, say $15,000 for a vehicle that runs 100,000
miles before depreciating to $0, is $0.075/min.7 7 $0.094/km ($0.15/mi).
• Insurance might run $1,000/year or $0.05/min.8,9 8 $0.061/km ($0.10/mi).
9 Pay as you drive (or pay at the pump)
insurance is a long discussed policy that
has yet to be mainstream in the US.
A version exists in Australia and some
other places, including some US opt-ins.
• Vehicle taxes are about a quarter to half that, depending on
where you are, so let’s say $0.01/min. In some states these are
dedicated to infrastructure, so we need to be careful to avoid
double counting.
• Repairs, oil, and maintenance probably have a similar running
cost to insurance, less in the early years, more in the later year
($0.05/min).
Adding that together is $0.185/min.
That leaves $0.165/min in ‘out-of-pocket’ costs car2go charges
above what you would pay for an equivalent vehicle. Some of this is
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car2go operating expenses – load balancing or moving cars around
so they will be near you, paying the cities for ‘free’ on-street
parking, having a nice app and GPS. Some of this might be because
car2go vehicles are actually used less than many private cars, so the
fixed costs have to be spread over fewer minutes. Some of this
might be higher insurance than you would pay. Some of this is
on-road assistance as needed. Some of this is operating profit, a
private company has to break-even as a business or it will cease to
exist.1010 Actually, car2go doesn’t have to
break even, as it, like Smart, is a
Daimler-Benz subsidiary, and car2go
purchases Smart ForTwo, which offset
less fuel efficient Mercedes cars under
US Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards.
One point is the average user of car2go drives less than the
average owner of an equivalent car, thereby saving the outlay of
$15,000 for ownership, $1000/year for maintenance, $1000/year for
fuel, $1000/year for insurance, and $250/year for vehicle tabs. Thus
when they are willing to drive, they pay more per minute than the
per minute basis for an owned car because they are paying for the
option value of having a car when they want, but not when they
don’t.
The second point is if the average owner of a car paid an
additional $0.185/min on top of $0.05/min, they would drive less.
For a ten-minute trip, they would be out-of-pocket an extra $1.85.
For a thirty-minute trip, they would pay an extra $5.55, which is
about the out-of-pocket price of an express bus.
The costs so far only describe the private costs of driving. Since
most of these costs are fixed, there is little reason not to drive once
these costs have been paid. People would drive less, and potentially
travel less overall, if they paid higher marginal costs of travel. This
is one reason we don’t expect that car sharing will result in the same
amount of vehicular travel as private vehicles.
Non-private costs
Infrastructure. The full cost of travel includes non-private costs,
including infrastructure. Nationally, direct user fees (gas tax and
tolls) pay for about one-third the cost of all roads,11 the other11 (Henchman 2013).
two-thirds comes from general revenue (particularly property taxes
at local jurisdictions, but also pseudo-user fees like motor vehicle
taxes). Since fuel taxes (the bulk of highway user fees) are
$0.0486/L12 at the national level and $0.0753/L13 in Minnesota,12 $0.184/gal.
13 $0.285/gal. $0.47 in total, we would need to about triple it for user fees to pay
for all of infrastructure costs or $0.02/min,14 of which $0.0067/min14 $0.372/L ($1.41/gal) or $0.025/km
($0.04/mi). is already covered by existing gas taxes, meaning a new tax of
$0.0133/min should be levied to convert road infrastructure costs
into a user charge).
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This assumes infrastructure spending is the right amount in total,
about which there is considerable argument. Clearly much
infrastructure is in poor condition or insufficient, which increases
vehicle repairs, crash rates, congestion, and future infrastructure
costs.
Parking. Parking is usually ‘free’ where most Americans live and
work and shop, so this is not an out-of-pocket cost until we start
charging for parking.15 Obviously there is a cost that is bundled into 15 (Shoup 2017).
other real estate transactions, or is subsidized by the infrastructure
provider in the case of free on-street parking. The value of this land
in alternate uses depends on location,16 and in most, but not all, 16 §4.1.
US places approaches zero, though obviously this is not the case in
active centers. Table 4.1: Summary Costs
of Monetary Costs of Car
Ownership ($/min).
Category Cost
Fuel $0.050
Vehicle ownership $0.075
Repairs, oil, & maintenance $0.050
Insurance $0.050
Infrastructure (ex. gas tax) $0.013
Externalities $0.100
Total $0.34
Externalities. Like parking, this also does not include
externalities, which are also ‘free.’ Crashes are mostly internalized
in insurance, but congestion and pollution and CO2 emissions and
noise are not internalized. These estimates vary widely.17 This
17 (Levinson and Gillen 1998; Parry et al.
2007).
might be on the order of magnitude of $0.10/min,18 though again
18 $0.12/km ($0.20/mi).
varies hugely based on location and assumptions.
We have not also included user time. Presumably drivers
consider their own time already (though undoubtedly over-estimate
the time spent driving). At an average wage of $20/hour (it is
probably a bit higher) this would be $0.33/min of labor foregone.
Note this is roughly the same level as the full monetary costs of
travel. In benefit/cost analysis, transport economists typically use
half the wage rate, though this is at best a rule of thumb.19 19 (Hensher 2019).
. . .
Table 4.1 summarizes our ballpark out-of-pocket monetary costs
per minute. Table 4.2 presents an estimate from extensive modeling
by (Cui and Levinson 2019). Time is a dominant cost of travel, though
we neglected it in the comparison above, as it applies to both car2go
and a private vehicle. Access time (the time to reach the vehicle) is
higher in a carsharing example than private ownership.
Reduction in travel
How much less travel would there be if the costs of driving paid
out-of-pocket on a per use basis? Economists use the elasticity of
demand with respect to price to estimate this. This tells us how
much demand drops as prices increase. The short run elasticity of
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Table 4.2: Average Cost
Estimates for Each Cost
Component Among All the
Links on the Twin Cities Road
Network ($/veh   km). Source:
(Cui and Levinson 2019).
Single Cost Components
Full Cost
Time Safety Emission Money
Internal 0.3819 0.0399 0.0009 0.2194
0.6785
External - 0.0227 0.0192 0.0359
demand for driving (measured in vehicle miles traveled) with
respect to the price of gas is about -0.05, meaning for every 100%
increase in the price of gas, there is a 5% decrease in gasoline
consumption (which correlates to driving in the short run, in the
long run there is also a shift in vehicle fuel economy).20 So if we20 (Hughes et al. 2006).
hold that to be true for all costs, going from $0.05/min to $0.34/min
is 676% higher cost (a 576% increase), leads to about a 29%
reduction in fuel use (distance traveled) in the short run if people
paid their roughly fixed costs plus infrastructure plus externalities
of vehicle ownership as variable costs instead. Of course at the
magnitude of shift, the elasticity values may no longer hold. In any
case, this is no small matter. Certainly the direction is right,
countries with much higher fuel taxes see much less driving in
general.
Economic responses
Income effects. There would be a countervailing income effect,
as people now had an income that was higher by the cost of the
car-payment (say $1,500 per year over 10 years), and $2,250 in other
vehicle costs. That additional income effect would be expended
consuming many different goods, not just travel by automobile. A
fraction of it (maybe 20-30%) would go back to pay for additional
transport, though not necessarily more travel, perhaps just nicer
travel in a better car (a Smart ForFour instead of a Smart ForTwo).
Since wealthier people travel a bit more than less wealthy, there
would be a small bit more travel, but probably a relatively de
minimis amount.
Induced demand. Further, if we did reduce congestion, we would
expect at least some people to take advantage of that change and
start traveling more than they otherwise would have. There would
be induced demand21 due to the lower travel times.21 §14.
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Time is money. As the adage goes, ‘time is money,’ and if we were
more directly aware of the cost of our travel, we would spend far less
on it. This implies we over-consume travel compared to a system that
charged users directly for their full costs. As we move towards more
efficient and equitable transport funding, using road pricing, and an
economy with shared vehicles and Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS)22 22 Different authors mean different
things by ‘Mobility-as-a-Service’. We
refer to car sharing, ride hailing, bike
sharing, taxi, and cloud commuting
type services. Some people think that
there should be single app with a single
mobility account, which allows using
different types of mobility services for a
single monthly charge. That definition
is too restrictive in our view.
we should expect significantly less passenger travel demand.23
23 Were the marginal costs of travel
to increase travelers may change
vehicles, switch travel modes, relocate,
telecommute (or not travel at all) or
increase demand for deliveries.
Consequentially, infrastructure providers should supply less
transport capacity in this policy environment than one where
people could free ride and over-consume. Since infrastructure is
long-lived, planning for a smaller network should begin now, with
the aim to avoid irreversible investments made today that will later
be seen as unnecessary.
One area that has received some attention for adaptable
infrastructure is parking structures. Parking is required as part of
new development in most of the US, yet demand for parking will
decline if on-demand services (including automated vehicles)
increase. Some architects and developers are already designing
parking structures for potential future transition to some other use.
Hidden subsidies
Highway users pay a fee for the cost of highways. Federal gas taxes
are dedicated to the federal Highway Trust Fund (HTF), and many
states have similar rules at the state level. The HTF has in recent
years fallen short of the amount that politicians want to spend on
roads, but that is in principle easily corrected with an increase in
the user fee or a decrease in spending. Most local roads (municipal
and county) are paid for via local general revenue. This is also well
known in the transport community, if not the general public.
The hidden subsidy is in states which have general sales taxes,
but don’t apply them to gasoline.24 In Minnesota, for instance, 24 The magnitude of this problem is
complex, as of 2012, 16 states have sales
taxes on motor fuels, but most of those
states dedicate funds to roads (and thus
not to other purposes, and thus cannot
be considered user fees), see (Workman
and Rall 2012) for explanation.
purchasers pay a sales tax on prepared food, but not gasoline (or
clothing, or a few other random things). Thus relatively, spending is
encouraged in those untaxed areas, which are 6.875% less taxed
than other goods. This lack of a tax is not a subsidy in a state which
doesn’t tax sales, and instead taxes income or property. But where
sales are taxed, but gasoline is exempted, other goods are implicitly
taxed more so gasoline can be explicitly taxed less. Note this is not
universal across the US.
In California, there has long been both a sales and use tax.
However the value of the sales tax on gasoline is now lower than
the sales tax on general goods, though for many years it was close
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or the same. There is argument about the fact that the sales tax is
levied on both the gasoline and the user fee associated with the
gasoline. In short, the general principal is that gasoline cannot
simultaneously be taxed with the funds dedicated to highways
(thus acting as a user fee) and exempted from sales taxes without
there being a subsidy that at least partially offsets the user fee. At a
$0.66/L25 price of gas, a 6.875% tax raises $0.0458/L.26 To compare,25 $3.00/gal.
26 $0.20625/gal. the state gas tax is $0.0635/L.27 Thus, in Minnesota the net state
27 $0.286/gal. user fee is only about $0.0178/L,28 not the $0.06356/L29 widely
28 $0.08/gal.
29 $0.286/gal.
advertised. The federal gas tax is $0.041/L.30 This is more truly a
30 $0.184/gal. user fee. Also since there is no federal sales tax, gasoline is not
disproportionately favored. The tax in Minnesota is higher in some
localities to pay for other things. We could similarly look at the
motor vehicle sales tax (MVST), which is dedicated to transport in
Minnesota. It is 6.5%. There is nothing wrong with dedicating the
funds, but as a result, they cannot be counted as user fees, since
sales tax revenue would otherwise go to general revenue. Since
2011, 60% of the MVST goes to the Highway User Tax Distribution
Fund, and 40% goes to the Transit Fund.3131 (Minnesota Department of Revenue,
Tax Research Division 2006). To minimize distortions, the general sales tax should apply to all
goods equally. For equity concerns, sales taxes can be refunded, or at
sale can be avoided with specialized payment cards. Better, a value
added tax should be used. Special taxes on beneficiaries should be
used where they can be, but not in lieu of general taxes. There is
sufficient economic capacity in the highway system for users to pay
for the whole thing (the evidence being how much people have paid
for gasoline per gallon in the past in the US, and how much they pay
in other countries), it’s a shame we don’t take advantage of that.
After paying for roads, and their externalities, and their share of
the general tax burden, road users will be paying about their fair
share. Taxes are needlessly complicated by special interests. This
allows all sorts of hidden subsidies. Let’s expose them to the
sunlight, and then make objective decisions about whether we
should lower the general sales tax on all other goods, and impose
that tax rate on fuel.
Road rent
There are a number of ways to view the cost of automobile travel. For
instance in this book we examine the congestion costs imposed, we
allocate infrastructure costs, and assess full costs to consider internal
costs, subsidies, and externalities. This section examines the idea
of road rent, which considers the opportunity cost of land used for
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roads. At the margins, what is the value of road space for parked
and moving cars, and how might that cost look on a per vehicle-km
traveled basis?
Land has value. Land used as roads has value both as a road
and potentially for other uses. What if the value for other uses was
higher than that for use as a road?
In Greater Sydney land values range from to $AU210,000/m2 in
Barangaroo on Darling Harbour to under $AU1000/m2 in Western
Sydney.32 In Minneapolis, we estimated a few years ago that 32 (Metcalfe 2018).
average assessed land value as $144/m2 for streets and $30/m2 for
highways.33 It seems that assessed value is about 2/3 of market 33 (Junge and Levinson 2013).
value in Minneapolis.
In some places it is much higher, in some places much lower, the
examples used herein are simply an illustration.
The idea is that there is a land holder (such as a government land
agency) that has to decide whether to allocate land to road uses or
for other purposes.
Charge rent for on-street parking. Consider a typical
suburban residential neighborhood with ‘free’ parking in front of
houses. The land is valued at $1,000/m2. Each house requires one
parking space out front, and parking is permitted 24 h/day.
Conservatively, a car takes 10 m2 when parked (the road is the
access lane, we consider that separately). It would cost $10,000 for
the land owner to purchase the land equivalent of the parked car.
The annual rent on that would be $400 (at 4% interest).
In this example $400 is how much the car owner should pay
annually to their municipality for a permit to park their car to cover
the cost of land (not the cost of infrastructure, or any other costs of
roads and mobility, just the cost of land). This is a bit more than
$1/day.34 In more expensive neighborhoods, this would be higher, 34 More precisely $1.095/day.
in less expensive neighborhoods, lower For Minneapolis, we have
previously estimated about 220,000 on-street spaces.35 At 35 (Levinson et al. 2018).
$400/space/year, this would raise $88,000,000/year, a not
inconsiderable share of the city’s $1.3 billion annual budget.36 36 (City of Minneapolis 2017).
Instead it is mostly given away free.
Consider the implications if property taxes were reduced by up to
$88 million in total, and parking permits sold at $400/year (payable
monthly with the water and trash bill). People would realize the cost
of on-street parking, and there would be less demand for it, and less
vehicle ownership at the margins, and fewer trips by car. Space freed
up could be re-allocated.
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Alternatively, $400/year is the value of public subsidy from
publicly-owned land to private car owners who get ‘free’ on-street
parking. In short from the car-less to the car owners.
Road space has alternative uses. The economic idea of
opportunity cost is important here. Opportunity cost is the value of
the next best alternative. The next best alternative to road space
might be renting it out. For instance, an urban US freeway that
destroyed blocks of extant development when it was built has an
opportunity cost associated with the value of that real estate.
So the question arises as to what other uses could be made of
the road; for if there were no other uses, you might as well store
cars for free. Here are several other uses that could be considered to
replacing a parking lane:
Figure 4.3: Illustration of
space occupied by cars. Note
that most cars do not have
2 occupants. This particular
layout is, surprisingly, in
somewhat congested conditions.
Cars often take up more space
at higher speeds. Screen still
from a 2002 Saturn car company
TV commercial. Image source:
The San Francisco ad agency
Goodby, Silverstein & Partners.
(Raine 2008).
• Park or parklet,
• Bike lane,
• Bus lane,
• Paid parking, via meters,
• Shared car parking (rented to
the car sharing company),
• Shared bike parking (rented to
the station-based or dockless
bike sharing company),
• Taxi or ride-hailing stand,
• Bus stop,
• Shared scooter parking
(rented to dockless scooter
sharing company),
• Food truck or ice cream
vendor,
• Road for moving motor
vehicles (a parking lane could
be another moving lane),
• Sold off for development.
The last item deserves some discussion. Consider that our road
with two parking lanes (one on each side) is maybe 10 or 12m
wide.37 This is wider than some houses are long. The city could in37 About 32 to 40 ft.
principle retain the sidewalks and sell off the roadbed for
townhouses or single family homes. Given the houses are already
serviced by alleys, and so long as not all roads were sold off, some
roads could be. An illustration of this is the Milwaukee Avenue in
Seward in Minneapolis, as shown in Figure 4.4. You will see there is
no paved street in front of the houses. This could be tightened up
further or realigned should there be demand.
This is not appropriate for every street. However, (1) there are
places this can be done, where roads are in excess and housing
scarce, and (2) this illustrates that land currently used as asphalt to
store and move cars has value, and that houses have value even in
the absence of streets for cars in the front.
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Figure 4.4: Milwaukee Avenue,
Seward. Source: (Milwaukee
Avenue Historical Association
2014).
There are always excuses – utilities may need to be relocated, fire
trucks would need to go slower down narrower sidewalks. But these
excuses can be overcome, there are numerous examples of narrow
paths that function as roads.
Charge rent for moving cars. Typically each car is in use 1 - 1.5
hours per day, and parked for the remainder. Above, we considered
parking, the ‘remainder,’ here we look at the time in motion.
When in use, the car is occupying not simply its area,38 but also 38 The 10m2 =2m·5m.
is preventing the use of other space around it. On a freeway with a
capacity of 1, 800vehicles/hour traveling at a freeflow speed of
100km/h, (i.e. just before the speed and flow drop due to congestion
sets in) there is a critical density of 18 vehicles/km.39 39 18 vehicles/km is 55.5m/vehicle. Lane
width is 3.65m, so the area occupied is
202 m2. Let’s round to 200 m2. Each
moment a car is in use, it is using 200
m2, on which it should pay rent. So for
an hour a day, this is 720,000 m2 · s. Or
72 hectare · s. Note: 1 are =100 m2 and
1 hectare (ha) =100 are =10,000m2. The
m2 cdotsec (or the larger hectare · second)
is a new unit of measurement (a time-
volume) that needs a catchier name.
It is the density that is the relevant number here, since vehicles
are occupying space that we are charging rent for in this thought
experiment. Though they are moving, and so the space they are
occupying moves with them, there is always some space being
occupied for the duration of their travel. Each of those vehicles per
hour is occupying a moving window of space.
Roads are a timeshare. When roads are less congested, cars are
consuming more space per vehicle. So uncongested urban roads are
much more expensive per traveler than congested rural roads.
When traffic breaks down, they are consuming less space, but
presumably are occupying that space for more time, since they are
going slower. Induced demand,40 and travel time budgets41 negate 40 §14.
41 (Levinson et al. 2018).that to a significant extent.
In this example, the hourly rent on 200 m2 is what we are
interested in. Though cars move, over the course of 1 hour of travel
in these conditions, they are claiming that much space. The specific
space they are claiming moves with the vehicles, but this all
balances out as other cars claim the space they vacated.
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Empty roads still have to be paid for, and paid for by actual road
users. Even when a road is not being used, it is available to be used.
Travelers have the option of traveling. Pavements cannot be easily
be rolled up and allocated to other purposes on the fly, particularly
purposes like buildings. (Roads can occasionally be closed for special
events, but this is rare during business hours.)
Example. Consider a car trip that uses three roads:4242 l = length (km), w= lane width
(m), v=velocity (km/h), q=flow (veh/h),
k=density (veh/km), AADT = Average
Annual Daily Traffic, p= land value
($/m2), i=interest rate = 0.04, y = year,
r= land rent ($/y/m2), d = days/year
• Road section 1 (suburban residential):
l =5 km, w =3.65 m, v =30 km/h, q =1000 veh/h, k =33.33veh/km,
AADT =10,000 vehicles/day/lane, p =$1,000/m2.
• Road section 2 (motorway):
l =10 km, w =3.65 m, v =100 km/h, q =2000 veh/h, k =20 veh/km,
AADT =20,000 vehicles/day/lane, p = $5,000/m2.
• Road section 3 (downtown):
l =1 km, w =3.65 m, v =40 km/h, q =1600 veh/h, k =40 veh/km,
AADT =16,000 vehicles/day/lane, p = $10,000/m2.
Consider each road section to be a homogenous pipeline.4343 With heterogenous traffic, this is
obviously far more complicated, and we
would make use of the q, k, and v
variables to compute an area-time.
The annual rent (R) for each road section is the R = p · i · l · w
• Road 1: R = $1, 000/m2y · 0.04 · 5, 000m · 3.65m = $730, 000/y
• Road 2: R = $5, 000/m2y · 0.04 · 10, 000m · 3.65m = $7, 300, 000/y
• Road 3: R = $10, 000/m2y · 0.04 · 1, 000m · 3.65m = $1, 460, 000/y
This annual rent is paid by the road agency to the land owner for
the use of land as a road. The road agency then wants to recover this
cost from its customers, the travelers.
The question of how to allocate always has some subjectiveness
to it. Another way of thinking about it is based on elasticity of
demand.44 Peak hour work trips are perhaps the least elastic (least44 This is formally called Ramsey Pricing,
see (Oum and Tretheway 1988). sensitive to price), and so from an economic efficiency perspective
should bear the greatest cost.
In this example, we take a simpler tack.
The allocation is R/AADT to get cost per year per daily
tripmaker, and divide by 365 to get cost per trip, and by section
length to get cost per km. In this example:
• Road 1: $730, 000/10, 000 = $73/y = $0.20/trip = $0.04/km
• Road 2: $7, 300, 000/20, 000 = $365/y = $1/trip = $0.10/km
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• Road 3: $1, 460, 000/16, 000 = $91.25/y = $0.25/trip = $0.25/km
The total is thus $529.25 per year or $1.45 per trip to cover land
rent.
The implications of road rent are several
• At an additional $1.45 per trip, travel by car (and congestion) will
diminish.
• Road rent is essentially additive with annualized infrastructure
costs. Infrastructure budgeting generally does not consider the
cost of land, rather, land is often implicitly considered ‘free’ or a
sunk cost.
• If travel by car diminishes sufficiently, road space can be clawed
back and redeployed for other public purposes.
• Narrower lanes impose less road rent. But not necessarily
proportionately so, as the throughput on narrower lanes (with
human drivers) may be lower as drivers are less keen to be
immediately adjacent to nearby high-speed vehicles.
• Slower moving vehicles take up less space, but take that space for
longer.
• While pedestrians and bicyclists use space as well, they use much
less space.45 Sidewalks (footpaths) are often considered part of 45 See discussion of flux in (Levinson
et al. 2018).the adjacent private property, and are thus already paid for with
property tax.
• Land used for roads instead of development is not on the books
for property taxes.
• The revenue raised can be used for many transport purposes or
redistributed back to taxpayers through some other means.
• The additional road rent reduces the effective land rent that
landowners can charge. If people have to pay more for travel,
they will pay less for real estate.
• Rural areas have much lower, perhaps negligible, road rent.
Though the number of users drops significantly (so there are
fewer travelers who must pay the burden of road rent), the cost
of land drops even more significantly.
• Were there no (fewer) roads, land would also have very little (less)
value, since it would be difficult to access and egress.
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Table 4.3: Mode Share in the US,
Weighted by Person Distance
Traveled. Source: 2017 National
Household Travel Survey.
Mode Share Mode Share
Car, SUV, Van, LT, RV, MC 75.8 School bus 1.0
Walk 0.8 Bicycle 0.2
Taxi, Limo, Ridehailing 0.4 Rental car, Car sharing 0.5
Public Transit 1.8 Paratransit, Dial-a-ride 0.1
Intercity bus, Charter 0.6 Amtrak, Commuter rail 0.9
Airplane 16.8
• If roads were fully built on, views would be terrible and the
existing buildings would diminish in value. But none of that is to
say we have the correct amount of roads now. Clearly urban
roads are undercharged in a real estate sense.
4.2 Bicycle subsidies
This book largely focuses on two transport modes: the
automobile/truck/highway system and public transport, and pays
short shrift to walking and bicycles, which tend not to have large
funding demands, nor in the case of bikes, large usage in the US, as
shown in Table 4.3.46 Bicycles also don’t have user fees.4746 Author’s note: David Levinson walks
to work in Sydney, and did so in
Minneapolis; David King bikes to work
in Phoenix, and walked when he lived in
New York.
47 While not a user fee, in 2017 the
State of Oregon added a $15 tax on
bicycles over $200 to fund new bike
infrastructure. (McLeod 2017).
Concomitantly bikes don’t have much infrastructure to show for it.
Certainly, as shown elsewhere, car owners don’t pay for 100% of
the cost of road infrastructure (more like 50% of operating and
capital costs, but depends how you count), but they pay more than
non-car owners due to gas taxes and vehicle registration fees. For
better or worse, this allows a lot of car-oriented infrastructure to get
built.
Transit users don’t pay for 100% of the cost of riding transit
(farebox recovery is nearer 33% of operating costs and 0% of capital
costs), but they pay more than non-transit users due to fares. This
allows transit routes to be somewhat more widespread than
otherwise.
There is a perception widely held among non-bike riders that
bicyclists are free riders. Bike riders do not pay more for the
available bike infrastructure than non-bike riders. Is this perception
wrong? Bicyclists could step-up (or pedal-up) and claim some
rights and funds in exchange for some responsibilities and paying
user fees.
Bicycling would get more respect at the table, and more
resources, if bicycle owners and/or users paid some amount of
money to support bicycle infrastructure.
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For instance, a $10/year fee for registering a bike would raise more
than a million dollars a year in Minneapolis, which would go a long
way toward bike infrastructure. Bike advocates should reframe and
embrace. A Bicycle Trust Fund could be very powerful.
Some suggest the funds for bicycle infrastructure should be
provided by the public out of general revenue. Our first thought is,
how is that working for you so far? If you are happy with the level
of bike infrastructure in America’s number one bike city,
Minneapolis, much less everywhere else, carry on. If you think it
should be better, you can rally and exhort, but you can also bring
some money to the table.
In contrast to sidewalks, which are largely maintained (or not)
by adjacent property owners, and paid for from special assessments,
bike paths are treated more like roads. Also, keep in mind, everyone
walks, not everyone bikes.
Tax collection bureaucracies have high overhead, but there should
be ways to do this and get a pot of money together. If you think a
$10 annual fee is too administratively complex, make a $30 fee at the
point of sale and/or at bike registration. Exclude bikes older than 3
years.
If you think the bike-tax cops will harass poor or minority
bicyclists, a very real concern,48 make it a secondary rather than 48 (Wisniewski 2017).
primary offense, so riders can’t get pulled over for it.
If you are worried about kids, set it up so parents pay for kids, or
make it only for bikes with a greater than 20 inch wheel – there are
many possible strategies.
We need to think creatively.
4.3 Transit subsidies
The words ‘transit’49 and ‘crisis’ have been associated in the 49 The terms ‘mass transit’, ‘public
transit’, and ‘public transport’ are used
interchangeably and refer to services
that carry multiple parties from multiple
origins to multiple destinations.
American lexicon for nearly 60 years. It is time to recognize this as a
chronic condition rather than a temporary event.50 Current
50 See (King 2013).
strategies have not placed transit on a financially sustainable path.
In most of the United States and much of the world, public
transport is publicly subsidized. Everyone in an area pays for transit
whether or not they use it. This was not always the case, and need
not everywhere be the case. Once mass transport was privately
provided to the public for profit (in most US cities) from the late
1800s through the first half of the 1900s. While rights-of-way were
often publicly provided, the companies operating transit paid for
the maintenance of those rights-of-way above and beyond what was
required for transit. This model was hugely profitable for decades,
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until it wasn’t. In fact, as late as the 1960s over 80% of mass transit
in the United States was privately owned and operated.5151 (Lave 1994).
The causes for transit’s decline are many, but rising incomes,
suburbanization, and of course a much faster competitor in the
automobile/highway system are among them. Operational reasons
include limits to raising the nickel fares starved the operators of
money to invest in the systems and diminished performance due to
travel in mixed-traffic. Between the 1930s to the 1960s, depending
on where you were in the United States, the private sector
abandoned mass transit and the public sector took over.
Over the past half century, US transit under public ownership has
seen an enormous and growing per passenger subsidy. The debate
over the merits of subsidy has become partisan.
Transit is essential to those who use it on a daily basis. But so are
many other goods and services that have much lighter public
involvement, ranging from food production and distribution to
electricity and natural gas. Aside from the inability of transit
operators to make money under the regulatory regime of 60 years
ago, is there anything about transit that warrants public ownership?
Let’s consider who benefits from transit:
• Riders, who on average directly pay about one-third of the
operating costs through fares, and none of the capital costs
• Employers of subsidized riders, who can pay lower salaries since
those employees have some of their transport costs covered. In
some places, employers subsidize transit passes or local transit
services for employees.
• Highway travelers who face less congestion the more other people
use transit. The federal Highway Trust Fund, most of which comes
from motor fuel taxes, dedicates 2.86 cents of the 18.3 cent federal
gas tax (or 16%) to transit capital costs. Many states have similar
transfers from highway users to transit systems. To be clear, the
purpose of transit is transport for people who use transit, not less
congestion for people who don’t.
• Land-owners whose value appreciates due to the option value
provided by transit, even when they themselves, or their tenants,
don’t use it.
• Society as a whole, which has fewer pollution externalities if more
people ride transit instead of driving alone in gasoline powered
automobiles.
All of these beneficiaries pay something, but they do not pay in
proportion to the benefit, because of the misperception that mass
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transit is a public good,52 like police or fire protection. In principle, 52 §A.
a public good is something that people cannot be prevented from
using, and that does not get worse the more people it serves. In
reality, transit is more like a club since we charge users all the time.
In fact, it would be technically fairly easy to charge users more.
The fear is that if users paid more, they would ride transit less.
Undoubtedly in the short run, if nothing else changed, a fare hike
would lead to a decrease in ridership. Yet many countries (including
Canada) have higher transit fares (and higher costs for competing
modes) along with higher transit ridership (and better service). With
exchange rates and complicated fare structures, however, there is no
perfectly fair comparison.
There is also the concern that transit is a merit good, so it is
aimed at serving poor passengers who cannot pay the average cost
of transit service. Overall, transit riders have lower than average
incomes. Yet many routes (think commuter rail and heavy rail
systems) have passengers with higher than average incomes. As we
discuss below, if you want to help poor people, give them money;
or, failing that, give or subsidize transport vouchers or transit
passes, rather than subsidizing the wealthy under guise of aiding
the poor.
But the primary problem with funding transit operations is not
that poor people are subsidized. Since the routes serving
low-income travelers are often profitable (fares cover operating
costs), it is that long-distance, inefficient suburban routes are very
heavily subsidized by profitable or near-profitable urban routes. If
the average farebox recovery in the US is one-third (as shown in
Table 4.4), many routes are much higher and other routes are much
lower. The lowest performing routes are typically in suburban
districts, where transit dollars are spent as part of a political bargain
to obtain some form of general revenue funding from suburban
jurisdictions.
An independent transit utility can raise fares, with the approval
of a public utilities commission. For a private firm, we would expect
that total revenues exceed total operating costs. The ratio of revenues
to operating costs is called ‘farebox recovery’.
Playing with this idea more deeply, we engage in two thought
experiments. The first considers this idea of full farebox recovery,
and what does it mean, and the second looks at a radically different
alternative: free transit.
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System Rate (%) System Rate (%) System Rate (%) System Rate (%)
Asia USA USA Australia
Hong Kong MTR 124 Amtrak 95 San Antonio (VIA) 12 Canberra 21
Osaka (Hankyu Railway) 123 Atlanta (MARTA) 30 San Diego MTS 39 Sydney 27
Osaka (OMTB) 137 Austin (CMTA) 10 San Francisco (BART) 70 Melbourne 30
JR East 84 Boston (MBTA) 30 Oakland Airport Connector 96
Tokyo Metro 119 Chicago (CTA) 55 San Francisco (Caltrain) 63 New Zealand
Tokyo Toei rail services 74 Chicago (Metra) 43 San Francisco (SFMTA) 35 Christchurch 35
Taipei Metro 100 Cleveland (GCRTA) 18 Santa Clara County (VTA) 10 Dunedin 60
Kaohsiung MRT 83 Dallas (DART) 14 So. Cal. (RRA) 42 Hamilton 34
Singapore (SMRT) 101 Detroit (DDOT) 20 Staten Island (MTA) 15 Wellington 57
Beijing Subway 59 Harrisburg, PA (CAT) 17 Washington, DC (WMATA) 42 Auckland 44
Las Vegas Monorail 56
Europe Long Island (MTA) 50 Canada
Amsterdam (GVB) 88 Los Angeles (LACMTA) 23 VIA Rail 51
Rotterdam (RET) 80 Maryland 23 Brampton (BT) 46
Berlin 70 Miami-Dade Transit 21 Calgary 50
Brussels 35 Minneapolis - St. Paul 25 Edmonton (ETS) 39
Copenhagen 52 New York City (MTA) 47 Mississauga (MiWay) 46
London Underground 107 New York City (NYC Ferry) 29 Montreal (STM) 46
Catalunya (FGC) 93 New York (Metro-North) 60 Ottawa (OC Transpo) 45
Madrid 41 New York (PATH) 44 Quebec City (RTC) 39
Milan 28 New Jersey (NJT) 45 Toronto (TTC) 70
Munich 70 Orlando (Lynx) 24 Toronto (GO Transit) 77
Prague (DPP) 53 Philadelphia (SEPTA) 38 Vancouver TransLink 55
Paris (STIF) 30 Pierce County, WA 30 Winnipeg 60
Stockholm 37 Philadelphia/ (PATCO) 49
Rome 36 Portland (TriMet) 30
Vienna 48 Seattle (King County Metro) 35
Helsinki 49 Seattle (Sound Transit) 42
Zurich 60
Table 4.4: Farebox Recovery
Rates. Source: (Wikipedia
contributors 2018c).
Thought experiment: full farebox recovery
Public transport in the US is heavily subsidized. Regardless of
whether this is a good thing, is 100% transit farebox recovery even
possible, or will a death spiral result in no users? This section
engages in a thought experiment to test what kinds of fares and
user subsidies would be needed to achieve 100% farebox recovery.
If 3 million people in the Twin Cities metro each purchased a
Metropass at $76 per month, that would be $2.736 billion per year
(about 9 times the current annual budget). This is highly unlikely
on a voluntary basis, the evidence for which is that we have not yet
seen it.
According to the Minnesota Department of Transportation total
budgets are $301 million per year on Metropolitan Council systems
for bus and LRT (excluding other services), so really only 330,000
pass-holders would be required to cover existing costs. This is just
an order of magnitude estimate, and certainly high since while a
large (but unknown) fraction of existing riders are essentially daily
riders, others are more infrequent riders and would still pay fares
rather than get a pass. The problem is that there are not 330,000
daily or near daily users of the system, instead there are 267,700
daily trips for Metro Transit, and a few more for suburban transit
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systems.53 Presumably about half that many persons ride daily, 53 These suburban systems are referred to
in the Twin Cities as ‘opt-outs’ since they
opted out of Metro Transit service.
assuming mostly round trips, and one round trip per day. This is
further complicated by transfers.
Working this problem in reverse to cover $301 million dollars in
expenditures from 267,700 trips (or 133,850 riders, assuming round
trips and no transfers) requires $2,250 per person per year54. But if 54 $187 from each person who rides per
monthfares increased to the equivalent of about $3.10 per trip (at 60 trips
per month), there would be fewer users.
How many fewer users?
Scenario 1. If users were now paying $2.25 per trip in fares
(two-way peak) and it increased to $3.10, that is a 39% increase in
effective user prices (though this is complicated by switching from
an out-of-pocket fare payment to a monthly pass). At an average
fare elasticity of -0.4, we would expect a decrease in ridership from
133,850 travelers each day to 114,000.55 55 (McCollom and Pratt 2004).
Total revenue drops to about $255 million per year.
Nevertheless, if Metro Transit could reduce costs by $46 million
without reducing service, good on them! That is however unlikely,
and we see aspects of the transit death spiral in place: Fewer riders
-> Less revenue -> Reduced Service -> Fewer Riders. This might
be self-limiting, as the weakest services affect the fewest number of
riders.
Alternatively, we could just keep raising prices until we reached
equilibrium. This reduces revenue and thus requires a rate increase,
which further reduces riders. This is also self-limiting, and in this
scenario the system ridership drops to just over 100,000 persons per
day (200,000 trips per day) at an annual Metropass rate of $2,988.
Scenario 2. A current farebox recovery ratio of 0.31 suggests riders
are not in fact paying an average of $2.25 per trip. Instead, it is about
$1.91/day or $0.95 per trip equivalent. Certainly some riders pay ‘full
freight.’ Other have passes and use more than the average number
of trips than a pass is equivalent to, ride in the off-peak, or otherwise
have discounts. Thus increasing to $3.10 for everyone would be more
than a 40% increase for some. In this case, we would need to increase
fares from $1.91/day to $6.17/day, a 223% increase. If riders actually
were expected to pay this, ridership would drop about 90%. Then
to continue full service (though why would we?), we would need to
increase daily rates to $56.22. This would reduce ridership to about
0. This is the full transit death spiral in action.
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There is a middle ground, retrenching service to that which is
profitable, which would lose riders and service, but hopefully lose
more costs than revenues.
Clearly we cannot uniformly more than triple real transit fares
as paid by patrons, in the absence of changing other costs in the
transport system, and expect the current set of riders to pay that.
A plausible policy would argue for ‘equity subsidies’ to cover the
difference for groups that society wants to provide aid to rather than
discounting fares for everyone alike.
Thought experiment: free transit
The foremost response to the thought experiment on farebox
recovery is that transit should be free. So why don’t we treat transit
like we treat elevators? Functionally they appear very similar,
though one operates on the horizontal and the other the vertical.
There are several answers.
• Sometimes we do charge for elevators, and while this is
admittedly rare, the cases are informative. The Empire State
Building charges users going to the observation deck, because the
users of the elevators are not paying rent in the building the
elevator serves and are not doing business with those who are.
Whether we are charging for the elevator or the view is not
always obvious. There is also an unpopular charge for some
elevators in China.56 The custom is of course that elevators (like56 (Lo 2018).
parking in most places in the US) is bundled into the rent. The
custom is not without reason, charging for elevator riders, like
charging tolls on drivers, or fares to riders, is an annoyance. The
mechanics are perhaps trickier, if you don’t have anyone
collecting the fare, do you have to have a turnstile at the elevator,
or just the first person who boards has to pay and everyone else
free-rides. Staffing the elevator is unnecessary. The honor system
would likely break-down, and proof-of-payment engenders an
enforcement problem. Also the marginal costs of elevators are
approximately zero.
• Sometimes we do give away transit, though this is rare as well,
and the cases are also informative. For instance, we give away
transit when there is a patron who views most of the riders as ‘us’
rather than ‘them.’ That is, for instance, the case at the University
of Minnesota, where every student pays (implicitly) a tax to ride
on the campus transitway, and the University subsidizes the rest
of the costs from other fees. The only people using the transitway
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are students, faculty, staff, and others doing business or research
at the University.
• Sometimes we give away transit in a business park. The punningly
named Emery-Go-Round in Emeryville, California, functionally a
business park with a few residents, is a circulator bus connecting
to the MacArthur BART station. This is an amenity for tenants,
and is paid for by a local Transport Management Association.
• Sometimes we give away transit in small cities. One of the largest
US cities with free transit is Vero Beach, Florida, with a
metropolitan population of 130,000 (though municipal
population of only 15,000) which is largely a tourist town. In
Tempe, Arizona, the city augments regional transit service with a
fare free circulator bus that is paid through a sales tax. The
largest city in the world offering free transit is Tallinn, Estonia, at
420,000 people (the metro area is only slightly larger at 543,000
people), which has only done so following a 2012 referendum.57 57 (Cats et al. 2014; 2017).
Yet Tallinn charges for tickets for non-residents. In short, Tallinn
residents are part of a largish club. The community (Tallinn)
identifies the riders as ‘us’ rather than ‘them.’
We could get into the causality of divisions into ‘us’ and ‘them,’
but we believe this is inherent in human nature:58 58 See the example from Muzafer Sherif’s
1954 Robbers Cave study of fifth grade
boys in Oklahoma (Sherif 2010).When individuals having no established relationships are brought
together to interact in group activities with common goals, they
produce a group structure with hierarchical statuses and roles within
it.
If two in-groups thus formed are brought into a functional
relationship under conditions of competition and group frustration,
attitudes and appropriate hostile actions in relation to the out-group
and its members will arise and will be standardized and shared in
varying degrees by group members.
So can buses (or if need be, trains) be the source of uniting the
community rather than a reflection of its divisions? The evidence of
casual empiricism suggests large communities inherently fracture
(red states vs. blue states) unless brought together under crisis (war,
tornado, etc.). The problems solved by transit (road congestion,
transport for the carless, emissions, the high cost of downtown and
University parking) do not seem a strong enough glue to overcome
this.
What would be the effect on a transit agency if fares went to
zero? Elasticities don’t necessarily hold constant over large ranges,
but a 100% reduction in fares at a -0.4 elasticity implies a 40%
increase in riders. In most US markets, this is too high.59 However,
59 And while the evidence is mixed,
Baum estimated -0.1 elasticity. (Baum
1973).
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with about a 5% work mode share for transit in the Twin Cities now,
this would increase transit work mode share to 7%. Assuming these
new transit riders were drawn proportionally from the other
existing modes this would reduce peak commuting auto mode
share in the Twin Cities from something like 78.3% to about 77%.
An improvement, but barely noticeable in terms of peak congestion,
since some of that gain will be contracted due to peak spreading
and induced demand.6060 §14.
The transit agency would need to make up the lost revenue or cut-
back service (reducing costs to cover that lost farebox revenue) since
its current 31% farebox recovery would go to 0%. Cutting service
by 31% while raising ridership by 40% would about double average
load factors (if done uniformly). When the bus is half empty, this
is not a problem. In peak times this would lead to crushing loads.
(Both the service cutbacks and the higher load factor would result in
ridership rising by well less than 40% – induced demand works in
reverse as well.)
Raising taxes for free transit seems politically difficult, though
technically it would be quite simple to raise a tax on something else.
For instance, a regressive sales tax on mostly non-transit users has
been mooted by the business and transit advocacy community to
subsidize transit.
Farelessness would make transit in the US more vulnerable to
cutbacks, as it would not have its own revenue source and unless it
were to gain massive ridership (and 7% work mode share does not
count as massive) it would still not have the political buy-in for
most people to see transit as serving ‘us’ rather than ‘them.’ The
reason we have ‘free’ rather than tolled roads is that almost
everyone identifies as a road user. To get the American driving
public to see mass transit in the same light requires a major
perception change.
Were transit free, very low value trips would get induced, for
instance, teenage joy-riding, which would impose a negative
externality on more serious riders.
When transit is on the left side of the U-shaped average cost
curve,61 with declining marginal costs, free can be argued as welfare61 §B.
improving. When transit has rising marginal costs (as in the peak,
or full commuter buses perhaps), free is a less appropriate option.
Transit is a private good,62 it is rivalrous in principle, and in62 §A.
practice during peak times, it is excludable. Further it can in many
markets be competitive, at least in terms of competitive tendering
for franchises, if not the full chaos of the market without property
rights in stops, which even libertarians have identified as
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City (£– 2012) City (£– 2012)
Paris 1.44 Amsterdam 2.28
Toulouse 1.35 Rotterdam 2.28
Berlin 1.94 Stockholm 4.20
Munich 1.01 Gothenburg 2.39
Rome 0.84 Oslo 3.39
Milan 1.27 Tokyo 1.25
Madrid 1.27 Osaka 1.56
Barcelona 1.69 New York City 1.41
Montreal 3.39
Table 4.5: Global transit
fares. Single price ticket in
central zone. Source: (MVA
Consultancy 2013).
problematic.63 Funding at zero fares like a club good is plausible if 63 (Klein et al. 1997).
you can clearly define an appropriate funding club (a small
municipality, a business park, a university). Funding it at zero
marginal fares when members pay a fixed seasonal or annual pass
is more promising.
Higher fares should be accompanied by full cost pricing for
competing transport modes – in other words, higher gas taxes or
road tolls. Low-income users should get a direct subsidy from the
public, not from the transit utility. This is akin to the universal
service fund telephone utilities often offer.
Comparison of fares around the world. Table 4.5 compares
fares globally. The US has lower fares than elsewhere.
If poor riders were subsidized for some large fraction of the
difference between current fares and the new fares, it could produce
a farebox recovery rate of about 100% (depending on actual fare
elasticities), compared to the 30-40% typical in US cities.
A perhaps more important point is that Canada has higher fares
than the US, a higher farebox recovery rate than the US, better transit,
and higher transit mode shares. What are they doing more right than
the United States? We discuss this with the question of federalism.64 64 §17.3.
The competitive environment for transit limits how
high rates can go. In cities with a greater dependence on transit
(and greater inconvenience for driving), transit agencies have more
latitude to raise fares. The political environment also matters, and it
may be simpler politically to subsidize rides for everyone, not just
those who need it.
Lowering costs can also increase farebox recovery ratios, by
lowering the denominator (expenses) instead of raising the
numerator (revenue). As discussed elsewhere, transport costs too
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much,65 so there are probably a number of possibilities for reducing65 §9.1.
expenses.
There are many policy alternatives for fares between $4.50 and
$8.00 day, there is no magic number. Until transit is again privatized
without subsidy there is no requirement for 100% fare recovery. It
would almost certainly be a bad idea to do this kind of change
overnight, large systems need transitions. Still, raising base fares
should be on the table to give transit agencies more operational
independence and to reframe their status from [whatever it is now]
to what it once was and will eventually be again, a public utility
providing a service in exchange for consideration.6666 To be clear, as long as driving
remains cheap there is little that can be
done via subsidy to make transit more
competitive. Drivers should pay the full
cost of driving.
Great cities have great transit and their users pay more for it.
4.4 Subsidize users not systems
Even though there is broad agreement that transit should be
subsidized, there is no agreement on how to subsidize or how much
to subsidize. Consider capital and operating subsidy. These are
related, but different enough that they should be addressed
separately.
Capital subsidy can be direct or indirect (such as assistance with
land acquisition), and these monies come from federal, state,
metropolitan, local and sub-local sources. Traditionally capital
subsidy has largely come from federal and state sources, though
recently local sources have used sponsorship67 and value capture.6867 See the Emirates Airways gondola in
London, for instance.
68 See the 7 train extension to the West
Side of Manhattan. The topic is
discussed more in §16.
Capital subsidy for transit expansion rarely, if ever, considers the
effects capacity and network expansion have on operating subsidy,
however. Since every transit system in the United States requires an
operating subsidy, every service expansion increases the required
operating subsidy and makes the financial position of transit
agencies worse over the medium and long term. In the US, unlike
many European countries, there is not even a requirement that
benefit/cost analyses, projections, or planning consider what
system expansion will do to operating budgets.
Operating subsidies are from local, regional and state sources.
The federal government placed severe limits on using federal
money for operations in the 1970s, in part because most of the
increases in subsidy went to total wages without any increase in
productivity.69 The primary reason for operating subsidy for US69 (Pucher et al. 1983).
systems now seems to be “that’s the way we do it here,” which is
not a proper justification. Many of the cities around the world have
much higher farebox recovery, fewer operating subsidies and much
higher ridership than transit in the United States. Maryland for
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instance considered a 35% cost recovery requirement for transit.70 70 (Shaver 2017).
This suggests a justification for less subsidy and higher fares:
planning without prices leads to bad planning.
The case for subsidy. For some public goods the case is obvious.
In the absence of excludability and rivalry, one needs to get revenue
from somewhere to operate a service that provides public benefits.
• Transit often operates on the left-hand side of the U-shaped cost
curve.71 Fixed costs are spread over more and more users as the 71 §B.
quantity demanded increases, while marginal costs remain small
if not zero. If we charge riders an average cost for a service with
near zero marginal cost (which is an approximation of the
situation in transit in the absence of crowding, certainly in terms
of the short run marginal cost, ignoring a few things like the
delays which boarding imposes on other passengers), we get
under-consumption and under-supply compared to the social
optimum. That means if we charge more than the marginal cost
of the ride, we get a less than socially optimal number of
passengers (there is a deadweight loss). Somebody who would
ride at a lower price that was still at least as high as their
marginal cost cannot. The social benefit (consumer’s surplus) of
that unmade trip is foregone. Unfortunately because of high
fixed costs, this implies that fares at marginal cost will not
recover total costs. Thus the natural monopoly / economies of
scale or density / declining fixed cost is one aspect that might
warrant subsidy.
• There are network externalities associated with public transit. The
more users of transit there are on a system, the more useful the
system is for everyone.72 72 §A.4.
• Transit helps the transport disadvantaged.73 This is part of the 73 §21.
argument used for the creation of the Urban Mass Transport Act
in 1964, the first federal program to provide assistance to public
transport. Equity or welfare has often been an argument in favor
of subsidy, that we do it to provide benefits for people unable to
afford otherwise, or transport for the disadvantaged. This gets
more into values than economics, but there are some people who
would be employed but for their ability to access jobs, so some
subsidy on the transport front is at least partially repaid by more
economic productivity.
• Transit subsidy helps poor jurisdictions. Spatial cross-subsidies
help poor jurisdictions rather than poor people.
• Transit arguably reduces congestion,74 on other modes, by taking 74 §5.
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cars off the road, and therefore benefits drivers (who should thus
pay for it).
• Transit stimulates economic development.7575 §11.20.
• Cars are subsidized, therefore transit should be subsidized.
These aspects argue in favor of subsidy. But then the questions
arise: Subsidy from whom? Subsidy for what? What is the
appropriate base for providing subsidy?
Here we argue in favor of a club good,76 model. People in the76 §A.
Club should help subsidize the service.
The beneficiaries of transit are relatively local. If we live in
Phoenix, the option of riding transit in Las Vegas or Curitiba is of
essentially zero value. The option of riding transit within the
greater metro area is of some value, and the option of riding transit
in downtown is of high value. The option of riding transit that runs
directly from home to the desired destination is the highest value.
Benefits diminish with distance from the system.
We can define the Club more narrowly as anyone who might
want to use transit and is willing to pay (or whose employer or
university is willing to pay or help pay) for a season pass. One
example of this is apartment building managers who supply their
tenants with shuttle vans.77 An advantage of using a season pass77 For an example from Pittsburgh, see
(Walnut Capital 2018). model (rather than pay per trip) is the ability that it presents in
providing services without excessively under-pricing the transit
service. Whoever wants to provide transport benefits for the
transport disadvantaged can subsidize those whom they want
without subsidizing everyone.
We can define the Club a bit more broadly as landowners whose
property value is increased by the presence of transit. The option of
riding transit sometimes is public good (i.e. the option is neither
rivalrous nor excludable), and its value is embedded in locations
near transit stations. This appears to justify some form of value
capture approach (of which property tax is the most widely used,
but certainly not the most direct or efficient mechanism).
Both of these clubs are smaller than the municipalities in which
transit operates, and much smaller than higher levels of government,
like county, state, or nation.
The case against subsidy. Though there are clearly some
arguments in favor, we promised arguments against transit subsidy
as well.
• Transit is basically a private good. Private goods can be privately
provided, which aligns incentives of the producer with their
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revenue model directly, better performance is rewarded, worse
performance is punished. When all transit lines – and road
networks for that matter – are planned and operated below cost
we simply don’t have any idea what the true value of any service
is. This is true whether publicly or privately supplied. As we
write this, large amounts of venture capital are subsidizing travel
through Uber, Lyft, Didi, Bridj, Chariot and others – and we
simply don’t know what actual demand is where the firms can
be profitable. We suspect they do not either. If fares increase to
cover costs, or at least come closer to covering costs, service can
adapt to revealed demand and firms and households can adapt
accordingly. Without proper prices we don’t know where to
increase capacity or improve service. We can’t identify actual
bottlenecks or spread peak demand across more hours in the day
by using dynamic pricing. By planning service while blind to the
value of the service, everybody is a bit worse off and many actual
transit riders are substantially worse off.
• The network effects might be relatively small either because they
are already played out (high frequency service in a high density
city), or because they never will be (low frequency service in a
low density city). The best opportunity is thus low frequency
service in a high density city, in which service can be increased.
Downscaling may need to occur in places with high frequency and
low density. Many technologies have network effects but don’t
require public subsidy. From Facebook to your ATM networks
the amount of public subsidy is zero, or small. What is usually
required is a monopoly (AT&T of yore, airline hubs), some type of
lock-in (social networks), collusion (credit cards), or cooperation
(the English Language), which readers of this book all use without
the government subsidizing.
• Though there are always returns to density (more riders on the
bus always lowers the cost per passenger on the bus), bus
systems have approximately constant returns to scale (more
buses are not less expensive per bus than fewer buses). Many
places have figured out an economic model which does work
from a profitability stance. There is little reason economically to
run a service with many buses under the auspices of a single
monopolistic organization. Constant returns industries don’t
warrant the same subsidy as increasing returns industries.
• While it is claimed transit should be subsidized to stimulate
economic development, it is also claimed that economic
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development should be subsidized because it stimulates transit.
It is not clear which, if either, or both, are driving this cart.7878 §11.20.
• Fixed route transit may be made obsolete by new technologies,
especially outside of cities and in off-peak periods.
• One bad subsidy does not deserve another. Just because cars are
subsidized is not a reason to subsidize transit. It is an argument
to remove the subsidies that exist. Technically (if not politically)
it would be relatively easy to charge cars for their full cost (i.e.
eliminate their subsidy) via higher fuel taxes (or mileage fees) but
the amount of the incremental charge would have a very small
effect on total automobile use.
• As for the Mohring effect,79 how much should a transit rider pay79 §A.4.
for the bus or train not taken (subsidy for options)? Consider a
downtown worker who prefers to take transit to work, but
sometimes has to work late into the evening. There is lots of
service for typical 9-5 employment, but a major reason workers
are comfortable on transit is that they know there is adequate
service for occasional trips such as when they work late. Let’s say
that a optimal fare that covers direct costs for a rush hour bus is
$2, but every other week a worker has to stay until 9:00 pm when
service is infrequent. Should the regular fare be $2.20 to reflect
the required subsidy for the not-full 9:00 pm bus? Or should
occasional trips be shifted to taxis or made the employers’
problem? In Manhattan most corporate employers will pay for a
taxicab home for employees who work past 9:00 pm, and San
Francisco employees are more likely to ride transit to work if
they know that they can take a cab for their return trip.80 As this80 (Hara and Canapary 2013).
is off-peak time for taxicabs perhaps this is a more optimal
solution than subsidizing increased fixed-route services.
• Finally there are many reasons not to trust the recent experience in
transport with investment. The costs are too high and the benefits
are too low. Giving more funds to existing institutions to build
more capital-intensive infrastructure while existing infrastructure
deteriorates may not produce the hoped for results.
4.5 Refactoring subsidies
There are poor people, and society won’t give them enough money
directly, (demand-side subsidies). Should society then subsidize
services for them (i.e. provide supply-side subsidies to the public
sector)?81 Clearly that is what the US does. But what should the US81 See (Freemark 2011) making the case
for spatial subsidies. do for the poor?
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The public should subsidize transport for the disadvantaged from
non-transport specific revenue sources. Perhaps the biggest problem
with current subsidies is that they are place-based and not people-
based. Why should the entire system be subsidized? Also, why
should a professor pay the same fare as students? Or in New York,
why should former Mayor Bloomberg, the richest guy in the city, pay
the same fare as the cleaning staff of Bloomberg, Inc.?
Demand-side solution: Give them money. The greatest
consequence of an effective fare increase to cover 100% of operating
costs would be on the poor. One strategy (which appeals to
libertarian and rationalist sensibilities) for dealing with this
problem is the negative income tax (endorsed by both Milton
Friedman and the US Green Party), i.e. give the poor money to
spend as they choose.82 There are some public policies which do 82 (Friedman 2013).
this (Earned Income Tax Credit), and others which have been
proposed (Universal Basic Income) but nothing so blatant as
systematic cash handouts. It is a clean elegant solution that avoids
distortions. Hence politicians don’t like it.
One of the concerns is with incentives. If we just gave people
money for being poor, wouldn’t we get more poor people? The other
concern often raised is one of financial responsibility. Some people
are poor temporarily due to bad luck or circumstance. Others have
trouble with financial management – just giving money would not
help.
Demand-side solution: Transport choice - give them
transport vouchers. If policy-makers don’t trust the poor with
money, and this seems to be the attitude of American society, which
does not actually give much money directly to poor people, give
transport vouchers to the poor to spend on transport as they choose.
Policymakers should transform today’s system of mass-transit
subsidies into an individual transport-choice program directed to
meeting the needs of consumers rather than producers, by
providing transport vouchers to America’s neediest. Low-income
people would be issued accounts and smartcards giving them
access to a set benefit that could be used for any eligible public or
private transport service (including transit fares and passes, taxi
rides, gasoline, tolls, car purchases, and car repairs).
We propose that this replace the bulk of the Federal Transit
Administration’s program grants for specific capital investments,
which would be defunded. States, metro areas, and localities that
wanted to invest in new transit infrastructure could still do so, but
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would make choices that were locally worthwhile given their own
situations, rather than decisions based on the premise that someone
else will pick up half the bill. Existing mechanisms like user fees,
land value capture, taxes, bonds, or non-forgivable loans from state
(or perhaps federal) infrastructure banks remain as ways to fund
and finance such investments.
This proposal would provide help to a broader base of low-income
families, not just those fortunate enough to live along new transit
lines. Instead of assuming what types of transport people should
use, it would give people a choice of how to spend transport dollars
in a way that best suits their own lives. Many travelers will choose
transit, paying for the services they use. But transit is not the best
choice for all (or even most) low-income workers, so why should
transit infrastructure be subsidized on equity grounds?
Rather than subsidizing all travelers with low fares, transit
operators could be permitted to raise fares as necessary with fewer
concerns about equity, since low-income travelers would have
vouchers specifically for that purpose. The share of operating costs
paid by fares should increase from the current average of 33%.
Because the stream of revenue would be higher, cost-effective
projects would be more likely to break-even operationally and repay
capital costs over time, and thus could be justified as investments.
The risk is that the poor with the transport voucher might find
buying a car or gasoline83 is a better decision than riding transit,83 §21.
especially if their jobs and homes don’t align with the network.
While this is presumably better for the individual traveler (why
would they allocate their resources that way if it weren’t), it doesn’t
help the transit agency or other travelers, as it weakens transit
service by removing the positive externality they would otherwise
generate, and adds to congestion on roads in the short run.
Demand-side solution: Give them public transit
vouchers. And if transport vouchers are unacceptable, public
transit-only vouchers are also straight-forward, and better for the
transit agency itself. This could be administered by topping up a
recipient’s per use transit pass with $X per week, or giving a
monthly pass, or some other mechanism. Recipients of top-ups
would use the same smartcard as everyone else, so no public stigma
is attached to using the card. Moving towards smartcard systems is
efficient all around, saving boarding times and reducing transit run
times. It could also be administered when anyone qualifies for other
social services, such as unemployment insurance or food assistance.
If people have trouble eating they probably have trouble with the
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expense of travel. For instance, the city of Seattle pays the transit
agency $3.8 million per year in order to provide free transit passes
for all public high school students.84 It accomplishes the 84 (Gutman 2018).
appropriate ends, without burdening the transit system with this
welfare function. It also allows freedom for funds to be spent on
taxi or rental car as needed (if in cash-equivalent form), rather than
just fixed-route transit.85 Just because some people are poor does 85 (King 2009).
not mean they don’t have other transport needs.
Presently, the ‘budget’ for subsidies for the poor comes from the
transit agency. Instead the budget for negative income tax, transport
vouchers, or transit vouchers should come from general revenue, as
the primary objective is to help individual people, not transit
systems. These funds would be billed to a separate government
agency (let’s call it the ‘Transport Opportunities Office’) which is
completely separate from the transit organization.
Who should pay for social fares? King County Metro, in
Washington, announced a low-income fare policy in 2015. This is
from the King County press release:86 86 (King County Executive Dow
Constantine 2014).
“Rising housing costs are leading many families to locate in
lower-cost locations that may be farther away from where they work,”
said Mike Heinisch, executive director of South King Council of
Human Services. “Providing a low-income fare is one way we can
help keep the region more affordable for working families and ensure
equal access to economic opportunity.”
“As a social service agency, we work with people who are in dire
need of affordable public transport to get to training classes, meet
with case managers, find and get to jobs and health care
appointments, as well as other important appointments,” said
Mahnaz Kourourian Eshetu, executive director of Refugee Women’s
Alliance. “The efforts of our County Executive and County staff to
make the discounted transit fare widely available to people who need
it the most is admirable and will have a positive effect on the
County’s economy while creating stronger communities. It was an
honor to serve on this task force.”
“King County is one of the first regions in the nation to put a
low-income fare in place, helping to make sure that our bus service
really is serving the whole community,” said Alison Eisinger, director
of Seattle-King County Coalition on Homelessness. “We can be very
proud that we are putting our values into practice in this way, by
taking a big step that will help advance greater equity and access to
opportunity. Thousands of people, and our community as a whole,
will benefit from this progressive policy."
While laudable, why is it the transit agency’s responsibility to
pay the $8 million or so annually? So Human Services, the Refugee
Women’s Alliance, and the Coalition on Homelessness are all part
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of a coalition supporting low fares for certain groups. While we
agree that all of these groups deserve affordable travel, we don’t see
why these benefits should be paid directly from the transit budget.
Expecting the transit provider to also provide social services is not
sustainable unless someone directly pays for those social services.
The public has a social obligation to provide access to opportunities,
but this doesn’t mean the mass transit operators should pay for
social programs.
Don’t subsidize everybody. Only as a last resort should we
distort an entire transport mode and drive it into perpetual ‘crisis’
mode for the sake of subsidizing a subset of users. This worst
solution is to subsidize transit for all riders. This needlessly reduces
the resources available to operate the transit system, and keeps
transit agencies in the subservient position of having to beg for
money on a regular basis rather than being fully funded by their
users.
Supply-side solutions: Build them stuff, Run them lines.
If politically it is too hard to actually help the poor directly with
demand side subsidies, which might pull through new investments,
we can push service and subsidize that spatially. Clearly it is less
efficient, and likely winds up benefitting the wealthy at least as much
as the poor. To use this last resort is basically the problem of the first
best and second best.87 In the first best world, we act as if everything87 See: (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956).
else is also optimized, in the second best, we optimize given the
suboptimality of the rest of the world. But by doing so, we consign
the rest of the world to suboptimality as well.
Just as roads are underfunded and we see congestion, because
they are not priced properly and spending is too focused on
expansion rather than preservation, a point that is made elsewhere
in this book, transit is underfunded and we see both crowding in
some places and literally, (yes literally) empty buses in others, both
of which are the consequence of severe misallocation of resources to
achieve the what Jarrett Walker calls ‘coverage’ aims.8888 (Walker 2012).
Places that would see service dropped once you went to an
appropriate funding model are not the poor inner-city areas, which
are (or ought to be with appropriate management, regulation, etc.)
profitable given their relatively high densities, but instead the low
density suburban routes. (Recognizing that the poor are
suburbanizing in many metropolitan areas). The current model is
largely a cross-subsidy from the poorer areas to the middle-class
areas.
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UCLA transport planning professor Brian Taylor writes:89 89 (Taylor 1991).
Federal subsidies of public transit, particularly transit operations, are
declining and the responsibility for supporting transit is falling
increasingly on states and localities. In California, the Transport
Development Act (TDA) has become the state’s principal source of
transit operating subsidies. It is found that the strict per capita
allocation formulas of the TDA strongly favor lightly patronized
suburban transit service over more heavily patronized service in the
central cities. Transit riders in San Francisco, for example, receive a
TDA subsidy of $0.13 per trip, whereas the TDA subsidy to transit
patrons in suburban Livermore is over $5.00 per trip. The built-in
suburban bias of the TDA is the result of partisan compromises made
to secure passage of the Act in 1971 – compromises to assuage a
Republican governor opposed to new taxes – and to include the
interests of rural and suburban counties. The result has been a
proliferation in California of new, well-funded, and expanding
suburban transit operators that attract few riders whereas older,
heavily patronized central city transit operators are forced to cut
service because of funding shortfalls.
While the numbers have changed since he wrote that, the basic
observation stands.

5
The Solution to Congestion
Figure 5.1: Congestion due to
taxis in New York City at Penn
Station. Photo by D. Levinson.
In many ways, congestion is the reciprocal of mobility, the ease
of movement on the network. Congestion occurs when a facility is
overcrowded. So if a bridge can carry 3,600 people an hour,1 but 1 Its capacity is given by (Qbridge,capacity =
3,600).at 7:00 am 4,000 people want to use it,2 we say it is congested. At
2 Its demand is given by (Qbridge,0700 =
4,000).the end of the hour, there will be 400 people left waiting to use the
bridge, who will presumably be first in line to use it during the next
hour.3 Congestion can occur on all modes, since every mode has a 3 This is a first-come, first-serve process,
and applies to many queues.capacity, and on any facility, which again have some capacity.
In practice, many modes operate very far from capacity, have
excess, unused, or spare capacity, and thus don’t see congestion
with additional users. Congestion matters to users because of the
delay that results,4 the travel time above and beyond what the user 4 Congestion can also add to travel time
uncertainty, which is another cost to
users.
would have experienced in its absence.
Congestion is bad. In economic terms it is a deadweight loss.
If we could organize everyone better, we could have travel without
96 a political economy of access
congestion, some people would just wait longer at home or work
before departing, to avoid queueing.55 The basic equation for travel by
automobile is given by:
v = t · d · s (5.1)
where:
• v = vehicle kilometers traveled,
• t = total number of trips,
• d = average trip length (km),
• s = share of trips by auto.
If there were fewer travelers, or they
used their cars less, or they traveled
shorter distances there would be less
travel.
We can measure flow (qn,h) in
network area (a road segment, a bridge,
a neighborhood, a city) (n) per hour (h).
qn,h = tn,h · sn,h (5.2)
If the travelers traveled at times
when there were fewer other travelers,
there would be less congestion.
The basic equation for delay due to
congestion (x) is
x = f
✓
qn,h
qn,0
◆
(5.3)
where:
• h = index of hours,
• k = index of network areas,
• qn,h = flow on network area (n) per
hour (h),
• qn,0 = hourly capacity on network
area (n),
• x = delay due to congestion.
Reducing travel is largely a behavioral change, though it is
affected by the distribution of activities and by the structure of the
network, increasing capacity requires investment or technological
shifts.
5.1 Welcome to the club
So your city has traffic congestion.
Welcome to the club. Congestion not only wastes time, it
increases pollution and crashes. While this undoubtedly annoys
you as a traveler, it could be worse; your city might not have
congestion because no one wants to be there. Still, it would be great
to have a thriving city without congestion. People could reach more
destinations in less travel time, and thus have more time to spend
doing the things they wanted.
Political double-speak today ‘addresses congestion’ rather than
‘solves congestion’ (almost twice as often according to Google). This
is probably because policy-makers want to sound like they are
doing something without promising anything. But talking to
congestion doesn’t accomplish much.
There are a number of proffered solutions out there. Congestion
is, in principle, a mostly solvable problem, even if no fast-growing
city has fully solved it. This chapter outlines many ways that
congestion could be solved. Some of these are dumb, many are
good, one is great.
5.2 Supply-side solutions
The first set of strategies are basically supply side.
Capacity. Perhaps the most obvious, ‘common sense,’ solution
when demand (traffic) is in excess of supply is to expand capacity.
This is what we do with most things if we can. In roads, this
usually means adding lanes to existing roads.
The first problem with this solution is that it is expensive. In
many places where you want capacity, existing buildings are built
close to (or on) the proposed expanded right-of-way, so taking them
in addition to being costly brings in an additional socio-political
dynamic – people don’t like to be moved.
Unfortunately, there are rising costs (and diminishing returns) to
capacity investments. All the high benefit, low cost projects have
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already been done. Lack of space in built areas means to add
capacity cities look to build elevated or tunneled roads (since all the
good surface rights-of-way are already used). This is extremely
expensive (look at Seattle’s Alaskan Way or Boston’s Big Dig or
Sydney’s WestConnex).6 Perhaps there will be technological 6 The Big Dig came out at $US14.6
billion. The Alaskan Way Viaduct
replacement tunnel has been estimated
at $US3.3 billion. WestConnex is
expected to cost $AU18.6 billion.
breakthroughs which reduce the costs of tunneling, or other
construction. It hasn’t happened yet.
Further, if you expand capacity, demand7 will respond. While
7 §14.population isn’t growing rapidly in the developed countries,
travelers will switch routes, time-of-day, mode, and destination to
take advantage of the new faster travel times, which means these
wider roads won’t be nearly as much faster as hoped for. New
(induced) developments will be built, and much of the capacity will
quickly be used up by new travelers. There will still likely be a
small amount of travel time saved for existing travelers, and the
new travelers do gain benefits (otherwise why would they make the
trip), so it is not necessarily a bad thing, but it may not solve your
congestion problem.
Connectivity. Often the problem is not width of the road, but
where it goes. A new road that goes directly to the right place can
replace a longer route that doesn’t. So reducing the circuity
(indirectness) of the network through selected connections can
reduce congestion and total traffic by taking traffic off of longer
routes. Even when there is nominal connectivity, it might not be
very good. A bridge can replace much slower and lower capacity
ferries, eliminating a bottleneck. But as with capacity expansions
above, it can be very expensive. In a mature network, all the cheap
and useful roads have been built already. A new connection may be
cheap, or it may be useful, but it won’t be both. The induced
demand outcome also applies, and improved connectivity will
increase travel.
Closure. Perhaps counter-intuitively, if we shut down key links
on the network, we could also reduce congestion. If people can’t
get across the River, they won’t drive from home to the River either,
reducing traffic along that path. Just as there is induced demand
when capacity is added, there is reduced demand when it is taken
away, as after the I-35W Mississippi River Bridge collapse.8 8 (Zhu et al. 2010).
In selected cases there is something called Braess’ Paradox,9 which 9 See (Braess et al. 2005; Murchland 1970;
Pas and Principio 1997; Rapoport et al.
2009; Steinberg and Zangwill 1983).
says that some links result in an increase in overall travel time when
they are added (and so reduce overall travel time when they are
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closed) because individual selfish routing choices can lead to bad
outcomes.
One solution for reducing traffic congestion that is seldom
discussed is banning the car, at least in places, which undoubtedly
reduces traffic congestion locally. Many city centers in Europe are
banning the private car. So, there are now and will be more places
that are free of traffic.
Controls. The next most obvious solution is to use the
infrastructure we have better. When we have a stop sign controlled
intersection, and there are long queues, we add traffic lights, which
manage traffic better because there is less time lost in starting and
stopping. Coordinating traffic lights on a city street grid can make
sure more vehicles hit green lights in sequence. The use of controls
(also called capacity management) on freeways includes devices like
ramp meters, the traffic lights at freeway on-ramps, that manage the
input flow to keep the freeway flowing (more) freely (than it
otherwise would). Traffic engineers have suites of controls that
manage traffic flow and squeeze in a few more cars on the same set
of pavement by reducing the size of gaps between vehicles. These
can help. These all may be worthwhile. However, this is on the
order of a 10% reduction in congestion, rather than the 100% we
would like to see. And these gains are potentially absorbed by both
general traffic growth where that occurs, and induced demand in a
mature system.
Crashes. It is sometimes estimated that half of all delay is due to
non-recurring congestion, most notably crashes.10 First, we want10 §7.7.
people not to crash. Crashes can be reduced by better designed
roads, such as greater separation of vehicles, slower speeds or, in
some cases, increasing the mix of traffic as suggested by Hans
Monderman.11 Crashes can also be reduced with better-trained11 (Vanderbilt 2008).
drivers. Making licensure more difficult so the drivers are better is
one strategy. Making driving more expensive so fewer people (and
especially fewer marginal drivers) are driving is also significant.
More importantly, crashes can be reduced by better-designed
drivers. Over the longer term, we need to replace the human with
the machine. Second, we want crashes to be cleared quickly. Quick
emergency response helps save injured travelers. Freeway service
patrols (under various names) help clear crashes and reduce the
amount of subsequent delay.
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Figure 5.2: Recreation of famous
Munster image. Road space:
bus vs. bikes vs. cars. Photo
by Canberra Cycling Promotion
Fund. (Bowen 2012).
Construction. Maintaining roads is important, without proper
maintenance they would eventually cease to be. But closing entire
roads for construction can’t be the right strategy, can it? Well, it
depends. The alternative, trying to do construction one lane at a
time will take much longer. So for a four lane road, closing one lane
at a time for six months each will take two years, but closing all
four lanes, and requiring travelers to detour might take less than six
months as it is more efficient.12 Doing all work at night or weekends 12 (Hourdos and Hong 2010).
is another strategy. The cost of the delays vs. the cost of construction
need to be properly weighed.
Competing modes. Just as widening a road is in theory a solution
to a congestion problem, building a competing mode is also a
theoretical solution. By building a rapid transit line or running an
express bus, or even building sidewalks and bike lanes, other people
may switch off the road, leaving the roads faster for the rest of us.
The traditional induced demand argument follows. The evidence
on this is weak though, most transit construction serves transit
riders (which is a good thing) and doesn’t reduce congestion much.
Gauge. Track gauge, the width of railroad tracks, determines the
width of the trains. As with railroads, the gauge of roads has been
largely determined, with freeway lanes being 3.65 m wide,13 and 13 12 f t.
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cars, buses, and trucks are narrower so that they fit. Lanes on
surface streets vary a bit more, but tend to be similarly sized in
newer developments. Most cars carry one person most of the time,
but are sized for at least four, two in parallel, and two rows. If cars
were half as wide, we could fit twice as many in the same space.
This is what we do with motorcycles and bicycles. Pedestrians can
even fit more, as shown in Figure 5.2. Before the motorcar, long
distance travel by horse was one man / one horse usually, and the
occasional horse and carriage for multi-person trips or cargo. Now
the carriage is brought along whether it is needed or not, wasting
space and delaying others. Redefining the gauge of road lanes, so
that lanes at least are split for narrower cars could double capacity.
Storage. On surface streets, we waste pavement storing parked
cars, usually for free. A lane or turn-lane or half-lane or bike-lane or
bus-lane can often be added in the space devoted to unmoving metal,
increasing throughput. Adjacent property owners are often under
the mistaken impression they or their customers have a right to park
(for free!) on the public street in front of their house. When there is
no congestion, this is not a problem. Where there is congestion, this
artificial right14 is costly to society.14 §4.1.
Land development. Land development, regulated or not by land
use planning, can increase accessibility, it can make cities more
valuable, and it can increase transit ridership, and in selected cases,
can reduce traffic.
Balancing housing and jobs, so that they are located near each
other, logically reduces travel compared to a situation where those
same jobs are far apart. This has long been understood in the
transport planning community,15 but is not well grasped among the15 (Cervero 1989; Levinson 1998).
general public.
However, moving a fixed number of things around is not how
cities actually grow. Telling place A you taking away their
employment is controversial. More generally new things are added.
It is commonly asserted that more development adds to
congestion. And often this is true. But not always, it depends on the
type of development. More housing in a housing-rich and job-poor
area will result in more total travel. More employment in a job-rich,
housing poor area will do similarly. More housing in a job-rich area,
and more jobs in a housing-rich area can actually reduce travel.
There are also marginal things about where you locate driveways
and such, but the main issue is that development density, which is
good for transit, will increase rather than decrease the number of
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people in any give space and thus congestion in its vicinity. Each
additional traveler has a non-zero likelihood of using a car, adding
to traffic congestion. Even if travelers don’t own their cars, evidence
to date suggests that ridehailing, such as Uber, adds substantially to
congestion in dense cities where auto ownership is low.16 16 (Schaller 2018).
Allowing or encouraging mixed uses will reduce some need for
some travel, as people can do multiple things on-site, and reduce
trip lengths, but the basic laws of travel demand are that more
people, jobs, shops, restaurants, will generate more traffic locally
than fewer people. It is also the case that as trip distances and costs
decrease, people will travel more often. In a place like Manhattan,
people frequently walk to the grocery store daily, while in suburban
Phoenix, a weekly or fortnightly trip to stock up at Costco is more
common.
On the plus side, increased density can help reduce exposure to
congestion. Since places to go are closer together in denser cities,
travelers might spend the trip in congested conditions but the overall
time spent traveling is lower than for spreadout areas. If congestion
is measured as increased time delay per unit of distance traveled,
by reducing the distance traveled overall delay and congestion will
decline.17 17 Joe Cortwright at City Observatory
developed this idea more fully
(Cartwright 2014).
5.3 Demand-side solutions
But congestion is caused by a mismatch of supply and demand, so
the remaining strategies focus on demand.
This first set of solutions addresses supply, the capacity side of the
equation. The second set of solutions address demand.
Locating. Putting land use into a pattern that makes it easy to
travel is a supply-side strategy to reduce congestion. The demand
side analog is choosing to locate conveniently. If only other people
lived near where they worked (shopped, studied), they wouldn’t
have to travel as far, and so would be on the roads less (assuming
they still traveled by car) or not at all (if they walked). While at
some level, people coordinate location of origin and destination
(they are usually in the same metropolitan area), they could
certainly do so better. From a public policy perspective, moving
more jobs close to where people live, and more people to where the
jobs are, increasing the local balance between jobs and housing can
reduce travel. In practice this is difficult, as there is no mechanism
to require people to take local jobs or firms to employ local
residents. The best municipalities can do is implement zoning18 18 §13.
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that permits developers to build appropriate developments.
Still, ensuring the opportunities are there is one thing (and at
best you can ensure developers are permitted to develop these
opportunities), ensuring people partake of those opportunities is
another. The cost of this also needs to be considered. There are
reasons many firms like to locate near other firms rather than
workers, which has to do with economies of agglomeration and the
efficiencies that can be had from close inter-firm coordination.1919 §12.
Telepresence. At the extreme of mutually co-locating home with
respect to work is working at home. This involves no commuting
travel outside the home, though may induce some additional
non-work travel outside the peak. This has been growing slowly
over the past decades, and is amenable for many, but by no means
most, jobs. Like location, this is largely an individual decision.
Better broadband would help, and encouraging employers to allow
or require employees to work from home would not reduce this
trend, but it is hard to see outside of money or regulation in some
form what persuades firms to behave differently with regards to
incentives for where employees work. Still, the more people that
tele-commute (tele-shop, etc.) the fewer that are traveling, all else
equal, which it never is.
Information. People are terribly inefficient routers, choosing
routes that are not only not the shortest for society (which is to be
expected) but not the shortest for themselves either.20 Using20 (Zhu and Levinson 2015; Tang and
Levinson 2018). real-time traveler information rather than their own intuition and
incomplete mental maps, drivers can find the shortest path to their
destination, reducing their trip length and travel time, and reducing
congestion for others. This comes at a cost, however, as research
suggests that real-time mapping has diminished our cognitive maps
and ability to navigate cities without aid.2121 (Neyfakh 2013).
Autonomy. If we can get the driver out of the loop, so cars can
drive themselves, we could narrow lanes (and thus get more of
them per unit of pavement) and cars could follow more closely.
While humans can barely safely drive with a two-second following
distance between vehicles, autonomous vehicles with advanced
sensors, in an environment where most or all the cars are
autonomous, are expected to follow at less than one second. That
doubles capacity. Automated vehicles also don’t require nearly as
wide a lane as human drivers do, which could almost double
capacity again (this is the same gain we would see with narrow
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cars).22 How well this works on city streets, as opposed to freeways, 22 There are a host of regulatory and
consumer preference changes that have
to occur for this scenario to pan out.
remains to be seen, but up to a four-fold increase in freeway vehicle
capacity just from a fleet of fully automated vehicles is well-within
the realm of possibility, and while it will induce demand, should
buy significant congestion reduction gains. Even non-freeways will
benefit as more travelers switch to the less congested freeways.
Scheduling. We also wouldn’t have congestion if not so many
people wanted to travel at the same time. We could stagger work
hours, so not everyone arrived at work at the same time. Some large
firms already do this, but it could be expanded. The downside is
that the whole point of everyone going to work at the same time is
that they be there together (or at the same time as customers and
vendors) so that can collaborate. The point of going to work is only
in part the ability to use expensive machinery in isolation. It is also
about the gains from cooperation of people being at the same place
at the same time. If people didn’t need to do that, and were (almost)
as efficient as working from home, then there would be little point in
traveling to work at all.
Sequencing. We do not begin and end all trips at home, we chain
our trips together to reduce the total amount of travel. We go from
work to the store to another store to home. This not only saves us
time, it reduces congestion. Do this more systematically, with a little
more planning, and you can reduce more congestion. Trip chaining
as described here is one reason that the evening rush hour commute
covers more hours than the morning rush, as people combine their
drive home with errands and activities to minimize total travel.
Shipping. Just as chaining trips may be efficient for you, chaining
trips may be good for your goods. Instead of you and your neighbor
each making a trip to the store and back (A –> Store –> A, B –> Store
– B). The store can send out a truck (or robot, or drone) and drop
off goods at you and your neighbor’s houses before returning (Store
–> A –> B –> Store), which should reduce the total mileage on the
network (though the trucks will need to load and unload frequently).
Sharing. Carpooling has been around since the dawn of cars, and
sharing the back of a horse, camel, or llama before that. It is easiest
when there are two people going from the same place to the same
place (like members of the same family going from home to work)
at the same time. All this sameness though requires coordination to
arrange, or sophisticated matching to discover. While people may
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carpool with non-co-resident coworkers in their youth, one party
(whoever is the most efficient or earliest riser) will tend to find the
cost of waiting for the ride (or worse, waiting for the passenger) to
be too costly, and eventually everyone gets their own set of wheels
if they can afford it. HOV lanes or restrictions in some cities
encourage people to pickup strangers (sluggers or jockeys) to fill up
the extra seats to save time.23 Overall this is a small phenomenon,23 (Burris and Winn 2006).
though many firms and futurists expect carpooling to make a
comeback through shared robo-taxis. But imagine you could get
paid for picking someone up along the way and dropping them off
– ridehailing services like LyftLine and UberPool are moving in this
direction – you might be more inclined. Information technology is
enabling everyone to be a taxi-driver. Whether everyone wants to be
one is another question.
Sharing with scale. Suppose instead of picking up one person,
you picked up two, or four, or eight, or sixteen, or thirty-two. You
became a jitney or vanpool or even a bus-driver. And if you pick up
a lot of people, maybe that is more remunerative than the job you
have, so you become a professional. And if you picked up thirty-two
people along the way, you would want to be careful about the route
so you don’t delay the passengers on board (your paying customers)
too much. You have discovered the continuity between driving alone
and public transit. And if someone else is driving a nice vehicle on a
convenient route, maybe you forego the car and ride instead.24 You
24 In the Phoenix region, for instance,
Valley Metro offers a vanpool program.
Originally the program was a response
to non-compliance of air quality
according to the EPA, but there are
over 430 commuter vans in service.
Any group of at least six people in the
region is eligible to receive a van from
Valley Metro, and is responsible for
gas, maintenance and insurance of the
vehicle. The advantage is savings on
parking and access to the HOV lanes.
have helped reduce congestion. And if one vehicle is carrying thirty-
two people who otherwise would have driven, we have removed
thirty-one vehicles from the road. And if everyone were in a vehicle
carrying thirty-two people, we can reduce congestion almost 97%.
But for all the reasons identified above, this magnitude is unlikely.25
25 The difference between this and
competing modes above is that this
sharing with scale emerged organically,
while the other is a top-down investment
in fixed route transit lines – process
matters. Walking or biking. Maybe you still like your independence and
don’t want to comport to someone else’s schedule, you just don’t
want to be in a car. If more people walked instead of driving, the
sidewalk utilization rate would increase, while the road utilization
rate would decrease. Bikes similarly would congest bike lanes and
bike paths, but that’s not as much of a concern, and bikes in mixed
traffic can sneak through without congesting cars that much.
Walking and biking are both up over the past decade. The best
opportunities for substitution are for short distances, which are a
large share of trips though a much smaller share of miles.
For $30B or so, we could buy everyone in the United States a
bicycle. For $6 billion, we could buy every kid in the US a bicycle.26
26 In 2018 NBA star LeBron James
opened a new public school in his
hometown of Akron, Ohio. The school is
for at-risk kids and offers many unique
services, including extended hours, job-
seeking assistance for parents, all meals
for the kids, college scholarships, and a
bicycle for every student. James believes
that bicycles offer freedom for kids to
explore their communities (Elkins 2018).
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To gain some perspective, this is a lot less than the cost of our
present vehicle fleet or major infrastructure investments, and $30B
is less than the cost of rebuilding all the NFL stadiums in the US,
which we collectively do every 25 years anyway. What kind of
changes would we see if bicycles were more ubiquitous? Would
people ride more? Would they drive less? Would they demand
different infrastructure? Would health actually improve?
As of this writing we are in somewhat of a natural experiment
about cycling. There is a global push for new bike and scooter
sharing systems. Many firms are supported by piles of cash from
venture capitalists to put as many shared bikes and scooters on the
streets as possible. A new twist is that many of the vehicles are now
electric, which makes biking much easier. As mentioned elsewhere,
we don’t know where these technologies will be in the years ahead,
but hopefully we can answer some of the questions above.
Figure 5.3: Is your journey really
necessary? Railway Executive
Committee.
Exhortation. Our friends often mock exhortation, but on
occasion exhortation has been used fairly effectively, often coupled
with monetary incentives: smoking has gone down, and recycling
up in the US in part due to exhortation. (When our kids were in
kindergarten they told us how recycling is better than rubbishing,
so clearly the education campaigns start young). How much of the
change is due to changing mores and social preferences, and how
much to cigarette taxes or trash collection discounts for recycling is
hard to say. On the other hand, modern campaigns to encourage
transit use and carpooling have been notable failures.
Rationing. Rationing seems fair, and is used in many megacities
throughout the world, either rationing the total number of vehicles,
or the days they can be driven. During World War II, the US rationed
rubber tires and fuel. Rationing however often devolves into a black
market (and thus pricing), as people pay for rations. For instance
there is a large market in license plates in cities that have day of
week license plate rationing.
If your license plate ends in an odd number, you can travel
Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday, and Sunday. If it ends in an even
number you can travel Monday, Wednesday, Friday, and Sunday.
Therefore each weekday will have half as many travelers, right?
Alternatively, license plates ending in 1 or 2 can’t drive on
Monday, 3 or 4 can’t drive on Tuesday, and so on. Therefore each
weekday will have 20% fewer cars. Mexico City introduced ‘Hoy No
Circula,’ or Do Not Drive, in 1989 to combat air pollution, and
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extended it to curtail weekend driving in 2008. It is viewed as being
fairly successful, but not without concerns.
This strategy is similar to one used in the some US states to
ration gasoline during the oil crises of the 1970s, keeping people
from buying gasoline on the wrong day. In practice, people with
money (which is to say, most people with cars) get a second car to
travel when they want. People swap cars, or license plates. People
get around these regulations, which are a terribly inefficient way to
reduce congestion.
Pricing. The best strategy for addressing traffic congestion is
charging for the use of streets. Road pricing is slowly being adopted
by more cities globally. London and Stockholm are well-known
examples, and many US toll roads are experimenting with peak
hour pricing, mostly on Interstates. The big opportunity for change
in the US comes with fleet electrification, which requires switching
away from the gas tax (since electric vehicles do not use gasoline) as
a source of road funding. This topic is sufficiently large and
important, it deserves its own chapter.2727 §6.
Charging people for the use of roads, more when and where it is
congested, less when and where it isn’t, will foremost reduce travel
during congested times, and thereby reduce congestion, and may
increase it in uncongested periods when there is excess capacity
(depending on the charge) as people adjust their schedule. This
better balances the load on the network, and is a strategy
undertaken in most transport modes, as well as other time sensitive
businesses like restaurants and movie theaters.
• How do travelers reduce travel? This is the best part. Each
individual decides for themselves when to change location, when
to change schedule, when to work from home, when to have
something delivered rather than making a trip to get it, when to
use a different mode, when to share a ride, when to reroute, and
when to forego a trip, thereby making decisions that are
individually rational.
• Doesn’t this lose road agencies money? This is the second best
part. With pricing, properly regulated road organizations,
perhaps constituted as utilities,28 will see roads as a valuable28 §19.
commodity rather than a commons, and if they increase
throughput more they can sell more. They will try to be more
efficient about managing the use of the existing roadspace, but
won’t have an incentive to build unnecessary new links.
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• Can this work? This is the third best part. There are many
proposed strategies to implement pricing. Obviously this has
been politically difficult, or it would already be widespread.
Transforming road agencies into public road utilities is one step.
Further, the emergence of electric vehicles and the advent of
autonomous cars reopens the window of opportunity to consider
pricing to replace gas taxes, and enable road demands be
managed far more directly.
There are undoubtedly some pet solutions out there not discussed
here, and lots of details overlooked.

6
Pricing
Figure 6.1: Singapore Electronic
Road Pricing Gantry. Photo by
D. Levinson.
In fairness, the people who drive on a road should be charged for the
service received, and in proportion to their use of the service.1 1 (Friedman and Boorstin 1996).
When Milton Friedman and Daniel Boorstin wrote those words
in 1950, the Interstate Highway System did not yet exist. Roads
generated more benefits than they cost, but were insufficient for
America’s needs. A new generation of toll-funded inter-city
turnpikes was being developed by states. The federal gas tax was
on the order of $0.015/gal in 1950s dollars.
The designers of the Interstate Highway System that began
construction just a few years later could not have known what route
you would take from your home to your workplace today. But they
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did know which roads, and which kinds of roads, increased
accessibility, and so they built a network that made it easier for
people to reach the gamut of constantly varying potential
destinations. Those highways directly connected places that had
been only circuitously linked, sped travel by upgrading traffic lights
to interchanges, and added lanes to reduce congestion.22 The most important of today’s roads
(about 250,000 mi (400,000 km) across
the US) have been designated as part of
the National Highway System, including
the 46,000 mi (74,000 km) Eisenhower
Interstate System.
That highway system is largely regarded as successful. Though it
accounts for about 1% of US road miles, the Interstate carries about
a quarter of all travel. This success comes with costs3 for such heavy
3 §7.
use; costs borne by drivers and people nearby.
We in transport economics generally say roads are underpriced
and travel is heavily subsidized by society at large. As a result, we
over-consume travel. The solution is raising the price of travel.
Pricing comes in numerous flavors. It might be very precise to time
and location, or might be in selected areas or inside of defined
cordons, or on selected facilities, or at selected times of day, or
everywhere, with tolls varying by distance.
High-occupancy/toll (HOT) lanes that charge by time-of-day on
selected facilities may guarantee that a particular facility is
uncongested (by limiting demand on that facility). This is as much
pricing for reliability as pricing to reduce congestion. The political
advantage of HOT lanes is their voluntary nature, and the untolled
alternative. We could certainly extend this to truck-only toll lanes
(TOTs) and perhaps to some other domains.
The London Congestion Charge affects most traffic entering
Central London, regardless of time-of-day or distance traveled. The
general sense is it has been successful, but a poorly conceived
extension of the charging zone from central London to the west was
reversed by then mayor Boris Johnson.
In Germany heavy goods vehicles pay to travel on the autobahn,
though cars travel for free. Higher tolls for trucks are common on
US toll roads.
Some people have even proposed paying people not to drive.4 We4 (Westervelt 2018).
suspect this would induce people to pretend to drive who otherwise
would not have in order to receive the reward for not driving.
Some travelers benefit more than others, and one of the arguments
about road pricing is to provide a way to discriminate between trips
of different value, encouraging travelers making low value trips, once
peak hour tolls are imposed (and thus at now expensive times) to
change their behavior. Travelers making high value trips will pay the
toll and save time.
Without tolls, travelers still have different values, but we have no
means to differentiate them, and all travelers (rich and poor, those
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in a hurry and those not, workers and retirees) sit in traffic together
without good alternatives. By pricing more in the peak (and less in
the off-peak) flexible travelers will switch travel times from when
capacity is fully utilized to when there is spare. Of course, induced
(or reduced) demand5 operates in all cases, but that can be 5 §14.
considered when setting prices.
Road pricing has been unsuccessful to date because it is framed
wrong. We say it is ‘unsuccessful’ because it is not widely adopted,
despite being a policy proposal on the table for decades, despite its
widespread support among transport economists, transit advocates,
and others. Unfortunately, it is perceived (by drivers and
politicians) as punitive.6 The cover of this book shows rioters 6 As we mentioned in dogfooding
(§17.6), few officials in charge of transit
are transit users. They are drivers,
so even in places like New York City
officials take the view from the windshield.
They see themselves as the subject of
the toll more than others who would
benefit.
smashing a toll gate during the Rebecca Riots.7 The events in
7 (Williams 1955).
France in late 2018 suggest raising the price for transport (in that
case, with a carbon tax raising the price of petrol and diesel),
remains politically challenging. There is a large and growing
literature on the acceptability of congestion pricing.8
8 (Giuliano 1992; Schade and Schlag
2003; King et al. 2007; Hårsman and
Quigley 2010; Börjesson et al. 2012).
Road pricing has two complementary objectives, raising funds
and allocating scarce resources like roadspace. Pricing programs
can be designed to manage (or even eliminate) congestion, but
congestion reduction is not necessarily an outcome of road tolls. We
already raise funds for roads with gas taxes. Gas taxes are in the
present (non-EV) world almost perfect as a fund raising mechanism,
as they don’t have much in the way of administrative costs, but they
are poor at reducing peak hour travel.9 9 (Wachs 2003).
The economic ideal is called ‘marginal cost pricing,’ which
charges drivers a toll equal to the marginal cost of the additional
delay they impose on other users. This is the difference between the
social and private prices that travelers pay: Ps   Pp in Figure 6.2. If
this revenue were reinvested in infrastructure, under certain
assumptions, we have what is called a ‘self-financing rule’ that says
the revenue from pricing will pay for the cost of infrastructure at
optimal investment levels.10 Unfortunately, this ideal runs into 10 (Verhoef and Mohring 2009).
many practical difficulties for widespread use, especially outside of
city centers and off-freeways, where the vast majority of roads lay.
In the absence of pricing, ‘second-best’ solutions for financing have
been proposed, these range from a ‘vehicle mile tax’ or
‘mileage-based user fees,’ cordon charges and congestion charging
zones (as in London), HOT lanes, and so on. The gas tax can be
seen as a second-best pricing mechanism that does not differentiate
charges by time-of-day or location.
We of course might want more funds, but we believe we should
not raise revenue and switch methods at the same time. If we want
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Figure 6.2: Technical Externality
(Costs).
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to switch methods (to better allocate roadspace) we need to be
revenue neutral. If want to raise revenue, we should raise rates
under whatever system is adopted. These two debates should not
be conflated.1111 Politicians of course see the advantage
of conflating issues.
6.1 Temporal variations
The critical aspect of urban travel is its peak by time-of-day. We
have morning and evening rush hours, corresponding to when most
people go to and from work. However, there is a lot of non-work
travel in these periods as well (especially in the afternoon): people
collecting and distributing children, going shopping, to the gym, or
eating out, who may have more sensitivity to price than people going
to work. We can see peaking in Figure 6.3. Demand for work travel
peaks in the morning and evening (non-work trips are flatter, but
not flat). Speeds drop in the morning and afternoon peaks. If we
balanced the load more evenly, average speeds would rise in the peak
and drop in the off-peak. But the net should be an overall gain, since
there is excess off-peak capacity.
Therefore, the primary objective of any new road pricing strategy
should be to better balance loads, i.e. manage the use of a scarce
resource, roadspace, during the peak hours. Basically we want to
move some drivers from the peak to what transport analysts call the
‘shoulders’, either just before or after the peak, to the off-peak, to the
weekends, to another destination if feasible, or to some other mode
(transit or telecommuting, for instance).
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MWCOG Household Travel Survey (1988)
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Figure 6.3: Temporal Variations.
(Parthasarathi et al. 2011).
Because it is costlier to provide extra road capacity to support
travel in the peak, and because of congestion externalities, travelers
in the peak should pay more than travelers in the off-peak to satisfy
both equity and efficiency arguments.12,13 Currently most federal 12 Congested traffic also results in more
pollution due to stop and go travel.
(Zhang and Batterman 2013) After the
installation of EZ-Pass electronic tolling
in New Jersey, which allowed drivers
to pay a toll without stopping at a toll
both, fewer babies born to those who
lived nearby has low birth weights or
were born premature (Currie andWalker
2014).
13 Ironically, perhaps, additional travel by
public transport in the peak may be less
expensive than in the off-peak, as the
high fixed costs of tracks and vehicles,
and the costs of drivers, are spread
across more users in peak times, so long
as the system is not fully utilized.
and state road funding is from a gas tax that is proportional to fuel
consumed, more or less proportional to distance traveled, but
almost entirely independent of when that travel takes place (more
fuel may be consumed per mile in the peak than the off-peak
because of additional braking events in stop-and-go traffic, but this
is too small to affect people’s behavior).
6.2 Spatial variations
Just as we want to balance trips across time-of-day, we might want to
balance trips across the network. While during the peak, some links
are congested, others have spare capacity. Perhaps we can move
travelers around?
Work in our labs with computer models of the Twin Cities road
networks shows that moving from a user equilibrium solution,
where each driver selfishly chooses his or her own route, to a
system optimal solution where each driver chooses a route that is
best for society, reduces total Vehicle Hours Traveled by less than
5%.14 This suggests there is not much to gain for all of the 14 (Levinson et al. 2018).
complexity involved in getting travelers to switch routes, but keep
their time-of-day.
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Varying tolls by time-of-day matters more than by place.
6.3 You can toll some of the roads some of the time ...
One way of raising the price of travel is tolling new roads rather than
letting them be free.
Scenario: A private toll road. This road sets a
profit-maximizing toll, subject to regulation, in a world where travel
on other roads is ‘free’. Because the road would not have been built
but for the private investors, this regulation will typically have been
negotiated in the franchise agreement to be a light touch, so tolls
will be close to profit maximizing. Since this is not a competitive
market as taught in Econ 101, profit-maximizing tolls are not
welfare-maximizing, and instead will likely be too high.
Given that drivers have alternative untolled roads, imposing tolls
on the toll road that are too high will thus drive vehicles away from
this road and onto other roads, which will be more congested (and
polluted) than necessary. Total travel overall will be higher than
without this road. However on competing routes, travel will be
slightly lower (recognizing induced demand eats up some of the
capacity, though consumer surplus should still rise), than if the road
did not exist, so this capacity, compared to its absence, generally
improves the transport welfare (consumers surplus) of travelers.
However, this priced capacity, compared to it being free, reduces the
transport welfare of travelers.
Based on their history, individual toll roads are not an especially
good business to invest in.15 They are high risk and the forecasts15 See for example, the cases of the Dulles
Greenway outside Washington, the
privatized Indiana Toll Road, Texas SH
130, San Diego’s South Bay Expressway,
the Greenville, Southern Connector, and
the Pocahontas Parkway in Richmond.
In Australia, the Clem7 toll road and
Airportlink toll road in Brisbane, and
the Lane Cove Tunnel toll road and the
Cross City Tunnel toll road in Sydney
went under. In Spain, the Madrid-Toledo
highway went down a similar path. For
a more formal treatment, see (Bain 2009;
Flyvbjerg et al. 2005).
cannot be trusted. New toll roads have tended to over-estimate
demand and under-estimate costs. Eventually they need to pay
their creditors, and the investors get wiped out. The good news for
the public is the roads continued to operate, despite bankruptcy.
There are many reasons for this, but pity not the toll road builders,
they do it to themselves. Governments have also bought out
privatized toll roads to get out of poorly written contracts, like the
91 freeway in Orange County, California, which was acquired so the
public could expand the parallel free lanes, which had been blocked
by a non-compete clause.
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Scenario: All roads tolled. Tolling all roads requires the
cooperation of the road owners, almost universally involving
multiple levels of government.16 While the system might be 16 Government cooperation is also hard.
In New York, there are five public toll
setters, none of which set tolls with
regard for the others. So Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey tolls
have been increased independently of
New York’s Metropolitan Transportation
Authority’s toll increases. As a result,
models often get it wrong as the case
of multiple toll setters is not considered.
Serial monopolists along a corridor
impose even higher tolls than a single
monopolist would. (Levinson 2002).
administered under contract,17 it will undoubtedly be at worst
17 §18.2.
regulated like a monopolistic utility, with cost plus rate-of-return
rates. The costs might include externalities,18 and not just direct
18 §7.
costs, or maybe the externalities will be taxed separately (such as
carbon taxes at refineries or mandatory car insurance). These tolls
will be close to welfare-maximizing after covering costs (though the
welfare-maximizing toll may not cover costs, depending on the
shape of the cost function and whether the road is congested).
Still, the key point is that tolling some of the roads may very well
be worse than either tolling none of the roads or all of the roads. It
introduces distortions, may result in new underutilized capacity in
an environment where other roads remain congested, and discredits
the premise of pricing in the mind of politicians and voters. While
incrementalism is generally a good strategy, the steps need to be in
the right direction (for instance, tolling all of the roads a bit may be
better than tolling some of the roads a lot and others not at all).
6.4 You can toll some of the cars some of the time: Phasing in
road pricing one vehicle at a time
There are several issues that keep getting ignored by those endorsing
quick implementation of road pricing.
• Gas taxes send the right signal about general use, and encourage
conversion from gasoline to electric powered vehicles if set
appropriately, though does not send a useful signal for time and
place.19 19 (Wachs 2003).
• Gas taxes are administratively efficient, road pricing loses on the
order of 20-30% of revenue to administration and collection
costs.20 20 (Levinson and Odlyzko 2008).
• Imposing a new mileage-based user fee/road user charge/vehicle
mileage tax on existing vehicles is going to be unpopular, probably
less popular than simply raising gas taxes.21 21 (Millward 2009).
Yet everyone now recognizes gas taxes will cease to be effective as
user charge as hybrid and EV adoption rises (even if the gas tax rises
with fuel economy, eventually the fleet will be nearly 100% electric).
If we rely only on gas taxes, we eventually will have to tax 100% of
the cost of roads on the last gasoline powered vehicle. The system
will break down22 long before then. 22 §3.
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Still, road pricing has proven difficult to implement, but this is
changing as other traditional sources of revenue are stagnant. Since
any transition to electric cars, which are not subject to the gas tax,
would force consideration of new sources of revenue anyway, they
raise the opportunity of a gradual transition without the high
political and implementation risks of a sudden shift in policy.
Moreover, the higher the gas tax, the faster a transition to electric
cars will occur.
This suggests an obvious transition point.23 Use gas taxes to23 In fact, many automakers have already
declared a year after which their entire
fleet will be electric. Volkswagen says
after 2025, for instance, they will no
longer develop gas powered engines. As
of now these are speculative claims, but
claims nonetheless.
collect revenue from the old fleet powered by gasoline or diesel, use
some form of distance-based road pricing (with an off-peak
discount) to collect revenue from the new fleet powered at least in
part by electricity. It can be easily communicated that the new fleet
does not consume gasoline (or as much) and this is about fairness.
The relative gas and electricity charges can still be skewed to adjust
for environmental externalities associated with gasoline, but other
than that, should be equalized to reflect costs imposed and benefits
received. A standing, independent Highway User Fee Commission can
set federal rates to ensure full funding of the Highway Trust Fund
(and secondarily manage traffic by time and place). States could
piggy-back on the apparatus.
Each new electric or quasi-electric car can have an on-board device
to compute tolls specific to the vehicle (based on fuel economy, and
therefore discounting for the gas tax already paid) and for time (hour
of day, day of week) and general place (in the city, on the freeway, vs.
in the country, on local roads, etc.). Since this would apply only to
new cars, no older EVs would be harmed (it is a small price to pay
for political harmony).
Trucks are another story, since the fleet is smaller and more
centrally managed.24 They can be converted sooner.24 Some large truck fleets have a great
deal of central management, others give
drivers more latitude. Many trucks are
owner operated, and thus more similar
to cars in their management. We should phase in pricing one EV at a time. We propose
that all new Electric Vehicles (EVs), Hybrid EVs, and other
Alternative Fuel Vehicles (non-gasoline and non-diesel vehicles)
participate in a new road pricing system. All such vehicles would
qualify for rebates on general tolls, local property taxes, or other
general-revenue sources of road funding, as well as any gas tax paid
(in the case of Hybrids). And they would be equipped with the
devices necessary to participate in automated road pricing. This
would give the automakers an opportunity to implement the
necessary devices into a small fraction of their cars at first, ensure
that bugs and difficulties were discovered early, and inconvenience
only a small portion of the population that would knowingly
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choose to participate in this gradual experiment. It would also give
the government the chance to set up a revenue collection system
that can over time cover a larger share of the fleet, and eventually
the entire fleet (either as EVs and other Alternative Fuel Vehicles
come to dominate or as all new cars are brought into the system).
And it would both raise revenue and manage traffic, using
discounted off-peak rates.
As more and more vehicles become non-gasoline powered,
participation in this system would grow, allowing it to become more
and more effective.
Such a proposal would have several major benefits:
• Equity: Requiring travelers to pay for the roads they use would be
more fair, and many Americans would consider having wealthier
people pay more to be more equitable. To date, early adopters of
electric vehicles have above average incomes.
• Implementation: This strategy would avoid a big-bang
implementation disaster. Information Technology is difficult, it is
better to phase it in than try to do it all at once.
• Choice: Drivers of gasoline-powered cars should be allowed to
voluntarily opt into this system, which for many travelers would
save money. Policymakers should further allow an opt-in tracking
feature, which would provide a discount in exchange for rates
that varied locally. At the same time, owners of EVs should be
allowed to opt-out in exchange for paying annually based on their
odometer readings at the highest toll rate.
• Rebates: If there were a surplus at the end of the year, above
the participants’ total share of the cost of roads and rebating for
other taxes, all participants in the system would receive an equal
dividend.
We should phase in pricing one AV at a time. To paraphrase
and update Russell B. Long:
Don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax that robot down the street.
As with EVs, there are not many Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) on
the road now, which makes it an ideal time to introduce pricing for
this class of vehicles. While most AVs are likely to be EVs, there is
no guarantee. AVs pose an additional risk, they can drive around
unmanned. While wasting the driver’s time is a disincentive to
congesting the roads, wasting a robot’s time is no such issue, and if
driving were cheaper than parking (which might be the case on
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unpriced roads in a downtown area), AVs might circle the block
without parking waiting for their passenger. Robin Chase,
co-founder of Zipcar, refers to this is as the ‘hell scenario’.25 While25 (Chase 2014).
such a scenario seems absurd, it is only absurd because policy will
quickly address it. And the means for addressing it is a prohibition
backed by fines and heavy enforcement, or more generally, road
pricing. While certainly a proactive stance will head off this
outcome at the pass, a reactive stance is more likely, since we are
talking about American local government.
6.5 Billing systems
The US’s largest telephone company, AT&T, has been described as a
billing system attached to a telephone network. The point was, the
complexity of the phone network was incidental to the amount of
technology and effort required to bill for the use of that network.
In contrast, road organizations often don’t have any billing
system at all, and have no way interacting with their users. As they
transition into road utilities,26 developing some form of revenue26 §19.
collection system from users (be it tolls or mileage fees, or indirect
like fuel taxes) becomes essential to the operation. Billing closes the
loop so that users who benefit from the system pay for the cost of
that system, and the revenue generated pays for the infrastructure
users benefit from. Billing will become a core competency for which
there will be a penalty to pay for outsourcing.
Presently state DOTs typically have no direct revenue collection
interaction with users. Turnpikes are often separate agencies, and
gas taxes are similarly collected by third parties (from the oil
companies, who collect it from consumers). But collecting revenue
from customers is critical to transactions, and while once it was
complicated to accept anything other than coins or cash, today even
food trucks, independent publishers, and non-profit blogs can
accept electronic transactions.
This is an important interaction with the consumer if done in
person, or even remotely, an opportunity to manage the customer
service aspects. While many utilities do this poorly (cable TV being
the most obvious), it need not be.
Initially we will think of transport systems as charging per use.
But there are many different services people may buy. For instance
unlimited mileage, or unlimited off-peak mileage, or a limited
number of trips per month with overage charges. All of these can be
good for consumers, as it may save them money, or at least ensure
the reliability of their price and travel time. It may also be useful for
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the organization operating the system, as they can adjust prices in
advance (with fewer surprises) in order to smooth out demand.
Pricing will be far more sophisticated than a simple marginal cost
price charged in real-time. This implies a relationship with
customers. Further, there may be value added resellers, who
consumers can deal with, who each have a particular number of
slots on the system, and can develop other pricing strategies.
Closing the loop between benefits and revenue has several
advantages.
• It builds confidence. People will clearly see that their payments
go to pay for the utility, and don’t get lost in the black hole of
governmental general revenue. Even though gas taxes today are
hypothecated27 to pay for roads at the federal and most state 27 §3.1.
levels, many if not most consumers are unaware and
disbelieving. Yet few doubt the electric utility uses the money it
collects monthly for generating, transmitting, and distributing
electrons.
• It educates consumers. Transport users will see what transport
costs to provide at a particular level of service at a particular time-
of-day. The resulting incentives can only reduce consumption.
• It informs the agency. The agency will see what it does that
provides value, and what doesn’t. A revenue forecast will be
coupled with demand forecasts. There will be a real penalty for
mis-forecasting.
• It leads to better investments. The return on investment aligns
directly with the agency’s decision making process.
6.6 Road service providers
Suppose, instead of purchasing road services from the government,
(now via gas tax, later via mileage-based user fees), travelers
purchase transport services (the right to travel at a location at a time
for a price) from independent road service providers. Road service
providers (RSPs) would purchase capacity from the infrastructure
owner, presumably the government. This idea resembles Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) in telecommunications
industry, who lease capacity from network operators and then resell
network services to customers. It also resembles internet service
providers who sell bandwidth to consumers. If an RSP’s customers
over-consumed the road, the RSP would pay a penalty. The RSP
would charge its customers accordingly to maximize profits in this
new competitive market. What does this allow?
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1. It allows competing RSPs to offer a variety of bundled services to
customers (a per use charge, a charge for a the right to travel 10
times per month, or unlimited service, or service bundled with
cell phones, or insurance or other services e.g), but to each have
different bundles. RSPs are likely to be better at product
differentiation and price discrimination than governments with
omnipresent political and equity concerns.
2. It allows the government to stay out of the data ownership
business, it would be responsible only for identifying which RSP
a traveler subscribed to, and thus would eliminate ‘the
government is tracking me’ problem with road pricing.2828 We still have ‘the big business
is tracking me,’ but for holders of
cellphones or credit cards, that game is
already lost.
3. It provides newmarkets for private industry. This could be an app
as part of a mobile phone or GPS or in-vehicle service (like GM’s
OnStar) or insurance (AAA, Progressive). The only technology
standard that would need to be established by the government
is a simple (such as RFID) sticker adjacent to the license plate
verifying the RSP. The road owner would then deploy inexpensive
RFID readers to count the number of cars on each link by time-
of-day with the RSP. The private firms would be responsible for
monitoring their own customers.
4. It provides a more stable revenue stream from government,
which receives revenue directly from RSPs who bid on road
space. In congested areas, road space would go for a higher
price, in uncongested areas, RSPs would negotiate a per-use
charge with governments.
5. Equity concerns of such a program could be mitigated through
direct subsidy to travelers. Similar to how low-income people can
get assistance for phone service or heating bills, people could
qualify for aid based on need. We offer assistance for phones and
heating because we treat those services as necessary. We should
treat mobility the same way. Matt Caywood and Alex Roy argue
for Universal Basic Mobility as a Human Right.29 Assistance29 (Caywood and Roy 2018).
could be paid from some of the revenues raised.3030 Alternately, travelers could use
tradable credits, where driving would
cost many credits while walking would
cost none, and the overall cost of
travel would depend on how spatially
intensive and congestable each mode
is. People who conserve their credits
by walking or taking transit could
then sell their credits to people who
want to drive. A similar scheme has
been explored for congestion pricing.
(Kockelman and Kalmanje 2005).
One can poke some holes (faking RSP, like faking insurance or
fake license plates or fake drivers licenses), but the idea is worth
exploring.
Vehicle leases: A new vector for road pricing. The
ownership model under Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) has often
presented the dichotomy of an owned autonomous vehicle, the way
Americans most typically use cars, vs. a shared autonomous vehicle
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(autonomous vehicles that come to you like a taxi). But many
automakers are now trying to move customers to the leasing model
of vehicles, which gives owners a long-term stake in an individual
car, but not full ownership rights. The reasons a customer may
prefer a lease is that technology is rapidly changing; who wants to
get stuck with an out-of-date vehicle?
Alternatively, drivers may anticipate their tastes or needs will
change, and don’t want the hassle of resale. Automakers have often
leased things like Electric Vehicles which require a major overhaul
at some point in time, and this also gets them a built-in service
business, as the incentive for a lessee would otherwise be to not
service the vehicle and run-down capital stock, while the lessor
wants to maintain capital so they can re-lease (or sell) the vehicle
subsequently after the expiration of the lease.
Moving automobile ownership to the lease model, particularly
with EVs, provides another advantage, this one for the road
administrators. It reduces the number of players who own cars and
makes a new model of road service provider possible.
The lessor may be a road service provider or contract with one.
Part of the lease can include terms about when and where you can
use the road. Just as lease terms today allow X miles per year, new
terms could be Y peak hour miles, and Z off-peak miles. The
automaker/vehicle owner would then compensate the road owners
for use of the roads by the cars they lease-out, while setting rates
and incentives for vehicle users/leaseholders to manage their
demand. Private firms would be able to explore demand space and
develop interesting combinations of services (the price for traveling
on certain facilities at certain times) in a way that the public sector
just cannot do for issues of both capability and fairness.
6.7 What about the revenues?
An obvious potential benefit of road pricing is revenues. Private
firms compete for privately operated toll roads because there is profit
in some of them. States and counties receive revenue under these
arrangements, either in up-front payments or annual rents.
We argue that these revenues, whether collected through private
firms or directly through tolling, can and should be used to generate
political support for pricing. If all we want to do with road tolls is to
reduce congestion and create environmental benefits, then it doesn’t
matter if we dump the money in a giant pit in the countryside.31 A 31 A giant pit of cash, however, is not
something that the public will typically
support. (The Onion 2008).
better use of toll revenue, however, is to use it to pay for services the
public values, including subsidy to those who need it.
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Assuming the the revenues exceed the costs of collection and
facility maintenance, they should be used in a way that increased
political buy-in for tolls in the first place. Consider that the political
problem with tolls is one of implementation. People object to
paying for something that is currently free. However, once toll
revenues have been put to use, they have proven to be popular. So
earmarking some money to get political support is warranted and
good policy.
One downside to using toll money to generate political support
is sometimes the public doesn’t believe politicians when they say
they are going to do something. Implementing a controversial new
policy introduces a credible commitment problem. Lack of
credibility has helped derail congestion pricing attempts in Los
Angeles and New York City.32 Years of broken promises and32 (Manville and King 2013).
diverted earmarked revenues to avoid raising taxes makes voters
less likely to support new tolls.
For road tolls, credibility is additionally harmed as drivers
understand the direct costs the tolls will have on their wallets, yet
the benefits are less certain. Drivers don’t know how they will
benefit directly (what is congestion is reduced for someone else?),
and may not think they will at all. There are solutions to these
problems. Stockholm trialled congestion pricing before voting on
it.3333 (Börjesson et al. 2012).
One idea is to send money generated by tolls back to the cities
where the tolls were collected.34 This would compensate based on34 (King et al. 2007).
spatial factors, and provide resources for cities to add additional
barriers or landscaping that may alleviate some externalities of the
roadways. Or money could be rebated to residents or reduce taxes
some other way. These strategies will work best when the entire
road network is tolled. In places where a cordon toll is applied,
where the money should be invested is better defined. London is an
example of the cordon approach. To build support for their
congestion charge London invested in bus service prior to
implementing the charge, though the charge affected relatively few
commuters.35 London’s charge also fell on a small share of travelers35 (May et al. 2010).
as only about 12% of commuters to central London drove prior to
the tolls.
6.8 Planning with prices
Transport systems should use prices to allocate resources. Pricing
appropriately is an accessibility enhancing measure that creates
incentives for the public to build fewer mobility-focused roads and
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travelers to use more efficient modes. Marginal cost pricing for
travel will have additional benefits in that demand for infill
development and density will increase as people will seek to
minimize their (higher) transport costs. To be effective, however,
transport prices have to be set with a clear goal in mind – the
objective is not simply to raise revenue for a pet cause or punish
drivers. Prices should reflect the cost of building and maintaining
infrastructure, plus the costs borne by society.
Since increasing the cost of driving is akin to a new tax that is
widely shared, strategies that improve political buy-in are needed.
An important caveat is that political support is not the same as
public support. Politically, things are done all the time that a
majority of voters oppose. There is no shortage of obviously good
ideas that sit on shelves because no one will be their champion.
Using revenues to bolster support is a necessary but not
individually sufficient approach. Using revenues to minimize
inequities is also wise, but unlikely to overcome public opposition.
After all, laws are passed all the time that harm equity (no matter
how defined).
Ultimately, the biggest obstacle to road tolls of any kind is status
quo bias. People like the way things are more than they like change,
even if change will bring many benefits. There is a typical policy
approval cycle that takes political courage to weather.36 Policies 36 Yes Minister episode Six: ‘The Right
to Know’ written by Antony Jay and
Jonathan Lynn has this explanation of
‘political courage.’
Sir Humphrey: If you want
to be really sure that the
Minister doesn’t accept it,
you must say the decision is
"courageous".
Bernard: And that’s worse
than ‘controversial’?
Sir Humphrey: Oh, yes!
‘Controversial’ only means
“this will lose you votes”.
‘Courageous’ means “this will
lose you the election”!
start out as ideas that will be implemented at some point in the
future. Politicians will talk up the benefits at this point and
minimize the costs, and everybody is happy. As a policy idea gets
closer to implementation, details are revealed and people start to
pay attention to what is being sold. For road pricing, this results in
declining popularity. It is at the point of implementation that
pricing is least popular, generally followed by favorable feelings
once prices become the new status quo.37
37 (Eliasson 2014).
6.9 Congestion is over! If you want it
In short, to paraphrase John Lennon and Yoko Ono, Congestion is
over! If you want it.
Congestion is over, if you want it.
Pricing is the answer and you know that for sure
Pricing is a flower
You got to let it, you gotta let it grow
We could have accessibility without (or with less) congestion, but
we don’t want it badly enough. The choice is really congestion or
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pricing, and the political cost of pricing has to date outweighed the
political cost of congestion. We don’t value the time savings of
accessibility enough for politicians to do the things necessary to
save time. On the other hand, voluntary tolls (HOT lanes, TOT
lanes, and so on) are more politically acceptable, giving people
travel time reliability for an uncertain price, which is better than
nothing, but certainly not optimal from an efficiency perspective.
In the absence of collapse of the existing system, widely deploying
a new funding framework is fraught with difficulties. What we face
now, despite all the protestations of crisis and catastrophe by those
in the industry, is a slow bleed.
Indexing gas taxes to fuel consumption to ensure steady revenue
(if consumption drops because of mileage improvements, taxes rise)
is a good short-term (5-10 year) strategy. As is requiring EVs to join
a road pricing system.
Getting from our current world to a slightly better one can be
achieved calmly and rationally via white papers and deliberation, or
through a real or politically generated ‘crisis’ (the preferred mode of
governance in the US). A rationalist would certainly rather we went
at this systematically, and so many people have played the ‘crisis
card’ that there is ‘crisis-fatigue.’ However, politics does not seem
to want to make transitions without some stress. Perhaps the rise of
electrification and the collapse of gas tax revenue will be the crisis
required to move to a new and different organizational regime in
surface transport. But this is a slowly building crisis that could take
the rest of our careers, and we are impatient.
The US is unlikely to be a first-mover in road pricing for political
reasons. Fortunately there are many other countries. Unfortunately,
only Singapore (see Figure 6.1) seems to be going all in on the
subject.38 We expect that until some small north-western European38 London, Stockholm and a few other
cities have limited congestion pricing in
areas, but not full-blown road pricing.
nation like the Netherlands or Norway, or a more culturally
cohesive Asian country, like Japan, or more economically liberal
Oceania country, like New Zealand, with their simpler politics, gets
it done first, it won’t happen in the US.
7
Externalities
Figure 7.1: Car crash in New
South Wales. Crashes are a
significant externality of driving.
Photo courtesy of NSW Justice
and Police Museum.
Externalities are a hidden subsidy to transport. While we touched
on external costs in the Subsidy chapter,1 we give more attention to 1 §4
those ideas here.
7.1 Pecuniary and technical externalities
Economics distinguishes between ‘technical’ and ‘pecuniary’
externalities. ‘Pecuniary’ is the SAT2 word for relating to money, 2 SAT, formerly the Scholastic Aptitude
Test, is a university entrance
examination used in much of the
United States.
and the term ‘pecuniary externality’ covers cases where Alice’s
presence in the market raises costs for Bob, who is also in the
market. If we have an upward sloping cost curve, as we shift the
demand curve to the right in quantity, the equilibrium price rises.
Alice’s presence in a market (where variable costs are rising more
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Figure 7.2: Pecuniary
Externality.
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than average fixed costs are falling) raises prices for other
consumers (all the Bobs), as shown in Figure 7.2.
The Minnesota Vikings3 stadium in Minneapolis’s Downtown3 The Minnesota Vikings are an
American football club in the National
Football League. They are called the
Vikings because of the relatively large
Scandinavian population in Minnesota.
East drives up land rents for others. This pecuniary externality is
not what we are concerned about. Instead we are concerned about
‘technical externalities,’ where someone’s presence in the market
creates an impact on someone who is not in the market. This is
shown in Figure 6.2.
For instance the noise and congestion from a Vikings game lowers
the property value of nearby residences. A backyard bike trail may
lower property values.4,54 Really, see (Mogush et al. 2016).
5 For a more complicated example, think
about taking lanes from cars for a bike
lane may increase congestion in the
remaining car lanes. It is an imposition
by bikes on cars, but it is internal to the
transport system.
Just about any action has positive and negative effects on others
who are not party to the transaction. In the absence of regulation,
parties try to internalize the benefits and externalize the costs. The
positive externality argument has been used to justify subsidizing
many different goods and services.
7.2 Negative externalities
The ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ says the baseline is no
negative externality. Under this logic, a polluter must pay a
‘Pigouvian tax’6 equal to the cost of the negative externality to6 Named in honor of its promoter, Arthur
Pigou (Pigou 1920). society. If reducing the externality were less expensive than the tax,
the polluter will, of course, do that.
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Figure 7.3: External Benefits.
If instead society were subsidizing someone to not pollute, (such
as a cap-and-trade program, or congestion credits), we are reducing
the negative externality, but systematically distorting incentives all
around. We are changing the baseline from no pollution to the
existing amount of pollution. We are in a sense giving a property right
to existing polluters to continue polluting (congesting, crashing) the
amount they want, and the victim is required to pay them to stop.
In contrast, ‘Coasian bargaining’7 suggests we would wind up 7 Named for economist Ronald Coase
(Coase 1960) who published until his
death at 102 in 2010.
with the same efficient equilibrium when we can ignore transaction
costs. Coasian bargaining may produce a poor set of incentives,
especially if the polluter can game this system to increase their
initial endowment by maximizing initial pollution in a way that is
easily reduced for the polluter, but not obviously so to the polluted
upon.
Currently drivers do not pay for the pollution, congestion, noise,
or hazard that cars produce. They are thus being subsidized by the
amount of their negative externality. This subsidy comes from the
health sector in the case of pollution, from other drivers in the case
of congestion, from property owners in the case of noise, and from
other drivers as well as pedestrians and bicyclists in the case of
hazard.
7.3 Positive externalities
Is there a dual problem? If the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ is our
operating logic for negative externalities, what is the appropriate
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analog for positive externalities? We will call someone who creates
positive spillovers a Pollinator.8 So the operating logic is the ‘Pay the8 We will not argue about whether
pollinating insects truly create positive
spillovers.
Pollinator Principle.’ In long form: The person or organization who
creates positive spillovers (positive externalities) for society which
they cannot themselves internalize, should be subsidized. This is
shown in Figure 7.3.
The ‘Pay the Pollinator Principle’ says subsidize positive
externalities. In an experiment in the Netherlands, drivers were
able to earn rewards by traveling during non-peak times.9 Whether9 (Bliemer et al. 2010).
this is a positive externality or a reduction of a negative externality
is another question we discuss below. Assuming we could actually
determine when a positive externality occurred (i.e. assuming
perfect information), and that transaction costs were very small (i.e.
we could implement it) the pay the pollinator principle might make
some sense. Those two assumptions are at odds with how reality
often works. Nevertheless, it is certainly used as a rationale for
public subsidies for certain things like parks, schools, transit, bike
lanes, NFL stadiums, even roads.
Unlike negative externalities which we clearly do not want, no one
(or not everyone) necessarily asked the Pollinator to create a positive
externality.
• If society subsidizes to induce the positive externality – then
society is asking.
• If society subsidizes to reward the positive externality – then
society is thanking, and implying an implicit incentive for future
Pollinators. But these are different cases (before vs. after) with
different results.
• If it doesn’t occur to society to incentivize or thank the Pollinator,
but instead if the Pollinator demands a subsidy because of the
benefits she claims to provide that the rest of us don’t (at first, or
ever) see, that is another case still.
There are few cases where everyone benefits, and fewer where
everyone benefits the same amount. A pro football stadium benefits
place A and its businesses in large part at the expense of place B and
its businesses. In short, most of the benefits are transfers, and while
there may be a net social increase, there are winners and losers and
the winners do not actually compensate the losers.
Internalize it. While the Negative Externalizer has no incentive
to capture their externality, why can’t the Positive Externalizer
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capture the positive externalities? The Vikings, for instance, could
have moved from downtown Minneapolis to a suburban location
such as Arden Hills, Minnesota10 where they could own the land 10 Arden Hills is a northern suburb of
the Twin Cities and a site the team
wanted at one point for a stadium and
development project.
and put all the parking, hotels, shops, and restaurants on site, and
the only spillover would be name recognition and municipal pride
in a team so great they consistently bring home national
championships regularly for the metro area they purport to
represent.11 By moving to (staying at) a smaller site in the city, they 11 The Vikings were founded in 1961 and
have never won a championship. They
have lost four Super Bowls, and haven’t
made the league championship game
since the 1970s. To be a Vikings fan is to
accept that repeated failure is how you
build character.
cannot capture all of the excess spending by stadium-goers, which
instead spills-over to neighboring blocks in downtown, enriching
nearby landowners and their tenants, and indirectly increasing the
tax base (so it is said).12
12 In practice, when teams earn revenue
from parking, suburban sites with ample
land are favored. When teams don’t have
land for parking, they compensate with
additional dining, shopping and paid
amenities within the stadia. This internal
activity is at the expense of external
activities.
So what is the difference between a request for more subsidy for
bike lanes vs. more subsidy for a professional sports team?
As Adam Smith recognized,13 public works like roads, and wide
13 §1.
linear infrastructure in general, are notoriously hard to privately
build without government consent or granting of eminent domain
powers. Stadiums as point facilities are much simpler. A new
network of bike lanes divorced from existing networks of rail and
road infrastructure in a built-up area is impractical. In contrast, a
new network of bike lanes in a private master planned community
built upon a greenfield is readily accomplished.
In the absence of master planned communities replacing
administratively obsolete cities cursed with an excessive division of
property, a practical solution in the messy city needs to be
identified.
Is the good undersupplied when paid for by direct
beneficiaries? Many goods have positive externalities over some
range of quantity, but are not necessarily undersupplied once fully
deployed. Network externalities are an example. Our use of the
mobile phone network makes it more valuable for others. Our
taking the bus makes bus transport more valuable for others.14 14 See discussion of the Mohring Effect
§A.4 and (Mohring 1972).Similarly, our taking flights out of Minnesota makes air travel more
convenient for others in the long run, as more flights will be
supplied through Minneapolis, and hubs provide greater
connectivity.
That doesn’t necessarily mean that the public should subsidize
our cell phone, bus trip, or flight even though we provide this
externality we cannot capture ourselves. The private benefits are
large, and after a certain point, public subsidy would not actually
induce more consumption since the consumption is at the
maximum level economically feasible. This is certainly close to true
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for cell phones where networks were subsidized privately rather
than publicly. There has obviously been significant public subsidy
in the aviation sector, though today it is mostly privately funded. It
is widely debated for mass transit.
Would we get fewer or smaller football stadiums when the football
teams pay for it directly instead of with a large public subsidy?1515 The Minnesota Vikings, the Minnesota
Twins Major League baseball team,
the Minnesota Gophers college football
team, the St. Paul Saints minor league
baseball team, the Minnesota Gophers
baseball team, the Minnesota Gophers
women’s hockey team, and the MN
United FC soccer franchise all would
up with different new stadiums in the
new century, and the Target Center,
home to the Minnesota Timberwolves
NBA franchise (but not the Minnesota
Wild NHL franchise), was remodeled,
due to public subsidies and misaligned
incentives.
One could hope. Certainly the Minnesota Vikings have gamed the
system to get a huge reward for little investment.16 Would the public
16 This is true of all sports, but
particularly egregious for American
football as the stadia are so large
(typically about 80,000 people or more)
and used so infrequently (eight home
games per regular season). The National
Football League for many years held
out the US’s second largest metropolitan
area, Los Angeles, which lacked a
professional football team as a city
where another city’s team would move
if no new stadium were built. LA lacked
teams after the Rams (in LA from 1946)
moved to St. Louis and the Raiders (in
LA from 1982) returned to Oakland in
1994 (and will move to a new stadium
in Las Vegas in 2020, perhaps leaving
Oakland as the new market teams will
threaten to move to). The Rams moved
back in 2016. The San Diego Chargers
returned to LA in 2017, having played
there from 1959-1961.
thus lose benefits? This is not at all clear, as positive externalities are
notoriously elusive.
How you subsidize matters. We can subsidize the consumer
directly, by giving them cash or tax credit. Alternatively, we can
subsidize supply, lowering the cost and thereby inducing more
demand. These have very different effects.
7.4 Are reductions of negative externalities positive
externalities?
We have seen arguments that bicycling has positive externalities, and
thus society should subsidize it. The same argument applies to many
things for which government subsidy is requested, including large
stadiums for professional sports teams.
Stipulations:
1. Bicycles are not public goods.17 Bicycles are both excludable (with
17 §A.
locks when not ridden, by the rider when ridden) and rivalrous
(my riding prevents you from riding at exactly the same time and
place), and are thus private goods. There are so many bikeshare
firms precisely because they can sell access to bicycles.
2. Bicycle lanes may be public goods, since we don’t generally have
effective enforcement mechanisms to exclude people who do not
pay from using bike lanes.18 Excludability for bike lanes is18 While taxing regular bicycles is
difficult, some cities are dealing with
electric scooters and electric bicycles,
which are faster than regular bikes.
Since these vehicles look different than
regular bikes, enforcement is a bit easier.
For shared systems, some cities, such as
Portland, have a tax per vehicle per day
that is used to pay for infrastructure.
difficult with present technologies given their long and open
nature. Similarly bike lanes are not generally congested, unless
someone parks in one. The road paralleling such bike lanes may
in fact be congested (rivalrous), and thus the demand for the
space they use may be rivalrous – this usually varies by
time-of-day.
3. Bicycling benefits bicyclists, otherwise they would not choose to
ride their bike. So there are private benefits. (Similarly,
professional sports teams are already profitable.)
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4. Based both on theory and evidence, the provision of bicycle
infrastructure increases bicycle use and thus private benefits.19 19 (Schoner and Levinson 2014).
Similarly, a new stadium will increase attendance or ticket prices
at a sports event, at least for a ‘honeymoon’ period.20 20 (Clapp and Hakes 2005).
5. What a bicyclist would do if they were not bicycling is not
obvious. Perhaps they would walk, or ride transit. Perhaps the
trip would not be made (most trips are not work trips, and most
bike trips are at least in part recreational). Does more bicycling
actually result in fewer people using other modes?21 21 The classic (logit) mode choice model
implies that it does, though the shares
are not 1:1, so we cannot assume
that each bicyclist would otherwise
drive. The Independence from Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) assumption (Ray 1973)
implies that if bicycling were somehow
to disappear, bicyclists would use other
modes in the proportion those modes
have today, so maybe 60% of bike trips
would switch to auto driver. More
sophisticated models may be able to
answer this question more accurately.
To the extent that fewer people drive or ride transit, at the
margins additional bicycling reduces the negative externalities of
those other modes (congestion, pollution, noise, etc.). (Similarly,
what a fan would do were they not attending and spectating at a
football game is not obvious. There would be at least some other
leisure activity consumption.) This is insufficient to claim them as
positive externalities for reasons discussed below.
Do two wrongs make a right? Do two minuses make a
plus? Back to the original question: Is a reduction of negative
externalities from another mode (a benefit to society as a whole, if
not necessarily to each member) a positive externality of biking?
Classic economic examples imply that it is a positive externality.
One ‘introduction to economics’ website22 writes: “If you walk to 22 (Economicshelp.org 2018).
work, it will reduce congestion and pollution, benefiting everyone
else in the city.” which is about as analogous as you can get. Yet
something rings wrong.
The underlying logic is that ‘negative’ implies the minus sign,
and if we reduce a negative we are adding (multiplying two
minuses makes a plus in math even if two wrongs don’t make a
right everywhere else). From a simple welfare economics
perspective, you will get the same Net Present Value either by more
biking because you subsidized biking or you taxed non-biking.23 23 Note that you will not necessarily
get the same benefit/cost ratio, since
negative externalities are a cost and
positive externalities are a benefit, and
the subsidy is a cost (to the government),
and a benefit (to the traveler) and tax
revenue a benefit (to the government),
and a cost (to the traveler).
Life-cycle analyses often look at indirect effects. When thinking
about externalities, we need to distinguish between direct and
indirect effects. To illustrate, when driving a car, tailpipe emissions
are a direct externality. You may have purchased the car in a market
transaction. The car was manufactured in a factory. The factory also
had emissions. Are the factory emissions a negative externality of
driving a car? If they are, how about the emissions of the steel
factory which supplied inputs to the car manufacturer? How about
the emissions of the worker who drove to the steel factory? How
about the emissions of the food truck that supplied the steel
worker’s lunch? How about the emissions of the clothing factory
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that produced the shirt which was on the back of the driver of the
food truck? If we accept the auto factory, we have no basis not to
accept everything else in society, since the entire economy is a
connected network. The usual rule in economic analysis is that we
look at direct effects, not indirect effects mediated by market
transactions. In this way we can focus on real effects and avoid
double counting.
Figure 7.4: People like to look
at unicyclists. Photo by D.
Levinson.
Thus reducing negative externalities of driving because you walk
to work may be a wonderful thing, but contra our random
economics-type website, it is not a positive externality of walking
any more than the negative externality of the emissions of the
factory worker driving to the shoe factory which supplied you with
shoes. And any positive externalities of bikes should be associated
with those direct effects of bicycling, not the indirect effects of other
avoided things, nor should they be offset by the negative
externalities of bicycle manufacturing and distribution.
We are not sure we can identify any direct positive externalities of
bikes that are not mediated. Perhaps people like to look at bicyclists,
who provide a positive aesthetic externality. (Actually, people do
like to look at unicyclists, as in Figure 7.4, which is why circuses
can charge money). Bicyclists are healthier, which reduces claims on
publicly subsidized health care. However, this is not a direct positive
externality since it is mediated by the health insurance market. The
health claim also depends on local context, especially considering
safety and injury and deeply breathing in the toxic emissions of cars.
What would be true if everyone biked is not true if most do not.2424 See (Hankey and Marshall 2015).
Bikes are good, but they are mostly good because they are good
for bicyclists. Like all other transport modes, we argue they should
be funded primarily by user fees. One way to do this is through
charges for secured parking.25 Only if that is not feasible should25 Portland, Oregon, implemented a
$0.25 charge for each trip made by a
rented electric scooter to generate money
to spend on new bike lanes. Tempe,
Arizona charges scooter companies one
dollar per scooter per day.
other sources of funding be considered. However, since other modes
are not fully funded by user fees, we are in the world of the second-
best, and it would be unfair and inefficient for only bicycle facilities
to be fully funded by user fees. We will say this just to be absolutely
clear: drivers should pay the full social costs of their choice to drive.
Should the public subsidize indirect positive effects? So
then the question arises: Are these indirect positive effects worthy of
subsidy?
Problems arise when the private beneficiaries are clearly identified
(and organized), but the public beneficiaries are diffuse. This is a
classic political economy problem, and explains why many special
interests get tax breaks or subsidies. So the beneficiaries have an
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incentive to overstate the social benefit, especially when there is not
a clear neutral arbiter of facts.
The net result may be over-investment in such facilities on the
grounds of positive spillovers. This is obvious in the example of the
Vikings stadium, which is far more than actually needed to keep
the owners financially compensated for staying in Minnesota. While
bicycle advocates will scoff at this premise in the present context,
there are many examples of overbuilding in the history of transport.
Just look at paved roads for cars and trucks, which at one time were
in the same position as bike-only facilities today, and were clearly
under-supplied. Today most bicycle advocates would assert such
roads are over-supplied.
A second issue is the deadweight loss (the social benefit that is
missed because of under-consumption) might be very small
compared to the private benefit. This depends on the shapes of the
curves and the magnitudes of the private and public benefits, both
of which are unknown in practice.
Should the public tax indirect negative effects? In
addition to indirect positive effects, there are indirect negative
effects. The more people who rely on mode X, the more the
landscape orients itself to people using mode X, the more difficult it
is to use mode Y. For instance, automobile culture changes the
landscape making it difficult to walk places, due to greater spatial
separation, more danger for pedestrians, and increased delay for
those walking, both due to network circuity and delay at traffic
signals. The spatial separation also implicitly imposes more social
isolation on those without an automobile.
Making it harder to walk places no doubt reduces the amount of
walking. Since walking is an activity that makes people healthier the
more they do it, this undoubtedly has some impact on physical health
as well.26 26 (Ermagun and Levinson 2017).
But these indirect effects are mediated by markets, so accounting
for them, and then taxing them, risks a large amount of double-
counting.
Alternatives to public subsidy: Philanthropy. Public
subsidy is not the only means for groups to obtain what they want
when it is infeasible to do so privately. The not-for-profit streets.mn
website27 produces many social benefits, but is paid for by a 27 An early version of parts of this
chapter first appeared on http://
streets.mn as a blog post.
relatively few members, compared to its thousands of readers. The
readers must benefit, as they read. They probably benefit more than
the private time and effort involved in reading. Yet they mostly
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don’t pay, and instead free ride (free read) on the efforts of others,
and streets.mn is produced anyway. Life is a free ride on the efforts
of our ancestors, who brought us fire, steam power, electricity, and
the internet, among millions of other innovations.
Why isn’t transport itself philanthropically funded? While there
have been discussions of philanthropically subsidized mass
transit,28 we are not aware of this actually being implemented at28 (Jaffe 2013a).
scale. One may argue the scale is too large. While that may be true
for large public works, surely that is not true for bike lanes, which
are relatively inexpensive to construct. In the early 2010s, bikeshare
systems were often funded with a mix of philanthropy and user
fees.
More likely it is because government already owns the roads,
and thus the space out of which most bike lanes would be carved.
Government is currently charged with building and maintaining
roads, so that is the status quo. And if you can convince someone
else to pay, why do it yourself?
7.5 Pollution ethics
“The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few (or the one).”
– Surak
“The needs of the one outweigh the needs of the many.” – Kirk2929 The quotes were from the Star Trek
movie The Wrath of Khan.
Case A. An individual releases toxic substances into the
unowned environmental commons where it is breathed in by many
members of the community for the individual’s benefit and to some
community-members’ cost. This is pollution.3030 Strictly speaking, pollution may
also produce positive externalities.
For instance, some agriculture may
benefit from a change in the chemical
composition of the air, or change
in temperature, etc., these are often
thought to be relatively small compared
to the downsides.
Case B. The community releases toxic substances into an
individual where it is ingested by the individual for the
community’s benefit and to some individuals’ cost. This is
immunization.
Is A bad and B good?
A produces in economic terms a ‘negative externality,’ an
unwanted side-effect on third-parties.
B produces a ‘positive externality’ (a good side-effect on third
parties) such as ‘herd immunity,’ whereby the immunity of a
significant portion of the population protects others from disease, as
it limits the ability of viruses to spread.
So long as most individuals benefit from immunization, people
seem to let it slide. But there have been a number of immunization
attempts that were not generally successful, where the downsides
may have outweighed the upside, the US 1976 Swine Flu
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Figure 7.5: Wall of Sound.
Photos by D. Levinson.immunization is an example, where the flu killed 1 person, and the
immunization killed 25.31 31 The story is more complicated, and
those who were immunized in 1976were
less likely to get ill in the 2009 outbreak,
so it may have been net positive in the
long run (Wikipedia contributors 2018a).
And of course, maybe the immunization
prevented more widespread flu.
Pollution exists and is known to cause harm. Most people think
all else equal, pollution is bad for society. There is debate on how
much to regulate or price pollution, as well as the magnitude of the
harm caused from individual pollutants. In the US, air pollution in
general is down, though decreasing some pollutants may increase
other pollutants; processes that reduce the size of pollutants may
reduce the number of large particulates but increase the number of
small, less easily measured, particulates. It is known that vaccines
have side effects, it is not known in advance which unlucky
individual will be the recipient of those side effects.
If you are a communitarian, A is unacceptable, B is acceptable. If
you are an individualist, A is acceptable and B should be voluntary.
An individualist may willingly submit to immunization, but only if
their personal benefit outweighs their personal cost, not strictly for
herd immunity of for the benefit of others (unless those are things
that they get salutary benefits from, either from a feeling of moral
righteousness or from rising in status due to the perceptions of
others). They believe society does not have the right to forcibly
vaccinate individuals, or coerce individuals into vaccination in
exchange for mandatory services like public education.
This is a values question.32 32 §20.
7.6 The art of noise
In 2012, there was a lot of noise in Minneapolis’s Prospect Park
neighborhood about a new sound wall erected on I-94 by the
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Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT). Some
neighbors (on the north) complained about getting more noise as a
result of the wall (on the south side of the highway), as the noise
bounces off that wall and up to their house, which is above the
noise wall on their-own side of the freeway (and where the wall is
punctured by Franklin Avenue). The house shown in Figure 7.5 has
a party of signs and balloons with various anti-noise slogans.
Noise is of course unwanted sound. Your music is our noise. It is
a classic externality of transport, and in fact one of the most costly
(its economic value may exceed the cost of air pollution). To reduce
the amount of externality, transport agencies erect noise walls,
reducing the amount of noise on the other side of the wall (and thus
diminishing the decrease in property value). But that noise doesn’t
just disappear, it makes the road noisier, or as it is claimed in the
above example, the north side of the freeway.
People can often adapt to a steady stream of white noise as on a
crowded freeway, but it is the unusual noises (the one loud truck,
the motorcycle, the airplane, the train) that are more disruptive and
annoying.
Who has rights here?
When there is a homeowner, and someone moves in next door
and makes a lot of noise, we often say the new neighbor is creating
the noise externality. We often hear about the ‘Polluter Pays
Principle.’ But Coase would say that but for the homeowner, there
would not be an externality either.33 This echoes the famous zen33 (Coase 1960).
koan: if a truck roars on the highway and there is no-one there to
hear, does it make a noise externality?34 Either the homeowner34 More famously asked as: If a tree
falls in the woods and there is no one
there to hear it, does it make a sound?
(Wikipedia contributors 2018d).
should pay the neighbor to shut up, or the neighbor should pay the
homeowner to get insulation and better windows, or the
homeowner should accept the damages, or the neighbor should pay
him for his damages – society is indifferent. What we need is a clear
source of property rights. Who wins and loses in these two
circumstances does change with the allocation of those rights.
Managing these externalities (so that we can avoid expensive
‘nuisance’ lawsuits) is one of the important jobs of planning. Do we
have a right to quiet, or do you have a right to make noise?
Airports often face the question with their neighbors. Clearly
airplanes create noise. Should the neighbors be compensated? Well,
if the neighbors moved in after the airport already made a lot of
noise, they paid less for their house (or pay a lower rent) already,
why should they be compensated twice?35 If the airport is paying,
35 This issue is complicated when flights
paths are changed. At the Phoenix
Skyharbor airport (PHX) flight paths
were changed and new neighborhoods
started complaining about noise – it is
unclear if this would have been reflected
in prices. Lawsuits are going to the FAA
in this case. then the airlines are paying, and if the airlines are paying, their
customers are paying. But if the airport moves in after the
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Figure 7.6: Safety vs. speed.
neighbors had already built their houses (and to help tilt the
playing field, the airport had been zoned as a park previously so
there was no airport-anticipation), we feel it should compensate.
In this case, maybe there is an inexpensive technical solution.
Maybe there is an expensive technical solution.36 Maybe MnDOT 36 Technical solutions include free
soundproofing, as happened in the
Twin Cities. Economists have suggested
selling noisy houses to deaf people. In
the Daredevil TV show on Netflix, Matt
Murdock got a great deal on a New
York apartment because he’s blind so
didn’t mind the neon signs outside his
windows.
should buy out Mr. or Ms. Unhappy-with-Noise and resell the
house at a noise-affected discount with a noise-easement. Maybe
Mr. or Ms. Unhappy-with-Noise will just have to live with a noisier
world.
7.7 Safety vs. speed
How fast should we drive? From a social cost perspective, faster
speeds save time, which has a value, but faster speeds cost lives, a
negative externality which also has a value. To illustrate the
trade-off we did some back of the envelope calculations, imagining,
like a macro-economist, a single road represents the whole
transport system. Annually there are about 30-40,000 people killed
in the US, there are 5.1 trillion annual vehicle kilometers traveled.37 37 3.2 trillion annual vehicle miles
traveled.The average speed of travel isn’t known directly, but if we assume
the average person travels in a car 60 minutes per day (the 1 hour
travel time budget) this implies, at approximately 48 km38 of travel 38 30 mi
per day per traveler, about 48 km/h,which seems about right
(including about one-fourth of travel on freeways at higher speeds
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and three-fourths on surface streets and roads at lower speeds, and
including traffic signals). As the saying goes, ‘Your Mileage May
Vary,’ and this is intended to be indicative – not a universal answer.
Some additional assumptions:
• We take the Value of Life to be $10 million and assume fatalities
are the only cost associated with crashes (they are about 78% of
total crash costs according to our analyses, so we should inflate
this number to get total crash costs).3939 US DOT says $9.6 million (Moran
2016).
• We take the Value of Time to be $15/hour.4040 US DOT gives a lot of ranges, but
this number is high for all surface travel
excluding freight. (Rogoff 2014).
• We assume the number of deaths drops linearly with speed, to
zero at zero speed. The improvement is likely non-linear, as
reductions in speeds from high speeds are more valuable than
from low speeds.
• We assume the value of travel time savings is constant,
independent of the amount of time saved.
To be clear, these are huge assumptions. Examining the figure we
see the lines cross at about 120 km/h,41 which is the minimum total41 75 mph.
cost. So why don’t we set the speed limit to 120 km/h?
Travel time savings are, while still speculative in terms of their
valuation, both private and real. The statistical value of life is far
more abstract. The value of my life to me is infinite. The value of
your life to me is, sadly, not. Yet, I am willing to take risks that
increase the probability of my dying in order to save time or earn
more money. These are the kinds of factors that allow an estimate of
value of a statistical life.
Death and crashes are probabilistic affairs, while the time lost is
deterministic. People are gamblers.
There are some other benefits to faster travel not accounted for,
such as more or longer trips (to better destinations, or the ability to
get better real estate at the same price), which increase consumer
surplus. The analysis here does not consider user response to lower
speeds, which would be to travel less. There are also issues like travel
time reliability.
Since 1988 The Statistical Value of Life has risen 6-fold in US DOT
estimates, the value of time has little more than doubled. If we cut
the value of life to $3 million, (effectively holding the tradeoff more
similar to 1988 levels), the tradeoff is much higher.
Speed limits reflect what travelers will travel at, not what we wish
they would travel at.
8
The Solution to Pollution and
Greenhouse Gases
Figure 8.1: Venus. Venus in
real colors, processed from clear
and blue filtered Mariner 10
images. Source images are in
the public domain (NASA).
Images processed by Ricardo
Nunes, downloaded from
http://www.astrosurf.com/
nunes/explor/explor_m10.htm.
5 February 1974.
The solution to pollution is dilution – unknown environmental
engineer.
Pollution is bad. You would think at this point in human history
this observation would no longer need to be made, but
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governments in several countries are in denial over this basic fact,
so apparently are at least some of their voters. For these people, we
will quickly summarize the case. From a human health perspective,
pollution causes problems and reduces lifespan.1 It affects most1 As one example among many, air
pollution has been associated with
autism (Volk et al. 2013). While
correlation does not necessarily imply
causation, we believe it’s very unlikely
future autistic children retroactively
persuade their parents to have moved
near highways, and it is more likely
that the pollution from the highways
damages brain development somehow.
It is possible, though unlikely, that
people who prefer highway adjacency, or
who are less annoyed by highways, and
thus willing to accept highway adjacency
in exchange for lower home prices, are
more likely to produce autistic children.
significantly the young, the old, and those with compromised
immune systems. Pollutants are breathed in, and smaller pollutants
get deeply embedded in the lungs, where they can reduce lung
capacity, cause cancers, and are picked up by the blood supply
(recall, the lungs are where the circulatory system picks up oxygen,
which, while we are not medical doctors, seems to be important for
human health) and carried through the body, where they do
damage elsewhere, including the brain.
We are certainly not the first to make the case that not all bad
things require government intervention. However that doesn’t imply
the opposite that no bad things require intervention. Pollution is an
externality. Those who bear the brunt of pollution are not those
who caused it. Polluters are getting a free ride on the expensive
health care system and other people’s bodies. This is both unfair
and as a consequence of not addressing pollution, society gets far
more pollution than is economically efficient.22 Some level of pollution may be
efficient, for instance when the cost
of remediation is very high and the
negative impacts relatively low.
Other significant technical externalities3 include congestion,4
3 §7.
4 §5.
noise,5 and crashes.6
5 §7.6.
6 §7.7.
8.1 Global warming
So your planet has global warming.7 Venus says “Welcome to our7 Global warming is one aspect of climate
change. There are others. world!” CO2 pollution8 not only destroys the environment and
8 Some people don’t accept CO2 as
‘pollution’ and prefer ‘emissions.’ It
exceeds the ability of the environment
to absorb in the short term, it imposes
harmful or dangerous effects, and thus
it is pollution, even if it is a natural
product. All pollutants are fine in
small enough concentrations (hence the
opening quote about dilution being the
solution to pollution), and everything is
horrible in too great amounts.
adds to remediation costs, the traditional air pollution that comes
with it shortens your life. While this undoubtedly annoys you as a
human being, it could be worse; your planet might not have excess
carbon dioxide emissions or pollution because no one wants to be
there (hello Mars). Still, it would be great to have a thriving planet
without pollution. People could do more things over their longer
life.
Pollution like congestion can be thought of as a queueing
problem. There is a demand side (production of pollution) and a
supply side (the ability (capacity) of the environment to process
pollutants). When the production of a pollutant exceeds the ability
of the environment to process, the pollutant builds up. There is
more CO2 in the atmosphere because humans produce more CO2
than nature can absorb in the short run. So like traffic in a queue,
CO2 in the atmosphere rises.9 This is a straight-forward physical9 Perhaps we might call this
‘CO2gestion’. process.
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Figure 8.2: “The furnaces of
the world are now burning
about 2,000,000,000 tons of coal
a year. When this is uniting
with oxygen, it adds about
7,000,000,000 tons of carbon
dioxide to the atmosphere year.
This tends to make the air
a more effective blanket for
the earth and to raise its
temperature. The effect may be
considerable in a few centuries.”
(Molena 1912).
When the CO2 in the atmosphere rises, the heat of the planet
rises with it. This is also a straight-forward physical process, noted
by Arrhenius in the 19th century. However, like transport and
behavioral systems, environmental systems are complex, so even
though the direction is clear, the rate of change is hard to ascertain,
and there are many mitigating or exacerbating feedbacks. Still more
CO2 emissions means more heat.
Some of that gets absorbed in trees or the ocean, or is not
measured, but the temperature will rise. If the rate of human
production of excess CO2 falls to zero, the excess CO2 in the
atmosphere will eventually be absorbed by nature, the queue will
be discharged. But nature will have been changed by the whole
process. For as long as we don’t have net zero or net negative
carbon emissions, the queue of unabsorbed pollution will continue
to lengthen.
There are a number of proffered solutions out there. Pollution
is, in principle, a mostly solvable problem, even if no fast-growing
planet has, to the best of our knowledge, fully solved it.
This chapter outlines ways that transport-induced pollution could
be solved. Some of these are dumb, many are good, one is great.
8.2 Supply-side solutions
Perhaps the most obvious, ‘common sense,’ solution when demand
(pollution) is in excess of supply is to expand capacity. This is what
we do with most things if we can. If our house is too small, we make
it bigger rather than reduce our hoarding. If his wallet can’t hold all
of his cash and ID cards,10 George Costanza might get a bigger one 10 This is a reference to the Seinfeld
episode ‘The Reverse Peephole’, where
George’s wallet ultimately explodes.
instead of removing useless cards and receipts. If the internet is too
142 a political economy of access
slow, we add capacity instead of removing bloated adware. In roads,
this usually means adding lanes to existing roads. There are several
appoaches to address excess CO2 emissions.
Bio-engineering. Maybe algae could be added to the oceans, but
that sure seems like that would have adverse consequences. Perhaps
we could plant more trees to absorb more carbon pollution.
Unfortunately, there is not enough space for enough trees to offset
the problem.
Consider for instance the Boston to London air travel round trip.
It is 5,237 km each way11 and 1.1799 tonnes of Carbon emissions11 3,255 mi.
roundtrip. For $14.16 or 1,888 Award Miles a United Airlines
passenger can support the Alto Mayo Conservation Initiative.1212 (United Airlines 2018).
Objectively this is not a lot of money in the scheme of things, and
maybe it will offset your trip. Nevertheless, we don’t have the
impression most travelers purchase these indulgences.1313 Catholics have a notion called
‘Indulgences,’ which in the Middle
Ages became a means for wealthy
sinners to buy themselves out of eternal
punishment for their sins. Alternatively,
the loss of wealth might be considered
the punishment, if you want to be
charitable, which we don’t.
More importantly, this does not scale. Some estimates below:
A Trans-Atlantic flight might require 11 trees per person per
flight to do a full offset. There are about 100 million international
enplanements from the US per year. Not all are Trans-Atlantic of
course, many are Trans-Pacific or to South America, and so longer.
We will leave it to a research paper to figure out total distance. So
that is on the order of 1,100 million trees per year (probably more)
to be planted to guiltlessly offset US international air travel.14 That14 Let’s assume 5m · 5m per tree (25 m2).
25 · 1,100 million = 27,500 million m2
to offset international aviation from the
US (excluding US domestic aviation and
travel in other countries.
is 27,500 km2, or an area of about 165 · 165km on edge per year (for
say 50 years until aviation switches to biofuels or electricity). This is
the size of Massachusetts.
While that is technically feasible, since the US has lots of land (and
is more than fifty times the size of Massachusetts, as Massachusetts
is a smaller than average state), no one is actually doing this, and the
offset is over the life of the tree, not immediate, so we would need
one Massachusetts per year until the end of carbon-emitting aviation
to make offsets work.
We could pull out Kant’s categorical imperative:
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time,
will that it should become a universal law.
We might argue that since this doesn’t scale (can’t become a
universal law), you shouldn’t do it. But that’s the sort of nonsense
that we hope philosophers have recovered from.
Just because it can’t solve the entire problem and can’t become
universal doesn’t mean it can’t be useful to plant more trees. Trees
are good. However, while a carbon offset indulgence may absolve
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you from guilt on a particular trip, it cannot absolve the industry,
since it cannot scale. Imagine the number of trees required for all
aviation, not just international, and for auto travel (about 10x
aviation), and not just the United States, but the world. A more
serious solution is required, one which either takes CO2 out of the
air more efficiently, produces less CO2 per flight (through say
biofuels or electric power), or reduces the number of CO2 emitting
activities like flights (and internal combustion engine car trips) (by
reducing travel).
Now to be clear, if you expand15 the capacity of the planet to 15 §14.
absorb pollution (i.e. plant more trees), and people pay for their
pollution, the reduced cost per unit of pollution means that people
will pollute more. Drivers will travel longer, industry will use less
socially efficient means for energy generation. There might be a
small amount of GDP growth associated with both the
geo-engineering and resource extraction, so it is not entirely a bad
thing, but it may not solve the overall pollution problem.
Geo-engineering. Besides planting trees or algae, perhaps we
could do something faster, typically called geo-engineering, using
the power of chemistry to capture CO2 gas or change CO2 gas into
something more benign. There are a number of inter-related
approaches to this:16 16 This list is drawn from Wikipedia
• Carbon dioxide removal
• Greenhouse gas removal
• Biochar
• Bio-energy with carbon
capture and storage
• Carbon sequestration
• Direct air capture
• Ocean fertilization
• Enhanced weathering
• Carbon air capture
The first problem with this set of solutions is that it is potentially
expensive. Adding to the ability of the planet to absorb pollution is
difficult. People have only done this kind of geo-engineering
speculatively. So there is a huge risk associated with some of these
techniques, especially the more speculative ocean fertilization. But
you know, as they say: “what could go wrong?” For the less
expensive methods, the question is whether they can scale to be
significant contributors.
Solar radiation management. Just deal with the heat, ignore
the carbon. Solar radiation management reduces sunlight absorbed
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by deflecting sunlight or increasing albedo. This sounds like a
terrible idea, but if the CO2 is bad only because of the rising heat, it
could be an interim solution. Volcanoes have similar effects. The
problem is cold summers, and one could easily imagine this going
badly for crops (and thus humans). Some solar radiation
management techniques include:
• Stratospheric particle injection
• Stratospheric sulfur aerosols
• Marine cloud brightening
• Cool roof
• Space sunshade
8.3 Demand-side solutions
The first set of strategies are basically supply side. But pollution
problems are caused by a mismatch of supply (ability to absorb) and
demand (production). So let’s turn to demand.17 The main sources17 The basic equation for emissions in the
transport sector is given by the Kaya
Identity, rephrased here as:
e = p · (v/p) · (l/v) · (c/l) (8.1)
where:
• e = emissions,
• p = population,
• v = vehicle kilometers traveled,
• l = liters of fuel,
• c = CO2 or Other Pollutant (CO, NOx ,
SOx , Pb, VOC, PM10, PM2.5).
If there were fewer people, or they
used their cars less or their cars had
better fuel economy or the fuel produced
less emissions per fuel consumed, there
would be less emissions. The last
three of these things can be worked on
together. The first is behavioral change,
the latter will require technological
shifts.
of demand are transport, industry, agriculture, and residential, with
the electric power sector serving these indirectly. We focus on energy
sources first.
Bio-fuels. If all of our fuel were from recently deceased plant
matter, rather than oil (long deceased plant matter), and those
plants were replanted, net CO2 from burning fuels would be about
zero.18 The advantage is that the energy density of liquid fuels is
18 This assumes the equipment used to
harvest and transport the bio-fuels also
use bio-fuels. Like turtles in some Hindu
myths, it is biofuels all the way down.
generally better than batteries. The disadvantage is the large
amount of area needed for bio-fuels, which will compete with food
agriculture for the best farmland. Biofuels are likely to be especially
important for aviation, which need the range given by high density
fuels more than ground transport.
Electric vehicles. If all of our fuel were from electricity, there
would be no tailpipe emissions and far less pollution. The cost to
pollution would be attributed to the electricity generating sector. If
that electricity were from renewable sources, total pollution would
approach zero. If it were from burning fossil fuels, the location of
the pollution would at least be farther from population centers.
So EVs need to be coupled with renewable energy in the
electricity sector to be a net benefit.19 Electricity is about 1/3 of19 (Tessum et al. 2014).
greenhouse gas emissions in the US. Transformation from burning
coal is well underway, and adoption of renewable energy sources
like solar, wind, and hydro power, among others, are the best way
to get this sector down to zero net CO2 emissions over the coming
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decades. There is a large amount of fixed capacity (sunk costs) out
there now, so the transition will take some time.
Controls. Better pollution control devices like the catalytic
converter for internal combustion engine vehicles have significantly
reduced tailpipe emissions of EPA criteria pollutants.20 Something 20 EPA criteria pollutants are ground-
level ozone, particulate matter, carbon
monoxide, lead, sulfur dioxide, and
nitrogen dioxide.
similar could be done for CO2 emissions. So the same amount of
liters of fuel would somehow produce fewer tons of carbon. The
difficulty here is chemistry. The gasoline is ultimately burned,
producing CO2.
Perhaps it could be captured and stored, or catalyzed into some
other what we now believe to be innocuous byproduct. Arguably
this is a supply side method, but we class it as demand side here
as the aim is to reduce the amount of CO2 emitted, not improve the
capacity to deal with emitted CO2.
Improve fuel economy in transport. Optimization is about
making production processes more energy efficient. This is related
to conservation, in that it reduces consumption, but at a much bigger
and holistic scale, and examines the process by which outcomes are
achieved.
Better fuel economy for internal combustion engine vehicles has
significantly reduced fuel use, and thus CO2, and has plenty of
generally good side effects for society, like reduced air pollution
and less dependence of oil more generally. Increased energy
efficiency overall throughout the economy is feasible.
. . .
This set of solutions would electrify the automobile fleet, switch
the energy source for automobiles from fossil fuels to electricity
powered by renewable sources (like solar, wind, hydro, or nuclear)
or use fuel cells to transform the number of L/km to zero. However,
that is clearly a longer term prospect, fleets and electric generators
cannot change overnight. Alternatively, we might work on
behavioral aspects of demand, the first part of the equation.
. . .
Reduce (or end) automobile use. Transport is about 1/3 of
CO2 pollution, plus or minus. The chapter on congestion,21 which 21 §5.
this not-coincidentally resembles, outlines how to reduce
automobile demand, which is perhaps the largest source of CO2
pollution. So long as cars continue to rely on the internal
combustion engine (in some form for a few more decades yet),
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reducing automobile demand and gasoline consumption will be
critical to reducing CO2. There are many reasons to reduce
automobile use, pollution among them. It turns out, not
surprisingly, that biking is more efficient than driving. It turns out,
more surprisingly, that eBikes are more efficient than bikes, after
netting out the extra energy for the extra food for the extra calories
burned biking.2222 According to (Dave 2010).
Figure 8.3: Is your journey really
necessary? Railway Executive
Committee.
Shut industry. Industry is about 1/5 of CO2 pollution. Perhaps
intuitively, if we shut down polluting industries, we reduce
pollution. Certainly if we eliminate jobs, we eliminating commuting
to those jobs. To the extent we want the thing the industry intends
to produce (aside from the pollution), this might be problematic. If
we want it closed, but want the goods, the factory will pop up
elsewhere with fewer environmental strictures.
Exhortion. Tell people they shouldn’t pollute because it is bad
for themselves, or society, or will condemn them in perpetuity to an
unpleasant afterlife. Guilt can get you a little bit of benefit, but as
evidenced by the state of the world, can only go so far. This is really
a means to one of the other ways of actually reducing pollution.
Rationing. Give people and firms pollution credits, the right to
emit a certain amount of CO2 per year. Reduce that credit annually.
Allow them to trade credits for money. If it were cost effective to
reduce pollution, they would do so to sell credits. If it were not, they
could buy credits. When people talk about ‘cap and trade,’ that is a
form of rationing.
Pricing. Charge people and firms for the amount of pollution they
generate and they will generate less pollution.
• How do polluters reduce pollution? This is the best part. Each
individual or firm decides for themselves whether or how to
consume or pollute less, what production processes to change,
when to substitute clean power for dirty. With pricing, polluters
will see the air, which is now treated as an unregulated commons
as a valuable resource, and if they increase output per unit of
carbon, they will save money. They will try to be more efficient
about managing the use of the existing clean air.
• Isn’t this another tax? This is the second best part. It raises money
by discouraging people from doing something that society doesn’t
want them to do. Other high taxes on things that we want people
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to do (like work) can be lowered. Done properly, this is revenue
neutral.
• Can this work? This is the third best part. There are many
proposed strategies to implement pricing. Obviously this has
been politically difficult, or it would already be widespread.
Carbon taxes are the simplest intervention, and we already do
this in some places (12% of the world’s carbon is already
taxed).23 Since it is assessed for industries rather than on 23 According to the World Bank’s Carbon
pricing dashboard (World Bank 2018).individuals, it has a low cost of collection. For instance rather
than metering each car, petroleum from refineries or fuel
wholesalers can be taxed. This accelerates the uptake of electric
vehicles, which should on the net be a good thing.
There are undoubtedly some other solutions out there not
discussed here, and lots of details overlooked.
As with road pricing,24 we expect pollution taxes, if not handled 24 §6.
with care, will be politically upsetting. There are strategies for
dealing with that, we discuss one below. In general, dedicating the
revenue to environmental solutions is likely to be more acceptable
than putting the funds generated in general revenue. And offsetting
other taxes will make pollution charges more acceptable than if they
simply increase government funds.25 25 (Carattini et al. 2017).
8.4 Pollution trust funds
If we implement pollution taxes such as Pigouvian taxes, or auctions
of pollution credits in a cap-and-trade type system, or fines against
large polluters, or with any other mechanism, we will raise revenue
that previously was not raised. What to do with the money becomes
a question.
Roughly the levy imposed on polluters is proportionate to their
pollution.26 Fines above and beyond the base rate would be 26 For the purposes here, pollutants are
those that contaminate an environment
with manmade wastes. Air pollutants
include (but are not limited to) EPA
criteria pollutants: Pb, SOx , NOx ,
VOC, CO, PM10, PM2.5, as well as
ultra fine particulates, and CO2 and
other greenhouse gases. Water and
land pollution rules would also be
established. Other pollutants as defined
by a Blue Ribbon Commission would
also be appropriate for taxation.
collected on those who exceed permitted levels with especially
dangerous pollution levels.
That revenue should be dedicated to support the US Federal
Government’s broad collection of agencies that monitor, regulate,
protect, and restore the environment, reduce the impacts of humans
on the environment, and address the problems that arise when we
face environmental emergencies or just dealing with the costs of
day-to-day pollution. These agencies include the Environmental
Protection Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and
large swaths of the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and
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Energy among other environmental programs, as well as the Health
sector. Estimates of damages from pollution27 are similar in27 Knittel and Sandler (2011) estimates a
gas tax on the order $1/gal ($0.25/L)
would cover the social costs of carbon
from cars, and “reduced air pollution
would substantially ameliorate the costs
of an increased gasoline tax.” This is
substantially lower than fuel taxes in
many countries. In the US, current gas
taxes vary by state but are on the order
of $0.40-0.50/gal (state + federal) ($0.10-
0.12/L)
magnitude to the budgets of the listed government agencies.
As pollution diminishes, funding declines, pollution control and
remediation programs would shrink naturally, since they are not
needed as much. If pollution rises, the revenue increases, giving the
government agencies the resources needed to mitigate the effects,
redress the damages, and compensate those polluted upon.
A bipartisan Blue Ribbon Commission appointed by the National
Academies would be appointed to recommend rates annually based
on the best science and economics of the damages that pollution
causes (so if avoidance were cheaper than accepting damages it
would be undertaken). Any polluter could reduce their taxes by
limiting their emissions. Polluters that find reducing emissions
cost-effective will do so. The rates would be phased in over a multi-
year period to allow smooth and economically efficient transitions.
This proposal lowers expenditures on the discretionary budget
from general revenue by pulling the listed agencies off the unified
budget. This frees up budget resources that could be used for
income tax reform, negative income taxes for people with low
incomes, or lowering the budget deficit.
The Environmental Trust Fund, supported by a pollution tax,
would incentivize the market to determine the best ways to reduce
pollution, rather than relying on government regulations and
industrial policies ranging from subsidies and loans to tax credits
for favored sectors. Internalizing these negative externalities would
reward what we want (pollution reduction) and discourage what
we don’t (pollution). This would let individuals and organizations
figure out the best ways to reduce pollution. It would also provide
opportunities for tax reforms on the general revenue ledger.
8.5 Domain alignment
A key observation is that many of our problems are caused by
problem-solution domain mismatch. We often attempt to solve
technology problems with policy solutions, and vice versa, as
shown in Figure 8.4. The lesson is to focus problems and solutions
on the same domain, i.e. policy solutions for policy problems and
technical solutions for technical problems. When we get off the
diagonal, we get domain mismatch and ineffectiveness. The
engineers should rely on the policy-makers to solve policy
problems, not offer to do it for them, and similarly, policy makers
need to trust the technologists. Identifying the right domain may
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Solution Domain
Technology Policy
Problem 
Domain
Technology
Catalytic Converters or 
Electrification to Solve 
Pollution. 
Travel Demand 
Management to Solve 
Pollution
Policy
Capacity Expansion to 
Solve Peak Congestion
Road Pricing to Solve 
Peak Congestion
Figure 8.4: The Domains of
Policy Problems and Solutions,
with Examples.
still be contentious, and there is always overlap, but we hope, once
we recognize the issues, we can spot the domain. When we talk
about pricing, that is a policy solution, but it is a high level policy
solution that induces and aligns lower level policy and technology
solutions (demand reduction, system management) for particular
problem types (for instance congestion and pollution).

Part II
Network Expansion
The problems of expanding the automobile/highway and public
transport systems have become increasingly challenging. As
networks enter maturity, expansion is harder and preservation,
discussed in the previous part, more necessary. Network expansion
is essentially the long-run problem in economics.

9
Hierarchy of Wants
Infrastructure
Time
Money Quality
Costs
Revenue
Figure 9.1: The Project
Management Triangle: Time,
cost, or quality, pick two out of
three.
You can’t always get what you want
but if you try sometime you find
you get what you need.1 1 From the Rolling Stones song ‘You
Can’t Always Get What You Want.’ Jim
Erkel calls it the Rolling Stones theory of
transport finance.
An earlier chapter described the Hierarchy of Infrastructure
Needs.2 As self-actualization tops Maslow’s Hierarchy, we top our 2 §2.
hierarchy with access. And basic access is a need. Society wants not
just basic access, but more access. This is often operationalized as
more infrastructure or in some cases as more land development.
The problem here is that achieving our wants is getting more
difficult.
We want access. We want it to be free. We want it now. We want
it to be high quality. Yet, the famous project management triangle
154 a political economy of access
poses a trilemma, it (Figure 9.1) famously says “time, cost, or quality,
pick two out of three.”
In transport in the Anglosphere,3 we seem to be getting none of3 The English speaking counties of the
United Kingdom, the US, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.
the three. Projects are expensive,4 slow,5 and poor quality.6 Starting
4 §9.1.
5 §9.3.
6 §2.
in the lower left, we talk about infrastructure costs which are out of
sync with revenues. We then discuss the time involved in producing
infrastructure, and why it takes so long. This chapter concludes with
discussing the quality of infrastructure.
We have a set of funding problems:
• Wants7 exceed readily available resources. The federal gas tax,7 §9.
the dominant source of federal revenue for surface transport, has
remained unchanged since 1993. Roads are mostly funded today
on a pay-as-you-go basis, which requires current users to pay for
projects with long-term value. They are occasionally financed
through inefficient municipal bond processes. While states can
issue bonds, local governments often find that difficult.
• Wants (new projects) are preferred to needs (maintenance and
operations of existing facilities, recapitalizing existing roads).
This is referred to as ‘the Ribbon Cutting problem.’88 (Taylor 2004).
• Needs are not met (especially on local roads which continue to
deteriorate in many places).
• Revenues9 from traditional user fees are dropping (due to a9 §3.
combination of peak travel, better fuel economy, and slow
electrification of the fleet).
Roads, unlike many network utilities10 (electricity, natural gas,10 §19.
telecommunications, some water systems), are currently managed
by states and municipalities. Most, if not all, of these other utilities
are operated on the basis of a payment-for-use system. Utility
pricing varies regionally, some locales vary prices by time-of-day,
and users often have the option of choosing different rate plans.
These methods manage demand and help match consumer needs
with the cost structure of the utility. The public agencies managing
roads and transit in the US do none of this, and their culture instead
discourages or punishes innovation.
While there are congestion problems in places, there are also
many places where roads are overbuilt, what we call mostly empty
syndrome.1111 §9.2.
Both highways and mass transit cost too much. The reasons for
this are many and discussed in Costs.1212 §9.1.
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Figure 9.2: Light Rail Projects
Cost by Country vs. Reference
Model. (Costs converted to 2017
$AU). Based on Undergraduate
Thesis Research at University of
Sydney (Stephens 2018).
9.1 Transport costs too much
In the 1980s, there was an ad on local TV in the Washington DC
region wherein founder Robert Haft, sitting on piles of books,
asserted “books cost too much.” Haft created Crown Books, which
became at one time the third largest bookstore chain in the US, and
helped put independent booksellers out of business decades before
Amazon became villain number one among the literati.
Yet unlike independent booksellers, we weep not for the
independent contractors and businesses that charge so much for
transport infrastructure, equipment, and operations. Consider some
costs
• Signalized intersections ( $175,000),13 13 (City of Palmdale na).
• Roundabouts ( $300,000),14 14 (Office of Safety 0 02).
• Loop detectors installed ( $5,000),15 15 (Office of Highway Policy Information
2007).
• Diamond interchanges ( $9 million),16 16 (Washington State Department of
Transportation 2002).• Bridge to Houlton, Wisconsin ( $646.8 million),17
17 (Divine 2017).
• Buses ( $400,000),18 18 (Clark et al. 2007).
• Light rail lines ( $2 billion),19 19 (Metropolitan Council 2018).
• High-speed rail (HSR) lines ( $100 billion),20 etc. 20 (Vartabedian 2011).
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Figure 9.3: Metro Projects
Cost by Country. ($/km)
(Costs converted to 2017 $AU).
Based on Undergraduate Thesis
Research at University of Sydney
(Xylas 2018).
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More formally, we can compare the costs of Light Rail projects
(Figure 9.2) and Metros (Figure 9.3) in the US with other countries.
The US, while not the costliest in the world, is well above average.
The English-speaking countries seem to have a problem.
We are simultaneously spending too much and not spending
enough. Because we mis-prioritize where the money is spent, we
have inadequate resources for other things. We cut corners.
Why don’t we have better bus service operations? In part
because the scarce resources that could be devoted to that relatively
inexpensive but useful investment are instead spent on expensive
new capital investments that serve a much smaller fraction of the
population.
We can all think of technically feasible things that we would like
the transport system to do, but that it doesn’t because resources are
scarce. They are scarce because of mis-allocation, not lack of overall
spending.
When we are out-of-balance, people distrust that their tax money
is wisely spent. If people see many examples of mis-expenditure,
they will cut how much they are willing to allocate to transport. This
is the credible commitment problem, where the state is not believed
when it says what it will do. This is a problem for user fees, such
as congestion system pricing,21 where mistrust of where the money21 §6.
will go harms public support.2222 (Manville and King 2013).
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Mis-expenditure thus causes the system to deteriorate in two
ways. First, it reduces inputs to the system, money that could be
spent. Second, it allocates money away from genuine public needs
(starting with system preservation,23 adequate maintenance, and 23 §I.
operation of existing facilities) and towards unnecessary wants,
thereby increasing unmet needs.
We need to break this cycle of distrust if we want to adequately
fund transport needs (not wants). This requires institutional changes
in how transport services are provided. Asking the same people for
more money is unlikely to be very successful.
The following sections suggest many possible causes (we might
think of them as hypotheses), and to be clear, there is more than one
cause, and these causes interact.24 We do not even argue that all of 24 Alon Levy discusses a number
of these issues in the rail and
public transport sectors on his blog
pedestrianaboservations.com.
these are necessarily correct, though they are all empirically testable
with the right data.
Standards
‘Man of System’. In his first great book, 1759’s Theory of Moral
Sentiments, Adam Smith wrote:
The man of system . . is apt to be very wise in his own conceit;
and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal
plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from
any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its
parts, without any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong
prejudices which may oppose it. He seems to imagine that he can
arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as
the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not
consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle
of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that,
in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a
principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which
the legislature might chuse to impress upon it. If those two principles
coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society
will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy
and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will go on
miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of
disorder.25 25 (Smith 1759).
Standards have risen. Our obsession with safety, features,
environmental protection, compliance with the Americans with
Disability Act, and quality drive up the cost. Engineering design is
often 20% of project costs. If only we would tolerate a few more
deaths, a bus without air conditioning, pollution, and frequent
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breakdowns, and facilities that didn’t serve anyone with physical
challenges, our initial costs would be lower.
But while, as implied sarcastically in the previous sentence, some
regulation is useful, it can act like a strait-jacket. The Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS)26 leads to ‘lock-in’ effects where a complete26 Called ‘Environmental Impact Report’
in some places. EIS is a determining characteristic of a project’s viability rather than
some other type of analysis.2727 See (Todorovich and Schned 2012).
An illustration of this is the Green Line LRT (Figure 9.4) between
Minneapolis and Saint Paul. It mostly runs on University Avenue
between the cities, but in Minneapolis it switches to Washington
Avenue at the University of Minnesota. It was originally designed
to go under Washington Avenue, which required some space for a
tunnel descent, so was routed slightly north of University Avenue
for a few blocks to coordinate this. But to reduce costs, it was
rerouted to travel at grade on Washington Avenue. The reroute was
no longer necessary, but to change it would have required
amending the EIS. Since EISs can take years to complete, having one
ready is a big deal.
Figure 9.4: Green Line Route
Bump.
Gold-plating is adding unnecessary, needless, or useless
features to projects. The costs of gold plating are several.
Money spent on project X cannot be spent on project Y. This is the
monetary opportunity cost of misallocation. Land devoted to
project X cannot be devoted to project Y. More land also means
greater distances to traverse. This is a spatial opportunity cost.
There is a tension between the risk of gold plating (focus on benefits
to the exclusion of cost) and of corner cutting (focusing on costs to
the exclusion of benefits). But there is available to us a balance,
building something which maximizes the difference between
benefits and costs, not just looking at benefits or costs. Advocates
place insufficient attention on the trade-off and too much on the
desired outcomes.
Design for forecast. Designs, rather than responding to the
demonstrated needs of today, are responding to an unreliable
forecast of future travel demand, assuming behaviors and
technologies remain unchanged. While in the early years of
technology deployment, forecasts often underestimate demand, as
technologies mature, forecasts tend to overestimate demand. Today
transport planners also must demonstrate their projects will address
potential peak traffic 20 years down the road, when it is assumed
congestion will have increased dramatically and no new
technologies developed.
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System Deployment
Early Forecast
Early Actual
Late Forecast
Late Actual
Figure 9.5: Forecast error.
In the early part of system
deployment, forecasts
underestimate growth. In the
later, mature stages, forecasts
overestimate growth. Source
(Garrison and Levinson 2014).
Road design standards. Funds are collected at the state and
federal levels for transport and then a portion of that money is
transferred back to local governments for transport. Along with the
money comes requirements that dictate how that money is to be
used. These include engineering requirements for things such as
lane width, degree of road curvature, and design speed and
planning requirements for things like maintaining a hierarchical
road network. Similarly even local road design standards for
firetrucks are problematic. Most US states require cities to comply
with the International Fire Code, which insists on streets with a
minimum width of 20 f t28 and that all traffic calming measures be 28 Despite being an ‘international’ fire
code, the widths are given in imperial
units. 20 f t equals 6.096 m.
approved by fire officials.29 Does the firetruck really need to do a
29 See (Snyder et al. 2013).360 degree turn on the cul-de-sac, or can it back out? Should the fire
department decide on a bike lane?30 30 As in this case in Baltimore
(Broadwater 2018).
Construction on facilities still in operation. Aside from
the rare bridge, it is unnecessary to keep facilities open and operating
while doing construction. This reduces construction space, reducing
time, increases set-up/break-down costs, and otherwise adds to total
costs. Construction is much faster (and thus cheaper) if rebuilding
could be done on a closed facility.31 New York’s MTA introduced
31 See the London Underground as the
classic example of the high cost of
doing construction only at night and
weekends, but keeping the line in
operation. (Wolmar 2002).their FastTrack program to close portions of subway lines overnight
for a week to speed repairs and cleaning. This was preferred to the
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old system of having workers stop working when a train went by.
We can imagine better still.3232 (New York Mass Transit
Administration 2018). The system as a whole must be reliable, meaning a traveler can
get from here to there, but that does not mean every segment must
be open 24/7/365. One reason the reconstruction of the I-35W
Mississippi River Bridge in Minneapolis was so fast was that they
contractors did not need to worry about existing traffic.3333 That it was design/build, (§18.2) also
reduced construction time.
Open government/costs of democracy. The planning process
is required by law to bring in as many stakeholders as possible.
This has (potentially) led to transport investment being sought and
justified for non-transport concerns. Transport investment is now
used for social, moral, and economic goals that are not directly
related to mobility. Sometimes the costs of democracy are seen
through lawsuits. In 2010, San Francisco unveiled a bike master
plan for the city. Opponents sued the city on the basis that adding
bikes lanes would reduce the vehicular level of service on roads.
After four years, and at great expense, the city won the lawsuit and
was able to build their bike lane network.3434 (Goebel and Roth 2010).
Union wages. The Davis-Bacon Act requires contractors on
federally funded or assisted projects to pay workers a prevailing
wage on public works projects set by the US Labor Department.
Union work rules. Productivity gains are often made through
new technologies. Work rules may prevent new technologies from
being deployed.3535 (Chomitz and Lave 1981; Smith 2013).
Buy America. Trade protections drive up costs both by reducing
competition and reducing competency.3636 (Platzer and Mallett 2015).
Climate change adaptation. Designing to be resilient to climate
change is adding costs to projects, through better drainage, higher
elevations for road beds, and other relatively more environmentally
sensitive designs.3737 (Davenport 2018).
Paralysis by analysis. The bureaucratic requirement to conduct
analysis delays projects and adds costs. Process has been
weaponized by project opponents.
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Scaling
There are insufficient economies of scale. When
everything is bespoke, there is no opportunity for standardization
and economies of scale. While many rail against cookie-cutter
design, it is only with cookie-cutters that we get lots of cookies.
Thin markets. There is no online department store for public
works. We cannot go online and buy a transit bus or an interchange.
The internet has not driven down prices in this field the way it has
in so many others. As a result a few vendors can collude or
orchestrate higher prices than would be faced in a more competitive
market.
Peaking. Transport agencies attempt to provide high levels of peak
capacity to accommodate the demand that results from un-priced
roads and highways. This is very costly capacity to provide. If
tolls38 were charged that reflected true costs people would drive 38 §6.
less, especially during peak hours. It would therefore cost much
less to provide the economically optimal amount of peak system
capacity.
Material scarcity. Materials are scarcer than they used to be as
more and more are tied up in existing infrastructure, and thus more
expensive.
Building booms. Australia’s construction boom is driving up costs
due to scarcity of labor. Publicly-funded projects are competing with
each other for labor, driving up wages, requiring more overtime.
Baumol effect. Baumol’s cost disease (or the Baumol Effect)
produces a rise of salaries in jobs that have experienced no increase
of labor productivity, and was first identified for the arts. Since
fewer employees are needed in the now more productive industries,
the relative labor costs of the unproductive industries rises.39 39 (Baumol and Bowen 1965).
Labor productivity. Transit investment isn’t realizing any
productivity gains from labor. Every dollar spent on public
transport yields 70% more jobs than a dollar spent on highways.
This is used to bolster the argument that we should spend more on
transit, but instead suggests we are much better at building roads
than at building transit. As labor is a large proportion of total cost,
transit investment has not realized productivity gains that have
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occurred in road building. This could be explained in part by lack
of competition, low levels of total investment haven’t brought new
producers into the market, or a number of other reasons. The
relatively high number of jobs per dollar spent does not necessarily
mean that transit investment is more virtuous. It may just be more
inefficient. This is a problem with treating transport investment as
industrial policy.
Experience and competence. The US has no experience with
high-speed rail, so there is no domestic expertise. This is
particularly problematic when Buy America provisions are in play,
as international firms have to establish domestic operations, or new
firms and industries are created. An example of this is the case of
United Streetcar, which was created in 2005 and closed in 2015 after
delivering only 18 trains.4040 (Schmidt 2015).
Lack of upfront funds. Delays to projects add to ultimate costs.
Lack of funds is a scaling or scoping problem, the scale or scope of
the project exceeds the financial capacity to pay for it.
Scoping
Projects are scoped wrong. We have investments that don’t
match actual demands. And this is not just for megaprojects. We
have big buses serving few passengers. We have overgrown
highways. We have a fear of building too small and having
congestion or crowding, so we build too big.
Project creep. Side-payments in project development crop up. For
instance, to placate neighbors, road builders construct noise walls
hither and thither. Side-payments are a required part of the politics
of getting something built.
Scope Creep. Along the way, even after construction starts, new
problems or opportunities are discovered, and the scope of the
project changes, leading to expensive change orders.4141 The Sydney City and Southeast Light
Rail project had tremendous problems
with scope creep, especially regarding
utility relocation (Gerathy 2018). ‘Starchitecture’.42 The use of famous architects (‘starchitects’)
42 (King 2016). drives up the price of projects.
As always though, America must be the exception. Spain would never
spend $3.8 billion on a single starchitect-studded station, but its own
Santiago Calatrava was happy to build one if New York was footing
the bill. Calatrava’s original design called for an enormous bird-like
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World Trade Center PATH station whose walls would open up in a
sort of flapping motion, but it was scaled back for security and cost
reasons. The wings were clipped and evolution was set back a few
hundred million years – the bird will now be a ‘slender stegosaurus.’
Even the originally projected $2.2 billion cost would have been more
than Paris spent on its entire new 9 km Metro Line 14.43 43 (Smith 2010).
Fragmented governance. Fragmentation leads to large and
meandering projects rather than centralized projects. Politicians
have to “share the wealth” of projects. This is perhaps a cause of
“project creep.”
Utility works are uncharged. Utilities have little incentive to
minimize the costs and disruptions from moving and upgrading
service, and there are far more utilities now than there used to be.
Some countries charge utilities rent44 for road space when doing 44 §4.1.
subterranean work, which gives them an incentive to coordinate
construction projects.
Principal-agent problems
The principal-agent problem focuses on the different motivations for
the ‘principal,’ the individual or group that owns the project, and the
‘agent’ who purportedly represents them, but is typically acting in
their own interests.
Benefits are concentrated, costs are diffuse. As a result,
the known beneficiaries lobby hard for projects, but not just to build
it, but to build it in a way that is expensive. Costs are diffuse, it is
seldom worth the taxpayer’s time to oppose a project just because of
its costs, which are spread among millions of other taxpayers.45 45 See The Logic of Collective Action (Olson
1965).
Pork-barrel politics is the grease that lubricates
legislative bodies. Alaska Congressman Don Young famously
received campaign funds to lobby for road aid to Florida, the state
furthest from his district.
Local officials in Florida are receiving funds for a road they do not
want, and are being blackmailed to accepting it with the threat they
won’t get other funding. The reason, a local property developer
contributed to Congressman Young’s campaign.46 46 (Kirkpatrick 2007).
And the really strange thing is in the whole scheme of things,
they did not give much ... only about $200,000 for Republicans in
exchange for $91 million in local road projects. Pork barrel
164 a political economy of access
spending has changed substantially in the US since Congress
eliminated earmarks in 2011.4747 Eliminating earmarks also made it
more difficult to pass federal legislation.
Decision-makers are remote. Remote actors cannot have
precise information about local conditions, and in the absence of a
free market in transport (there is generally one buyer, who is
generally a government agency), prices are not clear. As a result
these remote actors mis-allocate because they are misinformed. This
notion derives from the economic calculation problem.4848 (Hayek 2011).
Other People’s Money. Public works agencies are spending
‘Other People’s Money,’ and so are less motivated to get value for
dollar than an individual consumer on their own. This
principal-agent problem prevails in many organizations, but
especially so in public works where the bias is not to have a failure.
There was an old saying in business, “No one ever got fired for
buying IBM.” The same holds in public works, where rocking the
boat with new or innovative technologies is not sufficiently
rewarded, and the same mostly reliable contractors are returned
to.4949 The term ‘Other people’s money’ was
the title of a 1967 play and a 1991 movie
based on a 1989 play of the same name.
(Sterner 1989; Weidman 1967). Envy is a green-eyed monster. Envy is a much bigger problem
in public works than in personal life. Taxpayers wonder why
Jurisdiction (neighborhood, district) X gets an LRT when their own
Jurisdiction (neighborhood, district) Y doesn’t?50 It’s a recipe for50 Or the converse, why the feature
they don’t want is located in their
neighborhood.
political hostages at budget time, as few political leaders have any
reason to say “You know, the benefit cost on a project in my district
just shows the project makes no sense.” It leads to two problems:
projects that make no sense to serve some notion of geo-political
equity, and project creep because if Jurisdiction X’s light rail
stations had public art and golden knobs and a fountain, then
district Y’s light rail should have those and more. Combined with
the Other People’s Money problem, this type of envy is a recipe for
project creep.
Percentage of cost reimbursement. Planners and engineers
are paid as percentage of total project cost, and thus have an incentive
to lean toward more expensive designs.
Separation of design and build. Different firms are
responsible for engineering and construction, creating high
communication costs. We know design/build51 saves money, yet51 §18.2.
this is not standard practice, but instead is considered ‘innovative.’
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In addition to driving up costs and dividing responsibility,
separating design and build extends construction time.
Formula spending. Formula spending reduces the incentive or
need to worry much about costs. Formula spending is a process
where how much is spent on what is dictated by pre-allocated
formulas. This reduces incentives to pay attention to spending.
Lack of user fee funding. Projects funded out of user fees are
more likely to be efficient, partly because the agencies or private
parties receiving those fees know the fees are limited and partly
because they want to spend them in ways that will generate more
fees (which means in ways that benefit users enough that the users
are willing to pay for them).
Capital-bias. Today the US Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
disburses money for new local transit projects, which compete for
federal dollars.52 Because the FTA subsidizes capital rather than 52 (Chen 2007).
operations, transit programs are more capital intensive than
optimal. Federal funding programs create perverse incentives that
lead to very costly capital projects. Almost any project looks good if
somebody else is paying for most of it. For example every year
billions of dollars are spent on passenger rail projects that would
never be funded were it not for generous Federal grants. These
Federal programs, no matter how well intentioned, tip the local
decision making process in favor of expensive capital projects and
discourage consideration of lower cost options and policy reforms.
Projects are also much more expensive because they have to meet
complex federal guidelines to qualify for federal funding.
Public ownership. Most of the transport system is owned,
planned, and managed by public agencies. These entities have
many objectives but efficiency and cost-effectiveness are rarely a
high priority. The public sector does some things well but it doesn’t
usually do them very efficiently. As a result transport revenues are
not always efficiently converted to transport user benefits.
Multi-jurisdiction coordination. Because transport involves
a large number of public agencies with overlapping or intertwined
responsibilities planning is complex and inefficient. Projects end up
with all the bells and whistles needed to satisfy the agencies and
constituencies that could block a proposal. Local elected officials
often load up regional plans with pet projects that do little to
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improve transport system performance. There is a whole science to
how public agencies bargain with each other and interact,
unfortunately the results are rarely optimal from a cost-effectiveness
perspective. The principal/agent problem is part of the reason for
this, but only a part. In nearly every metropolitan area in the US
institutional structure results in transport plans and policies that fall
far short of the cost-effectiveness that could be achieved.
Graft. Mismanagement and graft add to delays and poor project
selection. The highest demand areas for maintenance and new stock
occur in places that are expensive. The few suppliers are able to
coordinate prices (illegally).5353 As warned by Adam Smith (Smith
1776). See, for an illustration, price fixing
by suppliers in the UK (Rail Technology
Magazine 2018). Poor commissioning. Contracts determining who does what on
a project are poorly written, and affect outsourced projects.
Public-private partnerships. Public-private partnerships trade
additional up front costs for faster construction.
Lack of consensus. Political requirements for consensus add
delays. This is both a standards issue (the standard requires
consensus) and a principal/agent problem, the principals or agents
do not agree.
Stop/start investment. Often caused by budget showdowns or
changes of government, projects are wound down and restarted,
increasing costs.
Ratchet effect. Interest groups are attracted to a particular public
issue and pressure the legislative body to increase spending on that
issue, but make it impossible to decrease spending on the issue.
Ethos, training, and prestige. Transport engineering is more
prestigious in other countries. Infrastructure may not attract the
best and the brightest any more in the US. The hot industries are
those based in California, about how to get stickier ads in front of
people reading social network feeds. The kinds of ethos, training,
and prestige that go with bureaucratic jobs in Germany, France,
Japan, and other countries, are not found in the US.
Government power and legal systems. Governments in
places with a strong bureaucratic and public works ethos have more
power to implement projects, running roughshod over local
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D Figure 9.6: Diminishing
marginal returns to new roads
due to diminishing distance
reductions as the network is
increasingly complete. Adapted
from Figure 25.5 (Garrison and
Levinson 2014).
resistance, property claims, special interest complaints, and
lawsuits. Some international legal systems are more amenable to
construction, including liability, bonds, and insurance.
9.2 Transport benefits too little
We are not building much new transport in the US not just because
the costs are too high, but because the benefits are too low.
We make the claim that new projects are too expensive, and list a
series of hypotheses as to why that might be the case.
When the US was much younger as a nation, say 1956, and
growing fast, with relatively poor connectivity, you could do almost
anything and it would have a benefit/cost ratio above 1. Very little
of the Interstate Highway System has been reversed. But the
productivity of new investments has declined over time, as net rates
of return are given in Table 9.1.54 54 See also (Boarnet 1997; Iacono and
Levinson 2017; 2016).The 2000s are significantly lower. A value of approximately zero
returns in recent years is consistent with recent work.55 This is what 55 (Jiwattanakulpaisarn et al. 2012; Iacono
and Levinson 2016).you expect with life-cycle theory, and it applies well to existing
mature modes.
The reason we don’t draw new lines on the map is that the net
benefits are not perceived to outweigh the net costs. The costs have
risen as land has gotten scarcer, and the benefits of additional lines
drop.
Table 9.1: Net Rate of Return
of Transport Investment. Source
(Mamuneas and Nadiri 1996;
2006).
Period Net Rate of Return
1949-1950 0.554
1960-1969 0.48
1970-1979 0.298
1980-1989 0.212
1990-2000 0.136
Diminishing marginal returns from network
completeness. As shown in Figure 9.6, we have diminishing
marginal returns to new roads due to diminishing distance
reductions as the network is increasingly complete. This is a spatial
argument. Imagine you have a network with the historic one-mile56
56 About 1600 m.
grid originally surveyed as a result of the Northwest Ordinance,
typical for much of the midwestern and western US. With
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development of farms, you add roads in between, say at 1/2 mile
spacing, this reduces travel costs some, as people don’t need to
back-track as much, and this might be a significant share of the
distance for short trips. At most, you are saving someone 1 mile
(1/2 mile at the beginning of the trip, and 1/2 mile at the end of the
trip). Now add additional links to diminish spacing to 1/4, This
requires twice as many links, but only reduces travel costs by at
most 1/4 mile at each end of the trip (1/2 mile total). New links
reduce distances less and less. Distances, along with speed,
determine travel time.
Diminishing speed savings for new roads. Transport links
become congested and are thus slower over time due to:
• Induced demand,5757 §14.
• Induced development,
• Induced driveways and interchanges, which increase friction on
roadways and slow them down over time. While access
management addresses this on arterials, very few interchanges
are removed to speed freeways, construction is almost
irreversible.
Thus we have to discount the opening year forecast travel time
benefits to account for the fact that the travel time savings of any
expansion will in part (if not in whole) be eaten up by more travel.
While this is not of itself a bad (travel is a measure of people doing
something that they value), it is not perceived to be a good thing
(because it creates congestion and pollution externalities which
existing travelers bear).
There is some compensation for induced demand and induced
development, as more travelers may lead to more service (induced
expansion of existing links and construction of new links), but this is
a longer term process, and only works up to a point (and more easily
with transit services than roads).
Diminishing demands for new roads. Demand for new roads
is decreasing at least on a per capita basis due to peak travel as well
slowed population growth, particularly in un-roaded or
under-roaded exurban areas.5858 (Levinson and Krizek 2018).
This implies the benefits from new construction are falling.
Disillusionment with the quality of travel and
transport facilities. As we note at the outset of the chapter:
fast, cheap, or good, pick any two. It sometimes seems we have
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Figure 9.7: Intercounty
Connector traffic levels, in
vehicle miles traveled per year.
Image by Claire Jaffe. Source:
(Ross 2015).
none of these. We know transport costs too much. We know
transport takes too long to build. Surely if we are paying a
premium, it should be of high quality. It seems not. Maybe the few
facilities which are brand new, expensive, and took too long to build
are high quality, but the rest are not. Even then, we have doubts.59
59 The Big Dig ceiling collapse was
a notable failure, this one all the
worse because the facility was new and
expensive. (Peterson 2006).
Poor forecasting leads to ‘Mostly Empty Syndrome.’ If
you have been following this book, you may have detected a theme,
we don’t like the public wasting money on un-needed infrastructure.
Of course no-one endorses ‘wasting’ money, we just disagree what is
wasteful and what is an investment.
These are roads and bridges to ‘nowhere,’ or at least to places
that few people live, work, shop, or play. We think roads are more
widely used than they are, because our perceptions are developed
by observing ourselves stuck in traffic. But most roads are empty
most of the time. That by itself does not mean they are not valuable,
but it does suggest there is a lot of excess capacity in the system. We
have many routes that were built by the general public for special
interests, routes that drain resources from more important
investments, routes that were once important no longer are (because
the businesses they served moved away, or the area has
depopulated), and routes that were parts of larger projects that
never came to be or have not kept up with changing surroundings.
New technologies like self-driving cars promise even better capacity
utilization, and thus even emptier roads. This longer term ‘problem’
is only a problem if you are in the industry, not for everyone else.
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Capacity needs are dropping (due to peak travel, automation
(higher throughput, narrower lanes), car sharing, ride sharing, new
vehicle types, substitution of telecommunications for
transportation). Yet it is politically difficult to address this problem
and rationalize the network. The answer is obvious in retrospect. A
successful investment had a positive ‘return on investment’ at or
above market interest rates. An unsuccessful investment (or waste)
had a negative return on investment. Projects with positive but
below market rates of return sit in an analytical purgatory.
In prospect, we believe we can assess forecasts accurately, and
project advocates are not to be trusted for a variety of
well-understood reasons ranging from optimism bias to strategic
misrepresentation.60 Unfortunately, other people also think they can60 (Flyvbjerg 2008).
assess forecasts accurately, even if we know they can’t. If we had
better mechanisms for requiring forecasters to be more accurate, we
could mitigate these problems.
When these projects are small, it is not terribly important. The
analysis of benefits and costs should not be costlier than than the
benefits from the analysis (i.e. the difference in total welfare from a
build/no build or a build this vs. build that decision). But when the
project proponents ask for hundreds of millions of dollars (or more),
we should be paying more attention.
A large number of projects succumb to ‘mostly empty
syndrome.’ MES projects are infrastructure that are underutilized.
Mostly they are not underutilized by design, but by mis-forecast.
There are facilities however, like NFL stadiums, that are in fact
underutilized by design, with numerous marginal events scheduled
to mitigate the grossness of the structure.
These are projects that serve purported needs, but those needs
don’t materialize. Or they just are insufficient to justify the cost. Or
they can be met in a different way. A few examples are listed below:
• St. Paul Union Depot – It is basically slated to serve 350 train
passengers a day, and a few buses unless and until many
speculative rail lines are opened.6161 (Vezner 2015).
• Minnesota’s Northstar Commuter Rail – Some forecasts greatly
over-estimated benefits of this line.6262 See Section 20.5.
• Maryland’s Inter-County Connector – Failed to realize forecasts of
demand, as in Figure 9.7.
There are some counter-examples perhaps, projects that were long
considered white elephants, though eventually demand caught up
with supply. Dulles Airport meets this criterion. That still does not
mean it was a good idea to build it when it was built, even if it is
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heavily used today. The 20 years of underutilization are fixed capital
that could have been better spent in some other way.
There are other counter-examples, projects that were expected to
fail (by someone, though not by proponents) that exceeded
expectations. The Pennsylvania Turnpike comes to mind.63 63 (Cupper 1990).
What connects MES projects?
• History will show that they are designed and pushed through by
politicians serving narrow interests rather than by market
demands or public sentiment. That is, they are generated by
top-down rather than bottom-up processes.
• They are large and require special treatment.
• They are backward looking, built near, at, or past the maturity of
the technology they represent. Air travel was still growing when
Dulles was built, and the market grew into its capacity there. Auto
travel was still early in its cycle when the Pennsylvania Turnpike
was built. In contrast we now have peak travel,64 long ago passed 64 (Millard-Ball and Schipper 2011).
peak railway,65 and are hopefully at peak football.66 65 (Garrison and Levinson 2014).
66 (Cowen and Grier 2012).
The known benefits of preserving built infrastructure
generally outweigh the benefits of building speculative
new infrastructure. The arguments about benefits apply to
mature systems in general, and are modally independent. If a new
mode comes about that is better than existing modes for some
market, it has lots of room to run while providing benefits in excess
of costs. But if the new mode is inferior to existing modes, than it
has little in the way of prospects.
What constitutes better or inferior is in the eyes of the customer.
Certainly customers care about time and price, but they do also
consider quality, and may be willing to sacrifice one for the other.
But as experience with zeppelins and cruise ships (and conventional
intercity rail in most of the US) show, high comfort at slow speed
will not defeat low comfort at high speed.
This also has implications for the Preservation vs. Expansion
argument: Fix-it-First.67 If the old projects had high benefit/cost 67 §3.3.
ratios, and without proper maintenance are at risk of disappearing
(either failing catastrophically, or being closed to prevent such an
end), it is incumbent to maintain them. In fact, given that land uses
and resultant activity patterns that have evolved around transport
networks, the benefit/cost ratio (BCR) of preserving those links is
probably much higher than it was originally, and certainly higher
than the BCR of new links.
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9.3 Transport takes too long to build
America entered World War II in December of 1941. By August of
1945, three and a half years later, the war was over. While it is easier
to destroy than create, think about all that had to be created to
destroy so efficiently. The Inter-County Connector opened in
Maryland in 2011, the environmental review took 27 years.68 Plans68 (Plotch 2015).
for it dated to the 1950s, and the alignment to the 1960s. It now
takes longer to build a suburban toll road than up-end the world
order. There is something absurd about that.
In 2015, David Levinson had dinner with Fred Salvucci, former
Massachusetts Secretary of Transportation, obstetrician to the Big
Dig, and now at MIT, while both were in Santiago, Chile. Among
other topics, he talked about complaints about environmental
regulation. Critics will complain about environmental regulations,
which are used as cudgels by political opponents of the project
(including environmentalists, of course).69 Fred made a point any69 See also (McArdle 2019).
queueing theorist could appreciate. He argued that environment
regulations are not slowing down transport projects as a whole.
There is only so much federal (and state) funding, and that is the
real bottleneck. Loosening environmental regulations will not make
any more projects get built in any given year.
He adds:
A further concern that I have is that many DOTs are most concerned
with maximizing construction volume, so are likely tempted to skew
their candidate projects towards the simpler to get through the
environmental process. These projects may actually be the least
important ones to actually implement, so there is likely a perverse
outcome in terms of project portfolio.
Of course it may affect the sequence of projects, projects with
more environmental problems, or more social impacts which induce
well-heeled people to use environmental regulations as a roadblock,
may get deferred for simpler projects without such problems. But
shouldn’t they in a functioning democracy?
If environmental costs are real, and we think they are, that
should make projects more expensive in order to ameliorate such
costs, either through avoidance of creating the damages in the first
place, or compensating the losers. This higher costs reduces the
number of projects that can be done with the money. So it goes. All
the low hanging fruit was eaten years ago.
If those projects still pass a benefit / cost test after amelioration,
then sure, build them. That is of course less likely than if transport
investments export environmental costs70 to the health sector or70 §7.
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agriculture, or property values, or anywhere else that it is not
properly accounted for.
Recommended benefit/cost analysis procedure.
• All highway, transit, airport, and port projects that are considered in
project-selection processes involving expenditure of state or federal funds
above $5 million shall undergo a consistent, peer-reviewed, monetized
benefit/cost analysis that would:
– Consider the full benefits and full costs of the project (in comparison
with a no-build alternative) incorporating changes in: number of
passengers and amount of freight, travel time and travel time
reliability, accessibility to employment and workforce, land value,
wider economic benefits, crashes and crash severity, air, water, land,
noise, pollution costs, and carbon emissions, public health (including
both physical activity and pollution levels), vehicle operating costs, as
well as the costs of building, maintaining, and operating the project
over time.
– Consider these costs and benefits distinctly for the population as a
whole as well as any relevant transportation disadvantaged groups
– Consider these costs and benefits not only for the project, but for
the relevant portion of the transportation network, including related
transportation sections both upstream and downstream of the project
and competing with the project.
– Consider uncertainty bounds in the estimation
• These analyses must be performed according to a standard methodology
published by the Department of Transportation (DOT).
• The methodology and analyses shall be reviewed every two years by a
national panel of transport and economics experts convened by DOT.
• The results of these analyses, including both the final results as well as
the component estimations, shall be made public and posted on the DOT
website in a readily accessible manner. An Annual Report of considered
and selected projects shall be provided with the full benefits and full costs
reported, and justification provided for any projects that were selected
over other projects with higher expected benefit/cost ratios.
• In order to improve travel and cost forecasting, and provide an
understanding of the accuracy of such forecasts:
– The project-delivering agency shall review project cost estimates made
at the time the project was approved for construction upon completion
of the project, and report to the Legislature a table of expected and
actual cost expenditures for all projects.
– The agency shall review travel demand estimates made at the time
the project was approved for construction 5, 10, and 20 years after
completion of the project and report to the Legislature a table of
expected travel and actual travel for all projects.
9.4 Benefit/cost analysis
The problems identified above are in part due to misassessment of
benefits and costs, partly due to lack of cost and benefit and quality
controls, and partly due to no relative assessment of benefits and
costs.
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Agencies should conduct benefit/cost analysis. A recent
headline in the San Jose Mercury News says: “Bay Area transport
projects to be judged on benefits vs. costs.”7171 (Richards 2011). Heminger was
hired in 1993 and appointed executive
director in 2001, and only by 2011 do
they value doing benefit/cost analysis.
He left in 2018 (Vallejo Times Herald
2018). Examining the ratios presented
in the story, despite it being a textbook
procedure, they are clearly doing it
wrong. But it is progress to at least
acknowledge using B/C analysis even if
the implementation is flawed.
“Talk to any business person about not having a benefits vs. cost
discussion and they’ll say, ‘Duh, you mean you don’t do that?’ ” said
the commission’s executive director, Steve Heminger. “They insist on
it, but in the transport profession it is not all that common... This levels
the playing field.”
Because benefit/cost analysis is only as good as the integrity of
the data and the analysts, measuring benefits and costs can be tricky.
But it is not impossible to get a first order estimate, and the general
principle is straight-forward. Sadly almost no agency requires actual
benefit/cost analysis. We would suggest rules something like shown
in the box.
9.5 Big infrastructure
In his 1996 State of the Union Address, then President Clinton said
twice “The era of big government is over.”72 Clearly it was not.72 (Wikipedia contributors 2017).
While government spending ebbs and flows, big government
continues to be a feature of American society.
Our Presidential Administration would claim the “Era of big
(civil) infrastructure is over” in the US. Not that we don’t have big
infrastructure, we do, and it isn’t going anywhere soon. The size of
the paved area in the US is on the order of the State of Virginia.7373 (Peters 2015).
That’s pretty big, and just looks at one measure of one
infrastructure (admittedly a large one).
Once upon a time we did deploy big infrastructure. The railroads
in the 19th century, and the Interstate in the 20th were BIG. Turnpikes
and canals were other large technical systems of the 19th century, as
were the US Highway system, airports, container ports, and the like
in the 20th. But they have been deployed, and many of them are
already shrinking.
Instead, because the existing infrastructure systems are mature
(built out), they need little expanding (and likely some contracting).
Certainly there are potential new infrastructure projects for
surface transport. The most widely discussed would be intercity
high-speed rail74 and urban transit projects. Similarly there are74 §15.
proposals for water75 (rebuilding the water and sewer networks)75 §2.4.
and for energy (massive investment in renewables as well as smart
grid technologies). We think the transport investments are unlikely,
the water investments are mostly piecemeal replacements, and the
energy investments will be a set of many small, decentralized power
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generators rather than large facilities. In short, change is likely to
incremental rather than comprehensive.
In part the question turns on what you mean by ‘Big,’ and we
think we mean system level deployments, like the Interstate, or a
national high-speed rail network, and not individual segments that
are adding to an existing system or replacing an existing system
element in-kind with some added functionality.
On the transport side, there is little interest in large new systems.
The last great window for high-speed rail was the 2009 Recovery
Act, which did not achieve that aim. As of this writing a decade
later there is no actual high-speed service to show for it. Even if the
California line were ever opened, we are decades away at the earliest
from the onset of a national network in the US.76 76 While construction continues on some
segments of the California HSR line,
the overall project still lacks needed
land and committed funding, and has
been put on the back-burner. California
officials continue to plan on federal
funding for large portions of the total
cost, despite no federal interest in
providing any since the 2009 Act.
Proposals for new Interstates appear from time to time, like one
for a proposed I-87,77 and occasionally one actually opens, and even
77 10 points if you knew that was Norfolk
to Raleigh without looking it up .
a second or rejuvenated Interstate 2.0 system has been proposed, but
again there is no strong push for such a thing, and the advent of new
technologies gives such proposals a ghost-like feel.
There are new systems emerging. The internet and wireless
telecommunications are pretty important. Combine these with
transport and we can construct an on-call ride-hailing system that
has updated the traditional taxis. This may eventually become
substantial with autonomous vehicles. But this latter element is not
a conventional physical infrastructure investment (not much of one,
some servers, some software), rather it redeploys existing (and soon
new) vehicles in a useful way.
The new information-enabled systems that ride on-top of the
classic physical layers are the products of electrical engineers and
computer scientists, not great civil engineering works. We can
imagine some things that might become useful. For instance we can
think of space civil engineering, things like space elevators and
Dyson Spheres. But these are not on the near horizon.
Unless we can find an infrastructure that increases connectivity
massively the way the railroad and the Interstate did (doubling
speeds), there is no point in spending resources for that given the
increasingly high costs and diminishing returns that civil
infrastructure faces. We have enough trouble maintaining what we
have with its proven connectivity (or lack thereof), the value of
future infrastructure systems is speculative at best.
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Macroeconomics: Is Transport
Stimulating?
Figure 10.1: Civilian
Conservation Corps (1933).
Source: National Archives
and Records Administration.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
(NLFDR).
On December 6, 2008, in the throes of the Global Financial Crisis,
then President-elect Barack Obama laid out key parts of Economic
Recovery Plan.1 In his radio address he boldly said: 1 This chapter is based on a piece
originally written for the Van Alen
Institute (Levinson 2017).
... [W]e will create millions of jobs by making the single largest new
investment in our national infrastructure since the creation of the
federal highway system in the 1950s. ... If a state doesn’t act quickly
to invest in roads and bridges in their communities, they’ll lose the
money.2 2 (Wallsten 2008).
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This plan turned into the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act, (ARRA) with a total budget of $831 billion. It dedicated $105
billion to infrastructure, of which $48 billion went to transport. Of
that $27.5 billion went to highway and bridge construction projects,
a surprisingly small share, about 3.3%.33 (Wikipedia contributors 2018b).
How many jobs were actually created remains unclear. While
that spending directly hired some number of people, some of those
people would have been otherwise employed doing something else,
perhaps at a lower salary. Macroeconomic theory suggests those
who were directly hired would subsequently spend money,
resulting in more economic activity, and more jobs.
This is considered a multiplier effect. The Congressional Budget
Office (2010) estimates that every dollar spent on Transfer Payments
to State and Local Governments for Infrastructure results in GDP
growth of between 1.0 to 2.5 dollars, which is higher than tax cuts or
transfers for other purposes.44 (Congressional Budget Office 2010).
While claims of jobs that would be created varied widely (from
10,853 ‘job-years’ to 34,799 ‘jobs’ per billion dollars spent (implying
300,000 to 1 million jobs or job-years) the actual amount is unknown.
Though there may be some hope of knowing the number of people
actually employed, there is no hope of knowing the increase in direct
employment (as some of those workers might have done something
else). Also no one actually knows the number of indirect jobs created.
For instance, the Star-Tribune5 at the time of the ARRA reported5 (Anderson 2008).
on a study by the Federal Highway Administration which estimated
that for every $1 billion spent on transportation projects, a very
precise 34,799 jobs are created. The source of this cannot be verified,
but it may be a typo and a misunderstanding of a study discussed
below which showed 34,779 jobs for every $1.25 billion spent, the
difference in $1.25 and $1 billion is probably a function of the 20%
match that states are supposed to provide. In any case, if that had
held up, the $27.5 billion federal dollars on infrastructure would
have generated over 950,000 jobs.
The Minnesota Department of Transportation, citing what we
believe is the same FHWA study, but looking at direct jobs (jobs
actually created in the program) and indirect jobs (jobs of suppliers
for project materials) but not ‘induced’ jobs (the result of additional
spending on the economy) was a bit more humble, only claiming
that for every $1 billion spent, 27,000 jobs could be directly and
indirectly created, and then downscaled that to half as many.6 The6 (Zdechlik 2009).
President’s Council of Economic Advisors subsequently estimated
that each $1 billion created 10,853 job-years.7 The Grow America7 (President’s Council of Economic
Advisors 2009). Act promotion material claims “Every $1 billion in public
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infrastructure spending creates 13,000 jobs.”8 a number that had 8 (US Department of Transportation
2014).previously been used for the proposed American Jobs Act.9
9 Zhang et al. (2016) summarize the
literature:
Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) created an input-output
economic model called JobMod
with the Boston University Center
for Transportation studies in 1997
to estimate the employment
impact of highway infrastructure
investment. The 2007 estimates
show that a total of 34,779 long-
term jobs would be supported
for every $1.25 billion spent
in highway capital investment.
Of those 34,779 jobs, around
35% come from construction-
oriented sectors and 15% come
from supporting industries.
The remaining 50% is induced
employment. Some researchers
found that public investment had
a positive effect on employment;
(Flores de Frutos et al. 1998;
Pereira et al. 2007) others
argued that the impact of public
investment on employment was
insignificant. More particularly,
Kamps (2005) explored the
relation between public capital,
output and employment in
OECD countries, finding that
there was little statistical evidence
that public capital can yield job
growth. In the same direction,
Jiwattanakulpaisarn et al. (2009)
employed dynamic panel data
models to study the relation
between highway infrastructure
and county-level employment for
the state of North Carolina. Their
findings were similar to Kamps
(2005)’s, suggesting that, as the
model specification gets more
accurate, the magnitude of the
impact of highway investment on
employment becomes negligible.
Leduc and Wilson (2013) found that in the 1993-2010 sample
period, highway spending shocks boost state GDP but not
employment. However during the Great Recession, highway shocks
had a large short-run impact on GDP, likely due to the large
economic slack (unemployment). Leigh and Neill (2011) find
highway grants reduce local unemployment in Australia.
Across the US, as of 2017, about 337,000 Americans work in
highway, street, or bridge construction, some 222,000 in construction
trades.10 This number has been higher in the past, 360,000 as
10 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018).
recently as 2006, so there may be some reserve labor pool, possibly
unemployed or employed elsewhere, to draw from. Nevertheless,
any stimulus designed to increase employment in this sector is
drawing from a limited pool if the skills of the workforce are to be
recognized.11
11 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016).
This job difference is a drop-in-the-
bucket in an economy that in a
normal expansion creates about 200,000
jobs every month(US Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2017).
Most of these jobs are skilled, requiring two or three years of
apprenticeship and on-the-job training.12 So while stimulus may be
12 (Sherk 2013).
able to directly employ otherwise unemployed people with training
in this field, it is unlikely to be able to provide much useful work
for unemployed people from outside the sector, at least not
immediately.
In macro-economic terms, jobs that employ people who would
otherwise be unemployed are a short-term benefit; in
micro-economic terms, jobs are a cost. If one company proposed to
build a small bridge and said it would cost $1,000,000 and employ
ten people and another said it would cost $500,000 and employ five
people, the state would do the latter. To maximize the amount of
infrastructure society gets per dollar, the government needs to be
efficient about how infrastructure money is spent. From an
infrastructure perspective, if a road project employs some people,
that provides a nice rhetorical flourish; but if projects are aimed
solely to employ people, the state will be wasting money which in
the long run shrinks the economy. The debt borrowed to build
projects ultimately comes due.
Highways are much more capital intensive than they were in the
1930s, using heavy machinery and many fewer workers.
Macro-economists or policy-makers who think of highways as huge
job-creators are simply remembering grainy black and white films
of the Civilian Conservation Corps showing gangs of workers with
pickaxes digging ditches and building roads through national
parks, as illustrated in Figure 10.1. This of course doesn’t mean
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roads should or should not be built, but the stimulus bill was not
terribly effective in this arena for job creation.
The value of the projects from stimulus is also questionable. In
order to be viable for receiving stimulus funds to put people back to
work, they had to be ‘shovel-ready’ and not underway. But these
were projects that were already designed and had environmental
permits yet were not built, and so not priorities of the transport
agency.
Transport should be justifiable on its own merits (private plus
social benefits exceed private plus social costs), not because it
creates jobs. A recession may however make the case stronger. If a
recession causes employment to fall (and thus wages to drop, and
other demand to drop, so other capital costs to drop as well), the
total costs of a project will drop, and the ratio of benefits to costs
should rise. The benefits may be lower due to lower initial demand,
but that is only short-term and thus a small fraction of the benefits,
while the cost drop due to less expensive construction is a large
fraction of the costs. If the benefit/cost ratio rises, funding is more
justifiable.
More to the point, it is ideal to run the capital equipment
required for road construction at a continuous level of full
utilization, because this equipment is expensive, you don’t want it
lying about unproductive, and you don’t want to buy more for only
a short-term spike. Due to specialization, you cannot effectively use
much road construction equipment on non-road projects.
Continuous utilization is achieved by a steady rate of expenditure
on projects which is neither spiky due to stimulus or other money
bombs, nor on the other side, vulnerable to drops in revenue due to
failure to authorize expenditures, short term drops in user fees, etc.
Before the 2016 election, advisors to Donald Trump put out an
infrastructure proposal that would give some $137 billion in federal
tax credits for private financing of infrastructure. More recently, the
Trump administration proposed to spend $1 trillion on
infrastructure, through various tax incentives, (notably, not $1
trillion of direct government spending). The proposal is a bit of a
shell game because the assumption is that the federal government
will provide tax credits to these private companies who will then
raise money and build infrastructure. The claim is the tax credits
will be offset by greater revenue that comes into the federal treasury
because of income tax, because there are workers now who are
working on this newly funded infrastructure who otherwise would
not have been. The claims are dubious and disingenuous in a full
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employment economy because these resources would otherwise be
used elsewhere.13 13 In early 2019, when this was written,
the unemployment rate for the US
was 4%, which is considered full
employment.
Under full employment, if the workers weren’t working on one
particular road, they’d be working on a different road. There would
be profits from that different road, and there would be income taxes
from those workers, all of which would come into the federal
treasury anyway. Reallocating jobs from one project to another
likely has no stimulus effect, though it could easily add to the
deficit if workers are shifted from one project to another and the tax
credits are not repaid with higher income tax revenue.
Were the economy in recession or depression and the workers
otherwise idle and unemployed, such as in the depths of a
recession, and then stimulus employs them, infrastructure
investment for macro-economic purposes (i.e. Keynesian stimulus)
might be warranted. Taxes would be paid by workers who would
otherwise not be earning income. But stimulating the economy
when the unemployment rate is 4.9%, as at the end of President
Obama’s Administration, is very different than doing a stimulus
when the unemployment rate is 11%, as at the outset of that
Administration.
So while the creation of jobs from infrastructure construction is
limited, there are potential long-term benefits of constructed
infrastructure in terms of jobs. Again it depends on context.
Economic activity increases with accessibility, the ability for workers
to reach jobs and for firms to easily interact. In principle, one way
to improve accessibility is make it easier to traverse long distances
in less time, so you can reach a larger number of jobs (vendors,
customers, and so on) in a given travel time. This occurs with faster
and more direct transport.
However, the existing surface system (buses, rail, highways) is
mature. It is not just old, though it is that too, it also already
connects all the places worth connecting as fast as can be
cost-effectively connected in most parts of the US. It will not cease
to be mature by throwing lots of dollars into new facilities, (no
realistic amount of new facilities will obviate the existing system)
but will slowly become senile (and yes, literally, collapse) if it isn’t
properly monitored and maintained. It is not sexy, it will not cut
more ribbons, but it is necessary to rebuild what exists.
When politicians like to talk about jobs programs, they evoke the
job losses in the coal mines and rust belt industries. And certainly
there are problems in those regions. Yet, the areas of need of new
infrastructure are in larger cities and in areas that are doing
economically very well, while the areas of excess labor are in other
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parts of the country. Do those prospective workers want to relocate?
It might not be cost-effective personally for them to do that because
living in the big city is a lot more expensive than living in a rural
area. It may be difficult given their families and social networks are
embedded in place. There are also skills required. Construction is
not unskilled work. It might not require a college degree, but there
are many skills required in building a road properly understood by
the workers who have gained experience over time building roads.
And the people who build roads differ from the people who build
homes, railroads, storm sewers, and water pipelines, or who dig
mines.
Road construction is capital-intensive. What once might have
taken a hundred men with a shovel, now takes one construction
worker with a large piece of construction equipment to move dirt.
The mental models held by politicians and economists of building
infrastructure formed from the 1930s in the Great Depression, and
fail in a world where we have automation, and we require many
fewer people to build the same length of road as we once did.
Infrastructure and jobs policy should be two separate things. The
best infrastructure plan does not necessarily align with best plan to
create new jobs. Instead, we might think about jobs programs in
other fields, jobs that require a lot of person-to-person interaction.
Two Nobel Prize winning economists have suggested some rules
about managing economic policy:
• Jan Tinbergen’s rule: Achieving a multiple number of
independent policy targets requires an equal number of policy
instruments.
• Robert Mundell’s rule: Each policy instrument should be assigned
to a policy target on which it has greatest relative effect.
Following Tinbergen, jobs are one policy target, infrastructure is
another. Each requires its own instrument.
This book tends to abide those rules. There are occasions, like road
pricing, which both manages traffic and raises revenue, where there
are instruments that kill two birds with one stone, but infrastructure
and jobs is not a good example.
11
The Magic of Streetcars, the Logic of
Buses
(a) Washington Avenue 1954 (last run of Streetcar). (b) Washington Avenue 2014 (Green Line LRT, Photo by D.
Levinson).
Figure 11.1: These images
from Coffman Union show the
main Mall of the University of
Minnesota campus over a period
of 60 years.
Once upon a time (1888 to be precise), the United States and the
world launched a huge building boom for urban streetcars.
Companies like Twin City Rapid Transit laid miles of track in
fast-growing cities, extending well past the built areas to serve
greenfield sites for emerging suburbs waiting to be platted and
built. They did this because the streetcar promoters benefited
directly from the land sales. The availability of a new, fast transit
system connecting to downtown made houses much more valuable.
The fares from the new passengers covered the operating costs of
the system.
Streetcars were financed by a mechanism we now call value
capture,1 Joint development was quite common in the railroad and 1 §16. but is more accurately called joint
development.
184 a political economy of access
streetcar eras. As part of grants of rights-of-way to the
transcontinental railroad in the United States, large grants of land
were given to help the railroad pay for the infrastructure they were
creating. In an urban context, private transit companies were often
developers of ‘streetcar suburbs.’2 This occurred in the Twin Cities2 See the book Streetcar Suburbs by
Warner (1978). in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, where large parts of what
are Minneapolis and Saint Paul were built around that era’s
dominant transport technology. Evidence shows that the streetcars
led development in the Twin Cities (though in other places,
transport may lead or follow development).3 This growth is3 See Levinson (2008); Xie and Levinson
(2009); King (2011). illustrated in Figure 11.3.
Though it was used widely in the past, there is a lesson to be
learned from the deployment. Joint development was critical in
paying for the initial capital costs of the streetcars.
Networks continued to grow until the 1920s and 1930s, when the
bloom came off the boom. The new motor car served the prospective
suburbanite just a bit better than the sluggish streetcar. However
over time infrastructure needs replacement. By 1950, the streetcars
were upward of 60 years old and needed a major infusion of capital
to be maintained. Instead, they were abandoned en masse across the
United States for buses in a process that in the transport field has
been termed ‘bustitution.’ Unfortunately, the initial source of funds,
the cross-subsidy from real estate, was no longer available, as the
real estate was already developed. The owners of the streetcars in
Minnesota, still private, like many others across the world, chose to
convert to buses – ‘free-riding’ on public roads required much lower
capital outlays than reconstructing and maintaining tracks.
It may be too much to expect the initial streetcar developers from
the 1880s to have planned for replacement in the 1950s, but should
it be desirable to maintain infrastructure over a long period, a
continuing source of revenue that pays not just for operations, but
also accrues revenues ultimately for periodic reconstruction, must
be identified.
The causes of the decline of the streetcar remain a sore point with
urbanists, but this was a global phenomenon that happened in any
country rich enough to see mass motorization defeat mass transit.
The US transit crisis4 – a collapse of demand and thus revenue4 §4.3.
beginning shortly after the peak of transit demand during the
rationing of fuel and rubber during World War II – affected not only
streetcars, but also commuter trains and urban subways.
In response, the US federal government began funding large
transit capital projects starting in 1964 through the newly created
Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA). UMTA helped with
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Figure 11.2: McKinney Avenue
Transit Authority, Dallas, Texas.
the municipal takeover of transit, and then provided capital for
expansion in the 1970s. It’s worth noting that there was more
experimentation in this period than at present – the Peoplemovers
installed in Detroit and Miami came from this period, as did
funding systems like the San Francisco region’s Bay Area Rapid
Transit (BART), Washington, D.C.’s Metrorail, and Atlanta’s
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA). Beginning
in the 1980s, the underwhelming performance of this new
generation of heavy rail – especially systems like those in Baltimore
and Miami – led the federal government to support, instead,
streetcars, newly rebranded as light rail transit (LRT) systems.
This new generation of rail, including San Diego’s Tijuana Trolley
and the Portland MAX, differed from traditional streetcars in subtle
ways; even professionals have difficulty differentiating the two. In
general, the LRTs are wider and longer than the streetcars of a
century ago and their more recent reboot. More important, LRTs
tend to run in exclusive, but not grade-separated rights-of-way.
With federal matching dollars being just given away, cities bid for
new light rail systems, and many were constructed.
The modern streetcar was born when local governments balked
at running LRT vehicles down city streets because it took away too
much right-of-way from cars. The solution was to make a narrower,
shorter vehicle that harkened back to historic streetcar proportions –
although often modernized with low-floor boarding to comply with
requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, among other
amenities – and that could run in the street right-of-way.
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Running in traffic has major downsides. A streetcar, unlike LRT in
an exclusive right-of-way, cannot pass cars; it too gets stuck in traffic.
In fact, because it is tracked, it is more likely to be stuck in traffic than
a bus, which can change lanes. As any rider of legacy systems can tell
you, streetcars are no faster than buses, and in many circumstances
no faster than walking.5 Average streetcar operating speeds range5 In 2017 Toronto installed a pilot project
where streetcars on King St. were given
traffic priority, parking was eliminated
and traffic was restricted was put in
place. Speeds increased and ridership
improved by 11% during the following
year.
from 7.1 km/h6 in Little Rock to 12.4 km/h7 in Tacoma. Tellingly,
6 4.4 mph.
7 7.7 mph.
streetcars have been embraced by the ‘slow transport’ movement.8
8 (Condon 2012).
Portland, Oregon is one of the major battlegrounds in the mode
wars (bike vs. car vs. transit and the internecine rail vs. bus). Since
the 1980s, Portland has been held up by planners as the exemplar
American city that does almost everything right. The foremost thing
they do right in the view of the planning establishment is promoting
LRT and bicycling.
Portland opened a modern streetcar system in 2001. Along with
introducing the streetcar, the city changed zoning and other
development regulations, and the development machine took off.
The zoning could have been implemented in the absence of the
transit investment, but often rail justifies change.
This Portland example, excellently marketed, has been promoted
in city after city as the latest urban elixir, both absolving the city of
all its sins and growing city development muscles to Hulk-like
proportions. Other cities followed Portland, though more have
wound up with systems like that in Tampa (about 1,000 boardings
per day) than Portland (about 10,000).
The most recent boomlet in streetcar construction responds to
changes in federal funding priorities, as the Obama Administration
promoted livability through Transport Investment Generating
Economic Recovery (TIGER) grants. (Previous federal funding
sources were not amenable to streetcar service). Most of the lines
are local circulators, connecting tourist and entertainment
destinations. Many in fact are heritage lines, using historic
streetcars (or replicas) to deliver passengers in the same fashion as
100 years ago, as in Figure 11.2.
The problem of streetcars as transport is inherent in the
technology, but also in how the technology is operated. To rely on
transit, prospective passengers want frequent service – every ten
minutes or better. Almost none of today’s streetcars achieves that
frequency. It may look good on the watercolor rendering to have the
streetcar in front of the building, but for actual users, a conveniently
appearing streetcar is a rare occurrence.
In addition, though American streetcars seem to be cookie-cutter
systems, in fact they all involve custom designs, driving up costs.
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From a cost-efficiency9 perspective, streetcar systems should all use 9 §9.1.
standardized parts and cars.
Transport investments (both locations and choice of technology)
are empowered by emotion and feelings, as well as magical thinking,
at least as much as reason.
In the 1880s and 1890s the first generation of streetcars provided
a huge increment of accessibility over competing modes (walking,
horse). Today’s political leaders seem to engage in magical thinking
on the subject, claiming streetcars will have the same kinds of
transformative effects today as a century and half ago. But unlike
the 1890s, now streetcars provide no increment of accessibility over
cars and buses. They allow no one to get anywhere faster than
before. The entire argument rests on qualitative improvements.
As rational observers with formal training in transport, we have
had a hard time understanding the emotional relationship even some
people have with rail. Why do people like rail more than buses? Is it
simply how they are operated, or that it is modern capital, or is there
a psychological benefit some accrue by traveling on deterministic
tracks instead of the highly stochastic, very complex, and widely
diverging road network?
There are uncountably many theories on the matter, a large subset
of those are discussed and critiqued in the following sections. While
this chapter discusses transit, emotion rather than reason is also an
important factor in the location of other transport modes.
11.1 Ride quality
‘The Trolley Song’ speaks to the smoothness of the ride.10
10 ‘The Trolley Song’ was penned by
Hugh Martin and Ralph Blane and most
famously sung by Judy Garland in the
1944 film Meet Me in St. Louis about the
1904 World’s Fair:
“Clang, clang, clang” went the
trolley
“Ding, ding, ding” went
the bell
“Zing, zing, zing” went my
heartstrings
For the moment I saw him
I fell
“Chug, chug, chug” went
the motor
“Bump, bump, bump”
went the brake
“Thump, thump, thump”
went my heartstrings
When he smiled, I could
feel the car shake.
The quality of the ride on an LRT is smoother and less herky-jerky
than a bus, and passengers have a nicer facility.
The ride quality issue is primarily one of new infrastructure than
of rail or streetcar infrastructure, though to be clear, it is probably
easier to keep rail infrastructure smoother than roads. In the waning
days of streetcars, people praised the new buses for their ride quality.
For a young musically-inclined romantic, even a bus can be
idealized. For the regular commuter or the harried shopper, bump,
bump, bump is far from romance.
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Figure 11.3: The joint
development of streetcars
and suburbs in the Twin Cities.
Source: Xie and Levinson (2009)
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11.2 Speed
Transport is about speed (and frequency and reliability). While
speed has historically risen overall, speed (and reliability) on any
particular transport facility tends to decline with age. The day it is
deployed is the fastest the system will ever go, and over time it will
slow. While there are occasional improvements, as infrastructure
ages, it declines. Roads get more congested and more access points,
reducing speed. Transit wears out, is shut down for maintenance, or
slowed down in work zones, has stops added (more than they are
eliminated). New is usually faster, but more importantly, limited
access is faster. We can and do build new transport facilities that are
overall slower (though more frequent) than existing transport, but
that is harder to justify, so it is always pitched as faster, even if in
contradiction to the facts.
Trains are faster than local buses if they have their own
right-of-way and few stations. Bus rapid transit (BRT) on exclusive
right-of-way is faster than buses in mixed traffic as well. Streetcars
lack exclusive right-of-way. Exclusivity is the fact that distinguishes
streetcars from LRT in most US definitions, although the
terminology, and its use, are fuzzy. Streetcars are thus not
inherently faster than buses, and may be slower since they stop at
every stop, while buses can skip stops lacking passengers.
11.3 Operating costs
Table 11.1: Twin Cities Metro
Transit Annual Costs (excluding
initial construction, 2006).
Bus LRT
Capital $41,728,775 $21,559,465
Operating $208,249,261 $18,725,334
Total $249,978,036 $40,284,799
Daily Pax 212,088 28,147
Total/pax $3.88 $4.50
Some advocates argue from a systems perspective, which while of
little import to the daily rider, matters to the bottom line. Trains,
with a single driver pulling multiple carriages, and electricity rather
than fuel, may have lower operating costs (cost per passenger km)
than buses. Clean electricity powering a streetcar will save energy
and reduce environmental impacts compared to a diesel, or even an
electric, bus in traffic. We do not have clean electricity (yet) in most
of the developed world, so while the energy claim may remain, the
environmental one is weak at best. The labor argument may also
hold if you have a long streetcar that carries more passengers per
driver than a bus. Germany has double-decker buses that hold 128
passengers, while streetcars by Skoda hold 157, as with all things, it
depends on configuration, but it is not a knock-out punch. And it
is only critical on routes and times with that level of demand. And
if to achieve that demand, you lower frequency, you are worsening
service.
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Offsetting the operating cost advantage is the major capital cost
disadvantage. Buses can effectively free-ride on streets paid for out
of property and gas taxes, while streetcars are responsible for their
own tracks (and BRT on exclusive right-of-way similarly are
responsible for their own pavement). Does the $100 or $200 million
dollars spent per line garner any new passengers? Are the existing
passengers qualitatively better off in a way that they would actually
pay for? Is the trip any faster? If the service were indeed better, it
should be able to charge a premium and retain its customers.
Further offsetting this is scale economies. Cities that have buses
will continue to have buses. At first, and for a long time, those same
cities will have few streetcars. The buses will have many people
working on them, a collection of spare parts, expertise, and so on to
keep them maintained efficiently. The greater the number of distinct
technologies used, the lower the economies of scale that can be
achieved with any one of them. Streetcars will, especially at first, be
rare, without the library of spare parts, without the staff
maintenance expertise, and without any of the other advantages of
buses. Either costly redundant vehicles will need to be provided, or
the system will be ‘out’ more frequently than buses. As the data in
Table 11.1 shows, it is not even necessary that LRT has lower annual
costs than bus, even after neglecting the quite large initial
construction cost.1111 More recent data, including the 2014
Green Line, looks better for LRT in the
Twin Cities. The point is that looking
at some costs (such as operating only) to
the neglect of annual capital costs, much
less initial capital costs, significantly
biases the perspective.
Figure 11.4: A lit T sign in
Vancouver.
11.4 Navigability
It is hard to navigate current US bus systems, while the fewer
number of rail lines are fairly easy to figure out. Because trains
cannot steer, they cannot get lost the way a bus can.
An article in a local Minneapolis newspaper, “A Streetcar Named
Development”12 discusses the potential for streetcars for
12 (Haugen 2006).
Minneapolis. In the closing quote, Teresa Wernecke, director of the
Downtown Minneapolis transport Management Organization says
“With rail, you know where you’re going.” The implication is that
with bus you don’t. The navigability problem with streetcars is
solved by wires in the air and tracks on the ground, which tell you
where the service is going. Buses on undifferentiated blacktop have
no such obvious signals. In one sense this is correct, but this is
easily solved with better signage, and more importantly, tall lights
with ‘T’ on them as deployed on arterial rapid bus lines, which can
be seen from several stops away, as illustrated in Figure 11.4. Not to
mention this can be solved through smart phone routing apps, such
as Google Maps. This has been enabled by the remarkable
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standardization on the General Transit Feed Specification (GTFS) 13 13 (McHugh 2013).
and the use of automated vehicle location (AVL) to locate buses in
real-time.
In contrast to the assumption that rail is deterministic in its
destinations, we present an anecdote: In London14 on rail, you 14 David Levinson lived there for a
year (2006-07). This is based on his
experience.
don’t necessarily know where you are going either. Returning home
from Imperial College on the District Line, one might board a
Wimbledon-bound train at the South Kensington Station towards a
destination at Putney Bridge.
Well, more than once, before the train reached Gloucester Road
station, the conductor announced the train has been redirected to
Ealing Broadway, and all passengers bound for Wimbledon (or
points in-between) needed to change trains at Earl’s Court.
While this is not a big deal, walking from one train on the platform
to another across the platform, it created a lot of confusion. Native
Londoners were asking visitors and tourists what was going on.
Those in charge of dynamically rerouting the trains may have had
a good reason for this (another Wimbledon-bound train was already
at the Earl’s Court platform, one for Ealing must have been held up
somewhere upstream), trying to balance service or flow of trains.
If this had only happened once, one might say, “that’s strange.”
But this happened about monthly. If you missed the announcement
you would have to backtrack. This does not regularly happen with
buses. (Though sometimes they are cut short due to works or events.)
The point is that:
• When you have a complicated system, this creates opportunities
to dynamically reroute (on a single line system, the exercise would
be meaningless), and
• There is not something inherently more secure or informative
about rail over bus.
Real-time apps could, in principle, inform travelers of such
unusual activities, but as of this writing, most travelers are not
using them, and the rest are using them to choose a vehicle to
board, not expecting the vehicle they boarded would change
midstream.
11.5 Payment and boarding times
An advantage that rail stations often hold over bus stops is in how
trips are paid for.
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Transit companies are moving to requiring smartcard (and credit
card and smartphone) use for buses as well as trains, though this
movement is much too slow.
Smartcards are often standard for trains but not buses. On a bus,
payment is usually onboard. Cash payment takes about 6 second per
customer to process when boarding, while smartcard users are at 2
seconds per customer.1515 Based on work from a student paper.
Boarding times are reduced further still with prepayment and all-
door boarding. Right now this is standard on trains of all kind, and
rare for buses, but there is no need for this to be so. Payment readers
can be installed at bus stops, starting with the busiest.
Reducing boarding time benefits not only transit passengers by
speeding the trip, but by making the bus go faster, enables more
runs per bus per day, increasing operational efficiency and driver
productivity and the frequency of service that can be attained from
the fixed fleet.
Any location worthy of being served by fixed-route transit is
worthy of an off-board fare-collection mechanism (to speed
boarding) at every bus stop, as ubiquitous as modern parking
meters, which can take cash, coins, pin-and-chip credit cards, and
near field communications (NFC) embedded in modern
smartphones.
11.6 Nostalgia
Famously, Minneapolis and St. Paul saw their streetcars
‘bustituted,’ a word meaning substituted for by bus, by 1954, and
many mourned their loss. But Minneapolis and St. Paul were not
alone. Streetcars were obsoleted worldwide. Yet we don’t go to
London to visit their famous double-decker streetcars (at least not
since the 1920s). We don’t see them in New York or many other
world cities. Trams disappeared in Sydney in 1961, though
Melbourne kept theirs. There are reasons for this.
People who like rail recall (or wish they could recall) the
immediately post-World War II America when streetcars were at a
maximum.16 The year 1946 was a magical period in US history, a16 Perhaps coincidentally, this is also
the ideal time for model railroad
enthusiasts, as it authentically permits
the mingling of steam, electric, and
diesel model trains.
boom following the long depression, when streetcar networks if not
at a maximum were really close. Though streetcars were clearly on
the decline everywhere, this loss is felt deeply in the Twin Cities
region.
Losses (of things we want) are always felt more than gains.
Having the streetcars did not make residents as happy as losing the
streetcars made them unhappy. This observation connects with
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Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky,17 and helps explain 17 (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
why change is so difficult. We are loss averse. Even today, people
who were not born in a place feel outrage by the change that
occurred.
Loss aversion can be rational as a signaling mechanism. If you
believe we will be ‘irrationally’ upset at losses when you take
something from us, you will be less likely to take it. You will also
over-compensate us if you do take it, so that we will feel that we
have been properly compensated.
11.7 Novelty
The flip side of nostalgia is quest for novelty. People like new things
better than old things. Anything new (and shiny) has some appeal,
especially compared to old and run-down. We invent words to
make old things sound nicer than they are (historic, classic, vintage,
legacy, antiqued, previously owned, well-loved, patina). While once
streetcars were old and buses were new, the opposite is now (or
soon will be) true.
11.8 Conspiracy
There is a thought widely held that a conspiracy of automakers and
oil companies undid the streetcars. Conspiracy plus nostalgia is not
without power as an explanatory force.18 The conspiracy as told is 18 Possibly due to the popular film Who
Framed Roger Rabbit.not quite what happened, and most objective observers agree the
streetcar’s mid 20th century demise was driven by economic
factors.19 19 (Slater 1997).
Yet in many conspiracies there are kernals of truth that are
exploded into popcorns of myth. The aging tram system of Brisbane
was burned in the mysterious Paddington Depot fire.20 Phoenix lost 20 (Turnbull 2002).
most of its streetcars similarly.21 Unlike the situation in most of the 21 (Fearnow 2016).
United States, the loss of streetcars in the Twin Cities was in fact the
result of a criminal conspiracy. The Transportation Experience notes:22 22 (Garrison and Levinson 2014).
The streetcar lines in the Twin Cities were built by Tom Lowry in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and like many cities were
aimed at large part in land development. For the period between 1925
and 1948, fares held steady at $0.10, leading to capital shortfalls. The
Twin Cities lines were publicly traded and most shareholders were
non-local. The conversion from streetcars to buses took place after a
series of events helped drain the company of even more resources. In
1949, Charles Green undertook a hostile takeover. He asked for a fare
hike, fired 25% of the workforce, and canceled capital investment. He
194 a political economy of access
was employing a traditional ‘cash cow’ model, wherein new owners
milked the system of resources to pay for its own takeover.
A strange turn took place when Isadore Blumenfeld, a.k.a. Kid
Cann (rumored to be a gangster and murderer) and Fred Osanna
(known to be a lawyer) tried to take the system from Green. The State
Railway Commission made an investigation of bribery,
embezzlement, kickbacks, and death threats. Osanna and company
did successfully takeover the Twin Cities Rapid Transit in 1951, and
sold off the streetcars and many of the rails. It is reported that the
vehicles are still running in New Jersey and in Mexico City, though
while the shells may still operate, whether the mechanics in the
vehicles do is unclear. Osanna claimed “the fastest and most massive
streetcar-to-bus conversion ever undertaken in any major US city.”
However, Osanna wound up in jail for fraud. The system was
subsequently sold to Carl Pohlad (later owner of the Minnesota
Twins), and was eventually sold to the public Metropolitan Transit
Commission in 1970 for $7.9 million.
Figure 11.5: Litter outside the
Franklin Avenue LRT Station,
Minneapolis. Photo by David
Levinson.
11.9 Amenity
People like amenities, features, gadgets. Some of them are
genuinely useful, like the LRT station variable message signs which
are supposed to tell you how many minutes until the next train.
Shelters and heat are nice in bad weather. Pre-paying saves time.
Working, real-time signs can provide useful information which
relieve anxiety. New systems are coupled with amenities that old
systems lack.
11.10 Sexuality
Jonathan Richmond identified sexuality as an explanatory force in
his book Transport of Delight and earlier paper “The Mythical
Conception of Rail Transit in Los Angeles.”23 The image of the train23 See (Richmond 2005).
entering the tunnel clearly evokes a primal response. A bus entering
a tunnel would not have the same length, and thus presumably
fall-short in the primal response department.2424 Whether mass transit needs to be sexy
has been disputed. (Jaffe 2013b).
11.11 Respect
Some people won’t ride buses. Buses are perceived as a means of
travel for the lower classes. These same people would be happy
to ride an intercity coach, or a London Routemaster double-decker
bus, or a tourbus, or have their kids ride a school bus. It is not the
technology, it is a matter of respect and status. If buses are perceived
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as being for the lower classes, people striving to be in (or stay in) the
upper classes will avoid them.
But this is not about buses, it is a more general issue.
The Hiawatha (Blue Line) LRT opened in Minneapolis in 2004.
Soon thereafter it was already beginning to feel rundown. The
litter-strewn (Figure 11.5), ticket-machine-jammed Franklin Avenue
LRT station “just makes you feel poor.”25 Located in a no-man’s 25 Spoken by David Levinson’s wife.
land beside Cedar and Hiawatha, it is not a place one feels safe
walking to, especially at night. At the end of a Minnesota winter the
accumulated detritus of six months past is just par for the course,
but apparently no one claims responsibility for cleaning up the hill
adjacent to the station, or the boulevard26 along the street. This is 26 The term ‘boulevard’ in the English
language of the Upper Midwest refers to
the green planting between sidewalk and
street. In other places this is sometimes
called a ‘nature strip’ or ‘verge.’
the same kind of big investment in capital but “not one penny for
maintenance” philosophy that led the buses to decline, and the
streetcars before them. At least there was a police car parked next to
the station, hopefully deterring violence that is dragging some
systems down.
The perception of transit as a failure is succinctly summarized in
the wrongly but widely misattributed27 quote: “Any man who finds 27 It is said Margaret Thatcher said this,
but there is no evidence. Instead Loelia
Ponsonby is probably the source. She
was the model for Miss Moneypenny in
the James Bond universe.
himself on a bus over the age of 26 can consider himself a failure in
life.”
11.12 Status
People like to live with people who are like them, or their economic
‘betters,’ who raise their status by association. This process explains
economic sorting in real-estate markets. It should be no surprise that
people want to ride with people who are like them, or their economic
‘betters,’ who also raise their status by association, and don’t want
to ride with others.
This ‘people like us’ phenomenon also leaks into the taxi vs.
Uber/Lyft debate. Uber and Lyft drivers are more like ‘us’ (if ‘us’ is
middle class folks and above) than your typical taxi driver.
The decision of the ‘choice rider’ (as opposed to what was once
unfortunately called ‘captive riders’ in the field, and then ‘transit
dependent,’ and now the more positively-framed ‘transit reliant’) to
ride the bus depends on whether other similar people ride the bus.
Presumably they are making the same kind of decision. They are
not considering the positive externality28 (virtuous cycle) that their 28 §7.
riding the bus increases the likelihood someone like them rides the
bus (and their not riding the bus lowers the same likelihood in a
vicious cycle). Like any positive feedback system, this is both a cause
and an effect.
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The potential choice rider who doesn’t ride transit, or more
specifically the bus, chooses not to ride because of reasons of
efficiency (compared with the car), and respect and status
(compared with the car and the train). Their not riding makes the
status question even worse.
Imagine there are two transit services in an area, a low quality
system (L) that is pervasive (everyone is within 400 m29 of a low29 1/4 mi.
quality stop) and a high quality system (H) that is skeletal, only a
small fraction are within the same distance of a high quality stop.
Imagine there are two classes of potential users, poor people (P)
who will use either system, and rich people (R) who will use only
the high quality H routes.
Poor people perceive the system as larger (both L and H) and get
more network externalities from the system. They can go anywhere
in town on transit. Rich people see a small system, and perceive few
network externalities. They can only go places on the H system.
As a consequence, poor people are more likely to use the system
than rich people. The lack of choice riders weakens the political
constituency for improvements.
Try to tell people at dinner party they should willingly ride on
an old, slow, amenity-free service with people who they otherwise
would not associate with, even though they don’t have to and can
afford alternatives, and they will smile and turn to the next person.
They don’t want to feel second-class, so they don’t ride, but they
also don’t want to feel guilty about not wanting to feel second-class.
All too-often, this mode is ‘bus,’ especially in cities without historic,
classic, and patina-ed rail systems.
Instead tell people who have a choice that they can ride on a
mode that is new, fast, with amenities, and with people who are like
themselves, and they might consider it from time to time, and more
regularly if it is cost and time-effective. This mode need not be rail.
Unlike a new, fancy, and expensive rail system, existing buses are
now the opposite: old, basic, and cheap. There are several solutions
to this problem. The expensive solution is to build high quality
services everywhere to attract the fraction of R that would not
otherwise take transit. The less expensive solution is to change the
perception (and reality) of the low quality system so it appears
higher quality. Give it as many of the same features of H as
possible, starting with information (such as what bus stops at the
bus stop, when does it stop, what hours does it operate, where does
it go, what does the local neighborhood look like, is the bus
on-time, how much does it cost) and navigability.
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Instead agencies sometimes exacerbate the problem. In a recent
branding effort, The Twin Cities’ Metro Transit tried to differentiate
their services.
’The METRO system name identifies the developing LRT/BRT services
as unique,’ said Arlene McCarthy, director of Metropolitan Transport
Services for the Council. ‘METRO riders can expect fast, frequent, and
convenient service, whether they ride the Blue Line to Target Field, the
Red Line to Mall of America, or the Green Line to the State Capitol.’30 30 (Metropolitan Council 2012).
By implication the some 80% of regional transit riders who use
local buses can expect slow, infrequent, and inconvenient service,
whether they ride the 3 to downtown or the 67 to Franklin Avenue
Station. This framing aims to diminish local buses into second-class
service.
There is nothing technically preventing the bus and bus stop from
being nice, (basically as nice as a brand new train and rail station,
but usually a lot less expensive) but the reluctance on the part of
the public from doing so. The best example of trying to reverse this
status problem is the new rapid bus A Line serving St. Paul and
Minneapolis.31 Whether this will spread is unclear, though a large 31 (Palmateer et al. 2016a).
set of these rapid bus lines are under consideration 11.6.
Figure 11.6: Rapid bus network.
Source Metro Transit.
Bus transit has more than an image problem. Its image problem
results from the reality of services, which are due to the
rail-favoritism, which results from bus’s image problem. It is a
vicious cycle.
11.13 Pedestrian accelerator
Streetcars running along shopping streets can function as a
‘pedestrian accelerator,’ supporting walking trips who might hop
on and off a slow moving streetcar with frequent stops. Why a
streetcar is any different from a slow moving bus in traffic on the
same corridor, especially one that is marked as a shopping
circulator, is never made clear. It is also not clear why pedestrians
need to be sped up. If pedestrian speed is of interest then a moving
sidewalk may be a better answer.
11.14 Traffic calming
By moving in traffic rather than an exclusive right-of-way, streetcars
are slower than LRT (or BRT). Some, especially those with the ‘slow
travel’ movement, claim this as a virtue. Others argue that moving
in traffic slows traffic, and thus it acts as a traffic calming
mechanism, and improves the quality of pedestrian activity in the
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corridor. Again, why a streetcar is any different from a slow moving
bus in traffic on the same corridor is never made clear.
11.15 Superstructure
Rail transit forms an urban superstructure. Guideway transit,
especially LRT makes the city more like a single structure, and
makes everything seem closer. The LRT vehicle is continuously
running, and if activities are along the path of the vehicle,
everything seems quite coordinated. In a way, by organizing
activities linearly (or multi-linearly), it simplifies the city. Hopping
on a train is much like getting on an elevator.
LRT, like walking indoors, keeps you enveloped within
civilization, while walking, biking, or driving is a frontier
experience, you alone in the wilderness. Bus falls in-between. We
can posit that distances within buildings seem shorter than
equivalent distances between buildings. Distances connected by the
urban superstructure will likely feel closer than those which are not
so connected. Walking through a modern airport, or the
Minneapolis Skyway, or the Mall of America, will tell you
enveloped distances can be quite large, but still not feel as large as
leaving one building into nature for another.3232 The etymology of trans·port comes
from the Latin for across or through the
gate or door. We might think of travel
within an enclosure as cis·port.
Preferences for civilization or frontier-crossing (or degree of each)
vary across individuals. Driving of course places you in a machine,
but you, not civilization, are operating the machine, so just as
driving is freedom, not everyone wants that freedom to drive, they
may prefer freedom from driving. The extent to which you believe
in the importance of community over individuals (or vice versa)
will affect your perception of the issue.
11.16 Feedback
Transit invokes further passions because of the positive feedback
loop between ridership, revenue, and route frequency, especially
where transit is weak as in much of the US. Our riding transit
creates a positive externality33 for you: more riders, more frequent33 §A.4.
vehicles, and more routes, leading to more riders. So of course
transit riders want to impose their preference on non-riders. It is
only selfishly rational. Rail transit attracts more riders per mile than
buses.
Further, cars use scarce roadspace, create congestion, and make
bus travel even slower. While similar feedback loops may exist on
the highway side (more drivers means more closely spaced roads),
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congestion mitigates that and the network is largely built out, so
drivers do not feel the same need to impose their modal preference
on the transit-riding minority.
Finally, drivers may benefit in the short term if other drivers take
transit. Where transit is already congested and frequent, additional
riders produce few positive externalities as diminishing returns set
in.
11.17 Congestion reduction
Matt Kramer, then a Minnesota Chamber of Commerce
representative lobbying for additional public transit and transport
spending (then, as always, being debated at the Minnesota
Legislature) is quoted as saying
“Every person who is riding transit is one less person in the car in
front of us.”34 34 (Owings 2015).
This is a fascinating quote. First is the use of “us.” So the
Chamber of Commerce (probably correctly) identifies riding transit
as something someone else does (since “we” are still in the car).
And goes on to imply that it benefits “us” because there will be
fewer cars.
This evokes the famous Onion article: “Report: 98 Percent Of US
Commuters Favor Public Transport For Others.”35 35 (The Onion 2000).
But it also suggests transit reduces auto travel. The converse is
almost equally true, building roads reduces transit crowding. But
that is not an argument road-builders make. It is an argument
urbanists make against roads.
Of course, some transit users would have otherwise driven, but
many would have been passengers in cars, walked, ridden bikes, or
telecommuted. No one really knows what the alternative untaken
mode would be.
While there are surveys that have answered those questions, they
are all context specific. For most riders, transit lines are not a direct
substitute for driving.
Most transit users would not otherwise drive themselves. For
instance, the 2004 Minneapolis - St. Paul Metro Transit bus strike
could not be detected in the traffic counts. Most displaced users
carpooled, walked, or biked. That is not to say there was no
hardship; there was, but it was felt by transit users not drivers. And
sometimes in a larger city, the fear of a strike or an actual shutdown
will cause people to work from home for a short period, reducing
traffic for at least a few days.
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(a) The Difference in Access (Auto - Transit). (b) The Ratio of Access (Auto/Transit).
Figure 11.7: Automobile vs.
Transit Access in Sydney.
The line of reasoning in the quote above suggests the primary
purpose of transit is reducing auto travel, rather than serving people
who want to, or have to, use transit. This by no means an original
claim. In other words, building transit is good because it reduces
traffic congestion.
That is at best a secondary benefit, a benefit which could be
achieved must more simply and less expensively through the use of
prices36 as we do with almost all other scarce goods in society, even36 §6.
necessities like water.
Transit today is, in most markets, slower than driving, and as a
result the access by transit is lower. As shown in Figure 11.7, people
who depend on transit can reach fewer jobs than those who have
automobiles available. Some people use transit by choice, for
instance to save money (if they need to pay for parking), and the
rest without choice.
From an equity perspective, it is more important to spend scarce
public dollars to improve options for those without choices than to
improve the choices for those who already have alternatives. Perhaps
ideally we could do both; in practice, one comes at the expense of
other.
The purpose of transit is moving people from A to B who want
(and/or don’t have a good alternative) to use transit because it is
faster or less expensive or more convenient than the alternatives.
Their willingness to pay for that trip is the primary (and perhaps
dominant) benefit transit provides.
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The idea that transit is for the other person is true for the 95.5%
of people who don’t use transit regularly. But it warps thinking that
the aim of public transit funding is to benefit those non-transit users.
11.18 Transportainment
Transport and entertainment are ever inter-twined.
Every movie is a road trip, and not just the obvious ones, like
Thelma and Louise, or National Lampoon’s Vacation, or Apollo 13. The
linear narrative of movies is constrained to follow the single
dimension of time, marching ever forward. While attempts at
braking the strict linearity are possible (think about flashbacks, or
Rashomon-like stories, or Pulp Fiction) within those cul-de-sacs it
remains a road trip.
Many stories star or feature transport. Not just the obvious ones
like, Speed, the Faster and Furiouser series, or Gravity, but any story
which involves motion and gadgets. In some cases they attain
human-level personality, like Herbie, the Love Bug or all the
anthropomorphized vehicles of Thomas the Tank Engine and its ilk.
Outside of movies, sporting events too are about motion. Running
of course is simply who can move the fastest (unaided, unhindered).
Hurdles is who can move the fastest, with hindrances. American
Football is about who can move a ball across about 90 meters of
territory with a limited number of stops for committee meetings,
hindered by violent resistance, ensuring at least steady progress.
NASCAR, a sport that emerged from the use of cars during the
period of prohibition of alcohol to outrun the law, is even more
obvious. Going around a racetrack in a vehicle 400 times is
interesting enough to attract more than 145,000 people to attend an
event at the Charlotte Motor Speedway and seven million people to
watch on TV. Though, apparently, in-person attendance is dropping.
While we might complain about dozens of vehicles traversing 966
km37 and doing no physical work (i.e. returning where they 37 600 mi.
started), the more severe environmental consequences of the race
are not due to the racers, but the fans, traveling hundreds of miles
themselves.
Having now been to Charlotte, the Charlotte Motor Speedway,
and the NASCAR Hall of Fame, we have first hand knowledge of
the magnitude of racing in the local culture. You too can drive a car
on a race track for a not inconsiderable piece of coin. You learn that
people have purchased condominiums overlooking the race-track.
You learn they are now ‘right-sizing.’ You learn the stands are multi-
colored so they look more full in ads even when they are not.
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Not only is entertainment about transport. Transport has become
about entertainment.
We are not talking just about the in-vehicle entertainment systems
designed to entertain you while you travel, thereby making travel
less onerous (and more frequent).
Many, if not most, of today’s transport network investment
decisions are made by people who won’t regularly use the thing
they are deciding on. In one sense, this must be true, there are
many facilities, and only so much time in the day for
decision-makers to travel, given our relative centralization of
decision-making in the hands of government.
It is not only the specific links and segments of networks, but
entire modes that go mis-understood. As we noted above, many
people argue, if not believe, that the purpose of transit is the
reduction of congestion, one less car in front us.
Decision makers may try to imagine how they will use the
facility, but cannot develop a full scenario moving their home and
workplace and other activities to advantage themselves of the
corridor, which would enable them to see the package as a regular
user. They are limited to envisioning their occasional interaction
with the link or mode. They think WiFi matters more than
frequency or direct service. In this sense, they are viewing the
facility the way a tourist might, rather than an everyday user.
The decision-maker’s (or anyone’s) view of the transport modes,
links, and vehicles that they don’t use is like your view at the
amusement park or a place where you are a tourist: a ride, part of
an urban entertainment package, an appendage to a game or
concert or night-on-the-town wrapped up as an event.
These rides-cum-transport are designed to lure people who have
nothing better to do with their time than be entertained. If these
projects were self-financing, more power to them – perhaps raising
emotions of disdain for those who have nothing better to do with
their time but spend it on a ride and trivial amusements, but not
particularly impacting anyone else.
Unfortunately, these investments are not self-financing, except in
the fantasies of economic development analysts and perhaps in the
special case of Pedal-Pubs.
It heeds the cry of the child: “I’m bored, entertain me.”
It is fantastic that decision-makers believe our society has so
much wealth and so many resources that there are no more
important problems to solve, that we can build urban amusement
park rides for the sake of the novelty-seeking joy-riders. That we
can prioritize circuses over bread. That we can rise up Maslow’s
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Hierarchy of Needs38 from security and basic mobility to societal 38 §2.
self-actualization and social entertainment. That we can fuse
entertainment and transport into a newly converged
transportainment (hopefully obviating the need for entertainment on
the subject).
Do they really believe that?
Certainly, most travel is not ‘work’ travel (most people don’t have
regular jobs), but much of it is productive (or re-productive). And
if everyone had the opportunity to simultaneously have adequate
housing and adequate transport, then public subsidy for transport
as entertainment (or housing as entertainment – which in the US is
generally left to the private sector) would not be the worst way to
spend our social surplus.
Yet we keep hearing that there is insufficient affordable housing,
and more than a few people walk or ride bikes not out of choice but
for lack of affordable faster modes, and many people ride on buses39 39 §21.
that take 2 to 3 to 4 to 5 times as long as cars for the same trip
(not even considering schedule delays) because they cannot afford
or otherwise cannot drive a car, and because the transit system is so
poorly designed it takes so long to get to many places.
Every $2 billion spent on rail as part of the urban
transport-entertainment complex is $2 billion that cannot be spent
on more serious and economically productive urban needs of
travelers without the luxury of time and choice, improving their
safety and reducing their travel times, or just giving them the
resources to make choices.
11.19 Permanence and directness NewtownStation
St Peters
Station
Green Square
Station
Train towards
Strathfield &
Liverpool
Train towards
Bankstown &
Liverpool
Train towards
Airport &
Campbelltown
Train towards
Sydney CBD
Train towards
Sydney CBD
370 Leichhardt
City Rd
7am - 7pm
weekdays
King St
7am - 7pm
weekdays
Anzac Pde
7am - 7pm
weekdays
Glebe Pt Rd
7am - 7pm
weekdays
370
Coogee
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I J 0102
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
1011
12
MarketPlace
Leichhardt
Broadway
Shopping Centre
University
of Sydney
Royal
Prince
Alfred
Hospital
Sydney
Park
Royal
South
Sydney
Hospital
University
of NSW
Randwick
Racecourse
Prince
of Wales
Hospital
Coogee
Beach
Marion Rd
Fl
oo
d 
St
N
or
to
n 
St
Ba
lm
ai
n 
Rd
Moore St
C
at
he
rin
e 
St
Jo
hn
st
on
 S
t
Booth St
W
igr
am
 Rd
M
in
og
ue Cr
Glebe Point Rd
Br
idg
e R
d
Ross St
Parramatta Rd Broadway
Cit
y R
d Cleveland St
Butlin Ave
Missenden Rd
Kin
g S
t
King St
Enmore Rd Erskineville Rd
Al
ice
 St
Pri
nc
es
 H
wy
Sydney Park Rd
Mi
tch
ell
 Rd
Eu
sto
n R
d
Mc
Ev
oy
 St
Botany Rd
Bo
ur
ke
 St
Bo
ur
ke
 Rd
O
'R
io
rd
an
 S
t Epsom Rd
Jo
yn
to
n 
A
ve
D
al
m
en
y 
A
ve
So
ut
he
rn
 C
ro
ss
 D
r
Le
nt
ha
ll S
t
Todm
an Ave
A
nz
ac
 P
de
Darling StAddison St
High St
Belmore Rd
A
vo
ca
 S
t
Perouse Rd
C
ar
rin
gt
on
 R
d
Coogee Bay Rd
A
rd
en
 S
t
The Cresc
ent
Leichhardt
Annandale
Forest
Lodge
Glebe
Chippendale
Darlington
Newtown
St Peters
Alexandria
Zetland
Rosebery
Kensington
Randwick Coogee
Train line/stationTiming point
Section point
Bus route
Bus route number
Legend
Diagrammatic Map
Not to Scale
North
370 04
A
370Bus route map
Figure 11.8: Sydney’s 370 Bus is
highly circuitous.
It is claimed that rail induces economic development. A developer
can make a permanent investment decision based on the location of
rail lines, as the transit system is committed to this line, while a bus
line may be temporary, and thus not induce as much development.
Even if we don’t believe that ‘bus is temporary but rail is
permanent’ argument ourselves, if we believe other people believe
it, it creates the consensual hallucination that organizes
development and turns in to a self-fulfilling prophecy. The rail line
thus acts as a coordinating agent.
The simple fact that after some point in time most cities that had
streetcars lost them (for instance 1948 in Phoenix, 1954 in the Twin
Cities, 1961 in Sydney) belies their permanence. Yet on almost every
former streetcar route, today we see continued bus transit service.
This indicates the service is permanent if the demand is there, not
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the physical instance or particular technology. We can further look
at the built form of cities which have made significant commitment
to bus rapid transit (Ottawa, Curitiba) to see evidence of
development following the service, not the technology. BRT of
course is more comparable with LRT if it runs in its own
right-of-way. Arterial BRT or Rapid Bus, sharing the right-of-way
with cars, is more like streetcars or trams.
Figure 11.9: Historic Sydney
Tram Map. Source: Wikipedia.
Even more notably, bus routes can be quite long-lived. London
Buses route 22 was introduced on May 17, 1909. By 1911 it had
evolved into the route that served as the link between Putney
Commons and Piccadilly Circus. (The route was extended from
Putney Bridge to Putney Commons in 1916). The route has evolved
some since that time mainly being split into two pieces, the
northern branch ‘shortworkings’ designated 22A, 22B, and 22C and
later 242. The 22 was later stopped at Piccadilly and the Northern
shortworkings were fully separate routes.
Why is this of interest? A continuously numbered bus has
managed to last over 100 years on largely the same route, longer
than most rail services. One could attribute this to bureaucratic
inertia, but it also helps locals at least retain knowledge about their
transport geography.
There is however an aspect of embeddedness that works to the
advantage of streetcars over buses. This is the resistance to
rerouting. Tracks are more expensive, so once laid down, tracks are
harder to move than buses. This means it is harder to make routes
circuitous. Many bus routes look like they were designed by drunk
transit planners. One particularly egregious local bus in Sydney, the
370, (Figure 11.8) which runs near David Levinson’s office and
home, is so circuitous it is faster to walk even ignoring schedule
delay (which happens to be the highest in Sydney).40 This is hardly40 (Gladstone and Morgan 2018).
a problem unique to Sydney, we have studied transit circuity in the
US and found it far worse than typical travel by road.4141 (Huang and Levinson 2015).
There are undoubtedly reasons for every indirect zig that diverts
buses from the strait and narrow, its aim is to collect passengers.
Serve this building, serve that one, cover this street, reduce
pedestrian walking time. However, every circuitous zag also loses
passengers by increasing running time for everyone on-board.
In contrast, trams in practice are much more straitlaced, paragons
of transit routing virtue. The historic Sydney Tram Map (Figure 11.9)
gives a sense of routes that were pretty much as direct as possible.
It can be argued the 370 bus provides an east-west service that no
tram did, which is true in part. But that doesn’t mean trams could
not. It also could be argued that almost no one rides the 370 end-to-
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end. Though we have not checked the Opal smartcard data, this is
probably true as well. But a well-structured suburb-to-suburb transit
network could avoid this.
11.20 Development-oriented transit
“Item! Subsidies requested for project built along transit line that
itself was built with subsidies justified by promise of economic
development. chomps cigar” – Nick Magrino.42 42 Nick Magrino quoted from Streets.mn
Forum, April 1, 2014 (Magrino 2014a).
We subsidize transit to spur development
• Apple Valley hopes BRT line can spur development near transit
stations.43 43 (Wolf 2012).
• Twin Cities regional transitways will spur economic
development.44 44 (Metropolitan Council of the Twin
Cities 2011).
• New Lechmere Station for MBTA Spurs Development.45 45 (Jessen 2011).
We subsidize development to spur transit ridership
• Feds grant $2.9 million to ‘Reinvent Phoenix,’ light rail
developments.46 46 (Jimenez 2011).
• Grants help fund Twin Cities’ transit-oriented development.47 47 (Dornfeld 2012).
• Urban Transit Hub Tax Credit Spurs Development Interest in
Newark.48 48 (Corbalis 2011).
We as society cannot make up our collective mind whether we
want development to drive transit use, or we want transit use to
increase development. Advocates would say we want both to create
transit-served high density communities because of all the good that
it brings.
But if the transport-land use cross-dependency is so strong, why
do we need to subsidize either, much less both, side(s) of the
equation? If you subsidized transit to get the positive externalities
which are beneficial to development, it might make sense. For
instance maybe transit is under-supplied because the private sector
cannot capture the positive externalities due to transaction costs and
prohibitions on value capture,49 or because the automobile is 49 §16.
subsidized. If even after subsidizing transit, and there is still not
enough demand for private development to proceed without
subsidy, maybe you are trying to stimulate development in the
wrong place.
Someone is profiting off of this, and it isn’t the public.
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New streetcar projects in the United States are almost entirely
rationalized by increased real estate prices. An examination of
projected benefits of recent systems shows that about 80% of all
benefits – in particular, increased property tax revenue – are simply
due to higher property prices.5050 (King and Fischer 2016).
From a developer’s perspective, spending ‘other people’s money’
on this urban amenity is a brilliant idea.
An even better strategy for developers is to get a subsidy (often
in the name of affordable housing) for the transit-oriented
development (TOD) adjacent to these newly constructed lines.
Programs in a number of cities, such as those of the Livable
Communities Act administered by the Metropolitan Council in the
Minneapolis - St. Paul region, subsidize development along transit
lines.
The best strategy for developers, of course, is both – a publicly
provided system and public subsidies for TOD adjacent to it.
Although only implemented sporadically, land value-capture
techniques, such as special assessment districts or tax increment
financing, present strong opportunities for cities to recover some,
all, or more than enough revenue to pay the cost of many types of
transit infrastructure and operations. If streetcars are important to
developers, and not particularly important to the traveling public,
property owners should follow the example of the Grove shopping
center, a retail and entertainment complex by Caruso Affiliated in
Los Angeles straddling an iconic trolley: they should fund the
streetcars entirely themselves. Caruso, though, is not immune to the
siren song of free money. Now that they’ve seen the public largess
going to other streetcar projects, they want their system extended,5151 3.2 km (2 mi).
mostly paid by the public.5252 (Bachrach 2013).
Figure 11.10: Bloomington
Central Plan.
The claim of permanence inducing development is wrong.
Sometimes rail lines induce development; sometimes they don’t.
Sometimes (most of the time) development occurs without rail lines.
For instance, witness the LRT of Broken Dreams that is
Bloomington, Minnesota between the Minneapolis – St. Paul
International Airport and the Mall of America, which is the line’s
busiest station.53 A station every 200 meters, and no business, just
53 (Moore 2018).
grass and asphalt and one park-and-ride ramp. The line has had
nearly 14 years to attract development (more if you count
construction, when it was obvious a line would be built) and no one
has said “this is the place for me.” The activities along the line past
the airport seem to all pre-date it. There is of course a nice plan,
shown in the Figure 11.10, with many tree circles, and a surprising
amount of parking. Given all the hoopla and awards the plan had
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won, we had once thought the developments (or at least some of
them) there had actually been built. For now they are just
imaginings.
Table 11.2: Employment in
Minneapolis and St. Paul from
1970 – 2010.
Year St. Paul Minneapolis
1970 170,490 265,090
1980 176,900 268,600
1990 172,578 278,438
2000 188,124 308,127
2010 175,933 281,732
In a recent debate, Minnesota’s Metropolitan Council of the Twin
Cities argued that it shouldn’t have to fund local streetcars
proposed for downtown Minneapolis, because they were more for
economic development than for transport, and so Minneapolis
should be seeking a different pot of money.
Do streetcars actually develop the economy? We have
evidence in many historical cases of the co-evolution of transport
and land use (such as London, New York, or the Twin Cities).54 In 54 (Levinson 2007; Xie and Levinson 2009;
King 2011).those cases the transport mode developed was faster than
alternatives, and therefore increased accessibility, making land more
valuable.
Historical cases, while informative, are not predictive without
considering context. We have no evidence that streetcars, of
themselves, promote economic development in the context of
present-day US cities. That is, there is no case where modern
streetcars were built, nothing else was done by the public sector (no
road reconstruction, no public subsidies for development, no
change in development regulations), and the level of private sector
economic development changed measurably, and more than in an
otherwise comparable control case.
We have hypotheses as to why there should be no effect, and that
is the maturity of the system (streetcars are not connecting places
that are presently unconnected) and the lack of positive changes to
accessibility (or even negative changes to accessibility) that comes
with adding a slow mode to a network, which is already faster than
it was in the 19th century.
Absence of evidence is, in fact, evidence of absence.
But in probability theory, absence of evidence is always evidence of
absence. If E is a binary event and P(H|E) > P(H), “seeing E increases
the probability of H” ; then P(H| E) [Probability of H given Not E] is
less than P(H), “failure to observe E decreases the probability of H.”
P(H) is a weighted mix of P(H|E) and P(H| E), and necessarily lies
between the two.55 55 The very logical Less Wrong blog
discusses this issue: Absence of
Evidence Is Evidence of Absence:
(Yudkowski 2007).
It is often said that “Absence of Evidence is not Evidence of
Absence,” but this is wrong. This is especially wrong in a context
were we have motivated people searching for evidence.
Consider the example of Bigfoot. Bigfoot is a supposedly big
humanoid or primate living in very small numbers (and
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presumably hiding from humans). There was a fad in our youths
for blurry pictures of Bigfoot to appear in weekly tabloids like the
National Enquirer sold at supermarket checkout stands. However, as
the comic strip XKCD points out, cameras are everywhere now, on
billions of phones, and yet we have no more evidence of Bigfoot
than before.5656 (Munroe 2013).
Does this constitute ‘proof’ of the non-existence of Bigfoot? No,
because one can never prove a negative.57 It does however cause the57 See Popper (1953) on Falsifiability.
rational among us to become increasingly skeptical about our hirsute
friend’s likelihood of being real.
But for. We need to think in a ‘but for’ way when evaluating
economic development claims.
Would the development not occur ‘but for’ this particular
investment? Would it occur with streetcars and BRT, with only
streetcars, with only BRT, with neither?
We can’t fully know this without running four experiments in
four parallel universes. We can estimate this statistically by looking
carefully at multiple cases that have already opened, under multiple
conditions, and get likelihoods that effects are as estimated by the
model. There are some examples of modern transit lines increasing
property values, there are some examples of no effect, and there are
even some examples of transit lines destroying wealth.5858 Sometimes all found in the same study
(Landis et al. 1995). Once many studies are done, we can do a meta-analysis, and try
to put the complexity of findings into some order. The meta-analysis
is much more robust, combining the sample size of all of the studies
it takes in.59 These studies unfortunately do not generally apply59 For instance, see (Debrezion et al.
2007). to modern streetcars, which have very different characteristics than
high capacity services.
There have been a few attempts to summarize the results of the
streetcar and economic development debate. The Transportation
Research Board’s Transit Cooperative Research Program basically
finds an absence of evidence.6060 Relationships Between Streetcars and the
Built Environment (Golem and Smith-
Heimer 2010).
None of the reports about economic development effects have
survived a rigorous peer review process. So in the end, we
equivocate. If the new transport infrastructure notably increases the
relative accessibility of a place (compared to other places), it might
attract some development that would otherwise go elsewhere. If it
signals to developers to coordinate actions, and develop here, rather
than there, it might also concentrate development. If we concentrate
development, and create more accessibility, we might have some
economies of agglomeration further driving growth. If, If, If.
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Enhanced bus Streetcar Starter Streetcar Rapid bus
Line length (mi) 9.2 9.2 3.4 21.8
2030 Avg wkdy project boardings 13,400 19,900 7,200 34,700
2030 Avg wkdy new riders -1,700 900 1,200 6,700
Capital cost (million $) 94 393 200 110.7
Operating cost (million $) 13.6 20.1 10.6 9.06
Capital cost / wkdy rider ($) 7,015 19,749 27,778 3,190
Cost / rider / mile ($) 762.49 2,146.6 8,169.93 146.34
Table 11.3: Costs and ridership
of alternatives: Nicollet
Alternatives Analysis and
Met Transit’s Arterial BRT
study.
The evidence we do have is that employment in the core cities of
Minneapolis and St. Paul is very stable, as shown in Table 11.2,
independent of most of the vagaries of the economy, shifts from low
rise to skyscrapers, construction of freeways and skyways, the
expansion of the University, the rise of the dual worker household,
and so on.
An anonymous source nicely summarized some publicly
available information of the costs and ridership of alternative transit
technologies in Minneapolis, shown in Table 11.3.61 61 (Metropolitan Council of the Twin
Cities 2012; City of Minneapolis 2013).Upzoning and development would be factored into all
alternatives, especially since a number are already being developed
without a streetcar or other improvement. These ridership
projections also include the Alternative Analysis’s assumption that
streetcar riders perceive a 25-minute travel time savings (implicitly
making their travel time negative in some cases), and thus more
choose streetcar.
Do we really believe a small investment in infrastructure serving a
thousand additional people per day will change urban development
patterns? That would be the equivalent of urban homeopathy.
Advocates will advocate, that is their nature. If no one believes
their small estimates of economic impact, the estimates will just grow
and grow, so they can get attention. But don’t confuse their advocacy
with scientific knowledge, about which we have very little.
Are streetcars the best amenity? Are they the best transport
service possible? Or do they drain resources that would otherwise
be spent on something else, like maintaining and improving
existing transit systems or serving many more passengers with
Arterial BRT?
Unlike the case for LRT and even BRT, the peer-reviewed literature
provides little evidence that streetcars actually increase land value –
and the absence of evidence, when a systematic search is involved,
is evidence of absence. One study did find that the restoration of
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legacy streetcar service in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina was
associated with building permits.6262 (Guthrie and Fan 2013).
Is there such a thing as BRT-oriented development?
Above we asked if streetcars had economic development effects,
and concluded we have no evidence to date. In contrast, for BRT
systems, there is much peer-reviewed evidence, though not as much
as we might like.
First, obviously the nature of the impacts depends on what kind
of BRT you are talking about. Broadly, we can divide systems into
freeway-based BRT systems with stations, and arterial-based BRT
systems with stops. The differences are that stations are more
elaborate than stops, and less frequent. Worldwide, systems are
hybrids.
A 2008 review found wide variations in the types of BRT across
many dimensions (speed, construction costs, ridership, subsidies,
etc.) with some systems offering a peak headway of well better than
1 bus per minute, while others were at 10 minutes between buses.6363 (Hensher and Golob 2008).
BRT thus has many distinguishing characteristics, ITDP developed
a ranking system: the BRT standard.6464 The categories for which points are
awarded in BRT Basics are:
• Busway alignment: 7 points
• Dedicated right-of-way: 7 points
• Off-board fare collection: 7 points
• Intersection treatments: 6 points
• Platform-level boarding: 6 points
(Hook et al. 2012).
The standard scorecard is more complicated, and includes many
other factors as well. The best systems are rated Gold, and so on.
We don’t agree with all of the points or categories, but this is a good
place to start. The US and Canadian systems (Los Angeles, Eugene,
Pittsburgh, Las Vegas, Ottawa) tend to fall into the Bronze Category,
though Cleveland’s Health Line makes Silver.65
65 This is appropriate given the color of
the buses and its former name “The
Silver Line”.
As many people worry, something can be pitched as a
high-quality service, and then whittled down by the time of
deployment, or afterwards to save costs. Frankly, this can happen
with any technology, just look at what has happened to service
frequencies on the Phoenix LRT, which dropped to 12 minutes in
2010, but were 10 minutes at opening in 2008, or the Minneapolis-St.
Paul Blue Line, which began life with 7.5 minute headways that
were quietly retracted to 10 minutes). Clearly, as BRT is developed
and deployed, this needs to be monitored. But this is true for any
service with net ongoing operating costs that can be reduced over
time.
Some findings from the peer-reviewed literature are below. Most,
but not all of the evidence is favorable to measurable economic
development impacts, clearly every system is unique:
• “Multilevel models reveal BRT improvements prompted property
owners to convert single-family residences to higher density
apartments and condominiums. Land price premiums of up to
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10% were estimated for residences within 300 m of BRT stops
and more than 25% for retail and other non-residential uses over
a smaller impact zone of 150 m.”66 66 (Cervero and Kang 2011).
• “First, Seoul’s BRT contributes to increased development density
in urban centers, acting as a centripetal force to attract firms from
the suburbs into urban cores and supporting arguments for
Smart Growth proponents. Second, unlike its redistributive
effects on nonresidential activities, the BRT has a limited effect on
the redistribution of residential activities, implying that
residential locations are less sensitive to accessibility
improvements made by the BRT than are nonresidential
locations. Third, reflecting the transferred space demands from
the suburbs to the urban cores, the CBD reaps the highest
property value gains, while all of the outer ring zones suffer from
reduced property values.”67 67 (Jun 2012). This study uses simulation,
rather than empirical evidence, so keep
that in mind.• “[T]he BRT system is the favorable component for the location of
creative industries and service sectors within 500 meters of
BRT-bus stops. In addition, the BRT operation increases the
employment density within the same distance to the bus stops by
54%.”68 68 (Kang 2010).
• “The statistical analysis suggests that accessibility advantage
conferred by BRT is capitalized into higher property price. The
average price of apartments adjacent to a BRT station has gained
a relatively faster increase than those not served by the BRT
system. The capitalization effect mostly occurs after the full
operation of BRT, and is more evident over time and particularly
observed in areas which previously lack alternative mobility
opportunity.”69 69 (Deng and Nelson 2010).
• “Results suggest that for every 5 min of additional walking time
to a BRT station, the rental price of a property decreases by
between 6.8 and 9.3%, after controlling for structural
characteristics, neighbourhood attributes and proximity to the
BRT corridor.”70 70 (Rodríguez and Targa 2004).
• “Properties [in Bogota] offered during the year the extension was
inaugurated and in subsequent years have asking prices that are
between 13% and 14% higher than prices for properties in the
control area, after adjusting for structural, neighborhood and
regional accessibility characteristics of each property.”71 71 (Rodríguez and Mojica 2009).
• “The main results showed that, with respect to the value of
properties in relation to proximity, the housing market places
value premiums on the properties in the immediate walking
proximity of feeder lines. The analysis by socio-economic strata
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showed that middle-income properties were valued more if they
fell closer to the system, while there were opposite results for
low-income housing. Finally, analysis across time reflects slight
average annual increases in property values correlated with the
implementation of the system in two specific areas analyzed.” 7272 (Munoz-Raskin 2010).
• “In common with other forms of mass transit, a fully-featured
BRT has the potential to offer significant effects on land
development.”7373 (Deng and Nelson 2011).
• “A property 1,000 f t74 away from a station is valued74 300 m.
approximately $9,745 less than a property 100 f t75 away, all else75 30 m.
constant.”7676 (Perk et al. 2010).
• “A key result is that for condo sales that occurred in 2007 or 2009,
the BRT premium was approximately 7.6%. For condo sales in
2000 and 2001, prior to the opening of the Silver Line, no sales
premium existed for proximity to the corridor.”7777 (Perk et al. 2013).
All of this is consistent with general observations and what theory
would predict about accessibility improvements. A transport system
that adds to accessibility in a significant way warrants a premium in
the prices people are willing to pay to take advantage of it.
11.21 Discussion
Like magicians, modern US streetcar promoters engage in diversion
and distraction, attributing all urban success to streetcars and
covering up the mistakes. The net benefits of streetcars (compared
with other, less expensive technologies) are illusory, the costs are
real.
Wealthy US cities like their toys: new stadiums, trains,
convention centers, and the like are the most egregious examples. If
money were free, this would not be a problem. If money were free,
it wouldn’t be money. Consideration of resources matter in
transport design. Constraints (limits on available resources) can
drive creative design. But constraints matter, we should not
dedicate all of our resources to your pet project because that means
there are fewer resources to spend elsewhere. Aside from a few
macro-economists, no one believes that money grows on trees.
Wealth is created, and the more of our wealth we spend here the
less we can spend there. Spending more money on streetcars means
spending less on something else.
The notion of ‘permanence’ is in stark contrast with the idea of
‘responsiveness’ that make spontaneous cities work.78 Every dollar78 (Levinson 2016b).
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sunk into fixed cost is a dollar less available to adapt to changing
conditions.
Making large investments now in fixed expenditures to support
weak transit lines is a poor use of scarce resources. As the
technology environment changes, the types of appropriate
investments will change with them, and for the first time in almost
a century, we are on the cusp of major technological transformation
in transport. The arguments about streetcars will shortly appear to
be as moot as argument about canals.

Part III
Cities
Cities and networks co-evolve. While in the short-run networks and
land use are given, in the long run both change. The ideas of
induced demand, induced development, and induced supply show
how networks and land use change patterns. Cities are a solution to
the transport problem. They exist to enable access, and are why we
cluster. Travelers cause congestion, it is one reason why we regulate
land use through zoning. Cities grow (or decline) and then need
connections to other cities, which increases the daily interaction
areas.

12
Clustering
Figure 12.1: Real estate plexus in
Putney, London, England. Note
this wasn’t the entire complex of
local real estate agents clustered
in the shopping district of
Putney. Photo by D. Levinson
Hank Scorpio: Uh, hi, Homer. What can I do for you?
Homer: Sir, I need to know where I can get some business
hammocks.
Hank Scorpio: Hammocks? My goodness, what an idea. Why
didn’t I think of that? Hammocks! Homer, there’s four places. There’s
the Hammock Hut, that’s on third.
Homer: Uh-huh.
Hank Scorpio: There’s Hammocks-R-Us, that’s on third too. You
got Put-Your-Butt-There.
Homer: Mm-Hmm.
Hank Scorpio: That’s on third. Swing Low, Sweet Chariot ... Matter
of fact, they’re all in the same complex; it’s the hammock complex on
third.
Homer: Oh, the hammock district!
Hank Scorpio: That’s right.1
1 The Simpsons Episode 155 ‘You Only
Move Twice.’
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Housing and employment activities are not spread evenly across
cities and regions. This is obvious to anyone who has seen a
downtown skyline. Downtowns have dramatic skylines because
firms want to be there and developers want to maximize the return
on their land by building skyscrapers. But not all firms want to be
downtown, and not all households want to be in single family
housing. This chapter examines the factors that affect location
decisions of households and firms, which helps explain how
metropolitan spatial structure influences accessibility.
12.1 Multi-sided markets
The idea of the two-sided market is best exemplified by eBay. This
is hardly a great website (as of this writing), but it remains valuable
because it connects buyers and sellers. Buyers are there because
vendors are there. Vendors sell stuff there because buyers are there.
eBay gets its middleman cut, and better websites can’t get a
foothold since shifting everyone simultaneously is hard. Many tech
companies try to do this. Amazon operates in a similar vein, though
it also takes the role of vendor. Uber matches taxi drivers with
passengers (but loses money still, and may need to become a fleet
operator). There is lock-in because of the two-sided nature of the
marketplace and the value to consumers of a variety of suppliers,
and to producers of numerous consumers, despite the competitors.
Dating services match people seeking contact.
eBay is just the virtualization of a flea market (or shopping mall).
Those are physical places where everyone goes to trade. The
shopping mall (and parking lot owner) collects rent from the
vendors to be able to participate. In some cases they may also
collect rent from the shoppers (charging for parking, for instance).
Cities can be thought of as two-sided markets as well. The
primary economic function of cities is production.
We are here because you are here, you are here because
we are here. In this case, it is the production process, rather than
(or in addition to) the consumption process that is relevant.
Laborers and employers co-locate, people to get jobs, employers to
attract workers. Cities (or those who own them, the landowners), if
managing this properly, profit from taxes and increased property
values. In a democratic context, this is an argument for land value
taxes,2 since the land value appreciates because of the actions of2 §16.
others.
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Cities compete with each other, but each has some spatial
monopoly aspects as well. They also have specialization. Los
Angeles for instance specializes in film-making among other things.
Everyone is there because everyone else is there. It’s not impossible
to make movies elsewhere, yet many if not most are made in greater
‘Hollywood.’
Each film producer is also a multi-sided market, connecting all
the elements of film production (writers, actors, set-designers,
directors, sound production, cameras, editing) and distribution,
which are otherwise largely independent individuals and
organizations that come together to create art and entertainment,
and then disband. As such, producers have power over the system
in their coordinating function. Though technically anyone could put
together a team, a producer has connections that cause people to
believe that he (or she) will put together a more artistically and
remuneratively successful team, and thereby attract people to want
to be part of it. Success breeds success and power.
Universities establish several multi-sided markets. Students and
professors are matched. In the modern world, students don’t
directly pay the professors, it is mediated by the university. If we
can go back in time, we can imagine the professors paying rent to
the university to have the privilege of teaching, and collecting
directly from students.3 Instead universities commodified teaching 3 As professors, we do not advocate this
idea.and turned professors into laborers.
Researchers and funders are mediated by universities as well.
You can’t be an independent professor and expect to get funded by
science agencies in the modern world. This is mediated by
universities and similar organizations with Sponsored Research
Offices.
Perhaps the most cynical relationship intermediates between
students and employers. Students come to the university to learn
and get a degree, but also become certified as employable, and to
get some assistance in finding work (access to job fairs is baseline
for this, some schools, especially business schools, go much farther
in assisting job placement). So the university is selling itself to
students as a place where they can get a first job, and they are
selling themselves to employers as a place where they can find
labor. In fact universities often speak of training the workforce, as if
finding a job with a large organization (as opposed to becoming an
independent entrepreneur who starts new companies, or helping
the non-profit sector, much less a well-educated human being) is the
goal.
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Power accrues to the middleman. Most power comes from being
the middleman in a difficult-to-disintermediate multi-sided market.
Everyone agrees you have power because of common rationality of
beliefs. If everyone thinks that everyone thinks you have power, then
you have power, because changing everyone’s beliefs simultaneously
isn’t just hard, it’s the veritable herding cats.
People feign loyalty to powerful individuals. Many want to
appear to be loyal. Society rewards that characteristic, as someone
who exhibits loyalty to someone else might be loyal to me. They
may even feel loyal (as what better way to appear to be loyal than to
actually be loyal). But in the end almost all who claim loyalty will
leave when the going gets tough. They will ‘defect’ in game theory
terms if they believe that serves their long term interests, like rats
fleeing a sinking ship. Likewise, if no one believed you have power,
then you wouldn’t. We could act against you and no one would
back you. Cities try to exploit feelings of loyality with municipal
pride, sometimes centered on sports teams or unique food.
So today, the President of the United States has power because
enough people continue to agree that the President has power,
independent of that individual’s capacity for the role. If instead the
President were continuously disobeyed by staff and the federal
government, the President would not have any power. The risk is
that this would bring the whole system down, and people are
(rightfully) nervous about the unintended consequences.
Revolutions have a mixed history. But the ability to grant power is
in our collective selves, and we can choose to not grant it. Consent
of the governed is an important concept, but the difficulty of
displacing the lock-in of multi-sided markets should not be
underestimated.
12.2 Clustering and economic development
The chapter’s opening quote from the long-running television series
The Simpsons nicely illustrates the clustering of similar retail
activities. Why would hammocks cluster in the hammock district?
Might they not get more business if they were spread across town,
closer to the butts they hope to rest? By clustering together, Swing
Low, Sweet Chariot can capture business meant for
Hammocks-R-Us. Customers benefit from the variety and price
competition in the district and will avoid the random hammock
shop over in Shelbyville.44 For a more academic view on retail
clustering, see (Huang and Levinson
2011).
It’s not like customers need hammocks daily, so the travel costs
are relatively unimportant compared with the benefits of easy
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comparison shopping and thus competitive marketing. Suppliers
can serve multiple businesses on a single trip, and so offer lower
costs to the hammock shops as well. We see districts like these all
over, from scenes of realtors in London, where 11 different real
estate agents are all next to each other on the local High Street in
Putney, to the KitchenTown neighborhood in Tokyo, where
restaurants can get all their kitchen equipment. Even cities
specialize: in the United States finance clusters in New York,
computer technology in Silicon Valley, medical devices in
Minneapolis, as a few examples.
Clustering is a complex phenomenon, occurring at scales from the
street, to the neighborhood, to the municipality, to the metropolis,
to the nation, and across nations. It occurs in residential, retail, and
production sectors. It also occurs differently in different production
sectors of the economy. We discuss those issues in this chapter.
Standard urban economics describes Economic Base Theory. Tim
Chapin gives us a useful definition:5 5 (Chapin 2008).
The economic base technique is grounded in the assumption that
the local economy can be divided into two very general sectors: 1) a
basic (or non-local) sector or 2) a non-basic (or local) sector.
Basic Sector: This sector is made up of local businesses (firms) that
are entirely dependent upon external factors. For example, Boeing
builds and sells large airplanes to companies and countries located
throughout the world. Their business is dependent almost entirely
upon non-local firms. Boeing does not sell planes to families or
households locally, so their business is very much dependent upon
exporting their goods. Manufacturing and local resource-oriented
firms (like logging or mining) are usually considered to be basic
sector firms because their fortunes depend largely upon non-local
factors, they usually export their goods.
Non-basic Sector: The non-basic sector, in contrast, is composed of
those firms that depend largely upon local business conditions. For
example, a local grocery store sells its goods to local households,
businesses, and individuals. Its clientele is locally based and,
therefore, its products are consumed locally. Almost all local services
(like drycleaners, restaurants, and drug stores) are identified as
non-basic because they depend almost entirely on local factors.
Economic development practice is to entice/enhance ‘basic’
industry. The example of Boeing is especially timely, given the
recent issue of Boeing potentially moving airframe production if it
didn’t get labor givebacks. Most of the places to which Boeing was
considering moving do not already have an airframe sector, or
upstream or downstream vendors or customers, or a workforce
skilled in airframe manufacturing, which would generate benefits
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beyond ‘jobs, jobs, jobs.’ Similarly, economic development advocates
often argue for new infrastructure, despite at best weak evidence
that in a mature (road, rail, transit) network there will not be much
accessibility gain, and thus little resulting economic development.
Another Seattle company has had a similar story. The bidding war
for Amazon’s second headquarters, HQ2, was all about
metropolitan economic development.
The key point from welfare economics is that everything is non-
basic at a global level, and everything is basic at the household level.
While it might be locally preferred to have more basic employment
(we get money in exchange for stuff), that makes no difference on the
global scale. Economic development practice is parochial – so it is no
surprise that it is funded by place-based local and state governments.
We should think about ‘sectors with spillovers.’ Yet that
is not to say that local development is neither good nor bad. The
reason it might actually be better to have local concentrations is
because of various types of economies: in particular economies of
scale of various kinds (including economies of agglomeration,
which in places with very large employers, may all be internalized),
and network economies. These economies produce spillovers, not
just for the firm, but also for upstream and downstream suppliers
and customers, and potentially for competitors as well. We call
these spillover sectors.
Economies of scale are so pervasive we don’t notice them. Every
road is an instance of economies of scale, we walk/ride/drive along
roads because it is faster than going across unimproved space, even
though it is less direct, but we individually could not afford to build
the road, so we share the fixed costs with lots of people. The cost
per person for roads is lower the more persons we spread the cost
over. Economies of scale may also be played out (exhausted) at the
margins we observe. Just because we had economies of scale in the
roads we have built to date does not mean there are still economies
of scale waiting to be picked up off the street like the proverbial $20
dollar bill.
Two economists are walking down the street when one points to the
ground and says, “Look, a $20 dollar bill!” The second economist
replies, “That’s crazy. If that were a twenty dollar bill someone would
have picked it up already.”
In fact, most of the easy things with regards to transport have been
done. We picked the the projects with the highest benefit/cost ratios
(BCR) (low-hanging fruit) first, and worked our way down the list
(up the fruit tree), until the cost of building the project outweighs
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the benefits (the cost of getting the fruit outweighs the benefits of
consuming it). Clearly new projects are often on the low BCR side of
the equation.
Network economies mean that the value of something increases
the more people who use it. These are also so pervasive we don’t
always notice them. The more people who use the local airport, the
better the airport is for a resident, because it will have more flights.
Roads are also examples of network economies, as the more people
who use the road, the higher quality road we will build and the
more accessibility (by auto) we each have. Thus we have Interstate
highways because we have hundreds of millions of drivers. If there
were only one driver, even Amazon founder Jeff Bezos,6 we would 6 One of the world’s wealthiest people.
not have an Interstate system.
Within the context of types of employment the considerations for
economic development should not be Basic vs. Non-basic. Rather,
the concern should be about employment that has benefits from
concentration, either economies of scale and agglomeration, or
network externalities, or both, and then work toward establishing
concentrations of those sectors to maximize the benefits to society.
This usually means considering where local strengths already are,
rather than starting from scratch. Complement the existing rather
than dropping in an alien business. The job multiplier from two
jobs paying $75,000 may be the same, but the one in a spillover
sector will lower costs for others in the sector and/or improve
benefits. From a policy perspective, this means not going after
projects just because they generate jobs, but encouraging firms to
relocate into specialist concentrations where there are spillover
benefits from those concentrations.
In contrast, sectors which have losses with concentration (think
natural monopolies, where competitors split the market so that no
firm can recover fixed costs), should be encouraged to remain
dispersed.
Cities are positive feedback loops in space. Cities exist only
because it is more valuable for people and organizations to be near
each other than far from each other. Does density create
agglomeration economies or do agglomeration economies create
density?
Certainly evidence shows cities with greater density also produce
greater ‘wealth’ per capita. In Triumph of the City, Ed Glaeser argues
it is about the speed of the spread of ideas, in addition to the classical
reasons about transport costs for people and goods.7 However cause 7 (Glaeser 2012).
and effect are not clear, nor necessarily independent.
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Consider our contrary hypothesis:
Cities with firms that are more agglomeration-benefiting (i.e firms in
sectors with spillovers) produce higher densities; cities with firms that are
less agglomeration-benefiting produce lower densities. In other words,
density is the effect of agglomeration economies, rather than the cause of
agglomeration benefits.88 The agglomeration-benefits of an
industry change over time, and are more
important when an industry is young,
and in the growth phase than when it is
old, mature, and locked-in.
This hypothesis implies, for example, that increasing densities in
Phoenix will not suddenly make Phoenix more productive because
the firms in Phoenix don’t benefit much from the additional
clustering (and disbenefit from the negative externalities of density
such as crowding, pollution, congestion, and the higher costs of
services and land that accompany high density). Some industries
(finance, government, media) value the connectivity provided by
accessibility more than others (agriculture, large scale
manufacturing), and so are more likely to cluster together. It turns
out, these are also presently the faster growing industries in the
economy. Cities like New York, Toronto, London, Auckland or
Sydney, in which the finance industry (among others) locates, or
Washington, Ottawa, Westminster,9 Wellington, or Canberra in9 The City of Westminster and the City of
London were once distinct places. They
are still separate boroughs in greater
London.
which the government industry locates, benefit more significantly
from the daily walking distance, face-to-face interactions possible by
agglomeration.10 Even in those capital cities there may be limits to10 (Storper and Venables 2004).
agglomeration such that the marginal benefits of an additional
person or job may not outweigh the marginal cost.
Unfortunately, the spatial location rules that help the finance
industry be more productive (concentrate everything in Manhattan,
Toronto, Sydney, Auckland, or London) do not necessarily
generalize to other industries or other cities. Those other cities just
don’t get as many financial headquarters and offices, and don’t see
the growth in those sectors, won’t pay as high a premium for
accessibility, and aren’t as dense. Similarly, within metro areas, the
old, dense, downtowns retain the regional financial, legal, and
government headquarters while the new suburban areas that don’t
value the propinquity get less, since the density is costly and the
benefits for those in certain sectors is small.
Moreover, density of itself does not create growth11 or lead to11 Despite economic correlations
suggesting otherwise – correlation is not
causation.
more productivity without a useful transport system. This is why
fast growing areas are auto-oriented in many places, cars are faster
than transit under many land use pattern/road network
configurations and connect to more places in less time. As we note
earlier,12 accessibility is the product of both density and speed, how12 §1.
much one can reach in a given time. Certainly density helps
increase accessibility to a point (where the benefits of more people
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are outweighed by the congestion/pollution costs, etc.), but so does
a faster transport network. At the point where connecting by
personal transport fails, mass transport may be appropriate, and is
certainly necessary for very large conurbations like New York.
There is also the inter-firm vs. intra-firm spillover argument.
Many large firms, like universities and hospitals, build campuses to
internally capture the spillovers from the random contacts that
accessibility brings. This might lead to less vibrancy and turmoil in
the market sector, as there are fewer independent actors competing,
but it is also a natural stage of development from birth to maturity
in sectors. To obtain economies of scale, firms consolidate, and
fewer and fewer firms capture more and more market share.
Ultimately gales of creative destruction come13 and the stagnancy 13 (Schumpeter 1942).
of the few firms leads to their own demise, but that is the natural
order of things. If firms could never capture their downstream
profits by growing large, no one would ever invest. After all, the
first few years are much less profitable than those after the
monopoly/oligopoly has been established. And capitalism is not
about free markets and free trade, it is about profit – not that there
is necessarily anything wrong with that.
There are thus natural cycles. Firm formation is naturally higher
in some sectors, in some periods, and in some places, than others.
But the successes of dynamism lead to consolidation. Increasing
density exogenously (or removing some regulatory constraints in a
few places where they are binding) has very little to do with this.
Since there can only be one national capital per nation,14 and 14 We are aware of countries
with multiple capitals (Wikipedia
contributors 2018e), but this is
exceptional. We are also open to
having multiple capitals, or at least
spreading the functions of the single
capital across the nation.
perhaps one financial capital per nation, the opportunities for
creating financial mega-cities of the order of New York, London,
Toronto, Sydney, Paris, Tokyo, etc. are limited; second order cities
will not magically become first order just by increasing their density.
To take a case we are familiar with, Minneapolis, downtown has
not seen much new commercial growth in over a decade (a few new
official buildings in Downtown East mostly relocating existing
employment), though there has been a significant (though
regionally relatively small) increase in residential density.
Minneapolis might be termed a provincial capital. It has a large
hinterland, one of twelve US Federal Reserve Banks, many regional
and national bank operations (Wells Fargo, US Bank, etc.), and a
large number of headquarters of large firms (though many are not
downtown: Target, Best Buy, General Mills, 3M, Medtronic, etc.), as
well as emerging clusters in a few economic sectors.
While Minneapolis, much like other US cities, has seen
significant residential development in the past decade, and limited
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Figure 12.2: Balance of
Accessibility to Jobs and
Workers in (a) 1995 and (b)
2005 in the Twin Cities (ratio of
jobs reachable in 20 minutes to
workers reachable in 20 minutes
by car from residences in the
morning peak: 7:30 to 8:30 am).
Red indicates jobs in excess
of labour, blue-green indicates
labour in excess of jobs. Yellow
is balanced. Balance improved
in this period. (Levinson et al.
2017).
commercial investment, in downtown there remains plenty of
underutilized land (i.e. parking lots) for development to occur, and
no real constraints on new office (or residential) construction.
Clearly the private benefits of building downtown are not as great
as locating their new building in the suburbs (or elsewhere) to the
firms making those location decisions. Unlike New York City,
zoning in downtown Minneapolis is not generally a binding
constraint. In brief, the private share a suburban-locating firm
attains from agglomeration benefits from the central business
district (CBD) do not outweigh the costs, (including the opportunity
cost of building in some other locale). Suburban places too have
some (weaker) agglomeration benefits, and those may be sufficient,
or are at least perceived as sufficient by developers and firms. The
location within a metropolitan area still produces benefits (which
are weaker than the CBD benefits on daily walking distance
face-to-face metric, but still enable daily or weekly driving distance
face-to-face), such as shared labor pools.
Though there are agglomeration benefits of locating downtown,
they are not sufficient on their own to attract firms. So local
communities, acting through local government, offer incentives to
these non-CBD locating firms to move downtown to enable those
spillovers. As an example, in 2018 the Arizona Republic published
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an investigative story about the use of tax breaks in Phoenix and
Tempe, and showed that not only did the City of Phoenix not do
any sort of cost-benefit analysis for the largess, but the tax breaks
offered to new development increased the tax burden on existing
properties proximate to the new developments, and reduced the
amount of property taxes going to local school districts.15 These 15 (Philip and MacDonald-Evoy 2018).
examples show how fraught this sort of tax base chasing is, and
how potential public agglomeration gains can be captured or
squandered.
12.3 Constraints drive growth
Do cities with constrained real estate grow because of,
or despite, the scarcity of land? All land is scarce as we
don’t really make any more of it.16 Cities with scarce land have 16 We are aware of the concept of landfill
and the Netherlands, so while there are
exceptions where people do make more
land, these exceptions do prove the rule.
geographic constraints such as oceans, mountains, or other such
limits to buildable areas. Coastal cities are more economically
productive.17 In contrast, the Twin Cities or Phoenix are able to 17 (Rappaport and Sachs 2003).
grow spatially concentrically with few natural obstacles. The
economic growth of many cities with scarce land such as San
Francisco, New York, Seattle, Vancouver, or Mumbai raises a
question: Did those cities grow despite the scarcity of land, or
because of it?
On the one hand, consider the cause of the scarcity of the land,
the body of water on which these cities grew. That water provided
essential access to the rest of the world by shipping, and was critical
in the formation of many harbor-centered cities. So while the
constraint of water exists, it is a necessary feature of any city which
wants international water-borne trade.
The US has seen a decline of river-based cities (Cincinnati, St.
Louis) and a rise of container shipping-based cities (Los Angeles,
Hampton Roads).18 18 Chicago is a special case, where
the water not only provided shipping
(and Chicago trans-shipment from the
Great Lakes system to the Mississippi
River system), it created a barrier
which channelized the railroads through
Chicago, so that it was a natural point on
east-west railroads in the northern half
of the United States.
But perhaps the rise of constrained cities is not just because of the
accessibility to the rest of the world system that the constraint
provides, but also because of the internal accessibility that the
constraint forces.
Imagine two nascent towns, with equal harbors and otherwise
identical. A has a plethora of land and is essentially unconstrained
while B is on a peninsula. As they grow, B eventually becomes
spatially confined as the peninsula is filled up. B becomes denser
than A. Does it, as a result, grow faster or slower? If there were
positive externalities, such as economies of agglomeration that
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result from the increased accessibility, it might grow faster, despite
providing fewer choices to potential locators and having higher
costs for land.
Spatial constraints accelerate the urban feedback
loop.19 Why locate anywhere but to be near something or far from19 Jarrett Walker at Human Transit
notes “There’s an additional factor.
Constrained sites are spectacular sites.
The natural features that constrain cities
are almost always things that we value
as scenery. Isn’t this an independent
factor to the overall scarcity of land
in a constrained city, such that we
should expect the impacts of physical
constraints to be ‘squared’ or in some
sense steeper-than-linear?”
something? Cities offer opportunities to be near many things
(people, shopping, restaurants, employment, etc), and as cities exist,
those things must be of value to the people who locate there. By
locating, people add to the ‘stuff’ others can reach.
Accessibility is a measure of nearness to things: How much stuff
you can reach in T minutes time? Which stuff matters and howmuch
time is acceptable depend on individual preferences, but these can
be measured and observed. An area with higher density enables you
to reach more stuff in less time because it is physically closer, even
if the network is slower (you can move less distance per unit time),
provided the density increases at a rate faster than speed decreases.
As noted above, some cities are physically constrained. In fact,
the five densest cities in the US (New York, San Francisco, Los
Angeles, Honolulu, and Chicago) all have some significant physical
constraints (island, peninsula/bay, mountains/ocean,
island/mountains, lake) hemming them in.20 Australia’s Sydney is20 Not all constraints are natural. Urban
growth boundaries can artificially raise
the cost of land by limiting where
developers can build. These constraints
are bad policy when they are coupled
with restrictive zoning which then limits
how much developers can build.
famously built around the world’s most beautiful harbor, and is
constrained by the Pacific on one side, and will be limited by the
Blue Mountains on the other as it grows. Not surprisingly, these are
among the most expensive cities in which to live. This indicates that
the location is especially valuable, because of the accessibility
benefits it provides. Harbors offer accessibility to trade routes,
which can be analyzed the same ways as local accessibility, though
have obviously different policy implications. In modern times,
access to harbors is important for freight but access via airports is
arguably more important for global access for people.
Consider the hypothesis that the constraint itself creates value.
Because of the constraint, more people and firms are bidding for
scarce space (since the non-scarce, non-centrally available space has
a much higher transport cost (across the bay, off the island, in more
distant suburbs) driving up rents. As a consequence, developers
build at higher density in the core city, increasing accessibility. The
higher accessibility creates value for residents and businesses,
leading to even higher rents. Location has positive spillovers.
Higher density increases accessibility if the change in density
outweighs the reduction in travel speed due to congestion. For
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instance, a recent study of San Francisco found that proximity is a
better factor explaining access than driving speeds.21 21 (Thomas et al. 2018).
Accessibility improvements through increased density can be
achieved where either the existing transport network is well under
capacity (so adding demand does not noticeably alter travel times),
or where a new network is built that has adequate capacity (as in a
grade-separated transit network built to serve a high density area).
Whether the benefits of increased accessibility outweigh the costs
depend on the costs of congestion or the costs of a new transport
network to serve the higher density.
This accessibility has value (agglomeration economies), and
places with the highest accessibility attract firms that most value the
agglomeration, so industry sorts into those for which accessibility
has higher value (which locate in the center) and those for which
the accessibility benefits do not outweigh the combination of
congestion costs and higher rents, which locate where both rents
and transport costs are lower.
Accessibility is a normal good, so more is better and demand
increases with income. If we have these two cities, the denser, more
accessible city will attract more development, and thus become
larger, and because land is scarcer, land prices will be bid up.
12.4 Simpli-city
High-rises are functionally cul-de-sacs in the sky.
Without skyways connecting them, high rises are isolated structures
that don’t add any more to access than a cul-de-sac off the main
road. Travel within the building (cis-port, rather than trans-port)
imposes an equivalent cost, and from a high floor on one building
to a high floor on another requires walking to the within-building
public transport system (the elevator), waiting, boarding, traveling,
stopping for others to board and alight, and then exiting the
elevator at the ground floor to leave the building, and then
repeating the process in reverse once the destination building has
been reached.
To illustrate the point about height limits prospectively adding to
accessibility rather than reducing it, we provide a simple model of a
city, which we label Simpli-City.
This is a linear model for convenience, it has length and height,
that is, it is only one block wide, so it is 2-dimensional. A planar city
(3-dimensional, with x, y, and z coordinates) will give us the same
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kind of results, though obviously the numbers would vary, and the
illustration more complicated.
Simpli-city has demand for, say, six block-floors worth of
development, how should it be organized?
Figure 12.3: The Octahedron
is the accessibility maximizing
shape in a 3-dimensional 90-
degree grid, where the street
grid is at right angles, and
every floor of every building is
connected with its 4-immediate
neighbors by skyways.
At one extreme, Simpli-city can be a strip and be six blocks long.
At the other, it can be a single block and be six stories high. It turns
out these two extreme scenarios are equivalent in the accessibility
they provide if we assume inter-floor distance within the building is
the same as inter-block distance between buildings. You can modify
this assumption depending on width of roads and speeds of
intra-building travel, but the general point remains. This is because
they are topologically equivalent. Topological equivalence means
the shapes are the same if you deform them by stretching,
crumpling, or bending, but not tearing or attaching. A six-story
long city is the same as a six-story tall city on its side.
But there are a number of topological variations in between which
might be more efficient.
If we want to maximize access, we want to minimize the total
travel time (equivalent to walking distance) between blocks.
In the six block-floor sized example, Scenario 6b: The Tent, with
2 one-story buildings at the edges of town and 2 two-story
buildings in the center of town, minimizes total travel time, as
shown in Table 12.1. A few other configurations are also better than
the worst cases shown here (the strip and the tower). One can
imagine other scenarios, such as those which leave empty blocks
between buildings, which we might call sprawl, would be even
worse from an accessibility perspective.2222 (Levinson 2016a).
So adding height increases access up to a point, but there is a
point where it is better to build out (at the edges) rather than add to
the top.
Without skyways, each building is a cul-de-sac. Skyways can
increase access, as illustrated in the table summarizing a variety of
scenarios.
We know from geometry that a sphere maximizes the volume
available within a surface area. So the sphere maximizes
accessibility if there were no network, but this is complicated by the
topology and structure of the network and the presence or lack of
skyways between buildings above ground level. Cities are
organized around networks. We know that on a planar 90-degree
grid network, a diamond-shape defines an isochrone.2323 (Levinson and Krizek 2017).
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Layout Scenario B C CS C/(B2) B A AS S AS/S
1 1 1 0 0.000 1 1.00
1-1 2a 2 2 0.500 2 3.85
2 2b 2 2 0.500 2 3.85
1-1-1 3a 3 8 0.889 3 8.40
3 3b 3 8 0.889 3 8.40
2-1 3c 3 8 0.889 3 8.40
2-2 4a 4 20 16 1.250 1.000 4 14.52 14.79 1 0.273
1-2-1 4b 4 18 1.125 4 14.65
1-1-1-1-1 5a 5 40 1.600 5 22.10
1-2-2 5b 5 36 32 1.440 1.280 5 22.35 22.62 1 0.273
1-3-1 5c 5 36 1.440 5 22.35
1-1-1-1-1-1 6a-0 6 70 1.944 6 31.01
6 6a-1 6 70 1.944 6 31.01
1-2-2-1 6b 6 58 54 1.611 1.500 6 31.75 32.02 1 0.273
3-3 6a-2 6 70 54 1.944 1.500 6 31.01 32.30 2 0.641
2-2-2 6c 6 62 50 1.722 1.389 6 31.50 32.30 2 0.399
1-3-2 6d 6 62 54 1.722 1.500 6 31.50 32.02 1 0.525
1-4-1 6e 6 64 1.778 6 31.38
1-2-1-1-1 6f 6 64 1.778 6 31.38
1-2-3 6g 6 64 56 1.778 1.556 6 31.38 31.90 1 0.525
Where: A is access, AS is access when skyways are present, B is number of blocks, C is total cost of
travel in the city without skyways, CS is the total cost of travel in the city when skyways are present.
Accessibility is computed using a gravity model formulation of accessibility, where q the impedance
parameter is set =  0.08. Each row is a Scenario. The first column indicates the layout of the city, so
1-1 (scenario 2a) means there are two adjacent blocks, each with buildings one-story tall. Similarly, 1-3-2
(scenario 6d) means there are six block-floors, the westmost block is one story tall, the central block is 3
stories tall, and the eastmost block is two stories tall. In the variation with skyways, all blocks that can
be connected via skyways are connected, in this case, the second story of the central and eastmost blocks
have a skyway connection. The bold numbers indicate the scenario with the maximum access for the
particular city size.
Table 12.1: Summary of Results
from Simpli-city Model.
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In 3-dimensions, on a 90-degree grid network with skyways
connecting every floor with buildings to the north, south, east, and
west, it turns out that an octahedron (as shown in Figure 12.3) (two
four-sided pyramids attached at their base)24 is the access24 Best known to Dungeons & Dragons
players as an eight-sided die. maximizing shape. This implies a city floating in space perhaps, or
a building with a large underground pyramid mirroring the above
ground pyramid. The underground space will likely have lower
rents than the above ground space due to less natural sunlight.
Identical access can be achieved with different topologies. Things
that were topologically not equivalent without skyways may become
topologically equivalent with skyways, and vice versa.
If height limits (vertical constraints) add to access under some
circumstances, so that for instance, a single six-story building
produces less access than two 3-story, or three 2-story, buildings, it
should not take much convincing the same happens horizontally.
The Simpli-City model also demonstrates that constraints forcing
cities up rather than out can add to access. This may explain the
premiums experienced by topographically constrained cities above
and beyond simple scarcity of the land. The greater intensity of land
use produces positive spillovers (from both greater productivity and
more consumption amenities), at the cost of higher land prices.
12.5 Beyond density
If the market wants density, should the market get
density? We like density. This is a personal preference. Being
mostly (small ‘l’) libertarians, we feel no need to impose this on
others. If lots of people like density, they should create dense
places, or hire developers to do this for them. Or developers,
sensing this preference with their nose tuned to profit, can
speculatively build density. If people are more productive in dense
places and earn more money, or are more consumptive and get
more value for money, they are even more induced to create more
density. However, as we claim above, the most important part of
this argument is backwards. The primary causality is that cities
(metropolitan areas) with growth create density as people and firms
are attracted to faster growing areas. Take away the growth and
leave the built infrastructure, and even the people, and you have a
decaying city that slowly (or quickly) depopulates.
To be pedantic, and establish clarity, the population density of
the earth, the United States, Minnesota, etc. increases over time if
population increases and land area does not. The density of
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suburban areas tends to increase over time as they are transformed
from farms to not-farms. Local density may decrease as cities of
fixed boundaries depopulate. Part of this problem is the fixity of
boundaries, part is consumer’s desires as shaped by markets and
policies to consume areas with locally lower density.
But when people complain about something becoming too dense,
they don’t usually mean building more places at the same average
density, they mean increasing the density of existing places, that is,
intensifying development. While some community groups oppose
all new development under any conditions, we are all for fewer
regulations to allow more development, so long as negative
externalities25 associated with density (congestion, pollution, 25 §7.
parking spillover, etc.) are properly internalized. The lack of clear
property rights, road pricing, parking pricing, pollution pricing,
etc., however, has led communities to develop a regulatory rather
than pricing approach, which we discuss in Zoning.26 26 §13.
12.6 Competing centers
“The filling-up of America so that you can no longer build a detached
single-family house within half-an-hour’s driving time of the
interesting places people want to be, and the consequent rise both in
current location premia and expected future location premia.” – Brad
DeLong.27 27 (DeLong 2008). “[T]he traffic which
is bad everywhere anyone wants to
be.”(Yglesias 2008). See also the
argument that congestion is a measure
of urban success (Taylor 2002).
Metropolitan areas should have competing urban cores.
We argue that communities and developers should create new
places where people want to be, i.e. if all the current good places
are taken (and too expensive in terms of time and money), then
create new good places where land is cheaper, either suburbs,
satellite cities, or make other existing places ‘good.’ If there were, in
fact, demand, a premium to be paid by real estate consumers for
such places, it would be a matter of coordination to create new
precincts, or extend existing areas, so that they become interesting.
Economies of agglomeration, while they still exist, are clearly not
what they used to be, and downtowns are far less important.
Managing the positive feedback loop that are cities/real
estate/accessibility is no easy trick, but it takes a special kind of
elitism to think that ‘interesting places’ to use the term from
economist Brad DeLong in the quote aboveare inherently limited to
a few large cities with long commute times.
In the 2000 Census, the most recent available when DeLong was
writing, only three cities had an average over 30 minutes (New York,
Chicago, and Philadelphia) though another few come close.
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Cities28 are asserted to have economic value,29 and they must,28 We need to distinguish between ‘cities’
as in ‘central cities’ or ‘municipalities’
and ‘cities’ as in ‘metropolitan areas’.
In the US context these are generally
not the same. Even then, ‘city’
as ‘municipality’ means something
different when we think of high density
urban cores vs. low density, suburban,
single-family home neighborhoods.
Some urban neighborhoods are located
outside the primary central city. To
add more confusion, Australian English
uses the word ‘suburb’ to mean a
subunit of the urban complex, that is,
a neighborhood or district, rather than
as a lower density area outside the
traditional city. Fortunately Australians
do understand the concept of ‘suburbia’.
29 (Glaeser 2012).
else they would not exist. Walkable neighborhoods within cities are
asserted to have economic value,30 and they must, else they would
30 (Leinberger and Alfonzo 2012).
also not exist. If those values include spillovers, that might justify
subsidy for the greater good, as they will not be sufficiently supplied.
Who should provide that subsidy? Do they produce spillovers?
People ‘vote with their feet,’ an idea formally known as the
Tiebout Hypothesis.31 So if one municipality is not providing the
31 (Ostrom et al. 1961).
desired services, people can relocate. There are often many suburbs,
so this is not a problem for those who desire suburban living.
The problem is that the urban cores are monopoly governments
in most metropolitan areas, and in areas that once had competition
(such as New York) annexation combined them. The issue is the
merits of competition in inducing innovation, reducing costs,
increasing monitoring, benchmarking, etc. vs. the merits of
economies of scale (so New York City might be more efficiently
governed if Manhattan and Brooklyn are under one umbrella, or the
City of Westminster and the City of London, or Minneapolis and St.
Anthony, and so on. But even New York City has Newark, New
Jersey as competition; Washington, DC has Alexandria and
Arlington, Virginia, or Bethesda and Silver Spring, Maryland as
alternatives; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania has Trenton, New Jersey.
There are many older cores, which not as dominant as the main city,
and perhaps not as ‘interesting’, but still attractive and redeemable
places with good urban bones.
Just as we have competition among lower-density suburbs, we
need competition in urban municipalities, like say, the Twin Cities,
(or the Bay Area of San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose) which
enable people who want to be urbane to live in one of two or three
or more urban cores, and to choose one which has the best mix of
taxes and services and amenities and jobs.
Whether two or three cores is enough remains an open question,
but this gets back to the point that more such places should be
created, and would be if market demand were sufficiently great that
developers could compromise with opponents by offering side
payments.
13
Zoning
Figure 13.1: Washington, DC -
near Union Station. Photo by D.
Levinson.
Zoning has few friends these days. It has been criticized by many
of a libertarian bent as denying individual property owners the
right to do what they want with their property. It has also been
criticized by market urbanists who declaim the damnably high
rents1 induced by hard density caps enabled by zoning, and argue 1 (Yglesias 2012; Avent 2011).
caps have diminished economic productivity for the whole country.
We are of a libertarian bent and we like density, so why do we, in
principle, think zoning is a useful concept?
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13.1 Zoning tries to solve the externalities problem
Buy the sky and sell the sky.2 Economics talks about negative2 See R.E.M.’s ‘Fall on me.’
externalities,3 where the outcome of a transaction between two3 §7.
parties that negatively affects a third. The classic example is air
pollution. A has a factory making parts for B, but the factory
pollutes the commons (the air), and C is harmed. The best
theoretical solutions are either to have enforceable property rights
(eliminating the commons),4 or establish appropriate prices for4 (Coase 1960).
pollution,5,6 or to somehow internalize the costs by having the same5 §8.4.
6 (Pigou 1920). person control both the production and consumption of the
externality (the pollution and the air). Since we neither buy nor sell
the sky, nor even rent it, we must look for some other alternatives.
But regulate the land. Regulation is a second best solution.77 We are in the second best world
of (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956), and
while there are good changes that
we advocate that will move us to
the first best, activities which make
one set of parties worse off without
compensation, but only locally, without
changing the system as a whole, are
naturally perceived as unfair and thus
face political resistance.
Zoning, like other regulations, aims to achieve what could not be
achieved through property ownership or monetary prices. Those
solutions often fail for a variety of reasons, but the dominant is
transaction costs.8 It is not costless to impose prices, and it is often
8 Alain Bertaud effectively argues
that planners just don’t know urban
economics, and don’t even try markets,
so there is lack of knowledge and effort
as well. (Bertaud 2018).
impractical to create enforceable ownership of commons like the air.
Even if there are clear property rights, enforcement might be
expensive if it must go through the court system. Try to prove
whose air pollution made you sick and you can see the difficulty.9
9 Identifying sources of land and water
pollution is usually more straight-
forward.
Nuisance law effectively moved from the courts to regulation with
Euclidean zoning to avoid the large transaction costs and
uncertainties of the judicial system.10
10 Euclidean zoning is so-named for
the Village of Euclid, Ohio, which
implemented zoning in a case that
was upheld by the US Supreme Court
(Wikipedia contributors 2018j).
Zoning generates economies due to externalities. Zoning
is a specific form of regulation aimed at restricting certain land uses
in certain places, because of the negative externalities they create
that are difficult to address via property rights or prices. While
historically these externalities were flying shards of rock from
gravel pits, more recently zoning defends against are air pollution,
smells, litter, street congestion, on-street parking, and other public
service crowding. One might argue whether some of these items are
truly externalities.
No one has a legal right to the on-street parking in front of their
home (unless there is a permit system).11 But the custom, established11 Tacit rules exist. For instance, see
the idea of the parking chair, which
in some snowy cities marks on-street
parking spaces that have been shoveled
by neighboring residents (Wikipedia
contributors 2018h).
by decades of practice, gives them that expectation. Even if these are
not ‘technical externalities,’ they are still ‘pecuniary externalities.’
Upzoning drives up effective costs in markets (or commons) for road
space, parking space, park space, school enrollment space, etc. by
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making that space scarcer. That some or all of these ought to be
private goods is not a relevant rebuttal, as they are not now private
goods, and until they are (and maybe after) the losses remain.
Meet the Nimbys. Nick and Nora Nimby12 live near an 12 NIMBY is a pejorative acronym for
‘Not in my backyard’, reflecting the
view of neighbors who are opposing
a new development or public facility
nearby, whether or not they oppose
it as a general principle. We believe
there may be good reasons to oppose
particular developments or the locations
of particular facilities, but remain
skeptical about whether the opposition
in particular cases comes from such
reasoning or simpler selfishness.
apartment building. They don’t want more development than they
bargained for. When they bought their current house, there was a
set of laws on the books regulating development on other
properties, ensuring it would all be single-family housing. While
legally, Nick or Nora Nimby don’t generally have a property right
in someone else’s lack of property rights, the Nimbys do have an
expectation of policy continuity, and paid something for that
expectation when they bought their home. When someone else tries
to rezone property, (or the government proposes it), that may
produce economic harm to the Nimbys. They may suffer more local
air pollution, more malodorous neighbors, more broken beer bottles
on their front lawn from inebriated friends of the nearby youthful
renters who are otherwise undoubtedly good people (except when
they themselves are drunk at 2 am on a Saturday morning), more
traffic on the roads (and thus more time in traffic), more strange
cars in front of their house, more crowding in public schools,
lowered property value,13 and so on. While there may be great 13 Lower property value may be real or
perceived.social benefits to this arrangement, either through lowered costs of
public service delivery or greater economic productivity associated
with the huddled masses, there are quite likely higher private costs
similarly associated for the Nimbys.
It is not enough that everyone might be better off. Unless some
form of compensation is given to neighbors like the Nimbys, from
the great benefits such up-zoning entails, there is no reason for them
to be in favor.
Zoning creates an ‘Economy of Externality’ by reducing
suboptimal spatial adjacencies that experience suggests generate
negative effects. Recall that externalities require not just a polluter
but also a pollutee. If no one were in the woods to hear, the drunk
partiers did not create a noise externality. If Nick and Nora Nimby
had not earlier moved next to a kosher pig farm, they would not by
bothered by its smell. If the Nimbys did not also live next to a
gravel pit, its flying shards will matter not.
Meet the Yimbys. Yves and Yetta Yimby14 argue no one owns the 14 YIMBY is an acronym for ‘Yes, in my
backyard’ and formed in opposition to
NIMBYS blocking development.
right to uncongested roads and uncrowded facilities, and agree with
the developers, market urbanists, and planners who support them
in their quest for the highest and best use. The Yimbys note that
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denser cities are better for the global environment and the economy
than the alternative (suburban development or no development).
However, the Nimbys say the Yimbys think they can just offload
these costs to local neighborhoods and their streets and it is okay.
But what they do is take time and quality of life from other people
by increasing congestion and crowding. Recall that the Nimbys
think (presumably by custom, status quo, or some other logic) that
they have the right to prevent these externalities, and they do so
with restrictive zoning. Zoning regulates negative externalities that
are not currently governed by Pigou or Coase.1515 (Coase 1960; Pigou 1920).
. . .
Neither side is inherently right, the problem at its core is
undefined property rights and un-tolled roads. It is just two sides of
selfishness: greedy developers seeking profit vs. greedy NIMBYs
protecting their expected property values.16 It is just two sides of16 It is possible that NIMBYs may think
they are protecting their property values
but are actually harming their overall
value. In areas with high demand, if
developers are allowed to build more
units they can afford to pay more for
land as there are more units over which
they can spread the costs.
selflessness: selfless developers promoting the urban economy,
increasing accessibility, and reducing inequality for society at large,
or selfless NIMBYs trying to ensure that quality of life is maintained
for the neighborhood and the future.
Zoning creates tacit rights that people will expect
compensation for, when changed. This is not to say any
particular zoning regulation is appropriate, efficient, or equitable. It
is to say there is a ‘fact on the ground’ that has created a set of tacit
rights that ought not be blithely unseated without expecting to
provide compensation from the putative gains by rezoning or
dezoning to those for whom this implicit contract between the
public and private owners has been made. There are many options
for providing these economic side payments. There has been some
preliminary discussion about side payment in research on
congestion pricing, but this needs to go much farther. This can be
applied for all types of transport investments and land uses at
various scales. There will always be arguments about price, but if
the neighbors ask too much, status quo ante prevails (the developer
won’t develop). If the land use revolutionaries offer too little, the
status quo ante still prevails (the local politics will not permit
approval). If there were truly gains from trade, there should be a
core to this transaction. The logic of the ultimatum game might be
informative.1717 (Thaler 1988).
Yves and Yetta Yimby need to enable Nick and Nora Nimby to be
winners too if they are to support changing zoning and other land
use regulations.
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. . .
Systematically, there are four cases when a developer is
considering building somewhere:
1. The zoning is not binding, without externalities. In this case the
zoning exceeds market demand, but the negative externalities are
small. This case is not a problem for developers or the
community, and the development proceeds without hitch.
2. The zoning is not binding, with externalities. In this case the zoning
exceeds market demand, but there are negative externalities to
development which the neighbors want to avoid. This case is a
problem for the community, which must now pay the developer
not to develop, or must pay to mitigate the externalities. We see
this when communities purchase development rights (for
instance, agricultural reserve areas). Here the Coasian right to
develop resides with the developer.18 18 (Coase 1960).
. . .
One can see difficulties with these scenarios. Developers can
threaten to develop, and get paid not to develop, even though
they were not serious. Bluffing is very easy. Hence the desire for
communities to control the development rights through
restrictive zoning. Residents must act through government
because of the asymmetry and coordination costs, one-thousand
neighbors all harmed slightly do not have the ability or incentive
individually to give a side payment to a developer not to develop
at all (or as much), because some residents will want to free-ride
on the side payments of others. Only through the government or
a government-like organization can this be achieved.
. . .
3. The zoning is binding, with side-payment. The developer through
either request or lobbying (perhaps at some monetary expense)
gets an area rezoned. The lobbying allows political
decision-makers to collect rents from restrictive zoning, or
neighbors to achieve side-payments. These side-payments
compensate the community for the negative externalities that will
be received upon a change in the status quo. The political rents
are a problem for the political system and how we finance
campaigns or administer bribery laws. This case costs the
developers money, but in the end if they choose to build, it still
must generate above ‘normal profits,’ otherwise it would be
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better for the developer to keep their money in a bank account.
This results in a transfer of money, but is at least neutral and
probably win-win.
4. The zoning remains binding, without (sufficient) side-payments. The
land is not rezoned because the developer’s payments were, or
would be, insufficient to persuade the opponents or
decision-makers. This case might result in some social loss
(especially if there are, in fact, economies of agglomeration), but
what is happening is that the loss perceived by the opponents
outweighs the benefits perceived by the developer. There may be
of course miscalculations about the opponents willingness to pay
or willingness to accept, but in the end the potential gains did
not outweigh the potential losses, and the project may not have
been as good as claimed.
If there is value, where are the side payments from otherwise
rejected developers? Our perhaps cynical view, “No side payments,
no evidence of super-normal social profits, no evidence of huge
value being lost.” While the developer may be losing potential
profits, society is not losing much, as those who are negatively
affected are not being given compensation to offset the negative
effects they would receive were the project to go forward. We realize
there are transactions costs limiting the ease of implementing side
payments, but surely some institution could arise to facilitate this.
The scope of zoning conflict is narrow. These arguments
are generally fought on the margins though. Most of the United
States (territory-wise) is in the first case from the previous list.
Zoning is well in excess of demand. Zoning bites in some fast
growing and wealthy areas, notably New York City, Washington,
DC and its suburbs, and the San Francisco Bay Area. Washington,
DC and New York are both very special edge cases, being political
and financial capitals respectively, both of which at least historically
generated important economies of agglomeration. The San
Francisco Bay Area is more complicated. Obviously there is some
economy of agglomeration in the technology sector, and there
economies of amenity in the City of San Francisco for many higher
income people.
Density naturally produces more regulation because density
naturally produces more externalities: both more pollution and
more pollutees. Whether the zoning reflects the wishes of
developers or neighbors depends on context, and as population
density increases, we would expect the neighbors to become
relatively more powerful, if only because the negative externalities
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of development become apparent to more and more people, as well
as increasing in scope. Similarly as wealth increases, neighbors gain
political strength. And since high-density areas are naturally more
expensive (due to greater demand, otherwise they would not be
high-density), and high-density areas are also typically formed by
physical constraint, meaning less supply, they are likely to be more
regulated.
Yet, even relatively dense and expensive metro areas have
inexpensive housing in places, it just tends to be either lower
quality, or in less desirable neighborhoods.
13.2 Height limits
Height limits limit negative externalities and create
positive externalities. Height limits are a particular form of
zoning that restrict the maximum height of structures in some cities.
It is often initially promoted to protect viewsheds, so for instance,
views of the Capitol building in Washington, DC are not obscured
by buildings too tall. It has the same effects as zoning of limiting
development for all the reasons noted above.
Urbanists oppose building height limits. In contrast, we argue
that height limits are not an especially important problem, and are a
solution to some other problems
The density of Washington, DC, notorious for its 10 story height
limit19 feels right for a city, much like Tokyo, London, and Paris (all 19 Technically the limit is 110 f t (33 m)
and is tied to street width.notable for a lack of overly tall buildings). In DC, the buildings are
not too tall and canyon like, and there are few vacant lots in the core.
But there remain plenty of low density sites elsewhere in the city, as
shown in Figure 13.1.
What do height limits do? They restrict buildings over X stories.
Thus more buildings less than or equal to X stories are built over a
greater footprint if demand is fixed. In other words height limits
reallocate development. The consequence is that a larger area is
urbanized at a high density (at or near X stories), rather than a
smaller area at a very high density and a larger area at a lower
density. In Washington, there is a much larger urban sphere than,
say, height-limit-less Minneapolis, where high-rises in downtown
are surrounded by many low-rise and surface parking lots.
Instead of having 10 blocks of 50 story buildings, Washington has
50 blocks of 10 story buildings. Is this a really worrisome outcome?
This additional urbanized space is a positive externality in a
number of ways. Better urban form (more sidewalks are walkable),
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less congestion (traffic is spread out over more space), less pollution
intake (‘the solution to pollution is dilution,’ the bad stuff is spread
over more area), less crime (more eyes near street level), more
serendipitous random meetings on the street (which supposedly
create greater productivity) and so on.
At one limit, we could have a height limit of 1 story, and spread
everything out, at the other, we could have no limit, and buildings
would be as concentrated as the market and structural engineering
could support. Clearly the first is extreme, but so is the second, so
long as we have unpriced externalities. We live in an imperfect
(second-best)20 world with many unpriced externalities (congestion20 (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956).
and pollution among them), which have no clear property rights.
Regulating heights is one of many second-best solutions to this
problem.
Do the height limits imply more suburban development? Sure,
someone who really, really wants a high rise for some reason will
have to locate in the suburbs.
But we can’t think of a good reason except ego and marketing for
needing a high rise in a place like Washington, while we see many
inefficiencies associated with tall buildings: greater distance to the
ground floor and thus to people in other buildings (in the absence of
skyways on the 50th floor), limited interactions on the upper stories,
so much floor space devoted to elevators, higher construction costs,
etc.
By and large, suburban development in the DC suburbs is not for
lack of space in Washington, but rather due to a preference for the
suburbs. Cities without height limits get their share of suburban
development for all the usual reasons (lower land costs, easier
access for workers, etc.) when day-to-day inter-firm accessibility is
not particularly valuable in their sector, and intra-firm accessibility
still matters.
One of the critical problems here, as with many economic
phenomena, is the difference between marginal and average effects.
For instance, clearly transport matters: if there were no transport
there would be no economic activity. However, that does not mean
that a marginal increase in transport supply will have a significant,
or even positive, effect on economic activity, that depends on
context. When the network is mature, as is true in many large US
cities, the marginal returns to new investment now are much lower
than the historical average returns.
Similarly, the marginal returns to density might be much smaller
than average returns. Cities exist for a reason. That reason is
economies of agglomeration in various forms. That said, where
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cities are continuing to grow, those economies must be valuable.
Where suburbs are growing, the daily face-to-face inter-firm
interactions emerging from the classical 19th and early 20th century
transit-based downtown has declined relative to the need to be
within auto-commuting distance of places that are to be dealt with
on a short-term basis. When new cities grow, new patterns of
economic activity are forming, and these may be more valuable
than incremental changes to mature cities.
There are several points wrapped up in this:
• Empirical questions about intra-urban vs. inter-urban migration
– Do height limits move development to the suburbs or another
metropolitan area altogether?
• The rights of the property owner vs. the rights of the community.
• Economic productivity and positive externalities vs. pollution,
congestion, and other negative externalities.
• Empirical questions about the scarcity of land.
• Empirical questions about what constitutes good urban form.
• Empirical questions about the need to be downtown or simply in
the metro area – plenty of suburbs even in DC would be happy to
accommodate growth.
All of which is to say cities and their economies are dynamic,
and the first order factor is the underlying market economics, while
regulations (which are themselves the product of political market
preferences) are second order effects.
13.3 Should the Bay Area have 11 million residents?
California, and the booming San Francisco Bay Area in particular,
has caught the ire of many who blame restrictive zoning for causing
economic harm to the country. In 2012, Tim Lee wrote in Forbes:
“Why The Bay Area Should Have 11 Million Residents Today”:21 21 (Lee 2012).
Today, the Bay Area has about 7 million residents.22 In a free housing 22 Estimated at 7.76 million in 2017.
market, the population of the San Francisco Bay Area would have been
growing rapidly over the last two decades. For example, between 1900
and 1920, the growth of the auto industry helped the population of
the Detroit metro area nearly triple, from 540,000 people to 1.4 million
people. If the San Francisco Bay Area had grown that fast since 1990,
it would have about 16 million people today.
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We don’t doubt there are housing restrictions in Bay Area
municipalities.23 There are many municipalities. Some would23 David Levinson lived there from 1994-
1999, and saw first hand the benefits and
costs of rent control.
welcome development. Others just demand more side payments,
compensation for the negative externalities24 more residents bring.24 §7.
The so-called economies of agglomeration are just not large
enough to justify development in less desirable areas, or side
payments to compensate the existing residents of developed areas,
or they would be made. Nor are they enough to overcome social
problems constraining gentrification.
To get to Lee’s 11 million, four million people have to come from
somewhere (he’s not arguing for millions of new babies by existing
residents). Maybe they come from Phoenix or Dallas or Houston or
Atlanta, or, of course, everywhere. But then those places have the
infrastructure, land, and housing stock, where if the demand were
lower would just see lower land prices, not less people (mostly).
Maybe some development would not have been built in those
other metros. But that development (i.e. roll back the last 10 years
of US development for two million housing units, reallocate that to
the Bay Area, as is implied in the article) and most of that would be
single family houses that would be unbuilt. Preferences for two
million single family homes cannot physically be satisfied in the
Bay Area, so residents would thus face a worse housing situation
than preferred.
We have a friend from Minneapolis we nicknamed
‘Pre-Millenium Man,’ since in the early 2000s he wanted to live the
1990s hipster dream of San Francisco. He moved to the Bay Area
and found work in software development. Nothing stopped him.
He undoubtedly outbid someone who did not care to live there
quite as much. The people who are outbid contribute much less to
the economies of agglomeration than the average person who is
there (their wages reflect willingness to pay for housing, and are
determined by their productivity). Adding two million marginal
workers to the pool won’t increase the total productivity as much as
the average person today, and will ultimately reduce average
productivity. It will also worsen the aggregate productivity
elsewhere.25 There are diminishing economies of agglomeration,
25 At Georgia Tech, there was a common
joke about the student who failed out
and had to transfer to rival University of
Georgia, thereby improving the average
IQ of both schools. and increasing negative externalities with larger populations.
The entire rationale for housing regulations is to reduce negative
externalities, both perceived and real. If we lived in a world where
those externalities were otherwise internalized, communities would
be much more willing to allow more development, as the negative
spillovers would not exist. We do not yet live in that world.
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The Bay Area (thinks it) is the most important place in the world,
delivering us the future. Real productivity is created there, but so is
crap and redundant software.
Veteran journalist and Recode founder Kara Swisher once quipped
that San Francisco was becoming an assisted-living community for
millennials. She wasn’t exaggerating.
The on-demand economy could easily be rebranded as the
“mother-on-demand” economy. Cleaning, laundry, taking out the
trash: Its goal is basically eliminating all the chores you once did as a
kid.26 26 (Hartley 2017).
A much better strategy would be to stop wasting so much effort
on duplication, drivel, and so on, and incentivize those competent
software developers to make things that are worthwhile. If people
can no longer find good investments, or can no longer distinguish
between good investments and bad ones, perhaps the economies of
agglomeration have been exhausted.
Alternately, the economies of agglomeration might not lead to
societal benefits. Consider the finance industry in New York, which
is another city with high housing costs blamed on zoning
regulations. The industry has increased productivity and
sophistication, but it is not clear that these innovations are always
desirable. For instance, financial derivatives are one of these
innovations. Yet Warren Buffett has gone so far as to call financial
derivatives “weapons of mass destruction” in a 2002 report to
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders.27 27 (Buffett 2002).
Again, the limits of agglomeration economies can be reached.
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Fielding Dreams: Induced Demand,
Development, and Supply
Demand for Travel
Q1
P1: Price before
Price of 
Travel 
Capacity 
($/VKT)
Quantity of Travel
S1: Supply  
before expansion
S2: Supply  
after expansion
P2: Price after
Q2
Figure 14.1: Induced Demand.
In the Kevin Costner 1989 film Field of Dreams, a ghost whispers
“If you build it, he will come." ‘It’ refers to a baseball field; ‘he’
is the ghost of Shoeless Joe Jackson, a baseball player idolized by
protagonist, ‘you’, Ray Consella.
This has been adopted by planners to describe the idea of
induced demand: “If you build it, they will come," which,
interpreted in transport, means that if a place (‘you’) builds a new
facility (‘it’) (road, tracks, etc.) demand in the form of travelers
(‘they’) will respond and use it – making trips that previously
would have been unmade. This has multiple causes. In our use,
induced demand (and its converse reduced demand) results from
people changing route, schedule, mode, destination, or location of
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home or work within the existing built environment, or even choose
whether to make a trip at all, because of a change in access. The
related induced development occurs when people and firms develop
new real estate to advantage themselves of access, and so is a longer
run phenomenon. Induced supply is the change in the network that
occurs due to changes in demand patterns, and reflects the response
of infrastructure and service providers to changed conditions.11 (Levinson and Karamalaputi 2003a;b).
Induced demand (and development) is not surprising to anyone
who has thought about this, and the idea of induced demand has
long been well understood, even if the magnitude of induced
demand associated with any given project is difficult to estimate,
and the models are not used appropriately, and internal consistency
between model inputs and outputs is still not standard practice.2 A2 David Levinson did his MS Thesis
on this more than 25 years ago, and
it wasn’t a new idea then. See
(Levinson and Kumar 1994a). Also see
(Levinson and Kumar 1994b) for implicit
recognition of the idea.
related notion is Say’s Law, from 1803: Supply creates its own
demand, or more pedantically as per Wikipedia “that aggregate
production necessarily creates an equal quantity of aggregate
demand.”3
3 (Wikipedia contributors 2018i).
This has been illustrated using economic supply and demand
curves, such as in Figure 14.1. To an economist this induced or latent
demand was always there, just unrealized until the cost of travel
was lowered by the new capacity. The road (or train) fills up,
congestion returns, or at least the expected congestion reduction
benefits do not last long, as travelers adapt to the new environment.
The consumers’ surplus increases, as people can now do things they
want to do at lower cost.
In the planner’s telling, only the hapless traffic engineer (or traffic
modeler who is as often a planner as engineer), who made the partial
equilibrium assumption that demand does not respond to supply, is
surprised by this growth. In the anti-automobile advocates version,
induced demand is not merely a thing, it is a bad thing.
We want to establish several points in this chapter. First, we define
induced demand and development. Second, we claim that induced
demand is good of itself, but can impose negative effects. Third, how
can we identify whether it exists. Fourth, we have known about this
a while, but tend to forget what we know.
14.1 Defining induced demand
Demand is a function – not an amount.4 We find the amount (of4 We are indebted to reader Jay Wetmore
for this argument in this and the next
section.
travel) when we intersect the supply function with the demand
function as in Figure 14.1. Transport improvements, whether the
construction of a new runway at an airport or the signal
coordination along an urban arterial, change the supply function,
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(from S1 to S2) and therefore increasing the quantity of travel
consumed (from Q1 to Q2), and lowering the price (from P1 to P2).
While we might think we are ‘consuming travel’, we might
alternatively say we are ‘realizing the potential of access’. Access
can be thought of as a merit good.5 Merit goods are what most 5 (Musgrave 1959).
people think of when they talk about public goods,6 without the 6 §A.
messiness of concerning ourselves with rivalry and excludability.
Merit goods are normally associated with positive externalities;7 7 §7.
and as such are considered to be something that individuals or
societies should have on the basis of need; and something that will
be under-supplied by the market, making public provision
desirable.
We lay out four specific hypotheses (and four null alternatives) that can
be generated, varying three dimensions: construction (supply), demand
response, and sequence:
• If you build it, will they come? [Induced Demand Question]
– H1: Build it and [then] they will come. [Because demand responds to
supply, or because it was coming regardless] [Compare H2]
– H1null : Build it and [then] they won’t come [Because demand is
independent of supply]. [See H4]
• If they come, will you build it? [Induced Supply Question]
– H2: They come and [then] you will build it. [Because supply responds
to demand, or because you were building it regardless] [Compare H1]
– H2null : They come and [then] you didn’t build it. [Because supply is
independent of demand] [See H3]
• If you don’t build it, will they come? [Exogenous Demand Question]
– H3: Don’t build it and [then] they will come [anyway]. [Because
demand is independent of supply] [See H2null]
– H3null : Don’t build it and [then] they won’t come [Either because
demand is independent of supply, or because you didn’t build it]. [See
H4null]
• If they don’t come, will you build it? [Exogenous Supply Question]
– H4: They don’t come and [then] you build it. [Because supply is
independent of demand] [See H1null]
– H4null : They don’t come and [then] you didn’t build it. [Either because
supply is independent of demand or because they didn’t come.] [See
H3null]
Each of the hypotheses in the box tells us something a bit different.
There is both the dependence of the supply-demand question (are
they dependent or independent), and there is the sequencing (which
comes first, transport or land use).
Of course these are binaries, and we could consider how many of
’them’ need to come for us to say ’they came.’ So you built a stadium
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to seat 10,000 and 5,000 came, is that evidence of induced demand?
In short, yes, but not as much as you planned for.
Karl Popper developed the idea of falsifiability, which says: “[I]t
must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by
experience.”88 (Popper 2005).
Sequencing matters here, and it’s hard to prove a negative. A
single sequence of events cannot provide proof for induced demand.
Maybe Shoeless Joe and the rest of the ballplayers were going to show
up in Kinsella’s Field anyway, and the field just accommodated them.
Just because they never showed up before he built the stadium is not
the evidence we require. Instead, we need to compare multiple cases
to justify our case, and build the evidence for it.
A sequence of events can however disprove induced demand (or
supply), as the list above illustrates, there are several cases where
construction does not result in demand (we can conclusively
disallow induced demand in that case) or where demand does not
create supply (we can conclusively refute induced supply).
There are some other issues, such as what if they come and you
didn’t build it (or, reversing the sequence, you didn’t build it and
they come)? What is the correct sequence in the absence of an event,
the absence being not building something? It is impossible to state
when the event of not building something actually happened as not
building something is always happening. The related question is
when did the absence of demand occur?
In either case, negative externalities9 ensue, which is the9 §7.
NIMBY10 fear of growth without supporting infrastructure.10 §13.
NIMBYs may not want the growth with the supporting
infrastructure either, but their main complaint, on face value, is
growth without it, which realistically may negatively affect their
personal quality of life and property value. Whether or not you
believe they should prevail, you at least understand their
point-of-view.
Policy responses to ensure consistency between supply and
demand include concurrency or adequate public facilities
ordinances (APFOs). These are rightly treated skeptically by the
public.1111 David Levinson once worked on
implementing APFOs and growth
management / concurrency regulation
in Montgomery County, Maryland. He
recounts the analysis in The Limits to
Growth Management (Levinson 1997).
14.2 Induced demand can be a good thing
From the individual’s point of view, access provides opportunities
to more jobs, more entertainment and social options, and more
alternatives for consumption of goods and services. From a
business’s point of view, access provides a larger pool of labor and
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more raw materials. From a retailer’s point of view, access provides
a larger pool of consumers. From a municipal government’s point
of view, access allows more efficient provision of police protection,
fire protection and ambulance service by reducing the number of
facilities necessary to maintain acceptable response times.
Transport improvements that provide greater access per unit of
time lower transaction costs. Lower transaction cost lead to great
efficiency in the economy and a higher standard of living.
In telecommunications networks we have witnessed several orders
of magnitude improvement in capacity during our lifetimes, yet we
have always filled the new capacity. We stream video now when we
once sent text files. Yet few wring their hands about the induced
demand in our telecommunications network.
The key difference is that all of this additional travel has visible
side effects that consuming telecommunications does not.12 Your 12 Which is not to say that watching
home-made internet videos is good
for your brain, nor that texting while
driving is good for your (or anyone
else’s) health.
peak hour trip congests13 our commutes. Your tailpipe emissions14
13 §5.
14 §8.
makes us sick. Your travel increases our crash risk.15 The list goes
15 §7.7.
on. If society underprices these externalities, induced demand can
result in economic bads (the opposite of economic goods). However,
reducing travel itself has costs (which reduce benefits), so it is not
obvious which is worse a priori. We discuss solutions like pricing
elsewhere.16 16 §6.
14.3 Forgetting faster than we learn
There are many new players in the world of transport policy. On
net, the influx of new actors into the policy, advocacy, and planning
realms is likely a benefit, but does offer some concerns. One thing
that we see again and again is that new entrants and existing
players in the world of urban transport policy too often don’t know
or have forgotten lessons learned in the past. On one level this is
just a nuisance, and it is good that old knowledge is rediscovered.
On another more troubling level this is like health professionals
having to rediscover penicillin every other generation.
In a Vox piece17 the concept of induced demand was discussed
17 (Stromberg 2015).
with reference to empirical work by the economists Gilles Duranton
and Matthew Turner.18 As noted above, induced demand is a
18 See (Duranton and Turner 2011). Wired
(Mann 2014) also wrote about this
particular work. We don’t particularly
blame economists for taking credit for
long established ideas, it’s a professional
tic, we blame journalists for their
credulity.
well-known concept that goes back formally at least to Anthony
Downs’ ‘Iron Law of Congestion,’19 and was discussed informally
19 (Downs 1992).by Lewis Mumford (in 1955),20 who was referring to Mitchell and
20 (Mumford 1955).Rapkin’s Urban Traffic: A Function of Land Use (1954).21 Evidence
21 (Mitchell and Rapkin 1954).goes back much farther, including implicitly the Adam Smith
references discussed in Chapter 1.22 22 §1.
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Yet the Vox piece suggests induced demand is new knowledge.
Reading beyond urban economics research reveals that scholars in
transport economics and urban planning had already extensively
explored induced demand. In a 1995 ACCESS article Mark Hansen
describes the problem.23 Phil Goodwin (citing observations from23 (Hansen 1995; Hansen and Huang
1997). 1938),24 Robert Cervero,25 Robert Noland,26 Robert Cervero and
24 (Goodwin 1996).
25 (Cervero 2003b).
26 (Noland 2001).
Mark Hansen27 and David Levinson28 are some of the scholars who
27 (Cervero and Hansen 2002).
28 (Parthasarathi et al. 2003).
have published in leading journals, presented at conferences and
included induced demand in their teaching. Here is what Robert
Cervero wrote:
No issue has paralyzed highway programmes and side-tracked our
ability to rationalize new road development as concerns over
‘induced travel demand.’ Time and again, experiences show that
building new roads or widening existing ones, especially in fast
growing areas, provides only ephemeral relief – in short time, they
are once again filled to capacity. A study using 18 years of data from
14 California metropolitan areas found every 10% increase in
highway lane-miles was associated with a 9% increase in
vehicle-miles-traveled four years after road expansion, controlling for
other factors. Similar findings have been recorded in the United
Kingdom. In the United States, regional transport plans, such as in
the San Francisco Bay Area, have been legally contested by
environmental interest groups on the very grounds that they failed to
account for the induced travel demand effects of road investments
and expansions.2929 (Cervero 2001).
Cervero’s summary article30 is worth reading for nuance about30 (Cervero 2003a).
what induced demand really means for transport planning and
policy. He notes that while induced demand claims have stopped
highway expansions in the past, induced demand claims gloss over
more important concerns about the use and costs of travel.
It is also worth noting that even though induced demand is
usually discussed in the context of expanded road capacity, induced
demand actually applies for any particular transport technology.
Transit expansion along a corridor has the same effect on induced
demand as road widening. On his blog, transport scholar Kevin
Krizek explained how congestion is a poor argument for expanded
cycling facilities also because of induced demand.31 We actually31 (Krizek 2013).
know a lot about how transport capacity affects the price of travel,
which affects demand for travel across time and space.
This is just one example, but many newly interested and
well-intentioned people are wading into transport policy based on
limited reading and personal anecdotes, and if we follow their lead
we will have to relearn all the things that we already know.
Forgetting knowledge is not a new phenomenon and not limited to
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any particular set of experts, but it is problematic and deserves
more discussion about how to fix it. In a lead editorial in the May
2014 Planning Magazine32 the American Planning Association’s 32 (Farmer 2014).
CEO, Paul Farmer, begins as follows:
During a chat about planning in the US and Canada, several planning
colleagues addressed the topic of value capture. “We’ve coined the
phrase ’windfalls,”’ one Canadian colleague proudly remarked in
describing the unearthed benefits that a property owner might realize
from investment made by others.33 The late Don Hagman might have 33 The book referenced is Windfalls
for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and
Compensation. (Hagman and Miscyznski
1978).
been pleased, amused, or irritated by this appropriation of the
concept he popularized, if not invented, in his extensive writings half
a century ago.
Concern about keeping knowledge alive isn’t just sour grapes
about all the stuff we learned in grad school that people ignore. It’s
not clear how we can steadily move policy forward (in a better way,
however ‘better’ is defined) if we can’t keep the lessons of the past
in mind. This is not a question only for transport policy, either. In
The History Manifesto34 Jo Guldi and David Armitage argue that 34 (Guldi and Armitage 2014).
historical study should play a larger role in economic and policy
debates.
As transport policy attracts more specialists from fields outside
of transport – economics, computer science, software engineers, data
miners, etc. – the challenge of sharing existing knowledge rather
than rediscovering knowledge is really important. We don’t need to
have lots of policies that won’t work just to relearn that such policies
don’t work.
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Trains, Planes, and Automobiles
Distance
Travel Time 
or 
Generalized 
Cost
Plane
Train
Auto
D1 D2
Figure 15.1: Planes, Trains, and
Automobiles.
It might seem strange to include a chapter on intercity transport
in a part of the book about cities. But when you think about it,
intercity transport is mostly about extending the scope of the city,
bringing more territory into the daily urban market. Commuter
trains emerged from intercity trains. The Interstate Highway System
mostly serves daily urban users. We expect the same will be true of
new surface transport modes that might get deployed, such as
high-speed trains.
Figure 15.1, which is standard in transport economics or
geography illustrates the market trade-off for intercity transport.1 1 Similar graphs apply to freight, just
relabel it to Trucks, Trains, and Ships.The question is whether there is a range between D1 and D2; that is,
does rail actually dominate both autos and planes over any
distance. In terms of travel time it probably does (especially
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considering additional time for security at airports), and looking
only at operating cost, it might. In terms of overall cost, including
the fixed cost of construction of a new high-speed rail (HSR) line,2 it2 The industry is conflicted between
hyphenating high-speed or not, high speed.
We hyphenate except for proper names
which are not.
probably does not under current cost structures since capital costs
are so high. The size of this range, if it exists, is, however, empirical,
and subject to change with costs and technologies.
15.1 Mapping high-speed rail
Figure 15.2: US High-Speed Rail
System Proposal by Alfred Twu.
Figure 15.3: Amtrak Ridership
by Mike Hicks.
Maps are powerful ideas. A map once drawn can be viewed as a
contract, a promise to build something. We live with the ghosts of
maps drawn long ago. Unbuilt highways queue-up to get built, even
when their rationale has disappeared. But lines remain unbuilt for
a reason, people perceive the benefit do not outweigh the cost. Of
course, conditions can change, a line which once failed a benefit-cost
test may now pass it, or vice versa.
High-speed rail advocates have long assembled maps of proposed
routes. These present different visions of the future, and they can’t
all come to pass. But does that mean none of them should?
A private firm would build high-speed rail if the expected profits
exceeded the expected costs. Clearly that is not generally the case
in the United States, otherwise we would see more evidence of this.
There are certainly proposals,3 some farther along than others.
3 Recent proposals include Los Angeles
to Las Vegas, Houston to Dallas, and
Miami to Orlando, the last of which has
seen new privately-operated Brightline
conventional rail service.
The public sector remains uninterested in profit, but instead
should favor the more ambiguous general welfare. High-speed rail
makes sense when the full economic benefits outweigh the full
economic costs. The potential benefits include time savings for
travelers, increased reliability, improved quality of service, reduced
congestion on roadways and at airports, reduced pollution from
automobiles and airplanes, and more economic activity as a result
of the improved accessibility. The potential costs are those of
constructing the system, operating it, the pollution costs associated
with construction and operations, and so on. The evidence is that
the environmental capital costs of the new system do not outweigh
potential reductions in pollution.44 High-speed rail construction generates
pollution and greenhouse gases
that takes years of operation (and
substitution for other modes) to
recover.(Chester and Horvath 2010;
Levinson et al. 1999).
The first map (Figure 15.2) nicely draws with bright colors a
possible United States High-Speed Rail System. The second map
(Figure 15.3), shows actual Amtrak ridership. Actual ridership is
highest in the Northeast corridor, where the Acela service, along
with other conventional passenger rail runs today. The other big
Amtrak markets are between San Diego and Los Angeles, between
Sacramento and the San Francisco Bay area, between Seattle and
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Portland, and between Chicago and a variety of midwestern cities,
in particular St. Louis.
Figure 15.4: Network by
California High-Speed Rail
Authority.
Corridors that get traffic now with relatively slow service are more
likely to get higher levels of demand when upgraded (made faster
and more frequent) than corridors that get almost no ridership now.
This argues for incremental upgrades where the benefits outweigh
the costs, and focusing on specific proven markets rather than trying
to connect random large cities.
We should be looking for routes where train is more cost-effective
than either driving or taking an airplane. This distance is certainly
less than 1000 km5 for most of the US, under current costs of travel.
5 600 mi.
Once we have proven we can connect large places closer than 160
km,6 we should connect large places less than 320 km,7 and then
6 100 mi.
7 200 mi.
expand outward. We should not start with a grand vision which will
simply collapse of its own weight. We should also be looking for
routes with large trip generators at either end.
Figure 15.5: New York Hub
Network.
Examining the first map shows a lot of non-sensical routes. We
can’t rate them in order of non-sensicalness, some are just too
problematic. This is not to say there are not segments which could
productively be (and are) served by rail. The Northeast corridor is
one. Chicago to Milwaukee is one. Los Angeles to San Diego is one.
There are a few others. The key point is they are local serving, and
should be locally supported. There is no need for US federal
involvement. If the projects were worthwhile, the states and cities
and private railroads should fund them. Almost all the benefits are
local, the costs should be borne by those who benefit.
These segments can grow into systems that should be (1)
separately organized, managed, governed, and operated to improve
local responsiveness and reliability, and (2) allowed to evolve
organically based on incremental changes and extensions. We do
not ask San Francisco’s BART to interline with Washington DC’s
Metro,8 nor should we expect a useful local service from Chicago to 8 We might hope for technical
interoperability to have joint purchases
and achieve economies of scale.
Unfortunately, BART and DC Metro in
fact use separate gauges.
Champaign-Urbana to interline with a potentially useful route from
Richmond to Washington, DC. By doing so you create
dependencies: a blizzard in the Northeast holds up train service in
Illinois, without any advantages.
High-speed rail is a difficult proposition to begin with in the
United States. In the more than 50 years after it was opened in
Japan, it has yet to come to pass in the US.9 There are reasons for 9 We are aware of Amtrak’s Acela, which
is not true HSR. We are also aware of
California’s HSR project, which, while
under construction, is still far from
opening, if it does at all. There is not
currently funding lined up to complete
the project.
this, beyond simple political obstinacy. The markets are different,
the conditions are different. When HSR was opened in Japan, its
airlines were highly regulated. Further, Japan has a much higher
overall population density. The US has been unimpressed with its
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passenger rail service for many decades, since well before Amtrak
was formed to pick up the pieces of private passenger rail service,
and has lost its rail-building and train-building skill-base.
When we study successful technologies and networks such as the
Internet or the London Underground, we see they grow from a seed,
and expand outward – not from the top down. This is natural, it is
risk-averse, it allows learning to occur before over-building. Not all
technologies or networks will succeed, it is best to learn that early,
rather than after building a giant White Elephant.
15.2 A national high-speed rail network
Figure 15.6: Chicago Hub
Network by Midwest High
Speed Rail Association.
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Fig e 15.7: Denver Hub
Network by Rocky Mountain
Rail Authority.
Figure 15.8: Salt Lake City
Hub Network by Western High
Speed Rail Alliance.
Eric Peterson, President of the American High Speed Rail Alliance,
at a conference dinner estimated that a complete national truly High
Speed Rail (HSR) system for the United States (on the order of 350
km/h10 peak speed), not simply an improved Amtrak system, would
10 220 mph.
cost about $2 trillion, give or take. This sounds about right. This is
about the cost of 2000 professional football stadiums. A HSR network
would be a better investment than 2000 Stadiums. This would also
be the cost of 2000 LRT systems equivalent to the Twin Cities’ Central
Corridor (Green Line) project, which would serve more people on a
daily basis, and probably more passenger miles as well.
Is this a good thing for the United States or for any given state?
The answer differs. From a local perspective, someone else
spending money here is a good thing, and spending our money
somewhere else is not. A local benefit/cost analysis (which excluded
non-local benefits and non-local costs) gives a different answer than
a national benefit/cost analysis. If someone picks up half the bill
(which is typical for transit projects) or 90%, which was the case
with the Interstate Highway System, the local incentive for match is
much greater than if the locality must pick up 100% of the cost.
The network Peterson promoted was essentially a hub-and-spoke
system. Minnesota is at the end of the Chicago-based “Chicago Hub
Network” (Figure 15.6). Clearly this is more advantageous for
Chicago than Minneapolis, Chicagoans can (going
counter-clockwise) get to Minneapolis, Madison, Milwaukee, St.
Louis, Kansas City, Indianapolis, Louisville, Cincinnati, Columbus,
Cleveland, Toledo, and Detroit, among others. Minneapolitans can
go to Madison, Milwaukee, and Chicago before the travel time
becomes unreasonable. The access from Chicago is much greater,
and thus their benefit is much greater. Chicago has a much greater
interest in this than Minnesota.
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If Wisconsin were to pay for the line from Milwaukee to
LaCrosse, the extension to Saint Paul would be relatively short, and
the political economics (local Benefit/Cost Ratio) would differ from
the case where Minnesota paid for half the line crossing Wisconsin.
Figure 15.9: Seattle Hub
(Eugene - Portland - Seattle -
Vancouver, BC) Network by
Washington State Department
of Transportation, Oregon State
Department of Transportation.
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Figure 15.10: Ohio Hub
Network by Ohio Rail
Development Commission.
The logic also varies based on whether the line can be used for
commuter traffic in addition to HSR traffic. The history of transport
is rife with long-distance transport infrastructure being adopted for
short-distance travel. The Interstate is only the most recent example
(commuter railroads are another example).
The cost is not small. The nature of HSR is that fixed cost is
much greater than other modes, and the variable cost (per trip) may
be lower. If the demand were great enough, this trade-off would be
worthwhile, but when demand is small, the resulting White
Elephant can never repay the initial fixed cost. Thus far, few HSR
systems pay their full operating costs, much less pay back their
initial capital costs. Dick Soberman, a Civil Engineering Professor at
the University of Toronto joked if we wanted to make symbolic
statements about our community, we should build Pyramids rather
than rail lines, since the Pyramids have lower operating costs.
Some individual HSR lines may cover the cost of running trains,
but not the cost of infrastructure. The idea of profitability is
nonsense.11 If this were to be private, following the history of most
11 We cannot explain the irrationality of
markets, but refer to some excellent
papers by colleague, mathematician and
transport and internet historian Andrew
Odlyzko (Odlyzko 2010a;b).
transport infrastructure investments, the first generation of
investors are likely to be wiped out in bankruptcy. Governments do
not typically go bankrupt, they just borrow from other sources, tax,
or reduce spending elsewhere.
Some favor subsidy, but the argument for a subsidy for a mode
serving people undoubtedly of above average income (inter-city
business travelers) has no basis in equity reasoning.
Reducing congestion also seems a spurious argument, since most
congestion is urban, and that would possibly justify subsidies for
non-highway urban transport, but not for non-highway inter-city
transport. Air transport, the dominant mode of longer distance
travel, is on the order of 10% of total highway travel. Even if
inter-city travel were somewhat congested, that argues for pricing
the congested mode more appropriately, not for subsidy. The
environmental argument is also a straw-man, comparisons need to
be made between auto and air transport 20 years from now, not
today’s, and for much less than $2 trillion, a lot could be done in
those sectors. The source of electricity could be clean if we so chose,
with adequate investments in new nuclear, wind, or solar
generation.
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One cost people rarely talk about is noise, yet the noise externality
is much larger for rail than for other modes. Fast trains are loud and
infrequent, and so don’t generate the white noise that neighbors of
highways can more readily adapt too. While a five-year old fan of
Thomas the Tank Enginemay be happy living next to a rail line,12 most12 With the ideal spot being the
apartment next to the Elevated Trains in
Chicago, as in The Blues Brothers.
people would not.
We also need to consider the opportunity cost of using tracks for
passenger transport. This means they cannot be used for freight.
Europe moves a greater share of freight on trucks than the US,
while the US employs more trains. If the US wants an HSR network,
it will have to take freight tracks, thereby making the cost of
rail-freight relatively more expensive (and if we do reduce
congestion, the relative cost of highway travel less expensive)
moving more freight onto trucks. While this benefits the trucking
industry, it does not benefit society at large.
In end we need to ask what is the best investment of $2 trillion.
Is it in transport? If it is in transport, urban or intercity? Freight or
passenger? Which corridors? Which modes best serve those
corridors given the transport network they are embedded in? If you
had $2 trillion what would you spend it on?
15.3 Nationalize the rails
Continuing on thoughts on high-speed rail, we get to the question
of rights-of-way. Acquiring rights-of-way for new HSR corridors is
likely to be expensive. The owners of the best rights-of-way are
freight railroads. Of course many of those lines are used for freight
travel.
As shown in Table 15.1, these six RRs13 could have been purchased13 Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway
purchased BNSF in 2008 for an estimated
$28 billion. The 2018 $72 billion value is
estimated.
in 2008 for a mere $122.5 billion, and could be had for $336 billion
in 2018. This price tag is apparently nothing in the modern world of
Washington, and less than the market value of Apple, Inc.
Table 15.1: Market
capitalizations ($ billions)
for major US railroads. Source:
Yahoo Finance.
Railroad 2008 2018
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 28 72
Canadian Pacific (CP) 9.7 29.4
Union Pacific (UNP) 38 111.1
Norfolk Southern (NSC) 22 48.6
CSX (CSX) 21 63.5
Kansas City Southern (KSU) 3.8 11.7
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Then, the good passenger tracks for both HSR and urban transit
could be stripped, and the remainder of the railroads re-privatized
for some large (but not quite as large) sum of money.
Undoubtedly this would be cheaper than negotiating for lines on
an individual basis. To illustrate, the cost of merely running rights
for Minnesota’s Northstar Commuter line on BNSF track for about
60 km,14 plus paying BNSF to operate the train was $107.5 million. 14 40 mi.
This is not grade separated, and even more importantly, passenger
operations share tracks with freight, prohibiting high-speed
operation.
So one way to get an HSR system in the US at less cost than
building new is to nationalize the freight railroads and strip them of
right-of-way, rather than negotiating piecemeal.
Mind you, we do not think this is a good idea.
15.4 Supercities
An argument could be made about strengthening intercity linkages
to refashion the current metropolitan system into a megalopolitan
system, where people more regularly interact between cities. We
might think of this as Switzerland writ large. The California HSR, if
it ever actually connects to San Francisco or Los Angeles opens up
California’s Central Valley cities, places like Fresno and Bakersfield
among others, as suburban bedrooms for coastal cities which don’t
want to rezone15 to increase housing locally.16 15 §13.
16 It is worth noting that the HSR will
only expand Central Valley commuting
(and thus development) a small amount.
The early 117 million passenger/year
forecast implies about 320k trips per
day. If all of them were commuters (and
most aren’t) it’s 160k people. Hardly
worthwhile for ‘unlocking’ California’s
Central Valley.
Since the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market,
and transport can be used to expand the market, the division of
labor can therefore increase (i.e. be more specialized), which should
have some positive effects for the economy (akin to agglomeration
economies). The magnitude of this is uncertain (and certainly
location-specific), but presents the best case that can be made in
favor of HSR in the US.
That said, remember that real HSR17 is a long term deployment, 17 Real HSR is not the short term
improvements to get to 160 km/h, (in the
US context ranging from 90 to 110 mph)
which may or may not be a good thing,
but is certainly not HSR.
so it needs to be compared with cars 10 or 20 or 30 years hence, and
the air transport system over the same period. Cars are getting
better from both an environmental perspective and from the
perspective of automation technologies. Autonomous vehicles need
to be bested to justify HSR. Cars driven by computers should be
able to attain relatively high speeds (though certainly not HSR
speeds). Further they may move less material per passenger than
HSR (trains are heavy), so on net may have fewer environmental
impacts. This really waits to be seen.
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Sometimes the best travel choice is to not travel at all. A study
sponsored by AT&T Inc. and conducted by the Carbon Disclosure
Project estimates that skipping business trips and using video
conferencing instead could save $19 billion a year.1818 (SVBJ 2010).
The study also said that by 2020 companies in the US and UK that
have more than $1 billion in revenue could cut CO2 emissions equal
to taking about 1 million vehicles off the road for a year.
Clearly teleconferencing is getting better and presents
opportunities to achieve many desirable transport goals. Although
institutions are lagging individuals, we regularly video-conference
with our parents, and Apple’s FaceTime, as one example, has made
teleconferencing easy and portable. Making teleconferencing work
when dealing with government agencies (or many private firms, or
any bureaucracy) is more difficult. Any opportunity to avoid the
hassle and headache of most business travel would be greatly
appreciated by many travelers.19 As hockey great Wayne Gretzky19 We’ll leave aside what would happen
to airlines and publicly owned airports
if there were a large drop in business
travel.
said “Skate to where the puck is going to be, not where it has been.”
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Value Capture and the Virtuous
Cycle
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Figure 16.1: The virtuous
cycle of development,
accessibility, value capture,
and infrastructure (Iacono et al.
2009).
This chapter1 argues that infrastructure creates access, access 1 This chapter modifies, updates, and
adapts parts of (Levinson and Istrate
2011), published by the Brookings
Institution.
creates value, value can be captured, and captured value can finance
infrastructure to create further access and thus value. We call this a
‘a virtuous cycle,’ as it describes a positive feedback loop: more of
A begets more of B, and more of B in return results in more of A.
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16.1 Infrastructure creates access
Well-located transport infrastructure creates access. A good example
of this is the I-35W Mississippi River Bridge in Minneapolis, which
collapsed tragically on August 1, 2007. The bridge was rebuilt and
a replacement was opened on September 18, 2008. Figure 16.2(a)
shows the change in number of jobs reachable by car in the morning
peak period within 20 minutes with and without the bridge. The
areas in red saw an increase in accessibility with the bridge, the areas
in blue saw a decrease. Although not immediately apparent, overall
the bridge added accessibility. It is important to note that it did not
add accessibility for everyone, as traffic patterns altered, some links
saw more traffic, some saw less, and consequently lower and higher
speeds respectively. Any piece of infrastructure creates winners and
losers; we hope that both the absolute winnings, and the number of
winners, exceeds the losses and number losers.
This link, while important, was not as important at this
time-of-day as an additional lane on I-94, which had been added2 in2 The additional lane was obtained
mostly by converting the bus-only
shoulders to general purpose traffic.
response to the bridge collapse by the Minnesota Department of
Transportation as a traffic restoration project. Several weeks after
the replacement I-35W bridge opened, this additional lane on I-94
was reverted to operations as a bus-only shoulder. Figure 16.2(b)
shows the accessibility loss associated with reverting this lane.
While the I-35W bridge illustrates a project that could be built
quickly, if only because of the unusual exigencies of that case, in
practice new urban infrastructure is politically difficult and time
consuming. Even in a mature network, significant connections’
benefits fail to outweigh their costs, which cannot be completed due
to lack of funds.
A second example is the Hiawatha LRT line running from
downtown Minneapolis to the Minneapolis-Saint Paul Airport on to
the Mall of America. It too created access after it opened in 2004. A
study3 of the effect of the Hiawatha LRT, and other transit3 (Fan et al. 2012).
improvements in the Twin Cities between 2000 and 2005 shows
significant improvements in access to low wage jobs, as shown in
Figure 16.3. There were also improvements in access to high-wage
jobs, those are not shown here.
The authors argue that transit improvements resulted in
significant increases in accessibility by transit, both in the Hiawatha
corridor, and in other corridors where high-frequency bus service
was enhanced during this period. The large part of this change is
due to the changes in the transit network rather than changes in
land use, which were relatively modest, and mostly occurred in
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(b) I-94 Mississippi River Bridge shoulder lane reverted to
bus-only operation vs. I-35W closed.
Figure 16.2: Difference in
absolute accessibility to jobs
within 20 minutes by car (2008
data) with and without I-35W
Bridge. AM peak period 6:30 -
9:30 am. Travel times estimated
using GPS.
transit-inaccessible parts of the metropolitan area. The authors
could not disentangle how much was due to the LRT alone, since
the LRT was implemented concomitant with restructuring of
competing and complementary bus routes. Another study of the
Green Line LRT showed most of the benefits were due to the
concomitant bus restructuring rather than the LRT itself.4
4 (Owen and Kadziolka 2015).
The authors also found, using Census Longitudinal Employment
Household Dynamics (LEHD) data which records the home and
work block of all workers in the region, that commute flows
reorganized after the introduction of LRT and other transit
improvements so that more trips originating within a 400 m5 of 5 Approximately one quarter-mile.
transit stations terminated near transit stations. This in particular
occurred for low income workers and low income jobs. While this
data does not directly report mode use, it indicates that commuters
will orient their activity patterns to take advantage of available
transport services.
16.2 Access creates value
As noted by the quotes from Adam Smith,6 accessibility is a socially 6 §1.1.
produced benefit accruing both to the community at large and, in
large part, to private landowners. All access value comes from the
ability to reach things off-site, that ability is determined by the
pattern of development and the transport network. Without access,
land only has value due to its natural resources, and property due
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Figure 16.3: Difference in
absolute accessibility to low
wage jobs reachable within 30
minutes by transit with and
without the Hiawatha LRT and
other transit routes (2000-2005
data), 7:00 - 8:00 am period.
Note: other changes occurred to
transit network in addition to
the new Hiawatha LRT. Source:
(Fan et al. 2012)
to any structures placed by land owners. The beneficiaries of
transport can be associated with three groups:
1. Travelers, who benefit from every trip they make (otherwise, why
travel). On state and federal roads, the gas taxes pay for most of
the costs of operating, maintaining, and building road
infrastructure. They do not recover the benefits, which remain
with travelers.
2. Land owners, who receive value from the ability to access other
sites (whether or not they are actually accessed). This is
illustrated by the changing rents as one moves out from the
center of town. There is generally a rent premium, because at
certain sites one need spend less time in travel to obtain benefits.
We see rents embodied in construction when buildings are taller
in central areas, those areas where one can reach the most
activities in the shortest time. Land value captures much of the
benefit of infrastructure.
3. The Public at large gains from spillovers that are not captured by
travelers or land owners. The public benefits from a
well-connected population.
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Figure 16.4: Land Value in
the Twin Cities region, $/m2.
Source: Developed as part of
Junge (2009).
The evidence that access creates value comes from a variety of
empirical studies showing the relationship between property value
or rent and various measure of accessibility.7 Figure 16.4 shows the 7 Garrison et al. (1959) is one of the
first of such studies, hundreds of studies
supporting this have followed.
pattern of land valuation in the Twin Cities: land is at a premium
in the downtowns, at major interchanges, and adjacent to important
amenities like the Chain of Lakes.
16.3 Value can be captured
Current transport funding is a mix of federal, state, local sources,
and a mix of user, non-user beneficiary, and general public revenue
sources.8 While a large part comes from user fees collected at the 8 Detailed data for Minnesota can be
found here: http://tpec.umn.edu/
research/finance/MNTF/data/.
state level, local transport funding largely depends on local general
funds (which are often property tax based) as well as specific
dedications from property taxes. Each state differs in this allocation,
but the general pattern remains that many funds, especially for local
transport, are funded based on property value rather than user fees.
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Figure 16.5: Value capture
mechanisms summary.
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The economic rationales for reliance on local property tax
revenue are several. Roads are a necessary public function: we had
public streets and roads before the automobile and will have public
rights-of-way after the last car. Roads enable people to move on the
surface, enabling services from emergency vehicles to the mail, in
addition to personal travel. The property tax can be seen as a charge
to have access to the system, independent of use. The property tax
is collected in any case, so using an existing revenue source is
administratively efficient for local governments. Finally, in the
absence of congestion, roads are dominated by fixed costs rather
than variable costs, meaning the cost is largely independent of use.
While we support full cost road and transit pricing, in the absence
of that, we still need solutions.
Any revenue source makes trade-offs between administrative
efficiency, equity, political acceptability etc. There is no universal
best mix of funds, it depends very much on the context of the
specific place and time. That mix has to deal with several
inter-related problems, including funding both operations and
maintenance and funding capital expansion, which have different
requirements.
The term value capture refers to a family of public finance
mechanisms that raise funds in proportion to the increase in land
value associated with new or improved public infrastructure. These
mechanisms can be applied to new or existing development and can
fund new or existing infrastructure, paying for either capital or
operating costs. Several of these mechanisms are defined and
described below. There have been numerous papers reviewing
aspects of value capture, and effectiveness, and properly
implemented any of the mechanisms described below may have a
role.9
9 Reviews of the literature on value
capture include (Smith and Gihring
2006; Zhao et al. 2012; Batt 2001; Cervero
and Duncan 2002; Rybeck 2004; Gihring
2001; Cervero and Duncan 2002; Rolon
2008). • Case 1: New development, new infrastructure (expansion)
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– Impact fees can ensure that new infrastructure required to
support new land development is paid for by that new
development. These charges may be established in a number
of ways, so long as a legal nexus can be found which ties the
need for the new infrastructure to the new development.
These fees range widely. In suburban Maryland, where 16
counties have an impact fee or development excise tax. For
example, Anne Arundel County charges $11,400, while Prince
George’s County charges from $8,177 (inside the Capital
Beltway) to $14,019 (outside).10 These impact taxes pay for 10 (Halsey III 2008).
identified nearby master planned roadways which otherwise
could not be built in a timely manner, thereby ensuring public
facilities are adequate. In places with adequate public facilities
ordinances (APFOs), subdivision is not approved without
passing an adequacy test.
– Joint development describes several related ideas: jointness in
location, timing, and organization. In all cases the term
describes development adjacent to (or on top of) a piece of
infrastructure which serves it, such as a transit station or a
highway interchange. Development may be built by the same
organization (public or private) or may be coordinated by
different parties, with the land development cross-subsidizing
the infrastructure.
• Case 2: Existing development, new infrastructure (expansion)
– Special assessments can fund improvements whose benefits
accrue to existing development. A district around an identified
project would receive a special assessment to fund in part or in
whole a new piece of infrastructure. This technique is widely
used for funding streetlights, repaving, sidewalks, and the
like, but has also been extended to funding transit stops. The
Portland Streetcar was the product of a special assessment
district around the line.
– Tax increment financing funds an infrastructure project by
borrowing against the future stream of additional tax revenue
the project is expected to generate. For instance, an
interchange serving the headquarters of Fortune 100 retailer
Best Buy in Richfield, Minnesota was financed by the company
in exchange for the right to keep future property tax increases
that otherwise would have gone to the city.11 The company 11 (Pristin 2005).
gets the interchange, the city is hopefully no worse off (since
without the development, it would not have received the
property tax anyway), and likely better off if the project has
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any positive spillovers on other properties within the
metropolitan area.1212 The project also controversially used
eminent domain to acquire successful
car dealers for the construction of
the Best Buy headquarters, which
complicates the case.
• Case 3: New development, existing infrastructure (preservation)
– Air rights capture the real estate value of transport by selling
or leasing the space above (or below) transport facilities for
development.13 Typically this is after-the-fact of the13 Lari et al. (2009); King et al. (2008).
construction of the roadway, transit station, or rail line, so it
recovers value after creation, though it could be applied
simultaneously with infrastructure creation and in that case be
a form of joint development.
• Case 4: Existing development, existing infrastructure
(preservation)
– Land value taxes reform the property tax by separating the
value of a property associated with land from that associated
with the structure.14 Since the value of the land is determined14 Junge and Levinson (2012a); Kwak and
Mak (2011); Dye and England (2009). by its accessibility, which is created by the community at large
through construction of transport networks and location of
activities, a tax on only the value of land captures benefits of
transport more directly than a tax on both land and structures.
Such a system may also have beneficial side-effects of
encouraging development of valuable land like surface
parking in urban cores, which is now discouraged by the tax
code.
There are a variety of mechanisms to capture that value and
dedicate it to public infrastructure to harness this virtuous
cycle. The property tax is the most basic and primitive form of
land value capture. The foremost critique of its use as a land
value capture tool is that it captures both the value of land and
the value of structures built on the land. The value of the land
is determined by its relative location to other activities (or its
use in farming or resource extraction, but those are moot in
urban areas). That relative location is created by the
government and by the community as a whole. The value of
structures in contrast arises from the investments made by
land owners. As a land value capture tool, it makes sense to
disentangle these two aspects of property.
– Transport utility fees replace the share of general fund tax
revenue going to transport with a charge that is roughly
proportional to expected transport use.15 An example would15 Junge and Levinson (2012b).
be to use standard trip generation rates as the basis for
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charging rather than using property improvements. This better
ties benefits to costs, though still does not send a signal to
reduce transport use, the way a more comprehensive user fee
would (i.e. a charge based on actual rather than prospective
use). However, it would be much simpler to implement, and
therefore has greater administrative efficiency if the only aim
were funding rather than managing travel demand.
16.4 Captured value can fund infrastructure
The new revenue sources identified above can fund the construction,
operations, and maintenance of important infrastructure. For the
highway network, which is largely mature, revenue is most needed
to operate and maintain existing facilities. This is a way of preserving
infrastructure (and thus accessibility) already built, ensuring we do
not slip backwards by allowing important facilities to deteriorate to
the point of failure.
The techniques mentioned above have been used in various
places to fund some transport services, none have been fully
deployed to achieve their potential. The land value tax for instance
has been used in Hawaii, is still used widely in Pennsylvania, and
in other countries, but not widely in the rest of the US. Transport
utility fees are widely used in Oregon, and have seen limited use in
a few other states. Impact fees are used in more than half the states.
Tax increment financing has been favored in the Midwest and on
the West Coast. Joint development is used widely in Asia, and
sporadically in the US around selected transit lines (such as
Portland, Miami, Philadelphia, Washington, and New York). Air
rights have similarly been used on transit systems (for example
Atlanta, Washington, and Boston), but also above Interstate
highways, in many cases for parks, though for development as well
in high density areas.
The reasons for popularity of different mechanisms are likely as
much an accident of history as opposed to any structural factors.
Good ideas diffuse, first locally, and then elsewhere if there is a need.
But there must also be advocates, and disrupting existing political
equilibriums for a new financing mechanism are difficult to achieve.
16.5 Policy implications
Value capture is a set of techniques for associating benefits and
costs. It is most often used as a source of local funding, tying the
local beneficiaries to the local costs. Impact fees, joint development,
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special assessments, tax increment financing, land value taxes,
transport utility fees, and air rights are among the most widely
discussed forms of value capture, and all have advantages and
disadvantages from policy and political perspectives.
The value capture techniques suggested here apply primarily to
local governments, though there may be state and national
analogues to value capture. The first difficulty is that local transport
planning (particularly for larger facilities) is conducted at the state
or metropolitan levels, while land use is generally controlled at the
township, town, city, or county level of government. This is a classic
correspondence problem.1616 §17.1.
Value capture, which explicitly ties infrastructure funding to land
use policy, can provide the incentive for agencies to coordinate, and
can provide the revenue stream for local governments to pursue
more substantial transport projects without being at the mercy of
higher levels of government. States need to ensure that localities
have the legal authority to implement these strategies if they so
choose. Successful implementations will be emulated – ideas are
light baggage – and unsuccessful policies will be abandoned.
Value capture can replace existing sources of local transport
finance that assess costs independent of the magnitude of benefits.
Capital costs for new or rebuilt transit systems should
be recovered from land value capture. Transit services
create value they cannot fully capture themselves through the
farebox (though they would capture more of this with higher fares).
That value spills over to nearby land owners, whose property value
increases due to the accessibility transit provides and thus the
higher rents they can charge. The amount of value captured by the
system signals whether the investment is worth making. If some of
that value were captured, more revenue would be available to make
investments. Transit utilities should have the authority to develop
land at stops and stations, and to develop air rights over their
tracks, and to contract with private developers to coordinate station
locations. Local units of government desiring routes and stations
should have the authority to implement local taxes to subsidize the
transit utility for the cost of building the line. But the line should
only be built if it can at least break even operationally. If the route
cannot be funded from land value capture and farebox revenues, it
should not be built.
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Can the US Get Value Capture Right? New York City, Kansas
City,17 Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, Minneapolis and others have 17 Also with regard to representation, it is
worth noting that only 351 people voted
in favor of the property tax to pay for the
Kansas City streetcar. Direct democracy
is no way to manage collective goods.
We elect representatives for a reason – to
represent. But this deserves much more
space and time than can be supplied
here.
all pursued some type of value capture for transit and/or roads.
Now the US DOT looks favorably at projects that use value capture
when considering what to fund.18 Yet for all of its promise the US
18 (Rose 2013).
experience offers mixed results, at best, and at worst is just another
example of pernicious rent seeking and inadequate representation.
Here are three examples of value capture gone wrong that deserve
further study:
• Hudson Yards and the 7 Line Extension, New York City: The city
pushed forward with an extension of the 7 subway line to the
west side of Manhattan. To expedite the process the city avoided
federal funding and associated federal rules and regulations.
Local funding was through a Tax Increment Finance (TIF) district
managed by the Hudson Yards Investment Corp. The NYC IBO
released a report that detailed how the TIF was not generating as
much revenue as expected. Related Companies will actually get a
subsidy up to $328 million to build in the TIF district.19 19 (Levitt 2013).
Subsidizing development is, of course, exactly the opposite of
capturing increased property values.
• Los Angeles Downtown Streetcar: The residents of part of
downtown voted to tax businesses based on their location to the
streetcar. Having residents vote to raise specific taxes on targeted
populations that can not vote (businesses in this case) raises
questions of representation, but even more problematic is that the
streetcar project has changed for the worse as it is more
expensive for less service. That’s not what people voted for, and
now, as with the New York case above, the city will likely have to
pick up the balance of the costs above and beyond any value
capture mechanism.
• Chicago’s Morgan/Lake CTA Station: This station was paid for
through a TIF and is credited, ex post, with reviving the
neighborhood. Of course, the reason the station was planned
there was that the neighborhood was already attracting lots of
development.20 20 Quote from Center for Neighborhood
Technologies (Center for Neighborhood
Technology 2012).In 2002, the Chicago Department of Transportation (CDOT)
investigated the feasibility of constructing a new infill station to
boost train ridership and encourage economic growth along the
Lake and South Side branches of the Green Line. Morgan Station,
with its recent influx of residential and commercial development,
was chosen as the optimal station location. The 2006 construction
of the Pink Line, which will also be serviced by the new station,
was also a consideration in the final decision.
274 a political economy of access
It is great that investment follows demand, it is a good way to
build a great transit system. But it does call into question
economic development claims, and a TIF in this situation may
skim off property taxes that would otherwise have gone to the
city’s general fund. The TIF situation in Chicago is already
problematic, though. Google is moving to the neighborhood, too,
which is viewed as new development even though Google is
already in Chicago in a nearby location. We will also note that
even though Google considers transit access a plus, as mentioned
here, they are moving from a neighborhood with about the same
level transit access. What really improves with Google’s new
location is freeway access.
Ultimately, value capture is promising but also vulnerable to
abuse (like all things). Value capture is not a panacea. For whatever
reason, US cities and states too often enter into contracts that are
neither decent nor fair to the public purpose. This is a
generalization, but the US does privatization, contracting out, and
cost controls worse than most other countries with mature
economies. We worry that value capture will end up added to this
list of things the US can’t get right.
Part IV
Institutions
The many problems besetting roads and transit exist not because
the solutions are unknown, we identify many in earlier chapters,
but because the institutions that currently exist are incompatible
with those solutions. Our strongest recommendations are therefore
institutional. Get the institutions right, and better solutions can be
more easily implemented. That said, there are reasons institutions
are the way they are, and other institutions constrain the ability to
reform transport institutions. But there is also a blind-spot in
politics, taking institutions as given (which they are in the short
run), and accepting our fate as inevitable. We reject that, and can
point to other countries with better institutional structures.
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Figure 17.1: There are many
dimensions to devolution,
including: Temporal (Strategic
vs. Tactical or Planning vs.
Operational), Privatization
(Public vs. Private), Federalism
(National vs. State vs. Local),
and Functional (Transit vs.
Highways vs. Land Use).
Transport is planned at many scales. Land use less so, at least in
the United States. Transport policy is equally likely to be federal,
state (provincial), metropolitan, or local. The governance scale is
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influenced by mode to a degree; where the faster and longer
distance of travel, the more likely it is to be a concern of the federal
government (think air traffic control) and the slower and shorter
distance traveled modes are local concerns (think sidewalks). There
are obviously exceptions to this, but it works as a starting point for
a discussion of the appropriate governmental scale and scope for
transport.
Transport investment confers benefits through accessibility. A
road that connects Springfield and Shelbyville benefits both cities –
perhaps not equally – and can be planned and paid for as such. The
same case can be made for air travel or rail travel that improves
access between pairs. A new sidewalk in Springfield does nothing
for pedestrian accessibility in Shelbyville, however, which suggests
that Shelbyville shouldn’t pay anything for that improvement. On a
simple network, we can fairly easily assign costs and benefits.
When the network is complex, such allocations are more difficult.
What is the benefit to a resident of Arizona of the road used in
Colorado? It’s not nothing – Arizonans value being able to travel
north and receive goods from elsewhere. But an Arizona road is
more valuable to Arizona than a Colorado road is to Arizona. What
about transit? A better transit network in Phoenix has scarce value
in Denver. These examples suggest that under a beneficiary pays
model (not simply user pays) taxes and fees used for investment
should focus on where benefits accrue.
The federal role in transport policy has changed over the years.
Since the advent of the Interstate network, the federal government
used its power of the purse to prioritize investments. For decades
federal priorities became state and local priorities as the money
provided was too tempting to ignore. Federal sway was not limited
to physical building, either. In the 1980s the Reagan administration
tied any federal transport spending to states adopting a Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (MADD)-favored stricter standards for
drunk driving. All states quickly complied.
Relying on a strong federal role has drawbacks. The biggest issue
is that there are few national priorities in transport and land use.
Instead, there are many local priorities. The Interstate system was
clearly a national concern. That the network was built through cities
was in part because of the federal cost share where the US federal
government paid 90% of the costs of construction. Even Robert
Moses in New York City, who favored toll roads under his control to
ensure political independence, couldn’t resist the federal Interstate
program and its 90 cents per dollar spent. He quickly developed
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plans for Interstates through lower Manhattan. Fortunately for the
city, Jane Jacobs helped organize opposition and stopped him.1 1 (Caro 1974).
Since the early 1990s, the federal role has changed toward greater
state and local control. Unlike the United Kingdom’s policy of
devolution, which pushed power to cities and regions intentionally,
the US devolution experiment is a bit more accidental.2 The 2 (Campaign for Better Transport 2014).
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) legislation
was passed in 1991, of which one goal was to give state and local
flexibility about spending priorities.3 Another was to encourage 3 (Puentes 2011).
private investment in transport, such as allowing federal money to
be spent on tolled roads. The push to devolve the federal role
through ISTEA didn’t really work, however.4 There are many 4 (Snyder 2011).
reasons for this, but the first clue as to why is that the federal fuel
tax rate, the revenues of which are used to support the Highway
Trust Fund, hasn’t been increased since 1993. The federal
commitment has been flat or shrinking in terms of purchasing
power since then. Funding formulas that returned almost all fuel
taxes to the state where they were collected prevented
redistribution, and federal spending is primarily for capital
expenses while operations and maintenance are the responsibility of
state and local governments.
What has happened in the years since ISTEA is that federal
money is harder to get, comes with strings attached and is spent on
infrastructure that will strain operations and maintenance budgets
at some point in the future.
17.1 Subsidiarity
The idea of subsidiarity requires addressing social and political
issues at the most local level that can resolve those issues. The
reasons for this are several, including efficiency, motivation, and
information. Local stakeholders will know and care more about
issues and solutions than remote actors, as they have, and will
continue to live with the problem and its aftermath.
This principle is enshrined in European Union law. The Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States also implicitly
subscribes to the notion of subsidiarity.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.
In the context of transport, states are closer to travelers than the
federal government, and from a federalism perspective, to minimize
off-diagonal outcomes in the correspondence problem illustrated in
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Figure 17.2 (that is making sure local problems are addressed locally
and national problems are addressed nationally), and from the idea
of subsidiarity, placing these subsidies5 at lower levels of government5 §4.
has advantages, but there is no objective reason why, e.g. Amtrak’s
funding from one level of government is revenue and the other is
subsidy.
Loci of Issues
National Regional Local
Loci  
of  
Authority
National
Regional
Local
Figure 17.2: The spatial policy
correspondence problem: loci of
authority vs. loci of issues.
It turns out that most travel is local. Using GPS data for
Minneapolis - St. Paul commuters, we found that the share of
automobile travel occurring in the county of residence was more
than 70% for both county and city streets.6 It is likely higher for
6 (Levinson and Zhu 2012).
modes like walking, biking, and public transport with shorter
average trip distances. So while there is inter-county travel, it is
small compared with intra-county travel, and suggests, following
the principle of subsidiarity, that most roads and transit services
that can be, should be locally managed. We can debate whether
local means municipally, county-level, or metropolitan, and the
correct answer depends on administrative boundaries and
jurisdiction size. But it does not mean nationally in a country the
size of the United States.
17.2 Ending the federal surface-transport program
Since most travel is local, we can ask: What should be the
appropriate federal role for funding and prioritizing transport?
Should the United States end the federal gas tax entirely, phase it
out, keep it at the same rate, or raise it? There are proposals for all
of these.
Reihan Salam writes:77 (Salam 2013).
So far, the most attractive realistic proposal for reforming federal
highway expenditures is Fix It First,8 Expand It Second, Reward It8 §3.3.
Third: A New Strategy for America’s Highways9 by Matthew Kahn and9 (Kahn and Levinson 2011).
David Levinson, which calls for the following:
First, all revenues from the existing federal gasoline tax would
be devoted to repair, maintain, rehabilitate, reconstruct, and
enhance existing roads and bridges on the National Highway
System. Second, funding for states to build new and expand
existing roads would come from a newly created Federal
Highway Bank, which would require benefit-cost analysis to
demonstrate the efficacy of a new build. Third, new and
expanded transport infrastructure that meets or exceeds
projected benefits would receive an interest rate subsidy from a
Highway Performance Fund to be financed by net revenues
from the Federal Highway Bank.
Rohit Aggarwala of Bloomberg Philanthropies10 has called for a10 See (Aggarwala 2013).
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more radical approach, which might garner bipartisan support while
forcing believers in competitive federalism to ‘put up or shut up.’ ...
Aggarwalla calls for abolition of the federal gasoline tax and the
devolution of responsibility over surface transport to state
governments:
Getting rid of the tax would force a serious discussion in each
state about how, and how much, to fund roads and transit.
States could choose to reimpose the same tax, or they could set
a different rate based on their desired level of transport
spending. They could choose to raise other kinds of revenue to
pay for roads and transit – such as sales taxes, property taxes,
local taxes or tolls. Or they could simply reduce their transport
spending.
In this instance the bill being discussed
was the Moving Ahead for Progress in
the 21st Century Act, nicknamed MAP-
21, but this is perennial. See e.g.
• Federal-Aid Highway Acts (1916-
1987)
• National Interstate and Defense
Highways Act (1956)
• Surface Transport Assistance Act of
1982 (1982)
• Surface Transport and Uniform
Relocation Assistance Act (1987)
• Intermodal Surface Transport
Efficiency Act (1991)
• National Highway System
Designation Act (1995)
• Transport Equity Act for the 21st
Century (1998)
• Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transport Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users (2005)
• Moving Ahead for Progress in the
21st Century Act (2012)
• Fixing America’s Surface Transport
Act (2015)
In the wake of the periodic US surface transport reauthorization
bill it is worth reflecting on “Why is there a federal role?” In short
the argument against are that the system exists, most traffic is local,11
11 (Levinson and Zhu 2012).
and the states are perfectly capable of managing and preserving the
system, since they already do. All they need to do is raise their gas
tax by the amount the federal tax is reduced, and they are no worse
off, assuming all federal transport funds come from the Highway
Trust Fund, which is less true than it used to be. The federal role
could be reduced to research12 and safety regulations.
12 This might look self-serving as
researchers, but research is a public
good with positive externalities that we
support in general, not just our own
discipline.
One argument against the Aggarwala position is that it is
needlessly cumbersome to to fight 50 gas tax fights in 50 states,
there is a strong convenience of existing revenue source, and this
greatly reduces political transaction costs, since it is the status quo.
A second argument against is that we essentially need to rebuild
the Interstate in place, and this recapitalization is a national need,
just as the initial construction was, justifying a national funding
source. We would not want one state to let its existing Interstates
devolve to rubble due to poverty, even if it mostly hurt them. We
don’t think that would happen (at least not at a large scale), but
clearly different states would have different investment levels
without the federal minimum funds.
Avoiding 50 political battles and relying on the status quo funding
(which is also an indirect user fee) for a fewmore years, and directing
that existing funding, seems a good second-best solution, better than
immediate complete devolution. Of course, one could argue that
devolution might help force the transformation to a utility-based13 13 §19.
road sector, so this is not obvious.
For additional rationales for the highway program, read “The
Rationale for Federal Aid” from 1985,14 which could have easily 14 (Gómez-Ibáñez 1985).
been written today. We have learned nothing15 in 30 (60) ((90)) 15 §14.3.
years.
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Figure 17.3: Fuel Tax
Comparison. Source:
OECD/EEA database on
instruments for environmental
policy. https://pinedatabase.
oecd.org.
17.3 Transport finance without the feds: The Canadian model
Transit consultant Jarrett Walker makes a brilliant point about US
transport financing prospects:16
16 (Walker 2011b).
“In other words, US urban policy would become more like that of
Canada, a country where the federal role in most urban matters is
much smaller than in the US, but where cities, regional governments,
and provinces are correspondingly freer to chart their own way, and
pay for it.
It’s easy to imagine that more conservative states would just let
their cities die through underfunding, but that’s certainly not
happening in Alberta. Canada’s most conservative province, a
natural resource powerhouse that draws comparison to Texas in its
boom times, has remarkably good inner-city transit policy and a
continuous stream of provincial investment. Calgary’s downtown
commuter parking cost is about the same as San Francisco’s and the
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result is extremely strong ridership on its bus and light rail system, at
least for commutes, and support for a dense core.
The transition to a more Canada-like federal role would be hell.
Everyone involved is understandably horrified by the prospect,
including me much of the time. But if the federal budget-slashers
win, US cities and states will be on that course whether they like it or
not. Are we sure the eventual outcome would be a disaster?”
The declining share of US federal money for transport finance
has many people worried that transport policy and finance will
devolve to the states. Such devolution of authority is viewed as a
necessarily lousy outcome, especially by progressives.17 From our 17 Process arguments are often
arguments of convenience. We discuss
this in the section on the Department of
Accessibility, (§17.9.)
perspective, the status quo for transport policy and finance cannot
be objectively defended as a success. Looking at the period of about
1971 (the year Amtrak was formed is a good marker of the
beginning of the current era of federal policy, but just about any
year between 1964-1974 works) to the present, US transport systems
declined in nearly all measures of productivity,18 economic 18 (Lave 1991).
performance,19 social welfare,20 or just about anything else you care 19 (Drennan and Brecher 2012).
20 (Fan et al. 2012; Garrett and Taylor
1999).
to measure. For whatever occasional successes US policy has had,
the US has received an extremely poor return on investments made.
America can do better.
An experiment devolving transport policy and finance to the
states is likely to improve overall performance of all aspects of
transport. For evidence we can look to out chilly northern
neighbors in Canada, who do not have anything equivalent to the
US Department of Transportation. Transport policy is the
responsibility of the provinces, and transit policy is the
responsibility of the cities. So how do Canadian cities compare?
Table 17.1 is drawn from Paul Mees’ work. The city regions are
sorted by transit mode share. Every major Canadian region has
higher transit mode share than US cities except New York, Chicago
and San Francisco. The simple correlation between density and
transit share is 0.48, so density does not adequately explain the
differences. Canadian transit systems also have much higher
farebox recovery ratios than in the US.21 The Toronto system has to 21 (Wikipedia contributors 2018c).
maintain greater than 70% farebox recovery is order to receive
subsidy for the balance.
A 2013 report on Toronto area transport finance explains the
financing structures in place and potential future monies.22 The 22 (Kitchen and Lindsey 2013).
authors promote many taxes and fees, all of which are economically
sound and focus on raising money for transport by charging those
who benefit from a well-functioning transport system. Essentially, if
the Greater Toronto-Hamilton Area needs new transport investment
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to maintain and improve economic competitiveness, then they can
and should raise the money locally.
Local control can also lead to service innovations, such as
TransLink in Vancouver.23 British Columbia instituted a carbon tax23 §19.2, (TransLink British Columbia
2013). in 2008. There are certainly problems with the decentralized system.
Some Canadians want a national transit agency. Fragmented
governance in regions makes coordination difficult, and perhaps a
stronger regional agency is needed. Most difficult, perhaps, is that
many cities forego transit service altogether. However, eliminating
unproductive transit so that resources can be used elsewhere is
actually good policy. But by nearly every measure Canadian
transport policy outcomes are superior to US outcomes. Whether
US transport finance and policy devolves to the states remains to be
seen, but it certainly isn’t something that should be dismissed as
inferior to what we have now. It may well be better.
We shouldn’t worry that transit will be abandoned without
federal subsidy. In the United States there are conservatives who are
anti-transit,24 but this isn’t necessarily the case for cities in24 The Koch Brothers fund anti-
transit political activities through
their Americans for Prosperity group
(Tabuchi 2018).
conservative states. Oklahoma City is building a streetcar. Houston
and Dallas have made substantial investments in new rail systems
in recent years. While these rail investments would have likely not
been made absent federal capital subsidy, these cities are also
pursuing transit-oriented development, and, in Houston’s case, a
recent bus network redesign. Houston is one of the few cities with
rising transit ridership in 2018.
Canada does better than the US on many infrastructure
investment questions. In the end, both the ‘left’ and the ‘right’
should welcome this outcome. Local governments, weened from
Washington will make decisions that better fit local needs. Transit
investment will increase in places where it should (and not where it
shouldn’t). There will remain intra-metropolitan investment
mismatches, but a lack of federal dollars may also disempower the
metropolitan planning organization (MPO).25 At any rate,25 The MPO is a multi-jurisdictional
organization mandated by the federal
government for local areas to receive
transport funding.
metropolitan mismatches are less odious than federal investment
mismatches.
When the established interests start saying their ‘ohs noes’ about
the shrinkage of federal funds, think about our neighbor to the north.
They somehow muddle through.
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City Country Population Pop/Hectare Drive Transit Walking Cycling Other
New York US 21,199,865 20.5 67.6 24.8 5.7 0.3 1.6
Toronto CA 5,113,149 27.2 71.1 22.2 4.8 1 0.9
Montreal CA 3,635,571 19.8 70.4 21.4 5.7 1.6 0.9
Sydney AU 4,119,189 20.4 71.2 21.2 4.9 0.7 2
Ottawa CA 846,802 17.2 68.1 21.2 7.6 2.2 0.9
Vancouver CA 2,116,581 17.2 74.4 16.5 6.3 1.7 1.1
Calgary CA 1,079,310 14 76.6 15.6 5.4 1.3 1
Melbourne AU 3,592,592 15.7 79.3 13.9 3.6 1.3 1.9
Winnipeg CA 694,668 14.3 78.7 13 5.8 1.6 0.9
Chicago US 9,157,540 15.1 83.9 11.5 3.2 0.3 1
Perth AU 1,445,073 12.1 83.3 10.4 2.7 1.2 2.4
Victoria CA 330,088 11.1 71.7 10.2 10.4 5.7 2
Adelaide AU 1,105,839 13.8 83.1 9.9 3.2 1.5 2.3
San Francisco US 4,123,740 27 84.2 9.7 3.4 1.1 1.4
Edmonton CA 1,034,945 10.1 82.8 9.7 5.1 1.1 1.2
Washington DC US 4,923,153 13.1 86.5 9.4 3 0.3 1
Philadelphia US 6,188,463 11 86.1 8.8 4 0.3 0.8
Canberra AU 368,129 10.8 82 7.9 4.9 2.5 2.7
Seattle US 3,554,760 10.9 87.7 7 3.3 0.6 1.4
Hobart AU 200,524 10.3 82.6 6.4 7.6 1.1 2.3
Portland US 2,265,223 12.9 89.4 6 3.1 0.8 0.7
New Orleans US 1,337,726 19.7 89.3 5.4 2.7 0.6 1.4
Los Angeles US 16,373,645 27.3 91.1 4.7 2.7 0.6 1.1
Minneapolis US 2,968,806 10.3 91.8 4.5 2.5 0.4 0.6
Denver US 2,581,506 15.4 91.4 4.4 2.5 0.7 0.8
Las Vegas US 1,563,282 17.7 91.2 4.1 2.4 0.5 1.4
Milwaukee US 1,689,572 10.4 92.7 4 2.8 0.2 0.6
Miami US 3,876,380 17 92.7 3.9 1.8 0.5 1.1
San Diego US 2,813,833 13.2 91.2 3.4 3.5 0.6 1.4
Cleveland US 2,495,831 10.7 93.7 3.4 2.1 0.2 0.6
Houston US 4,669,571 11.4 93.9 3.3 1.6 0.3 1.1
San Antonio US 1,592,383 12.6 93.6 2.8 2.4 0.1 1.2
Sacramento US 1,796,857 14.6 92.3 2.7 2.3 1.4 1
Columbus US 1,540,157 11 94.3 2.2 2.5 0.2 0.5
Phoenix US 3,251,876 14 93.4 1.9 2.1 0.9 1.4
Detroit US 5,456,428 11.9 95.3 1.7 1.8 0.2 0.5
Dallas US 5,221,801 11.3 95.5 1.7 1.5 0.1 1
Table 17.1: Density and Travel
Mode to Work, US, Australian
and Canadian Cities 2000-2006.
Source: (Mees 2009).
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Figure 17.4: Ribbon Cutting of
Metro Transit Green Line in
2014. Source: Metropolitan
Council.
17.4 Transit federalism
Since transit benefits local areas, it should be primarily locally
funded and managed. Federal funding for transit has distorted
investment to be capital intensive – favoring ribbon cuttings for
politicians (e.g. Figure 17.4) – while resulting in neglect for local
operations. While the rational local transit organization will take
advantage of federal largesse, there is no good reason for federal
involvement. Over the next few transport legislative cycles, it is
quite possible that federal grant programs (funding) will be
transformed into loans (financing). Mass transit utilities would be
better adapted to this new environment.
It is not at all obvious that what the federal government’s actual
policy under the long-standing transit policy regime since the 1970s
(giving politicians ribbon cuttings) effectively helps poor people
reach destinations.
Urban scholar Lisa Schweitzer, while acknowledging “walking,
biking, and transit advocates have overstated their claims to global
benefits in trying to make a case for their slice of federal dollars,”
writes in favor of federal demonstration grants:2626 (Schweitzer 2014c).
The real pain comes in thinking about those places that don’t have
deep pockets. Without difficult-to-justify federal capital subsidies,
there is no Portland as it exists now, and while I die inside every time
one of my starry-eyed students/philosopher-kings advocates for yet
another slow light rail in Los Angeles “because Portland!”, federal
subsidies have given the US truly important social experiments with
transit, given how the feds shoveled out for BART, Portland, and
DC’s metro. Nope it wasn’t particularly just or rational, but it sure
has been interesting and transformative, and for the better. In concert
with transit experiments in Europe, Asia, and South America, it’s
mattered a lot to urban scholarship.
The problem is opportunity cost. Portlanders, we believe, could
have made Portland into today’s Portlandia without the federal
subsidies, that is, all by themselves, had they wanted to, if they
truly believed in what they were doing. Not that we fault them for
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asking for federal money, we just fault the US for giving it to
them.27 What did we not do because we gave money to Portland? If 27 Just as we don’t fault the person
making the bribe – they’re doing their
job, just the person taking it – they’re
not.
it’s fewer buses where that would have been valuable, or less food
for the poor, or fewer large screen TVs for the taxpayer is an ethical
question of what you do with the money, but by spending money
on LRT in Portland, something else was not done. But, you want to
fund one instance of one new technology for Science!, okay, but you
only get one. Science too has diminishing returns, the Morgantown
PRT for instance.28 28 A demonstration automated personal
rapid transit system on the Morgantown
campus of West Virginia University.
Even if there were a better way for cities to be, and certainly there
is, there is no evidence that the federal government knows this
better than locals. We don’t have a problem with federal financing,
as long as the loans are paid back, with interest, by the revenue
from the project (or ancillary spillovers like adjacent development).
But we fail to see any reason for the federal government to
systematically fund capital intensive, low return-on-investment,
local benefitting investments.
As we argue earlier subsidizing demand on equity grounds more
directly serves the persons in need, is more efficient in the resulting
allocation of resources, and allows consumers maximum choice. The
resulting investment outcomes would be quite different. This is the
spatial equity question,29 Undoubtedly some places are poorer than 29 §4.5.
others. But why should the jurisdiction be subsidized rather than the
poor residents. It makes more sense to give grants to poor people in
Mississippi than to jurisdictions in Mississippi that happen to have
poor people, or build new infrastructure that no one has money to
maintain or operate. This would be demand-side rather than supply-
side support, but that will lead to better transport for the people as a
whole, not just the lucky ones served by one local expensive project,
and fewer ribbon cuttings for their elected officials.
17.5 Whose values?
One lens through which to view transport policy is that of values.
Should policy favor driving or transit? How much should we care
about safety, and what should we do about it? How should we pay
for infrastructure, maintenance and operations? What about the
environment? These are some questions that arise in transport
policy, and how we answer them reflects values held by someone.
Does transport policy reflect what the public wants? While
devolving power from the federal government to the states may
result in policies that better align with local preferences, one can
take further steps, not just devolving from states to local
288 a political economy of access
governments, but from representative government directly to the
people.
At the heart of this question is representation. How are the
public’s values represented thorough policy? There are two ways:
1. There are appointed officials who run planning organizations that
make policy decisions, and
2. Voters are asked to vote directly on specific policies, such as new
taxes or particular projects.
In the context of appointed officials, generally speaking they will
act as a proxy for the values of the elected officials who appointed
them, and should favor policies that the officials campaign on. This
could be street maintenance, new rail systems, better bus service,
bike lanes, etc. They do, however, have a great deal of autonomy, and
the daily management of transport systems, rather than splashy new
investments, will be shaped by the values of the managers. Because
of this, it matters that many of the political appointees that oversee
transport decisions do not reflect the public at large.
There are no federal requirements for MPO board structures, and
these structures vary substantially across the nation. Some MPO
boards are balanced between ‘urban’ and ‘suburban’ interests, but
most are not. In a 1994 study, researchers showed that for MPOs
with central cities that had more than 200,000 residents, over 90% of
the central cities were underrepresented on the board.30 In a 200330 (Benjamin et al. 1994). It would be
useful for this to be updated. study, the effects of geographic imbalance were estimated and the
authors found that, unsurprisingly, for each additional suburban
representative on the MPO board there was a shift in spending
away from transit toward roads.31 The urban-suburban distribution31 (Nelson et al. 2004).
is but one source of bias in MPO representation. Board make up
rarely matches the racial and ethnic distributions within a regional
population. On average, MPO boards were found to be 88% white
when the regional average was 61 percent. Racial and ethnic
minorities were substantially underrepresented.3232 (Sanchez 2006).
An issue with these representation characteristics is that MPO
priorities will be more likely to reflect the values of a white,
suburban resident, who, in turn, is statistically more likely to be a
driver and less likely to be a transit user. Thus, the many small
decisions and priorities tend to favor suburban drivers even if there
are a few large investments in a flashy transit line.
In a different bias, MPO headquarters will tend to be in Central
Business Districts, so though fewer than 15% of regional workers
work downtown, the suburb to CBD commute will get
disproportionate attention from MPO staff and leadership; and
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transit investments will tend to favor that movement despite it
being a smaller and smaller share of total travel.
An alternative to appointed representatives is to move toward
direct democracy, where voters express support of, or opposition to,
projects or policies through ballot box initiatives. Putting the
decision directly to the voters is gaining in popularity as local
financial commitments is gaining importance as the federal
contribution shrinks.33 Ballot box initiatives must be broadly 33 (Goldman and Wachs 2003).
popular to garner enough votes to pass (in some cases, such as
California, with a supermajority). Generally, this holds as over 70%
of transport initiatives are passed. But do these ballot initiatives
represent voter values?
In many ways transport referenda do represent voter values
because to get them passed everybody gets something promised to
them. Successful initiatives are those that feature multimodal
investment spread throughout the region.34 Yet ensuring 34 (Werbel and Haas 2002).
geographic equity can come at the expense of good planning.
One reason that popular votes are a poor judge of the quality of
projects is that the public often has a hard time understanding the
issues. The best example of this is the perennial complaints about
congestion, which have topped commuter concerns for decades.
While commuters complain about congestion, they have little
appetite for the medicine that will cure it, which, as we and most
transport economists argue, is congestion pricing.35 Commuters do, 35 §6.
however, have insatiable appetite for all kinds of promises that are
intuitively appealing but ineffectual at minimizing delay. Building
more road lanes does not reduce congestion,36 which Anthony 36 §14.
Downs wrote about in the early 1960s37 and we have been 37 (Downs 1962).
relearning;38 ever since. But drivers like hearing that building more 38 §14.3.
roads will work, so they are willing to vote for it. Transit expansion
is another example.
Voters overwhelmingly approve transit projects when asked to
vote on them. Yet the support for transit spending, even when
accompanied by new taxes, far outpaces actual transit ridership.
Over half of all Americans have never even used transit, yet transit
referenda regularly pass with large majorities. This suggests that far
more people desire transit spending than desire transit usage.
Michael Manville and Benjamin Cummins looked at this puzzle and
concluded that transit support is most aligned with concerns about
the environment or congestion.39 In short, people largely favor 39 (Manville and Cummins 2015).
transit at the ballot box so that someone else can use it.
So, MPOs are managed by people who don’t reflect the diversity
of the region, and most often see the world through a windshield.
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This results in auto-oriented planning and investment that is tilted
toward suburban circumstances. Appealing to direct democracy
causes problems as well, as voters often don’t know the full details
about what they are voting on. There is a mismatch between what
the public values and what is provided. Absent a benevolent
dictator, it may seem unsolvable, but there are some good ideas. We
should start with a requirement that the people in charge of our
transport systems are users,40 of the systems.40 §17.6.
17.6 ‘Dogfooding’: Ensure managers use the system
Employees, and management, and directors or council-members of
transit agencies should ride transit to work and other activities.4141 Similarly employees (including senior
management) of highway agencies
should use roads to get to work, though
this undoubtedly occurs naturally for
the vast majority of even ‘multi-modal’
departments of transport or highway
agency employees, and doesn’t require
further discussion.
The term ‘dogfooding,’ derived from ‘eating your own dog food,’
is popular in the tech sector, and implies that a company should use
its own products wherever it can. Thus, in general, Apple employees
should have Macs on their desks rather than Windows machines,
and Google employees should use Gmail. The advantages of this
are several. Most importantly, bugs can be efficiently identified by
employees using the system on a daily basis, and feedback can be
channeled quickly through the organization. Secondarily, missing
features can be quickly identified similarly. Employees will get better
empathy for the experience of paying customers.
There are limits to this process. You would not expect Boeing
Defense employees to take a helicopter home with them, or even
operate one on a regular basis. However, for most consumer
products companies, this is a highly useful practice.
On a transport network, no-one can systematically use the entire
system, everyone is spatially constrained in where they travel.
Further, the bus drivers on the first ride of the morning (or the last
in the evening) cannot practically ride transit to work in a system
that does not operate 24/7, since there is no bus to get the bus
driver there, or take her home.
Still, there are many opportunities for many employees, and
more importantly, directors and Board members, of transit agencies
to use transit, and increasing this number would improve service.
Generally, transit administrators don’t ride enough. Consider these
headlines:
• Washington DC: Washington Post survey of the WMATA Board
found “Few ride the bus regularly.” (Though they do get a free
pass).4242 (Wilson Andrews and Lazo 2013).
• San Francisco region:
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– Dorothy Dugger general manager of BART drives to work
(2007): BART appoints first female general manager.43 43 (Bay City News Service 2007).
– Time to tie pay to Muni’s on-time performance.44 44 (Golinger 2014).
“In 1993, a grass-roots citizens group founded by [former and
future Governor Jerry] Brown collected thousands of petition
signatures and put a measure on the San Francisco ballot
requiring the mayor, supervisors, and top city officials to ride
Muni or other public transit to work at least twice every week.
In the voter information pamphlet, Brown wrote: “Government
is getting out of touch because too many officeholders and city
workers act like potentates, not public servants. Send them a
message! VOTE YES on AA to get them back to reality by
riding the Muni twice a week.” San Francisco voters
overwhelmingly agreed, with 65% voting to make this official
city policy. So when was the last time you saw Mayor Ed Lee
on your Muni bus?”
• Houston, Texas: Metro execs to drive less, ride transit more.45 45 (Snyder 2010).
About a dozen of the Metropolitan Transit Authority’s senior
managers will be required to ride public transit 40 times per
month, and some will be giving up their staff cars or car
allowances. “I know of no business where you can be successful
without using your own product and believing in it,” George
Greanias, Metro’s president and chief executive officer, said after
announcing the changes during a public hearing today on the
agency’s 2011 budget. Frequent use of buses or light rail will give
Metro executives a better understanding of what the agency’s
customers experience, Greanias said, while sending a message that
Metro is committed to public transport. Perhaps not coincidentally
Houston subsequently redesigned its network, and is one of the
few US agencies not to lose ridership in 2016.
• Salt Lake City, Utah: Just three of 16 UTA trustees accepted a
challenge to use bus and rail exclusively for seven days.46 One of
46 (Davidson 2014).
those who accepted, Keith Bartholomew, is a faculty member at
the University of Utah.
• Minneapolis - St. Paul, Minnesota:47 David Levinson is quoted as
47 Following an earlier version of this
chapter’s original posting on the
Transportist blog, Eric Roper wrote an
article on this topic about Minnesota’s
MetroTransit. Commentary includes:
(Magrino 2014b; Norvell 2014).
saying:48,49
48 (Roper 2014).
49 Subsequently Susan Haigh, who
claimed in a related article (Roper et al.
2014) that she was too busy to use the
convenient Green Line Light Rail Transit
between her day job at Habitat for
Humanity and her part-time role as the
Chair of the Met Council stepped down
from the position (Lindberg and Melo
2015). The bad publicity from this article
did not help. Brian Lamb, the Head
of Metro Transit, called to complain
to administrators at the University of
Minnesota about David Levinson. They
passed on the complaint, but of course
defended free speech, as they should.
“We should ask whether members of the council have sufficient
expertise about transit ... to be managing a transit system. Do
they understand the problems at a deep level? We can compare
the low transit usage by the Met Council to the board of Apple not
using their own computers. Having that experience of being lost
on the transit system is probably a useful experience for [council
members] to have to understand why their system isn’t as attractive
as it should be, why it’s not as popular as they hope it would be.”
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That said, the opposite problem, free travel passes for transit
administrators, (and especially free travel passes for family
members) are also controversial, as noted in these two articles:
• New York City: M.T.A. Revokes Travel Perks for Board Members,
from 2008 but with this gem “Why should I ride and
inconvenience myself when I can ride in a car?”5050 (Neuman 2008).
• BART’s Board also gets a free pass for life, for their families too.5151 (Bay Area News Group 2014).
It is not clear to us why an unused pass should be a problem, it
costs no one anything except in an accounting sense. A free pass for
an unpaid or underpaid transit Board who ought to be checking up
on the system like mystery shoppers seems the least of worries. We
can see how giving passes to family members stinks of favoritism
though.
This problem appears outside the US.
• Auckland, New Zealand: local transport agency’s staff shuttle
connects between offices, rather than having staff use public
transport, which is a bit slower.5252 (Transport Blog (Matt L) 2014).
“Staff at the agency which runs public transport in Auckland are
being offered a shuttle service for business trips between offices,
because buses and trains are too slow. Auckland Transport (AT) is
spending more than $122,000 over six months, trialling the shuttle
between its downtown offices and its headquarters in Henderson.
Public transport advocates say staff travelling between the
Henderson and downtown locations should be using the bus and
rail services at the door of both offices. AT wants to reduce its car
fleet by 20 vehicles, and is encouraging staff to cut car use. “We’re
providing options for staff, to have a tele-conference, to catch
public transport using business AT HOP cards, and we’re also
providing a shuttle between Henderson and Britomart,” AT
community transport manager Matthew Rednall said.”
17.7 Should voters have full information when voting on
transport projects?
Voters are asked to vote on all kinds of transport projects. In part
this is because of declining federal support for projects, and local
tax increases require voter approval. Elected officials hesitate to
promote new taxes to fund projects without clear direction from the
electorate. New taxes for transport spending usually pass. Yet there
are many referenda on specific projects where taxes are proposed
for a particular investment. Without making any claims about the
value of any of the individual projects, it is worth considering when
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projects violate the spirit and letter of the votes taken. California’s
high-speed rail has also been criticized for not adhering to the
specific systems and costs spelled out in the statewide 2008
referendum to raise a share of the cost of the project.
This isn’t just a problem for transit projects, either, though maybe
it is a problem that is worse in California because of a variety of
populist legislative requirements. Here is another Golden State
example. The LA Times reports that the 405 toll road project got into
political trouble:53 There are a few causes described: 53 (Esquivel and Flores 2013).
At a meeting this month, crowds packed an Orange County
Transportation Authority board meeting to denounce the lanes,
which have been supported by Caltrans. City leaders expressed
worry that the project would push traffic onto their streets, or that
motorists traveling in the toll lanes would find it too difficult to pull
off the highway and patronize local businesses.
The political shift over toll lanes has several causes. Some of Orange
County’s toll roads have struggled to attract drivers and each of the
major corridors has been forced to refinance its debt to avoid possible
default.
There has also been the sticker shock: Riding the 91 Express
Lanes can cost nearly $10 each way at the most congested hours, an
investment even for Lexus drivers. If the 405 toll lanes are built, the
priciest one-way toll would cost $9.91.
As for the 405, much of the anger stems from what Orange
County Supervisor John Moorlach called a “bit of a bait and
switch.”54 When voters approved a countywide half-cent sales tax, 54 (Esquivel and Flores 2013).
they were told funds would go toward adding one general purpose
lane in each direction at a cost of $1.25 billion.
Instead, the proposal before the OCTA would add one free lane
and one toll lane in each direction – but it would also convert an
existing carpool lane in each direction into a second toll lane, with
the added $220million price tag paid through bond sales that in turn
would be paid off by tolls.
So, the project as implemented is not what the voters approved.
It is substantially different, in fact. Is this direct democracy or
something more sinister? Voters often oppose new taxes or fees
because they don’t believe the revenues will be used as promised.
The votes for specific projects are not held as binding. This
introduces credible commitment problems that may affect future
votes.
There are many problems associated with these types of direct
democracy for allocating scarce resources. When voters vote on a
project, be it rail, transit, roads, etc., they should have complete
information. Since transport infrastructure projects tend to go over
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budget frequently, which affects the scope of the projects, it is
difficult for voters to accurately assess their support or opposition.
Also problematic is the absence of recourse the voters have. By
pushing tax and spending decisions to the ballot box, elected
officials insulate themselves from the severe problems that tend to
arise. After all, it was the voters who approved the project, not
Representative So and So from the great state of Denial.
17.8 Coordinate local transport and land use policies
Local transport policy should be coordinated with local land use
policies to improve accessibility by all modes of transport.
The governance issues ought not be underestimated. The United
States has many distinct layers of government: homeowners
associations, cities, counties, metros, state, federal, all of which have
a greater or lesser say in particular decisions. Coordination will
always be a challenge. Reducing the relevant layers of government
through municipal and regional consolidation should certainly be
considered if possible. Metropolitan areas have developed different
levels of coordination, with some (e.g. Portland, Oregon)
developing a relatively strong metropolitan level government, and
others (e.g. Washington, DC) remaining weak (in large part due to
the interstate nature of government there).
A second difficulty is that any change to policy creates winners
and losers. It is often implicitly assumed the status quo is equitable,
though there is generally no evidence to support that. The current
mix of funding sources benefits some parties more than others: the
benefits and costs do not necessarily align, some jurisdictions
cross-subsidize others; and the poor generally pay a greater share of
their income on transport than the rich. Developing a system that
would be universally acclaimed as fair is probably impossible,
however developing a system that improves equity compared to the
system today is feasible.
The federal government’s recent initiatives on livability provide
an opening to catalyze better transport and land use coordination.
Grants could be made available for demonstration programs in
transport-land use coordination, much like the Urban Partnership
Agreements in President George W. Bush’s Administration.
Ultimately however these demonstrations would need to show real
benefits, we cannot rely on federal grants to encourage local
governments to do something that should be in their own collective
interest. If such coordination does add value, as suggested here, it
will make those regions more competitive, and can drive a race to
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the top as other communities try to emulate their governance to
achieve similar positive outcomes.
17.9 Department of Accessibility
The problem is that as our society has become more complex, we
often find ourselves using a variety of means to achieve a single set of
goals. We are interested, for example, in economic development
which requires new markets, more productive workers and better
transportation systems. But which department do we go to for that?
And what if we want to build a new city, with sufficient public
facilities, adequate housing, and decent recreation area – Which
department do we petition then?
We sometimes seem to have forgotten that government is not in
business to deal with subjects on a chart but to achieve real objectives
for real human beings. These objectives will never be fully achieved
unless we change our old ways of thinking. It is not enough merely
to reshuffle departments for the sake of reshuffling them. We must
rebuild the executive branch according to a new understanding of how
government can best be organized to perform effectively.
The key to that new understanding is the concept that the
executive branch of the government should be organized around
basic goals. Instead of grouping activities by narrow subjects or by
limited constituencies, we should organize them around the great
purposes of government in modern society. For only when a
department is set up to achieve a given set of purposes, can we
effectively hold that department accountable for achieving them.
Only when the responsibility for realizing basic objectives is clearly
focused in a specific governmental unit, can we reasonably hope that
those objectives will be realized.
– Richard Nixon, Message to Congress, March 25, 197155 55 House Document 92-75.
The opening quote describes how and why President Nixon
proposed a major reorganization of the US federal government,
including a Department of Community Development that would
consolidate most of the then newly created Department of
Transportation with Housing and Urban Development in order to
“to help build a wholesome and safe community for environment
for every American.”56 This bill never made it to the floor of the 56 Discussed by (Davis 2018).
House of Representatives. That doesn’t mean the idea doesn’t have
merit though.
Urbanist Richard Florida has proposed a US Department of Cities,
which echoes this Nixonian idea to some extent.57 It would have a
57 (Florida 2013).
similar footprint, Florida writes:58
58 America didn’t get urban renewal
right the first time, so let’s try again,
but with even more authority. Florida
became an ardent federalist after the
election of Donald Trump and now
argues that cities and states need more
power. We do not think our favored
policies should depend on who is in
power. (Inskeep 2017).
The new Department of Cities would absorb pieces of HUD and the
Departments of Energy, Transportation, Education, Commerce and
Interior. Rather than bloating the federal bureaucracy, it would make
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it leaner, by directing federal investments strategically to the places
where they can provide the most bang for the buck. With a simple
mission of catalyzing and accelerating intelligent urban reforms, it
could be the first department to embrace and act on the new mantra
of more effective government: “cut to invest.”
Streets.mn writer and sustainability planner Brendon Slotterback
has called for a state Department of Accessibility,59 writing:59 (Slotterback 2013).
What if instead of a [state] Department of Transportation [(DOT)] we
had a Department of Accessibility and its mission was to improve
accessibility while meeting environmental standards, building
resilient systems, and being economically viable? I bet it would look
at lot different than our current DOTs (hint: it would do a lot more
with land use).
These proposals address the mismatch between the functional
scope of government agencies (indicated by colors on Figure 17.1)
and the scope of problems they seek to address. Increasing
accessibility, as we note earlier,60 requires not only transport60 §1.
solutions (making the network more direct and faster), but also land
use solutions (co-locating jobs and workers or consumers and
retailers or retailers and wholesalers, etc.) in close proximity so the
distance, and thus the time, required to engage in interactions
diminishes. While transport agencies deal with the transport
aspects, land use agencies deal with the land use aspects. The land
use planners complain they can’t control transport, and so are
responding to the conditions given, which is to permit development
induced61 by the new access that roads create. Transport planners61 §14.
assert they do not regulate or develop land use, and so are building
roads responding to the market environment which says there is
demand in excess of supply from existing developments. Both are
correct in their way.
The consequence is the landscape before us which is laden with
inefficiencies and spatial-network mismatches. If only there were a
single department regulating both. The difficulties in this are
political, and in particular have to do with the different layers of
government. Land use is generally treated as a local decision, and
transport as a regional decision. Readers of this book will likely
agree the scope of transport investments are often regional
(metropolitan) in the modern world. Towns cannot effectively build
highways or metros; local governments, and their residents are
loathe to abandon their powers over land use to a higher level
government, fearing that they will get saddled with locally
unwanted land uses, such as garbage transfer stations or high
density housing. And these are a problem because they generate
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externalities,62 like pollution,63 and congestion,64 and other impacts 62 §7.
63 §8.
64 §5.
like school crowding, that are uncompensated because of failure to
properly finance capital facilities and charge for them. Local
residents correctly perceive a degradation in the quality of their life
for the benefit of others.
The Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities has some aspects of
a Department of Accessibility. It implements long run plans for the
seven county region in Minnesota,65 ensures that county and 65 Hennepin, Ramsey, Washington, Scott,
Dakota, Anoka, Carver.municipal land use plans comply with the region’s long range
plans,66 approves the deployment of transport facilities, and 66 This authority was confirmed in a
court case Supreme Court of Minnesota.
The City of Lake Elmo, Appellant,
v. Metropolitan Council, Respondent.
No.:A03-458. Decided: August 05, 2004.
(Supreme Court of Minnesota 2004).
operates the public transit agency, among other functions. But it
does not approve or reject specific development. It cannot force
growth into a municipality that resists, though it can slow growth
by denying water and wastewater service, limiting density, nor can
it generate growth the market does not want to produce.
While we are not going to argue that the current bureaucratic
organization chart is somehow optimal, we are also skeptical that
reorganizing necessarily solves problems. There are reasons for the
current arrangements, and while these arrangements might be
suboptimal in producing accessibility, they may result in more local
input on land use decisions which could improve outcomes. At this
time, there is no evidence one way or another that a larger or
smaller level of government in charge of land use, or consolidating
land use and transport decision-making into a single Department,
produces more or less accessibility. This suggests that experiments
are in order.
17.10 Metropolitan Department for Transport
Since transportation and land uses are co-dependent, it makes sense
to coordinate these planning and policy activities. But as described
above, this is difficult in practice. Perhaps we should have a
Metropolitan, rather than state level, Department for Transport that
controls all of the transport systems within urban areas.
Currently, highways are paid and planned separately from
transit, which is separate from local roads, which is separate from
cycling, and so on. Even worse is that no one responsible for
transport systems has much of anything to do with parking
requirements. Niskanen’s model of bureaucracy67 predicts that each 67 (Niskanen 1971).
independent bureaucracy supplying transport will work to
maximize its own budget. We see this is the case – departments
charged with road building want more money to build more roads
and transit agencies want more money to supply more transit. But
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no one is trying to maximize accessibility, only their individual
mandate.
A model to emulate is one where a single department must make
internal trade-offs about what to supply and where. If we keep
expanding the road network and keep driving cheap there is no
amount of new transit supply that will make a meaningful positive
change in transit ridership. Bureaucratic competition among modes
must stop.
A close approximation to how this could work is the Transport
for London (TfL) integrated model. Created in 2000, TfL is under
mayoral control, and is responsible for all roads, subway, commuter
and light rail, buses, taxis, cycling and river services. In short,
everything except National Rail, and they are acquiring pieces of
that as well. They also administer London’s congestion charge. In
2004, London implemented parking maximums, as well, limiting
how much new parking could be built.
Other than the iconic Underground, TfL acts as as a coordinator
rather than operator.68 Most services, and all buses, are operated68 Offloading the Underground was
an unsuccessful experiment in Public-
Private Partnerships (Wolmar 2002).
through a concession system. What TfL is able to do through this role
is to minimize expansionary tendencies by all transport suppliers
and maximize overall accessibility. Being under mayoral control puts
this coordinated transport governance closer to land use decision
making, as well. So even if a Department of Accessibility is a long
reach, an integrated Metropolitan Department for Transport might
well be a feasible and successful first step.
17.11 The lump of government mistake
From 1976 through 2017,69 the US federal government was without69 Not including the 35-day 2018-19
shutdown that occurred as we wrote
this.
a budget for a total of 160 days, nearly half a year in 42 years, or just
over 2% of the time. Of those days, it was shut down for 61 days
(when many, sometimes referred to as ‘non-essential’, government
workers were furloughed), or two months.70 Other solutions are70 (Wikipedia contributors 2018f).
almost as bad. For instance, in 2013 the US federal government
implemented a sequester. Most sectors of government were cut by
some fixed amount. Much has been written about how stupid this
is. The proximate cause is the immediate stupidity of politicians
trying to create a Sword of Damocles above their colleagues to get
them to do something less stupid. There is a root cause. This is
what we call the ‘Lump of Government Mistake.’
Almost all agencies of the federal government are on the general
budget, paid for from general revenue, with an annual appropriate
cycle. This need not be the case. We could instead have many
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separate agencies, each with their own user-based revenue sources,
for as many parts of government as possible.
• Highways already have a Highway Trust Fund (underfunded
perhaps, but that is a relatively simple problem if there were an
actual desire to govern responsibly). Despite all the dysfunctions
we ascribe to US transport policy, this could be a model
compared to the dysfunctions elsewhere in government.
• Air Traffic Control could be handled by a private corporation paid
for from some kind of user fee on aircraft movements, like it is in
Canada or New Zealand.71 71 (Button and McDougall 2006).
• National Parks could be owned by a Foundation (or better
multiple Foundations) that solicit donations and charge cars for
the use of parking and roads to cover operating costs.
• Food Inspection Services could be a Non-Profit Corporation paid
for by a small tax on food producers (like the Food Marketing
Boards) and administered separately.
We can go on and identify many parts of government that can
easily be hived off into separable, self-sustaining, non-profit
organizations.
Once we did that, the threat of sequester or government shut
down disrupting the obviously generally useful things that happen
to be publicly owned in the US makes a lot less sense.
Clearly there are exceptions, true public goods72 like National 72 §A.
Defense and Foreign Relations perhaps. Similarly interest (and
principal) on the accumulated debt needs to be handled somehow.
Everyone receives ‘defense services’ from the Department of
Defense (whether you want it or not), so it needs to be paid for from
a general revenue source. But this need not be the same general
revenue source as used for income redistribution (like Social
Security), or health insurance (like Medicaid or Medicare). In fact it
is not. Social Security taxes pay for Social Security. Why should not
Defense taxes (e.g. a Value Added Tax (VAT)) pay for Defense.
Under this scheme, if Congress wants more, it raises the VAT rate
associated with Defense, if it wants less, it lowers the rate.
The National Science Foundation similarly should not be subject
to the vagaries of annual budgets. Like any good foundation, it
should have an endowment, and live off the interest.
The lesson to be learned is that, to avoid a total
government shutdown, the government should not be
totally central. Every function could have its own associated
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source of funds and rates, and would stand or fall on its own
merits. Horse trading would still exist, but this notion of cutting
useful self-sustainable services as collateral damage for reducing
the Defense sector (or building a wall on the southern border)
would be eliminated. Governance would be more resilient.
18
Private | Public
Figure 18.1: Sydney L1 LRT is a
privately managed rail line.
Once upon a time, roads were solely the responsibility of the
adjoining landowners, and we had roads of poor quality – justifying
governmental takeover (either directly or through
quasi-governmental organization) to impose prices. Like today’s
sidewalks, property owners were once responsible for maintaining a
right-of-way across their property. But they had little motive to do
this well (the analogy with sidewalks remains), and a
race-to-the-bottom ensued, where these paths were of poor quality,
inconveniencing travelers. As the Good Roads Movements (in
various forms through history) demanded higher quality for the
benefit of travelers, and landowners had no incentives, government
naturally took over.
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Today, roads may be the one of the last bastions of socialism in
the US. While we may want to temper that claim after the US
nationalized the auto industry and some banks during the Crisis of
2008; now that those holdings have been sold off, we are back to
highways as the flagship of US socialist enterprise.
Socialism is widely defined as an economic system characterized
by social (public, government) ownership of the means of production
and management of the economy.
Almost all the roads in the United States are publicly-owned
(either by states, counties, or cities or towns). They are allocated
first-come, first-serve, without regard to wealth (aside from the
entry cost of owning a vehicle), paid for by taxes (some on users,
some on land owners, some otherwise). One might almost say
“from each according to his abilities, to each according his needs.”11 This quote is from Marx’s 1875 Critique
of the Gotha Program. A critique of such socialist, (or dare we say it, communist),
allocation schemes is that they are inefficient, they allocate resources
poorly. Queues are quite common due to undersupply and lack of a
real-time price signal, which gas taxes cannot replicate. Clearly we
still see congestion on our unpriced roads. Congestion is nothing if
not queueing.
However, not all roads have always been socialist, many were
initially private turnpikes.
Adam Smith2 believed useful public works would pay for2 (Smith 1776).
themselves, be ‘self-liquidating’ as financiers say.
The greater part of such public works may easily be so managed as to
afford a particular revenue for defraying their own expenses, without
bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society.
But though he favors what we would call user fees (they “afford
a particular revenue”), Smith warns against private, unregulated toll
roads:
The tolls for the maintenance of a high road cannot with any safety be
made the property of private persons.
The reason is the monopoly power of roads, users have few good
choices, so the “private persons” who might own such a road will
exploit it by charging excessive tolls, benefiting the road owners at
the expense of the road users, and the wealthy at the expense of the
poor.
Smith was correct in principle, but turnpikes in the US were
largely unprofitable through the 19th century. There are even a
handful of private highways in the US today (and far more in other
countries). Other places have non-profit but non-government
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private road associations. Even nominally socially-democratic
Sweden has two-thirds of its road network managed this way.3 3 (Malmberg and Ivarsson 2006).
But efforts at building new private roads are highly constrained.
For one, these private roads are competing against subsidized
(‘free’) public roads, limiting their pricing powers. Second, the
public has an exclusive monopoly on the power of eminent domain,
enabling it to build roads without the hold-up problem that a
private entrepreneur trying to fashion a means of production
through the fields of others might face. Yet even opportunities that
might suggest a perfect opportunity, for instance a bridge between
two states with little nearby competition, is built by the government
because there clearly is insufficient benefit to attract a private firm.
Third, private roads are subject to taxes, while public roads are
tax-free.4 4 Now wipe away those tears, put away
that tiny violin playing that small sad
song, we come not to weep for poor
capitalists.
Should roads be socialist? If they are socialist, what government
should govern?
Though in politics, words like communist, socialist, and capitalist
are thrown around as pejoratives, when we actually decide whether
a sector is public or private, it is usually based on history, a set of
contingent events that could have played out differently. In the US,
transit was private, now it is public. Railroads are private. In the
UK, bus transit was private, then was public, and again is privately
provided (under public franchise agreement), but railway track (to a
first-order approximation, the legalities are complex) is public. There
is no universal principal of how much government is right.5 As Hans 5 Unless you are a Marxist or an anarcho-
capitalist.Rosling said:
People who don’t like government, go into this corner and discuss
Somalia, People who don’t like markets, go into that corner and
discuss North Korea.6 6 Quote from Hans Rosling presentation
at Ted Mann Theater, Minneapolis. April
27, 2011.Pragmatics decide. Many things are clearly better in the private
sector, we are collectively (if not unanimously) confident the
government could not provide the same quality good for the price.
Other things are clearly better in the public sector, since the private
sector cannot provide the good as universally as we desire for
technical reasons (free rider problems for instance). We have
multiple goals, efficiency is among them, though equity is also be
important. Reasonable people will disagree about the relative
importance of each.
Roads may fall under any of the classic four categories of goods:7 7 §A.
congesting,8 club, public, or private, depending on their 8 These are often called ‘common pool
resources’ in the economics literature.characteristics. Even if they are ‘public,’ which ‘public’ becomes a
question, as there are multiple layers of government, and as the
Swedes show, one can easily create new special layers of
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government for the purpose of managing roads, which have
spatially distinct sets of users.
Against this differing nature of roads falls the idea that there
must be some economies of scale in managing roads (even if there
isn’t much at the margins). Clearly everyone maintaining the road
in front of their own home would be costlier than some
centralization (a homeowners association, a town), since not
everyone has specialized tools to do proper maintenance, and has
little incentive to monitor. So even if in the absence of these
economies, there would be an argument for different owners, with
the economies, we may sacrifice some type of efficiency for another.
A feature (or bug) of socialized roads is the lack of pricing. This
of course is not required, but far more likely, as socialized roads
are subject to more political interference than a different governance
structure.
The auto-highway system is mature, it is on the cusp of decline.
Many declining sectors demand (and get) public subsidies they may
not have needed during growth. In the US, roads have been getting
subsidies for most of their history.9 But this is also an opportunity to9 Clearly user fees such as gas taxes
could easily be adjusted to avoid this, the
evidence is the range of motor fuel taxes
globally.
experiment, to find different models for managing the system (since
there is little controversy about maintaining the existing network,
while there is great controversy about building new roads, which we
seem not to be doing much of any more).
There is not only one possible model, transport is a big sector, and
what is public and what is private is fluid.
If we cannot fully decentralize roads to the point where people
provide their own, and if we recognize they are not well-structured
as a commons, perhaps we can privatize them in such a way that
they are competitive, so travelers have some market choice in which
roads they use. Theoretically, this has a lot of potential in providing
differentiated levels of service.
18.1 Ownership and network size
We explore the case for subsidy10 for roads and transit elsewhere,10 §4.
discussing the pros and cons of capital and operating subsidy. Yet
our discussion has largely focused on individual facilities or projects,
or who receives the subsidies. In this section we work through how
the physical structure of road networks varies under public or private
ownership regimes.
If the street network were limited to one road, it would be very
easy to supply privately and finance through tolls, see the
Ambassador Bridge in Detroit as an example. For a variety of
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reasons, it is in fact a network and not just a link. This provides a
wealth of benefits, as well as complexity.
Ubiquitous networks have positive returns to scale,11 in that the 11 ‘Ubiquity’ is not necessary for positive
returns, but some minimum scale often
is.
larger the network, the more valuable it is, as you can reach more
destinations. Think of telephones (not very valuable if they are
simply tin cans connecting you to a neighbor), transit (not very
valuable if it only runs a single route), or airports (you would have
to wait a long time if you only had direct connections, not hubs).
The problem is that building ubiquitous networks requires large
up-front capital expenditures and a base beyond existing users. For
instance, while the Interstate Highway System was built by ‘user
fees,’ before the first mile of concrete opened, drivers (who
obviously had not used the Interstate) were assessed federal motor
fuel taxes on all miles traveled, not just Interstate miles. The class of
drivers as a whole paid for the Interstate as a whole, and ultimately
benefitted as a whole. Any individual traveler may or may not have
seen those benefits, or paid for them.12 12 Similarly, airlines and airports must
invest in capital (planes and gates and
runways and so on) before it begins to be
paid back. The difference is that airlines
have investors who see the returns,
rather than charging future customers.
The public will over-invest in network size relative to
the social optimum and the private sector will under-
invest relative to optimum. This idea is generally true, though
it gets very complicated.
However, private actors will expand their networks in response
to demand where the public expands networks for other, and often
speculative, reasons. (There are obviously exceptions.)
Consider again the US Interstate Highway System. This network
is extremely large,13 and is overbuilt in many areas both rural and 13 Almost 47,000 mi or over 75,000 km.
urban. Unlike most European limited-access motorways, the US
Interstate was built by destroying parts of central cities and inner
ring suburbs.14 While these urban freeways are well used, in 14 The case of the construction of St.
Paul’s I-94 through the Rondo has
been made nationally famous by Alan
Altshuler. (Altshuler 1966).
retrospect they represent an unnecessary expansion of the Interstate
system and were built because of generous 90 cents per dollar of
subsidy by the federal government (from federal gas taxes paid by
motorists into the Highway Trust Fund). While some of the
Interstate network is congested, much of the available capacity sits
idle for most of the day.15 15 It should be noted that President
Eisenhower did not expect that the
highway system that bears his name
would be built in existing cities. He
discovered this was the case when
construction started in Washington, DC
and slowed his trips to Camp David
(Swift 2011) p.247.
Ownership of developing networks also leads to network design
that promotes goals other than transport. With contemporary public
infrastructure, political goals are often a primary justification.
Construction jobs, for instance, are politically popular but are a
project cost, not a benefit. Yet public officials support new
construction because of the jobs promised. These political goals risk
making the costs of the project exceed any benefits. (There is a
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macro-economic16 argument that these jobs benefit the economy as16 §10.
a whole in a period of under-employment in the road construction
sector. That is, if the project’s laborers would otherwise be
unemployed, building something may be better than doing nothing.
However if those laborers would otherwise be doing something else
more valuable, they are unambiguously a cost.)
Contrast the highways with a largely privately developed
network: US broadband. The United States has notoriously slow
broadband access, eighteenth in the OECD league tables, and in
part this is because we expect that these services should be only
provided privately.17 When a private network provider develops a17 See (Smith 2017) for 2017 rankings.
There are debates about whether US
broadband should be publicly provided,
but this seems unlikely as a policy
outcome. Australia, which ranks fourth
from the bottom on the same table,
would kill for US broadband speeds.
The dysfunctions in Australia’s publicly-
driven network deployment are far
beyond public vs. private.
network they will build a network based on expected profits from
usage. This inhibits large capital investments that are purely
speculative in nature.18 Because of this, wise but profit-maximizing
18 Iridium’s satellite network is a
cautionary tale of this.
broadband suppliers react to market demand by carefully and
slowly building out network capacity rather than building lots of
network capacity that may be used at some point in the future.
Not all private network constructors are as careful (or profitable)
as broadband. History is rife with speculative bubbles in both the
railway and internet sectors,19 while airlines as a whole19 (Odlyzko 2010b).
cumulatively lost more money than they have made.20 However in20 (Garrison and Levinson 2014).
those bubblicious cases, the race between many competing network
providers aimed to establish the monopoly (and gain market share)
rather than nourish an existing monopoly, as broadband does.
Broadband networks are also a current example of how
monopoly affects network development. Broadband networks are
controlled by oligopolies that have little competition in areas where
they provide service.21 The lack of competition means that these21 These firms maintain competition
across the nation but local markets
effectively act as monopolies.
companies need not compete on quality or speed in order to
maintain their revenue targets and profits, which helps explain why
development of faster services is somewhat sluggish. Within the
broadband networks, consumers are not fully realizing lower costs
of transporting data online and firms providing the services are
ensuring that their networks remain profitable.
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Figure 18.2: Design, Build,
Operate, Maintain.18.2 Public-private partnerships
Instead of ‘Public or Private’, we should think about
‘Private and Public’ – Private Provision of Public
Services in Transport. The term ‘public private partnership’
(sometimes abbreviated to PPP or P3)22 is used today to mean a 22 PPP is a US term, private finance
initiative (PFI) is used in the UK.number of different ways of providing infrastructure. These
partnerships may be something as simple as what’s called
design-build so that a single firm is responsible for both designing
the bridge and building it. Design-build speeds up the construction
process and ensures that there’s a single point of responsibility, so
you don’t have one company or one agency doing the design and
the second doing the construction and then people complain
because there’s some miscommunication. Or they may be more
elaborate and include design, build, operate, and maintain. The
firm that builds the bridge is responsible for operating and
maintaining it over a long period of time, and so they don’t build it
cheap and then let it fail early. They’re going to pay for the higher
costs of higher quality construction if they’re responsible for
maintaining it. And presumably that leads to better infrastructure
and lower lifetime costs.
Some major types of Public Private Partnerships are:23 23 (United States General Accounting
Office 1999).
• Build-Own-Operate (BOO): The private business builds and
operates a public facility and retains legal ownership
• Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT): The private business builds and
operates the public facility for a significant time period. At the
end of the time period, the facility ownership transfers to the
public
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• Buy-Build-Operate (BBO): The government sells the facility to the
private business. The private business refurbishes and operates
the facility
• Design-Build-Operate (DBO): A single contract is awarded to a
private business which designs, builds, and operates the public
facility, but the public retains legal ownership
• Build-Develop-Operate (BDO): The private business buys the
public facility, refurbishes it with its own resources, and then
operates it through a government contract.
We can think of it as a series of project stages vs. a series of
increasingly private roles, as illustrated in Figure 18.2. Contiguous
stages can be grouped together as in the list above.
Public private partnerships often feature revenue streams (which
is why private firms are interested), which in the case of highways
can mean tolls. Yet tolls don’t always cover the costs of any given
infrastructure project. They do in some cases, but as you can see
looking at the United States, most roads are not tolled, most bridges
are not tolled. Tolls and user fees (not including gas taxes) are about
8% of US road revenue, varying from 48% in Delaware to 0% in states
without tolls.24 And building a single toll bridge might not work24 (Henchman 2014).
from an economic perspective if there are nearby alternatives, but it
still may be worthwhile to have the infrastructure. So the state might
step in, and instead of paying for the road directly and maintaining
it, it pays a firm some amount of money to do this each year. The firm
is responsible for maintaining it to a certain performance standard.
The argument in favor of it would be that if the firm is
responsible for financing and gets paid back over time, that might
help a cash-strapped local government or state government provide
infrastructure that it otherwise couldn’t provide without borrowing
the money. Borrowing is often difficult for local and state
governments because of debt limits and the costs of the municipal
bond market. On the downside there remains the question of who
bears the risk? The negotiation of this is not just negotiation over
how much money some firm gets paid, but what happens if the
tolls that are expected don’t come in? What happens if the demand
that’s expected on the road doesn’t materialize? This is one of the
major risks for public private partnerships.
Some projects have gone bankrupt, others are uncompleted.
Accountability is an important issue that depends very much on
how projects are organized.
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London Underground. The case of London is instructive, and
suggests some of the risks of contracts. The London Underground
private finance initiative (PFI) set up was seemingly designed
without a clue as to how transport systems work. Christian Wolmer
reports legal costs of setting up the contract were £500 million
before even operating, we note that still did not deal with the
contingency that actually occurred.25 The aim was to rebuild and 25 (Wolmar 2002; Jupe 2011).
modernize existing assets, especially before the 2012 Olympics. So
as not to interfere with rush hour operations, all construction had to
occur between 11:00 pm and 5:00 am, including set-up and
break-down, and the system had to be open and operational for the
morning commute, or the contractors would face penalties. So the
concession-holder spent a couple of hours setting up, performed a
couple of hours of construction work, and then took a couple of
hours of cleaning up. It would have been much better to
temporarily close the line, do all the work required, and do it in a
relatively short amount of time (months instead of years). While
this would be disruptive in the short run, there are solutions. For
instance, London could have converted the streets above the line
under repair to an exclusive busway routes at grade, taking general
travel lanes to serve the displaced demand.
Indiana Tollway. Private financing doesn’t require a new piece
of infrastructure. You can sell an existing asset as well. In 2006,
Indiana sold the operations and maintenance of the Indiana Tollway
and received $3.8 billion which then it used to build other
infrastructure.26 At about the same time the same purchaser 26 (Gilmour 2012; Fitzgerald 2015).
acquired the adjacent Chicago Skyway toll road, hoping to achieve
economies of scale. And in exchange, the Australian firm that
purchased the toll road was given the right to collect the tolls over a
long period of time. It turned out they undertook this transaction
just before the Great Recession. Demand turned down and it
especially turned down on that road because they raised the tolls
more on that road in an attempt to maximize profits. As a result
they had to go through a bankruptcy process. The road didn’t
disappear. It continued to provide service and that’s one of the
great things (for consumers and the public) about infrastructure:
even if the firm goes bankrupt, the asset is still there. In practice,
many private toll roads have not worked out financially in the US or
elsewhere,27 yet the roads remain open. 27 (Bain 2009).
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18.3 Tender routes
The transit organization can lower costs by competitive tendering for
routes. Just as bus companies today don’t manufacture their own
vehicles, there is no economic requirement they run and operate the
buses themselves.
London Buses. The London model of bus franchises is
informative. Private firms bid to provide service on routes (and
collect revenue) for a franchise period. If the route is expected to
earn profits at the standard fare, they bid a positive amount. If the
route instead is expected to lose money, they bid on how much
subsidy is required for them to be willing to operate it. Transport
for London monitors quality, collects fares (via the system-wide
Oyster transit smartcard), determines routes, and manages stops,
stations, signage, and branding, so it appears as one unified system
to riders. Bus ridership in London has risen significantly since
competitive tendering.28 Strikes are a lot less effective once the city28 (Howes 2011).
no longer depends on a monopolistic transit service provider and
holding a monopsonistic contract with a labor union.
Lisa Schweitzer asks29 whether competitive tendering was causal29 (Schweitzer 2014a).
in increasing London transit ridership. Well, as we all know from
reading Popper, nothing is provable (though many things are
falsifiable), so we cannot prove causality.30 We also know from30 (Popper 1953).
reading Granger that we can infer causality if we have a plausible
causal mechanism and an appropriate time sequence.31 Clearly31 (Granger 1980).
there is a time sequence. What is the causal mechanism?
Competitive firms provide better quality of service than did the
previous arrangement because they are rewarded for providing
better service. Competitive firms have lower costs than
long-entrenched public sector agencies.
This clearly doesn’t explain everything. Population increases, the
congestion charge, increased total bus service, fuel prices, and
construction on the Underground also play a part. Yet, it probably
does explain something. We doubt that we can show this
statistically, since London is only one city and it’s not easy to get
route-by-route breakdowns of ridership and service quality before
and after competitive tendering.3232 See the following some more academic
evidence on this question: (Cantillon
and Pesendorfer 2004; Kennedy 1995;
Hensher and Wallis 2005).
However, London, even under Mayor Ken Livingstone
(nicknamed ‘Red Ken’ for his politics), did not seriously consider
undoing bus competition. London did undo the poorly conceived
rail competition. Mayor Boris Johnson subsequently reversed the
westward expansion of London’s vaunted Congestion Charge. He
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also reversed the introduction of ‘Bendy Buses’ (articulated buses)
and introduced a new double-decker bus. So undoing policy was
on the table. From this we infer that it is working and one of the
causes of ridership increases.
To be clear, the evidence is that differently structured (more
monopolistic) franchises awarded in other UK cities did not see
similar ridership increases, so the answer is quite complicated about
how to configure tendering to maximize consumer welfare, and
experimentation is probably required. Just giving the system away
is certainly not the answer. Having the franchises be of a limited
duration (for instance 5-7 years) is better than a 20-30 year franchise.
This is feasible for buses, the ultimate in mobile capital. It would be
much harder for a traditional utility where the infrastructure is
expensive, embedded in the ground, and long-lived.
18.4 Thought experiment: Auctioning green time
Eddie, a traveler in a hurry arrives at a traffic light from the East.
He would pay up to $18 to save an hour. Sue, a less-hurried casual
traveler arrives from the South, she would only pay $6 to save an
hour of travel right now. Who gets the green light, who gets the
red? Presently this is decided without consideration of how much
Eddie or Sue would be willing to pay to save a few seconds or a few
minutes. No one has the ability or the authority to make a
transaction occur where Eddie can pay a few cents to Sue and get
the green light, while Sue waits for the light to change. Until
recently, this was because it was technologically infeasible, but in
recent years, advances in transport signal technology and real-time
wireless vehicle-infrastructure communications have made this once
impossible transaction possible to contemplate. Now it is
institutional constraints that prevent this from happening. Traffic
signals are in almost all towns, cities, counties, and states publicly
owned and managed. Imagine instead that this was a service that
private firms would bid to supply.
A new organization, LightSpeed Traffic, has paid your city
$100,000 a year for the privilege of managing traffic signals. Instead
of this being a cost center for the city, it is now a revenue generator.
Why do they do this? A private operator is able to use traffic signals
more efficiently from an economic perspective than a public agency.
They can obtain revenues from sources such as:
• Acting as the facilitator of transactions between travelers as
described above to minimize weighted travel delay, Eddie pays
$18/hour (30 cents a minute) and saves a minute, Sue is
312 a political economy of access
compensated at $6/hour (10 cents a minute), and LightSpeed
Traffic keeps the difference, 20 cents a minute, to cover the costs
of operating traffic signals, paying the city for the franchise, and
earning some profit for shareholders. This could scale up, by
summing all of the traffic from each approach, and multiplying
by their respective values of time.3333 See for instance (Vasirani and
Ossowski 2011; Schepperle and Böhm
2009; Shantharam et al. 2013) for
illustrations.
• Providing real-time traffic data to a new generation of GPS
companies that aim to provide routing information to travelers.
By investing in the signals and sensing technologies around the
intersection (and at nearby intersections they also manage),
LightSpeed has accurate estimates of arterial travel time, and can
make predictions about future travel times, data that is extremely
valuable to those providing real-time advanced traveler
information.
• Administering red-light running cameras.
• Advertising at the traffic signal when it is red.34 Like transit34 See the patent: Traffic-light timed
advertising center https://patents.
google.com/patent/US5150116A/en.
companies who sell advertising on buses and bus stops, traffic
signals have laid out before them a captive audience that might
be interested in real-time information, especially information that
was customized by place and traveler. LightSpeed has the
authority to coordinate advertising with traffic signal timings.
Not making the light extra long to force drivers to wait, but
simply to use variable message signs to display ads when the
light is red anyway, and to benefit travelers by displaying
real-time travel information when the light is green.
Presently a few companies operate traffic signals under contract
to municipalities, notably in Sandy Springs, Georgia.35 None yet use35 (Segal 2012).
signals innovatively as described above.
Obviously this can get quite complex: there may be more than
one approaching driver, how do you decide the baseline to estimate
vehicle time-saved or time-list by adjusting signal timings, how does
this work in networks instead of just isolated intersections.
But scarce resources (like two vehicles seeking to use the same
space at the same time) can be allocated in many ways other than
arbitrarily or first-come first-serve, to the benefit of all. Sometimes
the best solution is a yield sign, sometimes a stop sign, sometimes a
roundabout, sometimes a traffic signal, sometimes a grade
separation. To be clear, it is not always a traffic signal. When it is a
traffic signal, there might be some merits to thinking creatively
about the organization and operation of the market that is created
by the rationing of time for the benefit of all.
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18.5 Asset recycling
Asset recycling is not taking the concrete from old roads and turning
them into new roads. Instead, it is financial, where roads are turned
into dollars which are turned into roads. Your state has a piece of
infrastructure. The infrastructure has a revenue stream that, with
proper management, generates enough money to pay for operations
and maintenance, and then some. The state can retain the asset, or
sell it. If it sells it, where should the money go? If the money goes
into building a new piece of infrastructure, Australia calls it ‘asset
recycling.’ The Commonwealth (national) government likes these
deals so much, it kicks in 15% to the states to sweeten the deal.36 36 See (Poole 2016; Robert W. Poole
2018; Varn and Kline 2017; Australian
Government 2014) for further discussion.
This is, to be clear, a form of privatization. The advantage of
privatization is getting the money the asset generates up front,
rather than over a long period of time. In addition, private
organizations may be able to manage the asset better (though this is
not clear). Also, private firms can often collect revenue (or more
revenue) that for political reasons the public sector is unable to, for
instance toll roads that under state hands might be reverted to ‘free’
roads. Everyone agrees that private toll road operators have to
collect revenue, not everyone agrees that states should put tolls on
public roads. The framing matters.
In Australia, the public sector is using asset recycling as a
financing technique to build projects, sell them off to the private
sector, and then use that revenue to build more projects. Rinse,
repeat. Because they are infrastructure, these assets will continue to
serve the public (though undoubtedly with higher user fees, but
less public subsidy from non-users). But because they are so large
and risky, and often require eminent domain, it is difficult to
convince the private sector to build them without public backing.
There are also profits in parking meters. Chicago leased their
parking meters to a private firm. The city received a lump sum
payment of $1.15 billion in exchange from Chicago Parking Meters,
LLC, which replaced all the meters and raised prices, and is
currently on track to recover their costs by mid-2020s, with over
sixty years remaining on the lease.
Utilities and transport services can use private equity and bond
markets to unlock value. How much capital would a well-governed
mass transit utility with actual users be able to raise if sold to pension
funds or the stock market? How much would a toll-road network be
worth?
Lisa Schweitzer writes:37 37 (Schweitzer 2014b).
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[T]ransit’s assets are worth more as assets because we all know the
taxpayer will buy them back if private sector managers allow things
to go pear-shaped. If there is something that, over the course of its
history, has been ‘too big to fail’, it is transit. From the municipal bail-
outs of holding companies in the mid 20th century to the devastating
strikes that occurred before then, disrupting transit service in the pre-
auto world paid out well for both capital and labor. It was textbook
Ralph Milliband.38 So we should think Uber-level values with a bail-38 Milliband was a famous British
Marxist. His sons rose to the top of
the UK Labour Party in the early 21st
century.
out and buy-out guarantee – which is basically what just about all
major infrastructure transfers to the private sector turn out to be given
enough time, save for some examples in Asia.
So she is skeptical of private investment. We don’t blame her,
we are not investing our retirement dollars in new rail infrastructure
either. But there are many lessons here.
An investment that produces a stable rate of return, even if low,
is extremely valuable as a financial instrument for annuities and
retirement plans. The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan now owns a
share of the Channel Tunnel among other infrastructure assets.
UniSuper, a large superannuation fund (retirement fund) for
university employees in Australia owns a large share of TransUrban,
a large, publicly traded toll road operator in Australia and the US.3939 Disclosure: Through no fault of his
own, as a feature of being employed at
the University of Sydney, some of David
Levinson’s retirement funds are tied up
in UniSuper.
Investing in new infrastructure is a lot riskier than investing in
already built infrastructure. The early financiers of the Channel
Tunnel got wiped out twice, similarly the Dulles Greenway and
many other privately funded pieces of new infrastructure that were
either more expensive than expected, or built too far in advance of
demand – yet the physical thing remains, so the public risk is
relatively low.
Unproductive assets should be retired. We have a few in mind,
but we suspect most fixed assets (aside from selected intercity rail,
commuter rail and streetcar lines) in US transit are redeemable, and
all the modern buses are as well, as they can be redeployed.
19
Utility Models
Figure 19.1: TransLink structure.
We have considered public and private ownership,1 of specific 1 §18.
facilities and services and who provides the service. This chapter
deepens the question from ownership to organization, exploring the
idea of utilities for both public transport and roads.
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19.1 What is a Utility?
Peter Norton says “A public utility was not just an enterprise ‘of
real public importance,’ but also one in which competition was
unfeasible.”2 Competition is unfeasible because a utility is a natural2 (Norton 2011).
monopoly. It has high fixed costs and low variable costs. So unlike
many sectors, competition actually drives up costs (since the fixed
costs are spread among fewer rather than more users). In short no
one will go and build a competing road or rail network in most
places.
Many utilities share with transport systems the characteristic of
having a networked structure. Most, if not all, of these utilities are
operated on the basis of a payment-for-use system. Utility pricing
varies regionally, some locales vary prices by time-of-day, and users
often have the option of choosing different rate plans. These models
are never strict ‘marginal cost pricing,’ but they may improve upon
average cost pricing. There are strong parallels between public
utilities and transport services, though some differences exist in the
nature of the services consumed, the role of technology, and the
structure of institutions and decision making.33 (Hillsman 1995).
Water faces similar difficulties as transport in the ambiguity of
appropriate property rights. Institutional reforms began in the 20th
century to better allocate water resources and to improve the
efficiency of water use. Water changed from being perceived as a
free good to a scarce economic good.4 Institutional reforms differ by4 (Saleth and Dinar 2004).
political setting and social environment.5 Decentralization (from5 (Saleth and Dinar 1999).
central to state and municipal governments) took place in Mexico
and Brazil, while corporatization and privatization occurred in
Chile, Brazil, France, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand,
among others.
Hillsman suggests four categories in which utilities have
developed to manage demand:66 (Hillsman 1995).
• Altering infrastructure,
• Packaging services,
• Substituting technologies, and
• Changing the price of service.
Transport agencies have considered all of these, but implemented
them weakly. In reverse order: prices are largely invariant, bundling
and packaging of services is not considered when looking at pricing,
infrastructure is hidebound to engineering standards, and difficult
to modify, and technological (modal substitutions) are not viable for
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most passenger or freight users.7 One could easily imagine more 7 Most US residents have few options
for switching modes, driving is the
default mode as other modes are too
time consuming, inconvenient, unsafe,
or have some other flaw.
creativity on the part of road providers in all of these aspects. The
constraints on the application of creativity are due to the engineering
culture in a public agency, where risk-taking is discouraged if not
punished, and certainly never rewarded.
With some modification, it seems possible to transfer the utility
model of governance to road transport. This model separates the
organization delivering the service from the client, is subject to rate
regulation, and implements a more direct, user-pays system of
financing. This model could depoliticize management of the
existing transport system. Whether rate regulation is in fact
economically necessary is the subject of debate; for instance Stigler
and Friedland argue there is no difference in prices in the electrical
sector due to regulation, because electricity is competitive with
other energy sources in the long run.8 One expects from experience 8 (Stigler and Friedland 1962).
with other utilities, toll roads, and road concessions in other
countries that it would be politically necessary to have some public
guarantee of an upper bound on the rates a road utility could
charge, as provided by a regulatory agency.9 The risk is that an 9 We note that Virginia currently does not
have an upper bound on their variable
tolls designed to manage congestion. In
this case we are not directly writing
about congestion, but investing in and
maintaining the overall road network.
We also note that as of this writing there
are Virginia politicians trying to pass
legislation that will establish an upper
bound.
upper bound on revenue would be too tight, resulting in financial
losses (and one of the causes of municipal takeover), as occurred in
the then private mass transit sector throughout the US in the early
to mid 20th century.
Such a system would transform but not replace public highway
or transport authorities as the party responsible for providing and
maintaining roads. One example of a transport system that has
transitioned to more of a utility-based model is the road authority
in New Zealand.10 This system was designed to be self-financing, 10 (Starkie 1988).
with what was originally called the National Roads Board allocating
charges among users on the basis of costs incurred. Three types of
costs were identified: load-related costs, capacity-related costs, and
driver-related costs (covering signing and other costs not related
directly to road use).
There are other elements of costs not included, such as access
costs (the cost of accessing the network from land and the cost of a
connected network, which can be separated from capacity costs
(related to the width of the roadway), and load costs (related to the
thickness of the roadway), and environmental costs (both how the
system deteriorates due to weathering independent of use, and how
the environment is degraded due to use).
Vehicles are split into two classes on the basis of weight, with
vehicles less than 3.5 tonnes paying a charge in the form of a fuel
tax. In the US, Oregon has a weight-mile tax for heavy trucks.
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Heavier vehicles pay a distance license fee, which is essentially a
form of weight-distance tax. Such a system is relatively
straightforward and requires minimal new technology, leading to
low collection costs compared with most proposed road pricing
systems. Newbery and Santos have also estimated the costs and
relevant charges for a similar, though hypothetical, system of user
charges for the UK.1111 (Newbery and Santos 1999).
19.2 TransLink: organizing transport like a utility
TransLink is the multi-modal transport organization for Greater
Vancouver, BC, and it is unlike what we see in the United States. It
could be thought of as a multi-modal transport utility with
autonomy constrained by oversight. Figure 19.1 shows an
organization chart. TransLink describes its organization in a long,
though well-done and readable, report:
The province agreed to provide six cents of tax room from the
provincial fuel tax, which would be a major funding source, and also
give the [Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority] (GVTA) the
parking sales tax revenue. The GVTA would have the ability to
generate a steady stream of revenue through levying taxes; however,
any increase in taxes would have to first be approved by the GVRD
board. The only increase the GVTA could implement on its own was
to transit fares.
...
“You can look at it as if it’s no different from water or sewers, or
any other kind of utility,” Cameron said. “So what are the financing
principles behind those utilities? They’re user pay, essentially. You use
water and sewer revenues to pay for water and sewer services, and the
aim was to get transport services to be autonomous, self-financing,
self-constructing utilities.”1212 (TransLink 2008).
One of the key points to consider is that metropolitan Vancouver
has a transit mode share of 21%, comparable with much larger
Toronto and Montreal (though behind metro New York’s 30%, it is
well ahead of Seattle’s 9%), despite ranking 31st in population in
North America as of 2015. Some of that has to do with institutional
factors and governance.
Canada should consider exporting this model of governance to
the US.
19.3 Transit should focus on core markets
Some transit markets (which we call the core, and are typically in the
center of metropolitan areas) are better than others. Deciding which
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mode to take is not generally a marginal decision. For a given market
(origin-destination pair), almost everyone chooses either one mode
or another. Very few markets are competitive. To be competitive,
the alternatives have to be perceived as having almost exactly the
same travel time, frequency, reliability, and other characteristics, or
the advantage in one characteristic has to be exactly offset by another.
Consider downtown Minneapolis. Under some assumptions,
transit mode share to ‘downtown’ for peak hour work trips is 44%.
We expect this is not uniform, for some origin-destination pairs,
transit mode share rises higher than 44%, and for others it falls far
below 44%.
Downtown is one kind of market, and larger, denser cities than
Minneapolis will even have higher transit mode shares.
Non-downtown is a different kind of market, with a transit mode
share much closer to zero. The mode share for all work trips in the
Twin Cities region holds around 5%. If the mode share is 44% for
trips going to downtown Minneapolis (and much higher than 5%
for trips to downtown St. Paul and the University of Minnesota),
then it must be lower than 5% elsewhere. Across the United States,
the transit mode share for all trips is under 2%
The Mohring effect13 implies there are two equilibria because 13 §A.4.
transit is a positive feedback system (and the primary competing
mode, automobiles, is a negative feedback system).14 The more 14 This model was developed in
(Levinson and Krizek 2008; 2017) and
extended in (Bar-Yosef et al. 2013).
transit riders, the more revenue, the higher the rate of buses (or
trains) per hour (and the better the service, as with more riders,
express and other services can be offered).
At high levels of ridership (relatively high mode shares), losing a
few riders because of small random exogenous shock, or even a
bus-full will not be noticed in the travel times (schedule delays) of
the remaining riders. At medium levels of ridership, losing just
enough riders to result in service cutbacks will have a noticed effect
on headways and thus schedule delays, driving transit ridership
down further. This is the vicious cycle that has destroyed transit in
most of the US. As students of systems theory know, vicious cycles
are just virtuous cycles in reverse. An exogenous shock increasing
transit use should increase supply provided, reducing waits, and
thus further increasing use. We imagine this might be a sharp
sudden increase in the price of fuel. This only happens if the supply
system is responsive, which typically happens with free markets,
but not necessarily under government management.
So in a world where people have the ability to have an
automobile, either many travelers (in a narrowly-defined market)
almost always use transit, and the frequency is high (the case for
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selected to origins to well-served activity centers), or almost no one
does (the case almost everywhere else).
This says that fixed-route transit investment should be highly,
highly focused in markets (OD pairs) where it is, or can cost
effectively and financially sustainably become the dominant carrier.
The transit goal should be reframed. Transit is not
competing to double its regional mode share for all trips from 1.5 to
3%. It is competing to increase its mode share in specific markets
from 40% to 60% to 80%, and to add markets where it can
dominate. (Regional mode share might be a byproduct of that, but
it is an improper goal). Otherwise, the service is spread out like
peanut butter and does nothing well.
To be clear, we cannot put the genie back in the bottle. As a
society, almost all new urban form since the 1920s has been climbing
up Mt. Auto and down Mt. Transit.15 Every change we make to the15 This analogy was discussed in more
depth in (Levinson and Krizek 2005;
2008; Levinson 2015a).
network to make it more convenient for cars makes it less convenient
for transit. Every change in land use adapted to the automobile is
maladapted to an environment served by transit. It would probably
take another century of concerted effort to reverse this, and there is
scant evidence that efforts are concerted.1616 As of this writing, among major cities,
only Buffalo, Hartford, Minneapolis and
San Francisco have eliminated minimum
parking requirements citywide in the
US. This step is fundamental to building
cities conducive to creating access
without driving.
Yet, there remain markets, mostly those that existed before the
1920s, where transit is competitive, and even dominant. Instead of
chasing butterflies, transit systems should focus on its dominant
and dominatable markets, and play to its strengths. Everyone can
think of local butterflies that are diffusing rather than concentrating
transit’s attention.
If, where, and when the transit service is good, it will attract
transit-oriented people to organize their lives around transit
services, and may encourage new people to become transit riders. It
might even encourage transit-oriented development17 to shelter17 §11.20.
those transit-oriented people, and transit-oriented stores and
businesses to serve them. It cannot do this where the service
remains poor.
Cars need not fail for transit to succeed. Each mode has
its use, the problem comes in deploying a mode where it doesn’t fit
(like urban freeways, cars on campus, or low volume fixed route
transit). If we don’t acknowledge the misfit, we will waste scarce
resources (time and money) that could be better spent elsewhere.
And let’s not kid ourselves, these resources are scarce. If we don’t
acknowledge the subsidies and the cross-subsidies in the system,
people will continue to behave inefficiently. The argument that
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because there are subsidies in other modes, we should have
subsidies in our mode is wrong. Two wrongs don’t make a right. A
bad subsidy does not justify more of the same, it justifies removal.
Retrench to a profitable core. Each money-losing route
should be cancelled or operated under contract by the transit utility
in exchange for specific revenue from the jurisdiction that route
serves. Transit organizations would at least break-even on the
operation of the route. The ‘deficit’ would shift from the transit
utility to the public sector, which would have a clearer picture of the
costs of its wants. Focusing on the core requires cutting service
elsewhere.
Mass transit systems in the United States are collectively losing
money hand over fist. Yet many individual routes (including bus
routes) earn enough to pay their own operating (and even capital
costs). But like bad mortgages contaminating the good,
money-losing transit routes are bogging down the system.
We can divide individual systems into three sets of routes:
• Those routes break-even or profit financially (at a given fare). This
is the ‘core.’
• Those lines which are necessary for the core routes to break-even,
and collectively help the set of routes break-even. These are the
‘feeders.’
• Those lines which lose money, and whose absence would not
eliminate profitability on other routes. These routes ensure
spatial coverage of more territory, typically lower density
suburban areas, rather than intensively operate with higher
frequency in urban markets. Jarrett Walker calls them ‘coverage’
routes to emphasize their spatial coverage (at the expense of
service frequency).18 18 (Walker 2011a).
The rationale for this is to think about, and organize mass (or
public) transit agencies as transport operators first, not welfare
organizations. Our view is as much about separating the transit
agency from the welfare function as about whether unprofitable
routes should be dropped. That is, transit agencies don’t do well as
dual purpose agencies. Organizations, like products perform better
with clear missions.
It would be much cleaner to give them a single mission: provide
these routes and make money/break even. They would earn
revenue from customers on profitable routes, and from society at
large on ‘coverage’ routes that society explicitly chooses to subsidize
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despite their inability to make money. The operating agency should
not be making welfare decisions, that is better done through an
explicit public policy process.
Thus agencies should be considered public utilities rather than
departments of government. Utilities, by their very name, provide a
useful service for a price to their users.
Local transit systems should identify and propose to retrench to
the financially sustainable system, and present local politicians with
a choice.
If local politicians want additional ‘coverage’ services, they
should be presented with a cost of subsidy per line, and then can
collectively choose which lines to finance out of general revenue, as
this is primarily a welfare rather than an transport function. The
Paris transit system, RATP, charges local and national governments
a ‘compensatory indemnity’ for keeping fares below the break-even
price.19 Governments recover this from an employment tax.19 (Wolman and Reigeluth 1980).
In other words, public transit organizations would present the
public with a bill for these money-losing services (the subsidy
required in order to at least break even on operating them (i.e. the
difference between their revenue and their cost), and not be
expected to pay for them out of operating revenue.
If the cost of those lines is deemed too expensive (i.e. the
politicians are unwilling to pay for them with general revenue tax
dollars), they should be canceled. Transit agencies would no longer
be losing money, they would now be break-even or slightly
profitable. They might even pay a dividend to their owners (the
general public).
General revenue (the Treasury) would of course now be losing
money, we didn’t pull resources from thin air. But since this is a
social welfare/redistribution function, that is perfectly appropriate.
This would entirely change public and political perception of transit
services. It might also result in fewer bad routes being funded, since
it would be crystal clear where the subsidies lay.
The ‘which routes to fund’ decision should be revisited
periodically.
We suspect no transit fare increase would be enough to pay for
the entire fixed route transit system as we know it in the US. The
demand would diminish sufficiently so as to keep the maximum
revenue collected below what is necessary for the full transit
system. This is why we suggest separating it out. There is a
profitable core. We should try to figure out what it is.
The point is not that transit should be profitable (though that
would be nice), but that if it is useful, it should break-even (i.e. be
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financially sustainable without depending on others). If people are
not willing to pay for the service, it is insufficiently useful. We think
the public utility model is valid (and historically how transit had
been organized in the first place).
Network shape and design should reflect the focus on
core routes. Hub and spoke (or radial) networks, which are
conventional for many transit systems, are an example of how
network design affects the usefulness of the overall system. Transit
networks are good at getting people into and out of central business
districts (the hubs) with few transfers but leave those who travel
suburb to suburb or anywhere other than downtown in the cold.
These networks are not optimal for access to opportunities
anywhere else.
As most job growth in the US occurs in the suburbs, historical
hub and spoke networks don’t help most people get where they
need to go. Yet, for transit, the best market remains its traditional
market, serving downtown and large employment centers from
pre-1930 residential areas. Whether it should play to its strength or
follow its customers is an important strategic question transit
agencies face. Most, like the Twin Cities, have chosen to reinforce
the pre-War employment nodes (downtown), with some radial
extensions to the largest suburban activity centers (Mall of America,
Eden Prairie). In contrast, some cities are rethinking their transit
networks so that they better reflect where people need to go. With
the assistance of transit consultant Jarrett Walker, Houston recently
redesigned their highly radial, CBD-serving bus network as a grid,
refocusing resources to improve frequency on selected routes and
streamlining the network. The old network and new network are
shown in Figure 19.2. This improved access.20 20 (Palmateer et al. 2016b).
19.4 Think of transit like a club
Users of transit should be treated as members of a club. Transit is
most like a club good,21 and the relevant club-members should be 21 §A.
its users and potential users. Users should be financially
incentivized to get season or annual passes (paid monthly with
bank debits) and become ‘members’ of the transit system rather
than pay-as-you-go ‘riders,’ which will encourage more usage, and
many users to get subscriptions so they have the easy option of
taking transit. As with many museums and zoos and other clubs,
membership should be reciprocal, so joining the Twin Cities Transit
System gets me ‘free rides’ in Chicago or New York. This will
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Figure 19.2: Reimagining
Houston Frequent Transit
Network. increase the perceived ownership that passengers have for the
service.2222 Most people who use transit only use
transit in one or two cities per year, so
this would be relatively minor. Again
this is a case where contracting out (to
Visa or Mastercard, for instance) might
be valuable.
Many people pay for transit on a per use basis, either by cash or
with a stored-value card. Others23 use a season pass for ‘unlimited’
23 In the Twin Cities 9.5 million rides of a
total of about 71 million (which depends
on what numbers you use) on Metro
Transit
use (‘unlimited’ use still has limits, for instance in the Twin Cities
you still need to pay for services > $3 per ride, i.e. Northstar). For
instance, a Metropass is $76 per month, if you belong to an
organization with 10 or more subscribers, and allows unlimited
service.24 There are many options.24 A U-Pass (for University of Minnesota
students) is only $97 per (4 month)
semester, with subsidy from the
University.
For the individual traveler, $76 per month is worthwhile at current
fares if you make at least 34 peak trips (17 days per month) or 43 off-
peak trips (22 days per month), i.e. if you are essentially a daily user
for commute trips, or use it for a lot of non-commute trips as well.
Several (perhaps obvious) points:
• There are probably many existing riders who would benefit from
a Metropass who don’t get one (this would cost Metro Transit
money).
• Possessing a Metropass would induce the holder to make more
trips by transit (since the marginal cost of use would now be zero).
• At a relatively lower price, more people would get a Metropass.
This may or may not increase Metro Transit’s revenue. This can
be achieved either by lowering the price of the Metropass or
increasing the price of non-Metropass use.
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• We would expect more people to have passes than use the passes
on the system every day (not every pass-holder need be a daily
rider). People pay for the option of not having to think about
price.
What benefits do clubs offer? Let’s look at the examples of other
public institutions that use the club model: museums, zoos, public
radio for some ideas:
• Unlimited transit rides in your
home city,
• Reciprocal unlimited transit
rides in other cities,
• Free entry to the local
transport museum,
• Discounts from participating
merchants and at events (like
sports games, shows, or
concerts),
• A tote bag or mug,
• A newsletter or magazine,
• Two free taxi rides per quarter,
• Free parking! (At park and
ride lots? In downtown?), and
• Eligibility to vote on
governance (such as a
Member’s Board which has
input into real decision
making).
While the tote bag will be popular, there are limits to the ancillary
benefits of membership in an organization, the main thing has to be
admission to the service that organization provides.
The more important aspect of membership is that it changes the
perspective from being a customer to being a member, if not owner,
of the system. Members of a club want there to be more members, as
it helps spread the costs and raises money for the services provided.
Members advocate for the organizations they join. Members feel part
of a ‘larger social whole.’ Members help maintain it, since it is their
‘property.’ A lot of this is ‘reframing’ but the psychology is important
here, people act differently based on whether they feel they have real
input into decisions and real effect on outcomes.
Some cities have Bus Riders Unions, but they are often at odds
with the transit agency. Almost everywhere has an Automobile
Association (Minneapolis and St. Paul each have one), about which
members have warm feelings since they help start cars when the
battery dies, or change a tire, or tow it when something else breaks.
Transit workers are members of their union. Even transit agencies
are members of APTA trade association. We cannot find an example
of a transit system that organizes and treats its riders as members.
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Why shouldn’t riders be members of the non-profit cooperative
utility that provides them transport services on a regular basis? And
why shouldn’t they help govern that organization?
19.5 Enterprising roads
Policymakers should permit states to form independent road
enterprises that would manage roads that are part of the National
Highway System (and any other roads states wished), raising
revenue from a variety of user fees, including road pricing, gas
taxes, and facility tolls.25 To facilitate these enterprises, federal law25 This section and the next are adapted
and extended from (Levinson 2012). should be changed to permit states to implement tolls of various
kinds on Interstate and other highways. The tolls could provide
off-peak discounts, thereby beginning the process of using prices to
reduce congestion.
Today’s congestion is evidence that the current governance
structure of American highways is unsuccessful in managing a basic
collective action problem. Discussions of road pricing for financing
and congestion management in the US still largely assume that our
existing institutions would do the pricing. But to date, this has
essentially been a non-starter. Institutional reforms are needed to
reconfigure state departments of transportation as public utilities
rather than departments of government. Then Americans will stop
seeing roads as a public service funded out of the pot of general
revenue and start seeing them as a fee-for-service proposition paid
for by direct user charges.
While everyone wants a free ride, dedicating highway user fees
to transport is widely preferred to more general revenue sources.
Although this already occurs in most states and at the federal level,
the public does not realize it, and therefore is not aware of a great
deal of evidence about how this approach can work in practice.
Establishing a clearly differentiated road enterprise would change
how people think about transport, as well as how transport is
managed.
This approach would separate the organization delivering the
service from the client, be subject to rate regulation, and would
involve a more direct, user-pays system of financing. This model
could partially depoliticize management of the existing transport
system.
Thus the road enterprise approach would be better positioned to
rationalize the transport network than today’s state departments of
transportation, subject as they are to the politics of their governors
and legislatures.26 It would have the authority to downgrade or26 §D.
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abandon roads that are uneconomical and the obligation to
maintain the rest at a high quality of service, including operating
them, maintaining, and reconstructing as necessary. It could
identify roads that should be expanded and new connections that
should be built. New road construction would still be subject to the
normal political process, but would occur only if there were
long-term funding in place to pay for it directly or repay bonds or
loans.
19.6 Minnesota Mobility: A scenario
It is 2025 and a new road enterprise, Minnesota Mobility (M2), which
was spun out of the old Minnesota Department of Transportation
(MnDOT), has recently taken over the operations and maintenance of
the state’s main roads. This new organization emerged from the local
culture of Minnesota and has quickly become a popular institution,
responsive to the needs of its citizens, who now see clear value for
their transport-related payments.
Revenue
M2 has the authority to raise revenues from road users via fees
assessed at the fuel pump (for older vehicles), or by using special,
in-vehicle equipment that charges according to mileage and axle
weight (for newer ones like autonomous and electric vehicles). In
both instances, fees are subject to regulatory approval by the state’s
Public Utility Commission (PUC).
In urban areas there is a peak period congestion surcharge on all
roads. This has reduced congestion, but has not eliminated it. For
those who require reliable transport and guaranteed travel times,
there is a complete network of MnPass managed lanes throughout
the Twin Cities. These also contribute revenue to M2. All trucks pay
a new weight-distance charge that varies by axle loadings and the
route used. Automatic Vehicle Identification has improved
considerably, dramatically reducing collection costs, and all in-state
cars have an account with M2 for their vehicle license. For those
that don’t drive in the peak period, don’t use MnPass, and don’t
pay at the fuel pump, a monthly bill is issued. Out-of-state drivers
are billed too, thanks to a cooperative agreement among all the state
road enterprises, and the few remaining DOTs in states still using
the old model.
In addition to conducting normal road operations, M2 exports
services related to ramp meter control and snowplow technology,
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where it has expertise. This gives it an additional source of income.
It manages traffic data collection and freeway management from a
multi-state traffic management center in the suburb of Roseville,
using the most advanced technology available. Neighboring state
transport organizations, as well as counties within the state of
Minnesota, contract with M2 to manage their traffic using ramp
meters. They find this less expensive and more effective than doing
it themselves.
M2 clears snow from major local roads (under contract to
counties and cities) and from freeways in adjoining states. They do
this using advanced technologies such as largely autonomous
snowplows, which through advanced GPS technologies can traverse
and clear snow-covered roads despite the absence of visible road
markings. With recent improvements in weather forecasting, M2 is
able to pre-deploy snowplows along corridors likely to be hit hard
and make better use of its expensive capital-intensive equipment.
Regulation
The Minnesota Public Utility Commission’s mission is to create and
maintain a regulatory environment that ensures safe, reliable and
efficient utility services at fair and reasonable rates.2727 (Minnesota Public Utility Commission
2018).
The PUC has an important role. By regulating rates, it in effect
determines the quality of service on the roads. M2’s natural instinct
is to push for higher revenues and to produce a higher quality
service, for instance by resurfacing roads more frequently, making
lane markings more visible, or clearing snow-covered roads more
quickly. The PUC’s job is to compare the rates and quality of output
in Minnesota with other states and to determine whether its
residents are getting value for money. M2’s board of directors plays
an important oversight role, but its main responsibility is to the
road enterprise and its shareholders. The PUC, by contrast,
explicitly serves the interest of service users. While M2’s users and
shareholders are similar groups, they are not necessarily identical.
Responsibilities
M2 provides a number of services related to infrastructure, traffic,
seasonal operations and licensing. The major categories are listed
below:
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Infrastructure Services
• Pavement maintenance, repair
and reconstruction;
• Bridge maintenance, repair
and reconstruction;
• Sidewalk maintenance, repair
and reconstruction.
Seasonal Operations
• Snow removal;
• Street sweeping.
Traffic Operations
• Traffic enforcement (police
services, red light cameras,
speed compliance cameras);
• Parking enforcement;
• Traffic control (signs, signals
and markings), including
monitoring.
Licensing
• Driver Licenses;
• Vehicle Licenses;
• Revenue collection.
Differences
Unlike MnDOT, but like some other state DOTs and the Australian
road enterprises, M2 has the authority to license vehicles to use
roads, and to license drivers. It has a special safety and security
service that enforces its rules on road use. As a result, it also
incorporates what used to be the Department of Driver and Vehicle
Services and the Minnesota State Patrol (once part of the
Department of Public Safety). M2 can also develop land adjacent to
existing state roads, generating additional revenue by capitalizing
on the accessibility benefits it creates. M2 has not yet done very
much of this, but there is potential.
M2 differs from MnDOT in several other significant ways. For
example, it is not responsible for the construction of new roads.
This responsibility now lies with land developers, newly chartered
turnpikes, and local governments. After construction, some of these
new roads are turned over to M2 for operation, management,
maintenance and reconstruction. However, many remain as private
turnpikes or toll roads, integrated into the network through
individually negotiated interoperability agreements, which enable
M2 to handle billing.
While it does have a voice on state and local transport planning,
M2 is not responsible for this. It plans for its own future, and makes
decisions about the capacity required on its existing roads, but for
the most part broader strategic planning takes a back seat to
management.
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Like MnDOT, M2 is not responsible for the operation of transit
services, which the state has separately contracted out through the
use of Public Private Partnerships. Aid to local governments for
roads and transit is distributed directly by the Department of
Finance. However, such funding has been considerably reduced,
leading to ongoing discussion about the role of local vs. state
government in the management of roads and other transport
services.
Ownership
Minnesota Mobility was chartered to provide road services to the
people of Minnesota, and as such, the citizens of Minnesota are,
collectively, its owner. Its board of directors comprises members
nominated by the state governor and approved by the state
legislature. They serve staggered terms, which helps prevent M2
being overly swayed by the political process and ensures a degree of
continuity in management. There have been suggestions that M2’s
board should be directly elected, but so far Minnesotans have been
content to let their democratic representatives attend to personnel
details. The board of directors selects a chief executive officer and
has approval rights over the CEO’s other ‘C-level’ officials. The
board sets the CEO’s salary through a compensation committee. It
also approves M2’s annual budget, revenue requests and major
expenditures. Unlike MnDOT, M2’s budget does not have to be
approved by the legislature. Nor is the legislature responsible for
the rates it charges.
Employees
The employees of M2 no longer work for the state of Minnesota,
and therefore are not subject to the vagaries of state politics and the
occasional state shutdown. Roads have become a public utility and
they must be kept operating. When M2 was formed, MnDOT
employees were allowed to apply for positions in the new
organization, but they were not guaranteed jobs. About 10% did not
apply (many choosing to retire) and about 15% were not rehired.
The old unions did not carry over and, so far, employees have not
chosen to form any new unions. The state absorbed the pension
system of the old MnDOT, giving M2 a clean slate.
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Reporting
Every year M2 publishes an annual report identifying revenue from
users, from services and from other sources, as well as expenses. It
also publishes an important time series of performance indicators
demonstrating the quality of pavements, roads, lane markings,
snow clearance, traffic congestion and so on. The organization has
set goals for performance in each area, and budgets enough funding
to achieve these goals. Nonetheless, every year, after it has invested
funds and ensured sufficient capital for present operations and
contingencies, M2 runs a small surplus. This comes in large part
from the congestion surcharge, which earns money by charging
more in the peak periods.
Dividends
Even after making deposits to a reserve fund, which helps smooth
financial flows and ensures that long-term maintenance and
reconstruction is properly financed, M2 is able to put part of its
annual surplus toward paying a dividend to its owners – the people
of Minnesota. M2 could probably run a larger surplus by raising
user fees to ‘what the market will bear,’ but that would be
politically contentious and not in line with its public service mission
(nor would it be approved by PUC, its regulator). As it is, there is
no more chatter about how state roads are subsidized by taxes: the
argument has moved on and everyone acknowledges that roads are
paid for by their users (and then some). The annual road dividend
warms the heart of local taxpayers, coming as it does every April 15.
Future
There has been talk of M2 fully taking over the road and highway
departments of counties and cities in Minnesota. Doing so would
relieve the local governments of a major expense that must be paid
out of property tax revenues, as local governments are unable to
assess gas taxes under current law. Furthermore, just as phone
companies and electric utilities own both ‘the last mile’ and ‘the
linehaul,’ there is now a debate about whether there should be
vertical integration in roads. Some argue that the economies of scale
this would allow, and the professional management and
specialization it would entail, could reduce costs and improve
quality significantly. There is even discussion of M2 merging with
road enterprises in neighboring states in order to achieve additional
economies, but these have not yet advanced very far. A few states
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have even begun to sell shares in their road enterprises on the stock
market or to large pension funds, in an effort to raise additional
capital and introduce private-sector efficiencies. However, most
states, Minnesota among them, have resisted investor-ownership so
far.
Clearly, some legal changes were needed to implement a
dynamic, politically independent system like this. But they were
neither unimaginable nor unfamiliar, as aspects of this approach
were already in place on some US highways and turnpikes. Once
some states started down the path toward road enterprises, others
quickly followed.
19.7 Takeaways
So who should own and operate networks? There isn’t an obviously
optimal network ownership structure. We argue for a regulated
public utility model for roads and a regulated utility model for
transit networks to achieve economic and societal goals. Public
transit networks built to achieve political goals will be too large and
may end up distorting travel choices people make. Justifying
transport investment because of construction jobs,28 is a good way28 §10.
to make sure the transport network is always expanding whether
we like it or not. Minimum parking requirements in the zoning
code ensures that the parking nodes on the network continuously
expand, which leads to more driving than we want. Yet networks
built by oligopolists and monopolists to strictly be profitable
through user fees may not be large enough for broader goals and
will maximize private profits at the expense of the public good.
Here are some takeaway points about network ownership:
• Monopoly ownership (public or private) may be needed to
support large capital expenses.
• However, most transit need not be monopoly provided, as the
main costs are labor and vehicles. Buses use shared road space in
most cases. There are economic stability issues if routes or stops
are not regulated. This regulation may be either by the public or
by the industry itself through route associations, where the latter
are often enforced in developing countries with real or implied
violence.2929 See (Klein et al. 1997).
• Public networks often attempt to anticipate need or are too large
for actual demand. This is because public networks are expanded
due to political reasons (such as the Interstate network) or have
dedicated revenues without direct user fees.
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• Public transit networks are justified on projected demand, which
is often distorted by optimism bias.
• Private networks will react to demand to maintain profitability.
This means expansion may be slower and contraction may be
faster than public networks.
• Indirect effects from network expansion, such as land
development or positive returns to scale may affect how much
investment networks receive.
• Private actors will sell off or abandon links and facilities on
networks that are unprofitable. Publicly owned networks have a
much harder time reducing the scope of networks.

20
Politics and Politicians
Figure 20.1: Metro Transit
Southwest LRT (Green
Line Extension) Ceremonial
Groundbreaking, November
30, 2018. Many politicians are
smiling, claiming it will be
a success despite decades of
setbacks. Photo by Metropolitan
Council of the Twin Cities.
Politics balances the ideal with the possible. In a first best
world, we do the best thing assuming everything else about the
world is ideal. In a second best world, we do the best thing
recognizing everything else about the world will remain as
dysfunctional as it already is.1 We identify four sources of 1 See (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956).
differentiation that people of good will may hold when disagreeing:
• Values. Many political debates are because people disagree on
values:2 some people think a lot of freedom is more valuable than 2 §17.5.
a little bit of safety, some may be more afraid, while some other
people capitalize on that fear; some think the life of the unborn
has value to society, others think a woman’s body is her own.
• Time frame. Debates occur because people cannot agree about the
relevant time frame: some think earning more dollars today will
enable us to more efficiently solve tomorrow’s problems, others
think we need to sacrifice economic growth to reduce pollution
now.
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• Knowledge base. A few debates are because people don’t accept
common facts: we think very few people attended the President’s
inauguration, he purports to believe it was the biggest ever.
• Worldview. Some debates are because people disagree about the
model of the world: we think most threats (future dangers) are
home-grown, others think they come from outsiders. This relates
to the last two, but is distinct because it deals with future facts,
not something evidence-based.
Often political debates are about how much change is possible.
This depends on the model of the world. If our voter votes yes
now, and yes passes, the world moves somewhat in the right
direction, but thereby releases the pressure to move farther in the
right direction. If she votes no, and no passes, society doesn’t
make the move, and she hopes a better offer will be on the table
later. There is no guarantee this will occur, and in the meantime
she may have lost some benefits. Say, in the US context, a voter
believes in what a real Green Party3 would stand for, but does3 The US Green Party at the national
level, unlike that in some other countries,
is of course highly problematic from an
environmental and political perspective,
and took funding from Russia in 2016.
not think the Greens will win, should she vote for the Democrats
instead, which will be closer than the Republican alternative to
her preferred outcome? Given the current US single-member
district, first-past-the-post,4 no ranked-choice voting system,4 The candidate who receives the most
votes wins, even without a majority. that’s a logical choice for most environmentalists. Voters are
choosing the second-best rather than nothing. They can make a
protest vote, or they can try to move the system. If everyone in
her admittedly progressive Minneapolis district thought the
Greens had a chance, they would act as if the Greens had a
chance, and the Greens would have a chance. The possible is
determined by what everyone thinks that everyone else thinks
everyone thinks.
People become politicians to be something or to do
something. We favor the latter. There is no point in being a
politician unless you want to accomplish something that improves
the world around you. Sure some people get into politics for
personal self-aggrandisement and wealth enhancement, but for
most politicians there is in the end no reason to accumulate power
but to do something with it, that is to impose their values, their
preferred temporal horizon, their perception of reality, and their
model of the world on the government. Further, they must have the
notion they can do this better than anyone else, not just better than
a person in the opposing party, but better than the next best person
in their own party.
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Power is a means to an end, and usually the end is more
significant than private wealth. Some politicians may forget this
along the way, many try to combine their values with
wealth-enhancement, but hopefully they remember near the end of
the careers the whole point of doing what they did and expend
some of their power to achieve their original aims.
It is the advocate’s job to move the politician in a particular
direction. This extends the Overton Window of acceptable
discourse.
It is the politician’s job to compute how far to move both to
maximize future power by ensuring his constituency is along for the
ride and to actually move in the ‘right’ direction consistent with the
reason for being a politician in the first place.
20.1 Political parties, three axes, and public transport
As a gross over-simplification, the current rap in the US is that
Democrats like trains and Republicans like roads, Greens like bikes,
and Libertarians like tolls. No party stands up for buses, which are
by far the most used transit mode.
Transport policy has become politically divisive, especially for
local politics which have been less constrained by national parties in
the past. Why should something as fundamental as infrastructure
policy lead to such vitriol and moral superiority?
We need a good framework to start working through why
advocates of a particular transport technology are so assured of
their rightness. In the current environment, there is no room for
reasoned critique of transit, roads, etc., or reasonable agreement
that these things are important.
Maturity (peak travel) is one explanation. Transport policy has
become ideological because there are not clear priorities for new
investment for any mode, and spending on maintenance doesn’t
make anyone happy, it just prevents future unhappiness.
Another plausible explanation is that as federal dollars have
become more competitive (for all things) strict party loyalty is more
important at the local level. This means that federal representation
sets priorities for non-formula spending and if you want any money
you best conform to that vision. As Republicans dominate rural
areas and Democrats dominate cities, party loyalty helps determine
what transport policies you favor.
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Three-axes model
If you take a charitable view of the world of ideas, and politics, you
can adopt the three-axes model of political beliefs popularized by
Arnold Kling. People have internal value systems that array on three
axes. He writes:
My hypothesis is that progressives, conservatives, and libertarians
view politics along three different axes. For progressives, the main
axis has oppressors at one end and the oppressed at the other. For
conservatives, the main axis has civilization at one end and barbarism
at the other. For libertarians, the main axis has coercion at one end
and free choice at the other.55 It is Sometimes Appropriate ... Posted
on December 4, 2012 by Arnold Kling.
For more see (Kling 2017) For convenience we have mapped these to the three-point French
Revolutionary slogan of ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.’
In brief:
• Liberty is associated with Libertarianism, and privileges
individual freedom.
• Equality is associated with modern ‘progressivism’ and social
justice, and thus, in the US, the Democrats, and prioritizes
fairness (with all that means).
• Fraternity (or community), considers most important group
loyalty, respect for order and hierarchy, and obedience to the
social order, preservation of civilization, abhorrence of barbarism,
and is associated with modern American ‘conservatism’ and
thus, in the US, Republicans.
There are important core-values associated with all of the axes,
and society requires a tension between them to be successful.
Lacking social justice, (which would be a problem of itself), the
out-group will not be loyal to the system. If out-groups provide
value to the other groups (such as by increasing international trade,
or advancing science, or providing labor, or cooking tastier food),
this is a major loss. Even without a clear racial out-group, people
naturally form divisions over even trivial distinctions.66 (Sherif 2010).
Without any individual freedoms, (which is bad of itself), and
rewards and responsibilities associated with personal action) there
will be no innovation or progress.
Without any respect for order, there will be no stability or
government or framework under which the others can operate.
There also needs to be defense against the outsider.
It is entirely reasonable to believe that society has moved too far
on one axis and away from another. It is entirely unreasonable to
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believe only one axis has value. Absolutism on any of these axes (as a
core belief) is politically unsustainable. Feigned absolutism as a way
of opening the Overton Window of Discourse7 may be, however, a 7 (Lehman 2014).
logical strategic move, depending the degree to which people believe
you are true to your beliefs.
Nevertheless, regardless of your political persuasion, everyone
should like buses. The rationale for the various political persuasions
are presented below.
Democrats
Figure 20.2: Buses are
S.M.A.R.T. in Starkville
Mississippi.
Today Democrats are associated with rail. The reason we hear from
politically connected folks is construction jobs and unions and real
estate development and property owners. Of course their more
urban constituency prefers rail to roads, while higher densities fit
with their urban ideal. To the extent that Democrats have an
underlying principle of ‘equality’ and ‘social justice,’ they should
support buses.
Why Democrats should want to prioritize improving buses:
• Buses serve more people than trains (since they are more cost-
effective), so bus improvements benefit more people.
• Bus riders are much more likely to be Democrats since they have
lower average incomes compared to rail users and the general
population.
• Buses generate more operating jobs than trains, as bus drivers are
labor and buses don’t carry as many passengers as long trains.
• Buses are harder to automate than trains, so driver jobs are
longer lasting jobs. While there are fewer construction jobs than
rail projects, those are short term anyway.
• There are more manufacturing jobs per passenger. Bus
manufacturing is more likely to be local.8 8 (Li et al. 2015).
Republicans
Figure 20.3: Buses are coldly
efficient, like this Metro Transit
bus in Winter.
To the extent Republicans uphold the value of ‘fraternity’ and
support the existing ‘social order’ they should endorse buses.
Why Republicans should like buses:
• Buses are much less expensive to build than rail, and thus much
more cost effective per passenger served in most markets. If you
are a Republican who wants to provide public services (that is,
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you believe in governing as the outcome of victory), you want to
provide them effectively.
• Bus transit helps more lower income workers get to jobs than a
similar investment in rail in most places. Employed people have a
stake in the system.
• Republicans can foster the many private bus operators serving US
cities, including many of the suburban bus companies.
• By supporting buses Republicans can show that they care about
an actual problem their constituents have and work to improve
how bus service is supplied.
It should be noted the late, racist, Republican, rail-advocate Paul
Weyrich continues to be trotted out by ‘conservatives.’ Weyrich was
embraced by the rail community despite admitting his ‘sordid grab
bag of lamentable beliefs.’9 His argument was that trains serve white9 (Trains for America 2008).
middle class republican voters, so (a) Republicans should support
their constituency (not much about actual core values of balancing
budgets or efficiency required), and (b) rail advocates should accept
the support as the coalition to build trains needed to be large due to
their large public cost.
We believe there are some values more important than transport
technology preference, and it is sad to see others making sordid
bedfellows.
Libertarians
Figure 20.4: Buses are franchised
out in London, like this
Routemaster, and in many
places have exclusive lanes.
Libertarians uphold the value of ‘liberty,’ freedom of action.
Providing mobility for those without effective options increases
overall freedom.
Today libertarian (if not ‘Libertarian’) transport policy (best
represented by the Reason Foundation)10 favors moving towards
10 See especially the new book Rethinking
America’s Highways (Poole 2018).
road pricing, public private partnerships, contracting out, HOT
lanes, and privatization as strategies, but doing so intelligently. All
of this will have the consequence of raising the cost of travel by
automobile and result in fewer vehicle miles traveled than current
policies. It also suggests that if auto travel is more expensive, the
use of other modes will increase. One of those other modes is buses.
Why Libertarians should support buses:
• Buses are more easily contracted out or franchised to private
firms in a competitive way than infrastructure itself (as in
London), which is embedded capital subject to natural spatial
monopolies. The evidence for the ease of contracting is the extent
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of contracting (many non-US cities already contract out or
franchise bus services).
• Bus routing and scheduling is also more dynamic and adaptable
to actual and changing needs given an environment with
ubiquitous roads and evolving land uses.11 11 (Klein et al. 1997).
• Buses can take advantage of High Occupancy/Toll lanes, and
integrated busways/HOT lanes are useful for suburb to city
radial commuting markets, sharing the fixed costs of expensive
facilities over more users than exclusive transit ways, without a
time penalty.
• Buses enable people without other options to travel farther than
no motorized transport at all, increasing freedom.
Greens
Greens are most associated in the US with non-motorized transport.
As pedestrians ourselves, we see the many advantages. While many
more people could walk than do, and many others could re-arrange
their home and work locations over time to enable one or more
members of their household to walk or bike, getting people to move
home or change jobs to minimize travel costs is a big ask. Creating
new (and re-creating existing) urban places (instead of new
suburban places) aligns with the philosophy of some Greens.
Economic development and real estate tend to be local issues, and
downtown real estate in particular is now an odd ally of the Greens.
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The next best thing to minimizing distances through changes in
relative location and land use is getting people to their destinations
in an energy efficient way.
While Greens don’t fit cleanly on the three-axis model, their beliefs
are probably most related to social justice and equality, but extending
the object of justice from people to the environment as a whole (that
is valuing the environment for its own sake, not just for the sake of
future humans). If we had to give the Greens a word to go along
with the French Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité, it might be Durabilité.
Why Greens should want to invest in buses:
• Buses (when more fully occupied) are more energy efficient than
other modes, and electric buses show promise to improve this
even more. In practice as shown in Figure 20.5, buses are less
energy efficient than cars on average, due to low occupancies in
off-peak and suburban services, though the marginal passenger
incurs almost no additional energy consumption.
• Buses (and vans) are community transport where people can meet
their neighbors and the driver, stops are community hubs.
• Rail construction (or any infrastructure construction) is highly
disruptive to fragile eco-systems and highly energy intensive, so
the payback period for CO2 emissions may be decades, if at all.1212 (Chester and Horvath 2010).
If you think that CO2 is something to worry about, improving
bus service in a matter of months should be far more valuable
than potential reductions more than a decade away.
• Making buses work better adheres to the adage used about
housing that ‘the greenest buildings are existing buildings.’ The
greenest transport is more intensively using existing transport.
Even with new rails, existing roads will remain. We should use
them wisely.
Instrumentalism
To be clear, everyone near power is instrumental13 – the Democrats13 Merriam Webster defines
instrumentalism as ‘a doctrine that
ideas are instruments of action and that
their usefulness determines their truth.’
favoring rail and construction in general due to the association with
unions and Republicans with their association with ‘free’ roads, or
Paul Weyrich with his justifications for suburban commuter rail.
Thus it represents a situation where values are an instrument to
build a coalition to obtain power, as opposed to using power to
support core values. The Libertarians and Greens are purer of heart
as they are farther from actual power.1414 And perhaps they are farther from
actual power because they are purer of
heart. The causality is mutual.
Despite the transport logic, trains are more politically popular.
A new train on new track in an exclusive right-of-way is a more
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comfortable ride than a bus on beat-up pavement shared with cars,
trucks, and other vehicles.
People riding buses are unhappier with their commute than
commuter train riders in Montreal (though about the same as Metro
riders).15 Walking and biking make their commuters happier still. 15 (St-Louis et al. 2014).
By implication Greens are happiest with their non-motorized travel.
The unhappiness with bus use occurs for a variety of reasons.
In part poor people (are rightfully) not as happy about the state of
reality than those with more resources and opportunities. In part bus
riders are likely less happy because of the stigma16 and disrespect17 16 §11.12.
17 §11.11.associated with buses and because of the underfunding of buses due
to that stigma and disrespect.
While that may seem like bad news for an argument about
investing more in buses, we think it is an opportunity. It is the
mode most easily improved. Thus it is where happiness can be
most readily increased by reorganization and increases in service,
better integration of information technology, and enhancing the
environment around stops and stations. We should increase the
dignity of riding the bus.
Bus has received far less attention than rail. In the Twin Cities, the
number of planners and engineers, leave aside dollars, per bus rider
falls far short of the number per rail rider. In addition to high level
design questions, attention to local details does matter, and does pay
off. Attention is required.
Typically, comparisons between bus and rail contrast existing local
buses, which are old, noisy and slow, with new trains. New beats
old. Where buses have been used to provide high quality, speedy,
quiet (electric), lane separated transit in good markets they perform
really well. Finding ways to make buses work requires cooperation
of the bus operator (public or private) and the infrastructure provider
(almost always the public).
The land use argument is one of choice. Zoning18 can be changed 18 §13.
without building rail, but no one seems to be doing that. Economic
development19 effects have been demonstrated for significant bus 19 §11.20.
improvements.
There is so much more than can be done with buses, and can be
done within a year, that it is depressing (if not insane) so few even
try.
Take away a few parking spaces, and even some general purpose
traffic lanes, and put some paint on the road (reallocating road space
to buses), then see how people like the new bus versus the old bus.20 20 (Hymon 2010).
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Reallocate transit dollars and see how many new high frequency
bus services can be deployed for the same resources otherwise
dedicated to a short rail corridor.
The mainstream political parties tend to exist for political
purposes more than for pursuing a coherent set of policies. The
evidence suggests no one in power actually wants less public
spending, and arguments are about marginal increases in spending.
Yet most of the public is far more interested is being able to get
around affordably and easily, reaching their valued destinations,
than what technology is used.
20.2 Trust as a positive externality
A few years ago, Francis Fukuyama put out a book called Trust.2121 (Fukuyama 1995).
He argued that social capital was a positive externality that
produces trust, and civil society only succeeds if people have trust
in the words of others, i.e. they believe others will do what they say,
and of course that only emerges if people do in fact do what they
say.
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis resulted in banks being unwilling
to lend to other banks for fear they wouldn’t be paid back. That fear
arose because, in fact, some banks now defunct, did not pay back
loans. The system of trust failed. One (or in this case a few) bad
players shattered the system of trust that had a positive externality
in encouraging lending.
The economy only works because of beliefs that a small piece of
paper (a dollar bill) will be redeemable by complete strangers for
something valued more highly than a piece of paper. Through this
belief, we can replace barter with a money economy, we can lend
money we don’t have (à la banks) and create wealth by investing in
wealth-creating instruments now rather than waiting until sufficient
resources are acquired.
It is hard to say how many years advanced economically society
is because of borrowing, but one imagines it is probably decades.
If the ability to borrow collapses, not only does society not grow
faster, society will grow slower as old debts still need to be repaid
out of current income, leaving little available out of current funds for
investment.
Positive externalities operate in two ways, as a virtuous cycle
(more of A begets more of B which begets more of A) or in reverse
as a vicious cycle (less of A begets less of B which begets less of A).
Changing direction requires an external shock – a collapse of trust
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for instance, or a major infusion of trust through a government
intervention.
The classic examples of virtuous and vicious cycles22 in 22 §A.4.
transportation and public transport ridership and service, which
grew as virtuous cycle from the 1880s until the 1920s, and where
after the past 60 years of vicious cycle operation, most of the US has
very little service and ridership left (despite 30 years of very
expensive investments). In the US, transport is ‘pay as you go’ at
the federal level, which may very well be a source of our
under-investment, as there is an unwillingness to capitalize now our
benefits from investments due to the positive gains they will
provide in the future. If we don’t want the entire economy to follow
the path of public transport in the US, something must be done.23 23 Without falling into the trap of
endorsing the first policy that comes
along: Something must be done. This is
something. Therefore, it must be done.
As suggested above, the collapse of trust is warranted when the
players are not trust-worthy. Even if there were an external insertion
of funding, if the behaviors of the players reveal their true preferred
actions, and these actions are not regulated in a transparent way, the
system cannot necessarily be restarted without new rules to establish
trust. As President Ronald Reagan was fond of saying “Trust but
Verify” (“doveryai, no proveryai”).
The same will hold true of bankers, who not only seemingly
distrust each other, but also should distrust the previous failed
systems of verification (bond rating agencies) that were insufficient
in providing advance warning of emerging problems.
Verification only works with transparency, where the actions of
players are observable by all.24 This occurs on open regulated 24 David Brin developed this idea, which
has come to be known as sousveillance.
(Brin 1998).
markets.
20.3 Lying as a vicious cycle
In response to the Global Financial Crisis, fortunately, wise leaders
stepped up to the occasion, and while their actions were imperfect
and too few bankers went to jail, the system of trust that drives the
economy of civilization was maintained.
We have recently decided as a civilization to elect unwise ‘leaders.’
Leaders for whom the old joke:
How can you tell when a politician is lying?
They are moving their lips
is no longer funny.
If we cannot trust the word of our so-called ‘leaders,’ can we trust
their minions, or anyone in government who reports to them and
does their bidding. And as lying becomes the norm, won’t the entire
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system of trust break down? Why should one cooperate with the
dishonest? And if you cannot tell who remains honest, or no-one
remains honest, mutually beneficial cooperation, the cornerstone of
civilized society, crumbles.
Ensuring trust, that someone will do what they say (i.e. pay you)
after you do what you say (perform a service) is tricky, but
extremely valuable. The value arises in being able to trade with
strangers, not just brothers and cousins. It permits specialization in
a way unfathomable to Adam Smith.
To enable the smooth function of trust, society developed an
entire legal system to avoid cycles of vigilante vendettas that arose
after perceived or real slights. But as liars take the helm, the legal
system itself becomes corruptible. We have a chain where at one
end are the judges, appointed over time by the liars. In the middle
are prosecutors, typically appointed by the same, and at the other
end are the police, with their own biases.
So if I loan you money, and you don’t repay, and I sue you, but
you control the courts, or just have friends in the right places, I will
not get repaid. If I know that, I won’t loan you money. Instead, if I
am not careful, you will just take my assets, and I will call the
police, and they will shrug their shoulders, and I have lost my
money anyway. Smart people outside the power structure will try to
emigrate from such a low trust society, leaving it with a brain drain
and less voluntary trade, less specialization, so ultimately it will
under-perform higher trust societies over time. This is bad on
dimensions beyond the economic.
Trust can decay from the bottom up or the top down. The
disintegration is surely faster when it starts at the top. This lack of
trustworthiness pervades government, not the least of which are
transport agencies.
20.4 It’s a success
There are no more common words to hear shortly after the opening
of a new rail project in the United States than ‘It’s a success.’ The
forecast that an agency or its supporters will declare a project ‘a
success’ is far more accurate than the forecast of ridership or costs.
For instance, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (WMATA), the agency which operates Washington, DC
region’s Metrorail claims:2525 (Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority 2014).
Metro: Silver Line ridership remains strong
Metro today provided updated Silver Line ridership information
showing that, less than two months after opening, the new line is
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already performing at 60% of its projected ridership for the end of the
first full year of service. As of last week, an average of 15,000 riders
are entering the system at the five new Silver Line stations on
weekdays for a combined 30,000 trips to or from the new stations.
In the planning process, Silver Line ridership was projected to reach
25,000 boardings at the five new stations after one full year of service.
Metro estimates that the Silver Line is currently adding
approximately 6,000 new riders – making roughly 12,000 trips – to
the Metrorail system each weekday. The balance, approximately 9,000
riders, are primarily former Orange Line riders who have switched to
the Silver Line.
Some outlets26 have used the word ‘success’ to describe the line, 26 (Warmoth 2014).
as did then US DOT Secretary Foxx. Certainly it is still early, but the
Silver Line didn’t exceed first year forecasts. Maybe it can exceed
final year forecasts, or even have benefits in excess of costs, or
somehow reduce inequity in the Washington region, or lead to
economic development, or any number of other objectives hoisted
on transit lines. It is arguably successful from a project delivery
perspective, in that it was delivered, and opened for service, but
that seems a narrow way to think about success.
In contrast, another new start, the Minneapolis – St. Paul region’s
Metro Transit Green Line has done a bit better, even with all sorts
of traffic signal timing issues. It too is heralded as a success,27 with 27 (Murphy 2014).
ridership exceeding forecast year ridership about three months in.
While many of its riders were transfers from existing bus services,
it clearly is serving more new riders for less money than the Silver
Line.
Which is more successful? Which is a better investment? Time
will tell, and we will leave that to the reader’s judgment.
We have three hypotheses as to why these words are so common.
• It may be that all projects are successful. For this hypothesis to
hold, we would need to see enormous transit market share across
the country after several decades of more than 20% of all US
government transport funding going to transit.28 Sadly the 28 (Pew Charitable Trusts 2014).
evidence suggests otherwise.29 29 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics
2018).
• To many people, simply building transit is considered a success.
In his book Railtown,30 Ethan Elkind declared Los Angeles a 30 (Elkind 2014).
transit success simply because they passed some taxes and built a
few new rail lines – nevermind that overall transit ridership has
been declining for decades, and has dropped by about 20%
between 2013 and 2018.
• It may be that the appearance of success is important, independent
of the actual facts on the ground. Calling ‘success’ aligns you
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with ‘Team Transit’31 and rewards your supporters. The illusion31 (Alpert 2014).
of success is critical to obtain future funds. No one wants to give
money to an agency that actively (if honestly) claims ‘It’s a failure’
or ‘It’s a disappointment,’ or ‘We’re still perfecting it,’ or even ‘It’s
a hobby.’3232 (Bajarin 2014).
We hold this last explanation as most likely. This is not to say
there are no successes in urban rail transit. There are many. Starting
in 1863 with the London Underground, rail transit globally had an
extraordinarily good run for 60 years. In the US, it sort of petered
out after that for the next 50 years or so, though in other countries,
rail transit has continued at various levels of strengths.
Some of the lines in the past 40 years have been more successful
than others, all depending on your definition of success. The best
systems33 remain the ones built in the early 20th century, with only33 (Wikipedia contributors 2018g).
LA’s Metro Rail breaking the top 5 in riders per mile (and DC’s
MetroRail coming sixth). Yet all new systems have been declared
successful by somebody – even the relatively low ridership per mile
lines like Tampa’s TECO line,34 or Charlotte’s Lynx.35 Some are34 (The San Diego Historic Streetcars Blog
2011).
35 (Light Rail Now Project Team 2008).
even pre-declared, like The Tide in Hampton Roads,36 or Dallas.37
36 (Virginian-Pilot Editorial Page 2007).
37 Point:(Pantell 2008), Counterpoint:
(Nicholson 2016).
We find it hard to see the $6.8 billion being spent on the Silver Line
so far to add 6,000 riders (12,000 trips) as an unqualified success. We
would find it hard to see meeting these low forecasts as a success
either. This is more dollars per passenger than many commuter rail
lines spend, as shown in the next section,38 which few outside the38 §20.5.
agencies themselves are calling a ‘success’ (the advocates of course
do use that exact word).3939 (Northstar Corridor Development
Agency 2012). If spending $2 billion added zero or negative riders, that would
be truly surprising, indicative of active destruction of money. We
will just state there were plausible alternative uses of the funds that
would have improved society in other ways. Every expenditure has
an opportunity cost.
Do not believe or repeat the press releases of agencies
and advocates uncritically.
20.5 Mischief in Minnesota
When Minnesota’s Northstar Commuter Rail line was just a glint in
the eyes of exurban Republicans, they distributed the promotional
material shown in Figure 20.6.
Ridership has not come close to the promised 3 million annual.
Ridership on the Northstar commuter rail line will be about 20% less
than forecast in its first year of operation, prompting one member of
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Figure 20.6: Northstar
Commuter Rail promotional
material promised 3 million
annual rides.
the Metropolitan Council to question whether the $317 million project
was worth it.
Officials had projected 897,000 riders total for the Northstar in 2010;
after nine months – including the Twins’ season – it now looks like the
annual ridership figure will be 715,000.
In fact, Ridership on the Northstar stayed within a disappointing
range from 2010 to 2017, ranging 700,000 to 794,000. There is no
evidence this line will be shuttered anytime soon. Yet, when do we
actually declare a failure? The article continues:
As a result of the lower numbers, Met Council board members voted
unanimously Wednesday to reject fare increases that for more than a
year had been set to go into effect Nov. 15.
“Do we ever unravel a transit project that is not successful enough
to sustain itself?” asked District 2 Met Councilmember Tony Pistilli.
“I’m not saying we should unravel Northstar yet, but do we have a
definition of ‘failure’?” Pistilli, in life outside the Met Council, is chief
appraiser and vice president of consumer banking risk management
for US Bank.
District 3 Met Councilmember Robert McFarlin, head of the
transport committee – and former interim head of MnDOT – said that
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“unraveling would be extremely difficult. I believe it’s incumbent
upon us that we give what’s in place the best possible shot to
succeed.”
But McFarlin added that Pistilli’s question “is an excellent one, and
[the lower Northstar ridership numbers] should give us pause looking
at other projects that are on the drawing board.”
In fact, other Commuter Rail lines in the Minneapolis - St. Paul
region have been put on the back burner since Northstar’s
disappointing arrival. While they continue to be studied, none have
been funded for construction.
What should have been the expectation? It depends on who you
believe. Consultants will vary, some in doubt depending on who is
paying the bill. In this case, there were three benefit/cost analyses
conducted prior to opening. Anton, Lubov, & Associates (dated
April 17, 2003) conducted an economic analysis of the line, and in
contrast with a 1998 Parsons-Brickerhoff BCR of 0.26, or a very
optimistic 2002 MnDOT BCR of 0.84, they came up with an
incredibly optimistic BCR of 1.15 for the line.
Cudos to Parsons-Brinckerhoff.4040 Parsons-Brinckerhoff rebranded to
WSP in 2017. Proponents will argue that the full line (to the metropolis of St.
Cloud, population 200,000) was not built, which is of course true.
However the unbuilt segment was expected to be a worse performer
than what was actually built.
At current ridership, this amounts to about a daily $61 round trip
capital cost and $28 round trip operating cost. Or $89 per person per
day.
Fares are up to $6.25 one-way, or $12.50 round-trip. Assuming
most trips pay the full fare (which they don’t), the daily subsidy
would be about $75 per day per rider.
Decommissioning should be an option. Not every scheme works.
Unlike the Pope,41 the Metropolitan Council and State Government41 Actually, very much like the Pope.
are not infallible, and need not defend every decision of every
predecessor. Every continued dollar supporting the long-distance
commutes of a few exurbanites is a dollar that cannot be spent on
providing more access to more people.
If this kind of mischief were unique to Minnesota, we could pass
it off as a mistake. However it is quite common in the world of
transit promotion. ‘Strategic misrepresentation’ as it is politely
called has been well-documented by John Kain, Don Pickrell,
Jonathan Richmond, and Bent Flyvbjerg among others.42
42 (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005; Richmond 2001;
Kain 1990; Pickrell 1992).
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20.6 Taking credit
“It is amazing what you can accomplish if you don’t care who gets the
credit.”43 43 This is attributed to Father Strickland.
Transport investments are politically popular as they often lead
to durable and tangible improvements in people’s lives. Transport
investments also offer opportunities to cut ribbons and name
facilities to ensure a politician’s memory lives on in perpetuity. The
desire to get credit for such investments can lead to trouble.
In 2011 the US Congress passed a law that banned earmarks
within spending bills. This ban was politically appealing for
conservatives and liberals in that it seemingly ended wasteful
spending on ‘bridges to nowhere.’ The federal surface transport
legislation passed in 2006 contained thousands of earmarks for
specific projects which accounted for 13% of total federal spending.
When this law expired the earmark ban was in effect, and it is no
surprise that it took years for new legislation to get passed. Without
earmarks, congressional representatives didn’t have currency to
barter support for broader legislation. While the earmark ban
remains in effect, congressional Republicans have made efforts to
rebrand earmarks as ‘Congressionally directed spending.’ They
should just call it advertising.
Politicians need evidence that they are delivering what their
constituents desire, even if what the people want isn’t necessarily
the best option. More importantly, elected officials want clear credit
for delivering what their constituents desire. Such
acknowledgement often confounds seemingly straightforward
transport priorities. One example of this is in New York City, where
Mayor Bill DeBlasio and Governor Andrew Cuomo, both
Democrats, really don’t like each other. While no one sheds tears for
their lost friendship, the fact that the Governor is responsible for the
city’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), which owns
and operates most of the city’s transit services, while the Mayor is
limited to some appointments to the governing board is problematic
for the transit system. Like most transit systems, the MTA depends
on subsidy to maintain service and invest in maintenance and
expansion. Currently, subsidy comes from a mix of sources, but
traditional sources are not enough for the MTA to maintain existing
services levels and upgrade the system (including rebuilding
subway tunnels damaged by flooding after Hurricane Sandy). As a
result, service is declining, which is causing ridership to drop.
Rather than work together to find a solution to the city’s transit
needs, the Mayor and the Governor have dug in their heels about
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not cooperating. Whatever the personal enmity between them,
ultimately this is about who might get credit for fixing the system.
The Mayor doesn’t want to spend city dollars on something the he
feels the Governor will use for acclaim. Instead, the Mayor has
developed and proposed a number of highly visible and very
expensive alternatives to fixing the subways and buses: new ferry
service and a waterfront streetcar. These solutions are projects
directly under city control, and have not been part of the long range
transport plans of the city and region.
The need for a politician to claim credit for transport is not
unusual, but it does affect the types of projects cities and regions
will pursue. In many cases, the interests of the public and the
politicians may align. In others, not so much. New York City is now
spending over $300 million to expand the new ferry service so that
it can service about nine million trips per year, which is about what
the daily ridership is for subways and buses combined. If it weren’t
for egos, and misaligned governance, New York could really have it
all.
20.7 Expertise
A notable feature of transport is that everyone, citizen and politician
alike, believes themself an expert on their own commute, (which is
true) and on transport problems generally (which is not). While no
one knows better how to route from A to B than the person doing
that day after day, not the Department of Transportation, not Google
Maps, not traffic information services like Waze, we also know that
those expert commuters are doing it imperfectly.44 Their expertise on44 (Zhu and Levinson 2015).
a single origin-destination pair, among the millions in any city, does
not give them any special expertise on managing the city as a whole.
No one fully has that expertise. We do think there are systematic
rules that those managing the transport and land use systems should
use, rules that say changes to the system should tend to increase
accessibility for travelers and potential travelers, and all else equal, a
greater increase at a lower cost is usually better than a lesser increase
(or decrease) or a higher cost.
Due to the daily failures of transport systems, which are political
problems, there is a great deal of skepticism about the competence of
transport professionals. Just as respect for expertise has diminished
in other sectors of American society,45 the respect for the engineers45 (Nichols 2017).
and planners has fallen farther than it has deserved. No sector is
perfect, but the recommendations of most transport engineers and
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planners and economists when not being leaned on by politicians
are generally far better solutions than those actually implemented.
20.8 Frontiers or values as instruments
There is no North American metro area colder than Minneapolis- St.
Paul that is larger than Minneapolis - St. Paul. It is on the size-cold
frontier. The partial converse is true for Phoenix, as it is the largest,
hottest region.
On the brawn-brain frontier, Stanford ranks highly, no university
with smarter students has a better football team. Cal-Tech might say
the same. As might Ohio State in 2015.
Combining different things into a single metric is inherently
arbitrary. Economics likes to monetize everything, so instead of
noise, we have monetized noise externality, which is directly
comparable with monetized time, monetized crash death, and
monetized air pollution.
In the end this is sometimes useful, especially at the margins. We
have to decide how to spend limited money to reduce pollution vs.
increase safety vs. reduce travel time. But this is also problematic,
especially when dealing with wholes.
People don’t think that way. And people don’t think that way
because nature doesn’t reduce to a single metric. No amount of
nitrogen in the air could offset too little oxygen (while 100% oxygen
would kill you, so something needs to dilute it). We are advised to
have a balanced diet. Some things are inherently un-substitutable,
and therein lies a conundrum for comparing alternatives.
Arguments about projects and policies are usually over unstated
values not facts. And if the arguments were good faith, people
would clearly state their values, agree on the facts, and then some
democratic process would resolve the values and achieve
compromise, side payments, and so on. People would go home, a
decision would be reached, and we could move on with the next
thing.
Instead the arguers corrupt truth and self-select facts to achieve
rhetorical aims, without consideration of the longer term
consequences of devaluing what objectivity actually does exist in
the world (it sometimes goes by the name of ‘science’) and
destroying trust in the democratic process in general.
We individually assume that we want to achieve the best trade-off
for ourselves (the most house in the best climate) subject to budget
constraints. I can have a smaller house in California or a larger one
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in Minnesota. California has (or at least had) a better climate than
Minnesota.
We assume society also ‘wants’ to achieve the best trade-off,
except society doesn’t ‘want’ anything. The simple illustration
demonstrates convergence to a single preference is not
guaranteed.4646 This is the Condorcet paradox.
Everyone has preferences:
• Alice Likes Blue over Green over Red
• Bob Likes Green over Red over Blue
• Chuck likes Red over Blue over Green
From which logic tells us:
• Two people like Blue over Green
• Two people like Green over Red
• Two people like Red over Blue.
So Blue is preferred to Green is preferred to Red is preferred to
Blue. Ergo, society does not have well-defined preferences. People
are individually just as irrational, since our minds are themselves
just a bunch of individually networked neurons. Sometimes I like
Blue, sometimes Green, and it may be entirely unpredictable by an
observer. Some people are sufficiently self-aware to identify their
own contradictions. Walt Whitman for instance said:
Do I contradict myself? Very well, then I contradict myself, I am large,
I contain multitudes.
Marvin Minsky described the brain as a Society of Mind.47 Most47 (Minsky 1988).
people are oblivious to this fact, others in mere denial if not
self-denial.
And if people don’t know what they want individually, how can
society? We devolve into deferring to the most confident sounding,
the brashest, the blow-hardiest, the strongest, the wealthiest, to avoid
being eaten by the lion.
Strong opinions, weakly held is a strategy to address the
confidence trap. Yet if someone changes their opinion, they are
criticized as a flip-flopper, and are assumed to be easier to roll in the
future.
The best response is perhaps
When my information changes, I alter my conclusions. What do you
do?4848 This has been attributed, perhaps
apocryphally to John Maynard Keynes.
We try to operate at the frontier in production space in economics,
anything else is an inferior solution. Why be not as smart and not
as strong (good at American Football) as another university? And
if we are not on the frontier (football skills vs. IQ) we thought we
wanted to be on, redefine terms of the argument (maybe we educate
more students or are more equitable, maybe our city is Windier than
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any larger city instead of Colder). But we need to be flexible in our
thinking and pliable in out goals to have the nimbleness to identify
our competitive advantage.
In short, our values are arbitrary, we believe them so as to make
ourselves superior in some dimension or set of dimensions, so we
can feel good about ourselves and have high status in some clique
(which presumably has evolutionary payoff). We convince ourselves
that one particular value trade-off is what we actually care about,
and internalize this belief so we can better convince others.
Our final quote:
It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends on his not understanding it.49 49 This is attributed to Upton Sinclair.
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Transport Poverty
Figure 21.1: Nobody Walks!
Source: Photo by D. Levinson.
When we talk about access as a value that should guide transport
policy, we need to address access for whom, not just access to where
by what mode. In the auto-dependent US, the mode that offers the
most access in most places currently is the car. Yet cars are expensive,
and many people struggle with basic access (and mobility) simply
because they can’t afford it. Transport is the second largest spending
category for US households, behind only housing. This is the case
even as transport is heavily subsidized, regardless of mode.1 As 1 It is likely that transport is so heavily
subsidized because it is such a large
share of household spending.
discussed in Subsidy,2 the general approach is to spread whatever
2 §4.help is offered thinly across infrastructure capital investment. This
does little to help those with the least.
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If we view access as a necessary utility, such as energy, then we
can supply access to ensure that people aren’t left out of the economy.
We argue subsidy should be paid directly to travelers. But that is not
the world in which we live, nor is there a credible expectation that we
will start doing so anytime soon. The reality is that American cities
are largely built around the automobile, which means that to access
economic opportunity you have to drive. If we accept the US cities
are automobile-dependent, and we do, then it follows that people
without autos are disadvantaged, as they do not have the thing on
which cities are dependent.
One way to think about people at a transport disadvantage is
through the lens of transport poverty. The fewer options that people
have for getting around, the more vulnerable they are to situations
where they can’t do the things they need to survive and thrive.
Transport poverty may result in social isolation, loss of economic
opportunity, or exposure to negative externalities from transport.
For many, the problematic situation of transport poverty should
be addressed through investment in alternative modes of getting
around and better cities: walking, biking, and mass transit serving
denser residential neighborhoods. Density is good, and we largely
agree with these ideas, our preferences for density or our concerns
about the environment should not come at the expense of people
suffering from transport poverty. Society doesn’t prevent people
heating fuel in the depths of winter just because burning it pollutes
the air. Staying warm is more important than being a perfect
environmental steward. We should apply the same standard to
transport.
Transport poverty hits families in multiple ways. First, there is
the monetary cost of travel, in particular the cost of owning and
operating an automobile. Second, there are the time costs involved
to travel if a car is unavailable. We often hear tales of a benevolent
boss or group of co-workers who pitch in to buy a car for someone
who walks for hours to reach their job.3 These are not stories that3 For instance, Walter Carr was given a
car after he walked 12 miles for his first
day of work as a mover. His boss found
out because he was picked up by the
police at 4:00 am, presumably because
walking alone at that hour is viewed as
suspect behavior (Garrand 2018).
should make us cheer the generous co-workers, but are stories that
should alarm us as to just how vulnerable too many people are when
it comes to transport.
The time and money costs combine to promote social and
economic exclusion among many, particularly people without cars.
A story from the Seattle Times illustrates these points.4 Simon4 (Tu 2015).
Nakhale is an immigrant from Kenya whose family relied on bus
transit for their first few years in the United States. His bus
commute was a four-hour round trip. Eventually he and his family
realized this routine was unsustainable and they bought a car. The
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car not only shortened their commutes, but allowed Nakhale to get
a second job.5 Too often, cases like Nakhale reflect the relationship 5 Whether people should have to work
multiple jobs to get by is a separate
question.
between long commutes and low wages. Even with low wages,
people will buy cars as soon as they can afford them just to access
more opportunity.
Studies of low-income households show that families go in and
out of car ownership frequently. One study that uses the Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics shows that while 13% of US
households are car free any given year, only 5% of households are
consistently car free.6 This suggests that the value of a car is greater 6 (Klein and Smart 2017).
than the expense, even for low income families.7 Over the past few 7 Each year the American Public
Transport Association (APTA) puts out
a ’fact sheet’ that claims switching from
driving to public transit will save a
household $10,000 on average. They
promote this as look at how much
money is being wasted by people who
choose to drive rather than take the bus
or train. An alternate interpretation,
if their analysis were accurate at all, is
that a typical family is willing to spend
$10,000 yearly to have the access a car
brings.
decades, a lack of a car has become increasingly associated with
poverty.8 The income gap between households with a car and those
8 (King et al. 2019).
without is greater than households with a college degree and those
without, or households who own their home rather than rent. In
America, to be carless most likely means poverty.9
9 An exception to this is Manhattan.
Voulgaris et al. (2017) estimate that
only 5% of the population reside in
what we would consider “old urban”
neighborhoods which are easy to live in
without a car.
Banks and automakers have taken note of the importance of auto
access. As cars have become more expensive, but also more reliable,
auto loans for eight years are now commonplace. A Canadian study
shows how high levels of auto dependence correlates with high
levels of household indebtedness for car-related expenses.10
10 (Walks 2018).
Sub-prime loans and predatory lending are also pervasive for low
income households simply trying to buy a car so they can be part of
the economy. People on the edge of car ownership are vulnerable to
many things, and should be protected.
By reorienting our transport thinking to accessibility rather than
mobility, we reward transport choices that take advantage of
proximity of activities and diminish the status of higher speed
travel, which favors the auto. This will naturally make families
more resilient with regard to transport, but also will minimize the
necessity of automobile ownership, which should be a policy target
ahead of minimizing automobile ownership in absolute terms.11 11 As we have argued elsewhere in the
book, drivers should pay the full social
costs of driving. If this happens, then
we are indifferent to how much driving
occurs.
Transport poverty presents many challenges for the political
economy of access. The primary challenge, obviously, is how to
ensure that everyone has the access they need to the places they
need to go. But supplying access to everyone is at least a
straightforward goal. The real challenges are trying to achieve it
where there are resource constraints, which depends on how policy
is made. Money spent on access for some is money that cannot be
spent on access for others. Some (most) people are more concerned
about their ability to hold a job than their carbon footprint. We
know that during recessions environmental concern declines.12 12 (Kahn and Kotchen 2010).
Similar attitudes will be held by workers struggling to get by. This
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creates tension between preferred solutions for transport poverty
and solutions to problems that automobility causes.
People have different priorities that affect interventions they will
support. For instance, for some people carbon emissions and climate
change are the biggest problems associated with transport, and they
feel that all policies should focus on reducing emissions. But how
to reconcile this preference with improving equitable access? The
US is car dependent. People who do not have cars are then, by
definition, disadvantaged. To improve their advantage we should
expand auto access, which can come in many forms, but doing so
will harm environmental policy, cause more congestion and other
externalities, and may take away some transit riders when transit
can scarcely afford to lose any. So, we need to balance the needs
of some people today with the desires of some people in the future.
This is not easy.
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Pretexts of Safety and Justice
Figure 22.1: Shoes and a
gun on the ground outside
Philando Castile’s blood-stained
car as Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension (BCA)
investigators take photographs
of the scene of where a St.
Anthony Police officer shot
and killed 32-year-old Philando
Castile in a car near Larpenteur
Avenue and Fry Street in Falcon
Heights, Minnesota, on July 6,
2016. Photo by Tony Webster.
Source: Wikipedia.
American cities are substantially shaped by race relations.
Discriminatory policies have been widely acknowledged in housing
policy. Redlining practices, mortgage insurance, and local zoning
codes discouraged multifamily housing while simultaneously
making single family housing the default option in most cities.1 1 (Rothstein 2017).
Racial discrimination has been less central to transport policy,
though this is more by oversight rather than wokeness.
Transport in the US strongly affects civil rights. Rosa Parks
started her protest on a bus. Recent Black Lives Matter protests
have shut down roads and freeways as a deliberate strategy to
argue their point.2 The use of fines and fees from traffic citations 2 (Badger 2016).
has turned minor offences into life-altering jail terms.3 3 (Shapiro 2015).
Communities of color have higher rates of pedestrian deaths by
automobile than white communities.4 The transport planning 4 (Cottrill and Thakuriah 2010).
system reinforces these and other longstanding racial biases. None
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of this can be fixed easily, but ignoring the issues associated with
policing and transport exacerbates existing problems.
By far, the most common interaction people have with the police is
traffic stops. About 9% of American adults are pulled over annually.55 (Langton and Durose 2013).
Due to the local nature of policing, this varies by state and city. Men
are more likely to be pulled over than women, which suggests men
drive more lawlessly. Yet Black and Hispanic drivers are more likely
to be stopped than white drivers, and there is little reason to think
there are racial differences in driving behavior. If anything, since
Black and Hispanic drivers know they are more likely to be stopped,
we might posit they will be better drivers to minimize risk from
police stops.
What we should take from all of this is that transport policies,
including calls for greater traffic enforcement, have racial
implications, and we are wrong if we ignore them. Promoting
accessibility means promoting access for everyone, regardless of
their personal characteristics. Too often concerns about equity and
social justice are discussed as a nice ideal that can be achieved
through painless policies. The truth is more complicated in that to
solve problems of racial equity in transport requires better policies
and a broad agreement that a problem exists. We have work to do
on both policy and education.
22.1 Safe streets for all
As we talk about accessibility, we make an implicit assumption
about safety. Namely, we assume that by promoting access by
multiple modes we aren’t putting people in danger. Walking in
your community shouldn’t come with risk of death. Yet, this is the
case for many low-income communities. These areas tend to have
more biking and walking than wealthier communities, but this is
more by circumstance rather than choice. More active travel, while a
desirable planning goal, is risky when it is done on high-speed
arterial roads with few crosswalks and poorly maintained
sidewalks. Income is not the only factor, either, as pedestrian death
rates are higher in African American and Hispanic communities as
well.66 (National Complete Streets Association
2017). In many ways, accessibility explains why some communities are
more dangerous than others. In the case of pedestrian deaths,
accessibility for autos diminishes accessibility by other modes,
which in turn makes these areas less desirable for development and
re-development. Through this cycle low-access places become even
less desirable communities to live in as they are filled with cars
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driven at high speeds, polluting the air and making noise –
automobility is a disamenity to neighbors. This imposes downward
pressure on housing prices, so lower income people move into
housing they can afford, but often without safe alternatives to
driving. This is a vicious cycle.
Auto-oriented neighborhoods are demonstrably worse for people
who walk or bike. Not only are drivers less likely to yield and let a
person cross a street when driving fast, but drivers are less likely to
yield to non-white individuals.7 Even worse, justice is often 7 (Goddard et al. 2015; Coughenour et al.
2017; Schneider et al. 2018).perverted to blame the victims who are hit. In 2011 Raquel Nelson
was crossing an Atlanta area arterial with her three children in
order to catch a bus.8 There wasn’t a crosswalk near the stop. Her 8 (Schmitt 2013).
four-year old son was hit and killed by a drunk driver. She was
charged with vehicular homicide – not the driver. This sad story is
made marginally better as the charges against her were reduced to
jaywalking and a $200 fine. Her son was still dead.
Issues like these are both design concerns, but mostly reflect
prioritization of mobility over accessibility. No one would suggest
that bus stops should be placed in areas where it is deadly to cross
the street. Yet we do this very thing, and it is usually communities
of color that suffer the consequences.
22.2 Racial bias in traffic enforcement
Few things are as identified with being an American as driving.
‘Driving is freedom,’ as the saying goes, and most able adult
Americans drive themselves most places they need to go. The car
and the open road are part of an American identity, for better or
worse. Another identity in the United States is of African
Americans. Being black in America is to experience the country in
ways that are different from the experiences of any other racial or
ethnic group. In Pulled Over,9 the authors describe driving as a 9 (Epp et al. 2014) (p.17).
required condition of citizenship and equality in a modern
democracy. Because of this, they argue, traffic enforcement – even if
seemingly modest requests for identification or insurance – strikes
“at the heart of democratic citizenship and racial equity.”
Automobility is required for economic and personal freedom.
The conception of automobility as a prerequisite for full
participation in democratic society strikes many planners as wrong.
Cities should be built to provide access to all, regardless of how
they travel. In the abstract, this is a fine sentiment. Cities should not
be built so that people have to drive everywhere. But a normative
view of how cities should be must be balanced by a positive
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recognition of how cities are now, and at present most cities are
auto-dominated and driving remains aspirational for many people.
Attitudes about city services are also affected by race and
ethnicity. White residents consistently have higher opinions of
municipal services than African American, Latino, or Asian
residents. Policing, in particular, stands out for racial differences. A
nationwide survey estimated that share of African-American
respondent satisfaction with police services is more than 20% below
the share of white respondents who were satisfied.1010 (Hajnal and Trounstine 2014a;b).
In Suspect Citizens11 the authors trace the history of traffic stops11 (Baumgartner et al. 2018).
from the advent of ‘reasonable suspicion’ as the standard for police
intervention after the Terry v. Ohio Supreme Court decision in 1968.
Prior, police needed probable cause to intervene. This legal change
opened the door for the United States’ ‘War on Drugs’ to become a
very large traffic sting. There was so much pressure to find drugs,
and the likelihood of finding any was so small, traffic enforcement
became a volume business that continues to this day. A recent Los
Angeles Times investigation found that police targeted a section of
freeway north of Los Angeles for drug busts, and stopped over 9,000
drivers between 2012 and the end of 2017. Seventy percent of drivers
were Latino, and three-quarters of the Latino drivers pulled over had
their cars searched despite no evidence that Latinos violate drug laws
any more than any other group.1212 (Rubin and Poston 2018).
Traffic enforcement is not a straightforward public service. While
traffic laws such as speed limits and obeying traffic signals are clear,
enforcement is determined in many ways by factors independent of
any infractions. Enforcement often features spatial differences,
where neighborhoods that are similar in most ways will differ
greatly in traffic enforcement activities. These differences may be
explained by the presence of a school for instance, or a poorly
designed intersection that leads to a high rate of crashes.
Socio-economic factors also play into enforcement activities.
Cities with higher proportions of African American have greater
reliance on fines and fees than otherwise similar cities. A recent
examination of 9,000 municipalities in the United States showed that
the share of minority population is positively associated with the
use of fines and fees.13 These fines and fees are not exclusively from13 (Sances and You 2017).
traffic enforcement, but traffic is a major component. One reason
traffic enforcement is so popular as a revenue source is due to local
control of law enforcement. Cities can set fines as they wish, though
in some cases they have arrangements with the state to share any
revenues. New York City, for instance, shares 50 percent of revenue
collected from moving violations with the state, but keeps 100% of
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parking enforcement revenues. This is the reason parking is
enforced more zealously than moving violations.14 Traffic 14 (Hinds 2013).
enforcement is putatively for safety. Unfortunately, this public
safety goal is tainted by revenue goals. Abusing safety-granted
powers for revenue or harassment of minorities is wrong.
22.3 US police interactions are needlessly violent
On July 6, 2016 a City of St. Anthony police officer shot and killed
Philando Castile following a traffic stop in the Saint Paul suburb of
Falcon Heights, the aftermath was filmed by his girlfriend Diamond
Reynolds. We have both been past the site, next to the Minnesota
State Fairgrounds, hundreds of times.
It has never been a problematic area or considered a dangerous
neighborhood.
Recent shootings are catalogued at The Counted.15 Police in the 15 The Counted by The Guardian, counted
police-involved deaths in 2015 and 2016.
The US Bureau of Justice Statistics
decided to track this in 2017, so the
Guardian stopped.
US shoot and kill about 1,000 people per year. We have no good
data from more than a few years ago, and there is no requirement
that the more than 18,000 police departments in the country report
shootings to the FBI. Many begin with traffic stops and moving
vehicle violations of one form or another. In this case, Castile was
driving and pulled over for a broken light. He certainly knew the
drill – he had been stopped by police 46 times in the 13 years he
was a licensed driver.16 16 (Peralta and Corley 2016).
Cars (and their drivers) kill about 40,000 people a year in the US
(and have risen in recent years) and 1.25 million globally. This is
terrible. The US has the highest rate among high-income countries.
It justifies many things, including engineering safer roads,
educating better drivers at the initial training and licensing stage
and ongoing continuing education programs, designing better
vehicles and especially automated cars, reduction in drunk driving,
and increased enforcement.
But does enforcement, which is ostensibly about safety, require
armed police officers pulling over men of color at a
disproportionate rate because one tail light is out, and shooting
them? Is this ‘enforcement’ really about traffic safety? Or rather, is
this just another way for municipalities to raise money in fines for
minor violations, as was done in Ferguson, Missouri, or discourage
people ‘who don’t belong’ from traveling on the quiet streets of
someone else’s neighborhood.
Transit systems are not without police bias, as well. In 2009,
Oscar Grant, an African American, was killed by Bay Area Rapid
Transit police officers who shot him in the back while obeying their
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orders. Though the officer who shot Grant was found guilty of
involuntary manslaughter, he was acquitted of more serious murder
charges. This verdict, and the shooting itself, led to days of protests
that sometimes turned to riots in Oakland.17 Many transit agencies17 The events of Oscar Grant’s killing
were the basis of the 2013 film Fruitvale
Station.
enforce fare payment with the zealousness of national security. In
most places, fare evasion is criminal offense that carries substantial
financial penalties and time in jail. Enforcement also
disproportionately affects African American riders. Fare evasion
enforcement has also led to deportment in at least one case.1818 (Lee 2017).
Fortunately, many cities and states are starting to decriminalize fare
evasion to make it a civil offense.19 Reducing the severity of the19 (Schmitt 2017).
offence is good, but enforcement is still conducted by armed
officers.
Looking at The Counted, about 1/3 of police killings were
transport related. Certainly most of the killed were violent, and
committed serious traffic violations, or otherwise engaged in illegal
activities or fleeing the scene of a crime. If you want to give the
police the benefit of the doubt, perhaps killing them was the only
way to subdue them and keep them from immediately harming
others. Yet somehow other countries don’t seem to have this
problem in such numbers, why is that?
Poorly trained police in the heat of the moment afraid of people
who look different and armed with deadly force will sometimes
make mistakes that they regret. But why are they in that situation to
begin with? Why are they poorly trained? Why are they afraid of
‘the other’? Why are they using a gun on someone nominally
pulled over for a broken tail light rather than backing off a bit,
photographing the car and recording the license plate, calling for
help and trying to safely get control of the situation?
22.4 Why is traffic safety used as a pretext?
Traffic rules and regulations are the pretext for enforcing the crime
of ‘Driving While Black.’ This is not to say there is no use for traffic
enforcement, even though evidence is mixed as to its
effectiveness.20 We can stipulate real enforcement probably does not20 An alternative to greater enforcement
is better design. reduce traffic safety. So long as there are humans driving cars, there
will be humans driving cars badly. Automatic surveillance has
successfully reduced much bad behavior like speeding and red-light
running. This can be done systematically, and not randomly, and
thereby both avoid bias and be more effective.
Yet think of what many of the actual stops are for. Not speeding or
moving violations, but for vehicles out-of-perfect-order. The broken
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tail light is illustrative. How many lives have been saved by traffic
stops who informed the drivers of vehicles that one of their brake
lights is out? We could not find a peer-reviewed article on whether
broken tail light enforcement is effective in increasing safety. No one
has felt it worthy of study in the traffic safety community. The broken
tail light does show up as an issue of pretext, the legally protected
excuse law enforcement gives to pull someone over because they
want to inspect the vehicle or the occupants.
Clearly we want cars with working tail lights. Minnesota law
requires two working stop lights for cars manufactured after 1960
(but not for motorcycles).21 But this is also not a high priority. 21 Minnesota Statute 169.57 Vehicle
Signals. Available through the
Minnesota Office of the Revisor of
Statutes.
If we actually cared about tail lights, there is an alternative
scenario. Police (or better a machine) could have just photographed
the car and mailed a fine to the address on record of the owner of
the car, which would hold up annual registration if not paid and if
no proof of repair provided. The car would eventually get fixed.
Instead, we have the scenario, which if it had gone well, finds the
driver (not necessarily the owner) getting a stern lecture and a fine.
There is no actual guarantee of the repair.
But if we cared about traffic safety, the time and resources the
police spend on harassing vehicles with broken tail lights could be
spent on something more serious: actual drunk drivers, actual
speeders, actual red-light runners. The evidence argues these stops
are not about traffic safety.
22.5 Not in our name
Everyone involved in the transport professions should say “Not in
our name.”
Everyone who advocates for traffic safety should say “Not in our
name.”
Everyone who plans roads, sidewalks, and neighborhoods should
say “Not in our name.”
We in the transport community need to advocate for measures
that truly improve traffic safety, and advocate against slippery
measures that are used as pretext for racism or drug war
enforcement or municipal fund-raising.

Part V
Conclusions
In our conclusions, we call for rethinking how we build and operate
transport systems to promote access for all.
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Jam Today, Access Tomorrow, or Six
Impossible Things Before Breakfast
Figure 23.1: Alice with the
Red and White Queens. From
Through the Looking Glass.
Drawing by John Tenniel. Story
by (Carroll 1917).
Throughout this book we have described the political challenges
permeating our transport and land use systems. While politics gets
messy, our arguments are straightforward. We need to prioritize
accessibility over mobility, preserve what we have before we
expand, and reform our institutions so that their incentives are
aligned with broader economic and environmental goals. Mobility,
expansion and current institutions are all political decisions and
they can be changed. We have chosen, albeit slowly and passively,
to build our cities the way they are. We can do better, but only if we
change our focus to what matters.
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Increasing accessibility is more important than
reducing congestion. Accessibility describes how well the
transport and land use system work together. It is why cities and
networks exist, they are both ‘machines for access.’1 Considering1 (Levinson and Krizek 2005).
mobility or congestion alone (how quickly one can move on the
transport network) would lead the unsuspecting reader to conclude
the system was getting worse. However, examining mobility in
addition to land use changes demonstrates that people can reach
more activities in the same time, despite the historical increases in
congestion.
Accessibility as an idea is much deeper than just a performance
indicator. As a measure of benefit, it suggests a path for reforming
local transport finance to better connect benefits with costs. If costs of
transport (the transport share of local taxes) were more proportional
to the benefits, both efficiency and equity would improve.
Accessibility considers both travel time and the number of
opportunities, which gives a fuller understanding of travel, cities,
and policy approaches. Congestion can be reduced in any number
of ways. One way to do so is through an economic recession.22 For instance, congestion declined and
travel speeds increased substantially
during the Great Recession. The decline
in VMT starting in 2004 that led many
to call ‘peak car’ was largely explained
through economic factors (Manville et al.
2017), though per capita auto use has
still not reached its early 2000s peak in
the North America, Western Europe, or
Australia.
Congestion clearly is not a good performance metric for cities;
while the ability to move on roads has improved with fewer
travelers, the number of places to go to (and the resources available
to spend there) have both declined. Passenger travel is still largely a
derived demand, so we should be careful about thinking we’ve
solved congestion when larger economic problems may be in play.
Infrastructure preservation gives more access per
dollar than system expansion. Through this book, we argue
maintaining existing networks is more important than constructing
new networks. In the near term, we should redirect existing federal
(and state) gas taxes to address the problem of aging infrastructure.
We identified the federal problem as preserving the National
Highway System. There are gas taxes already spent to some extent
on this problem, but gas taxes (highway road user fees) are also
spent on new projects, and for transit projects, neither of which rise
to same level of national justification.3 It is clear with electrification,3 Identifying the amount spent on
transit is easy. Disentangling highway
capacity expansion from preservation
is tricky, since many reconstruction
projects wisely bundle both to achieve
efficiencies.
and without increases in the federal gas tax, that existing revenue
sources are beginning to fail.
There are insufficient revenues to properly maintain the system, a
problem that will be exacerbated over time without a directed
solution. From a ‘technical’ perspective, this is easily resolved:
• Pay for local roads with highway user fees. Currently local road
funding is dominated by general revenue (property tax). There
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is no reason these roads cannot be paid for with user fees, most
simply today a state-level gas tax returned to local governments.
• Internalize the costs of various environmental externalities so
that roads are not being implicitly subsidized by everyone who
experiences the externalities they cause. Charge roads (and their
users) directly for noise, air pollution, water pollution, and
carbon emissions, and any other measurable effect on which we
can objectively place a price tag. This does not generate revenue
for roads, but does lower demand and thus infrastructure costs.
These externalities are a cost to society, borne by the health,
insurance, and real estate sectors among others.
• Charge the general sales tax on gasoline and other transportation
inputs, on top of road user fees, for general revenue. This will
put roads and cars on a more even basis with other goods, and
avoid hidden subsidies. Similarly, charge roads for the land that
they use, and charge annual property tax on that land. Again, this
does not raise funds for roads, but by making road users pay their
share, decreases demand
• Raise and index the gas tax in the short-term to establish a baseline
of user-based revenue that coincides with expenditures required
to preserve the existing system.
• Phase in the a mileage tax in lieu of the gas tax starting with
electric vehicles (EVs), which don’t pay gas taxes, and
autonomous vehicles (AVs) which risk Robin Chase’s ‘hellish’
scenario of unoccupied vehicles circling the block to avoid paying
for parking.4 EVs are still few in number, AVs fewer still, but 4 (Chase 2014).
they are, and will be for some time, disproportionately owned by
the rich. One day soon they will be commonplace and the gas tax
revenue will really go to zero.
• Phase in time-of-day pricing, initially as an opt-in discount for
vehicles paying by the mile. This has the merit of both raising
funds from the users who place the greatest stress on the system,
and lowering demand during peak times.
• Implement a weight-distance tax for trucks. This both raises
funds and encourages truckers to more efficiently manage their
fleet considering infrastructure costs they impose.
From a ‘political’ perspective this is more difficult.
Network expansion should be paid for by project
beneficiaries. Why shouldn’t the federal government focus on
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expansion of the system? The short answer is it long ago picked the
low-hanging fruit and built the best routes, around which we have
built our existing communities. Ensuring that the existing National
Highway System remains functional offers a far greater return on
investment than expanding it with new routes serving land
speculators or widening roads serving local traffic, at a time when
new technologies such as self-driving cars are on the verge of
significantly increasing roadway efficiency. New projects generally
have lower benefit/cost ratios (if even above 1.0) than maintaining
existing roads. Infrastructure maintenance is expensive, but it lasts
for many years. It is important to make the wisest choices about
where to spend scarce dollars.
In addition to narrowing the federal government’s role to
preserving the existing network rather than expanding it,
policymakers should empower localities to make their own choices
about how to spend those maintenance dollars. Highway Block
Grants would return highway user funds funds collected in states
and localities to those areas so they would have the freedom to
make their own decisions about where to invest in the preservation
and maintenance of the National Highway System. After all,
policymakers in the states and localities better know the conditions
and needs in their areas than do remote administrators in
Washington.
Transit capital projects are seldom of an interstate nature, and
federal funding currently distorts transit decision-making by
making it very capital intensive. Further transit projects are
currently funded by road users rather than by transit users (or the
general population). People engage in magical thinking about
transport modes, we believe public policy would be better served by
rigorous analysis, and that would demonstrate that projects cost too
much, they benefit too little, and the costs are now borne by
non-beneficiaries. If prospective beneficiaries had to finance what
they hope to benefit from, there would be better management and
oversight of projects, from the local governments and private firms
with skin in the game.
To that end, there are a number of specific solutions:
• Use a combination of tolls and various types of value capture to
pay for the large capital costs associated with any new
infrastructure. If the project cannot be financed from either users
or direct non-user beneficiaries, it cannot be justified on
economic grounds.
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• Build and expand fewer roads. Demands are dropping already
with peak travel, and will do more so once congestion pricing is
implemented. Most roads are underused most of the time, so load
balancing is better strategy than new construction. Make those
roads smaller when they are built.
• Reduce the size of the mobility-focused network (gravelization,
freeway abandonments, reallocation of road space to transit and
bike lanes where appropriate, etc.). Smaller networks promote
access through more efficient use of scarce space and improved
proximity of opportunities.
• Reduce operating costs by replacing active management with
passive or self-managing systems. For instance, we can replace
traffic lights with roundabouts in many locations,5 and deploy 5 Though we cannot put roundabouts
at over-saturated urban intersections or
where there are space constraints.
shared spaces more widely.
• Given continued public allocation of transport funds at the local,
state, and federal levels, funding should reward projects that
measurably, objectively, and cost-effectively increase accessibility,
rather than those that reduce congestion or solely focus on
mobility. Projects can be ranked based on units of accessibility
(for instance, the increase in the number of person-weighted jobs
within 30 minutes in the AM peak hour per dollar spent), with
only the best projects supported.
Cities are organically evolved ‘machines for access’.
Cities, counties, metropolitan areas, and states have a number of
strategies to increase accessibility. Reducing congestion on existing
roads, and expanding transport capacity is one of a family of
strategies. In this regard, removing or mitigating transport
bottlenecks, and adding (or restoring) missing links to networks are
among the most promising strategies. Using existing road space
more efficiently can provide significant capacity. This includes
strategies like ramp metering, widely deployed in some cities, to
lane speed management and policies to discourage lane changing,
deployed now in a few places, to narrowing lanes and conversion of
shoulders to travel lanes (as on I-94 in Minneapolis in response to
the I-35W bridge collapse). There are many low-cost strategies
available with existing technology that can make significant
differences. One of the great untold stories of the construction of
the Interstate Highway System, which invaluably expanded long
distance accessibility, is how it tore asunder local neighborhoods6 6 (Altshuler 1966).
and reduced local accessibility (especially important for non-work
trips) by disconnecting local streets, reducing network redundancy,
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and overall made the local network more tree-like and less web-like.
This can be reversed at least in part with land bridges and more
local road crossings.77 (King et al. 2008).
Land use strategies that encourage and reinforce natural market
tendencies to co-locate jobs and housing is another.8 Providing8 In December 2018 Minneapolis
passed a comprehensive plan that
abolished single family zoning and
eliminated parking requirements for
new construction. This should lead to
more duplexes and triplexes throughout
the city, thus creating more ‘missing
middle’ housing and promoting access.
Creating density does not have to mean
large apartment buildings.
incentives (or removing barriers) to locating residences in job-rich
areas, and job-sites in housing-rich areas would improve overall
accessibility. Similarly, developing land at transport nodes more
intensively could also increase transport network efficiency. The
effectiveness of many recent rail systems is diminished by local
zoning that restricts development density at stations. As these are
among the most expensive transport facilities, it is most important
to correctly coordinate the transport and land use here.
Traditionally, regulations on land use are designed to diminish
negative externalities like congestion and pollution in the absence of
good pricing. With proper pricing, land use regulations can be
relaxed to foster access.
Existing institutions don’t let us implement our
preferred policies. When the United States last significantly
overhauled federal surface-transport policy in 1991, Americans who
wanted to travel to an unfamiliar location used paper maps, usually
purchased from a bookstore or gas station. If they were on a toll
road, they stopped at the tollbooths and rolled down the window.
They listened to an AM/FM radio, a cassette tape, or maybe, if they
had a new car, a compact disc. The car of the future was equipped
with a fax machine. The Internet, smart phones, and texting were
essentially unknown. The nascent Global Positioning System was
incomplete, and its use was limited to the military.
Today, Americans use GPS apps with crowdsourced traffic data
not only to help them navigate but also to alert them of hazards and
reroute them to avoid congestion. They use radio transponders to
pay as they drive through toll plazas without slowing down. And
they might subscribe to satellite radio, use a predictive streaming
service such as Spotify to listen to music, or subscribe to podcasts
that cater to their specific tastes. Electric vehicles have moved from
fringe to the forefront of automotive technology. There are even a
few self-driving cars on the road.
And yet, despite all these innovations and advances, America’s
transport policy remains blissfully mired in the 20th century with
road maps and cassettes. Every day, urban commuters confront
congestion and an aging infrastructure whose deterioration
outpaces its repair. The causes of these problems, however, are not
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as obvious to drivers, including structural issues with transport
funding and financing (who pays and how much), the insufficient
and outdated management system that oversees our patchwork
road system, and the propagation of unnecessary transport projects,
including infamous bridges and roads to ‘nowhere’ serving special
interests.
Institutions are broken, so what we believe to be the sensible
policies advocated above are not politically feasible at the moment.
Moving towards a utility model would help. The political
governance needs to be resolved before funding is. Establishing an
independent, regulated, and publicly-owned or cooperative ‘road
utility’ (or several of them, at different levels of the road hierarchy,
and/or for different geographical regions) is a strategy to
successfully implement pricing. It deals with both privacy and
institutional structures and provides the rationale and cover for
funding increases to maintain existing infrastructure (and perhaps
expand it).
A large part of the problem is its political nature. We would not
tolerate in the US periodic blackouts from an electric utility because
they could not manage supply and demand. In fact this was the
what in large part led to the downfall of Governor Gray Davis of
California and the political rise of Arnold Schwarzenegger. Why do
we tolerate the transport equivalent, congested roads and unreliable
transit? Because roads and transit are owned and operated by
governments. If they were separate (and regulated) organizations,
not directly responsible to the state legislature, we might have
different outcomes. The notions of ‘free’ and ‘already paid for’ and
‘double-taxation’ that are used to politically defeat tolling proposals
would be replaced with a ‘fee for service’ concept common in
public utilities. A model of ‘institutions loosely coupled,’ each with
specific missions, management, and revenue would outperform a
giant monolithic government that tries to do everything for
everyone, yet nothing very well for anyone.
The key points in reformulating the institutional structure are
listed below:
• Move the administration of transport to an independent publicly
regulated utility.
• Depoliticize road management decisions by taking road
operations out of the hands of the Executive Branch so that
decisions are made on technical rather than political grounds.9 9 Investments in new routes and rights-
of-way remain political in their vary
nature.• Depoliticize road pricing and taxing decisions by taking them out
of the hands of the Legislative Branch and are instead put them
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in the hands of an objective, less political Public Utility
Commission, so that decisions are made on technical rather than
political grounds.
• Reduce the number of layers of government: Treat road services
as end-to-end systems (including local and long distance routes)
managed by a single organization that can attain and exploit
economies of scale.
The wisdom of the White Queen. The Red Queen from Lewis
Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass noted:
Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the
same place.1010 Carroll (1917).
This gives rise to the evolutionary (Red Queen) hypothesis that
organisms must constantly adapt to survive in a continuously
changing environment with evolving opposing organisms. In
technology history, technologies take the place of species, and while
we get progress in technology, all other technologies and behaviors
adapt. We may expand a road, but find the capacity is used up by
more cars traveling longer distances. We may reduce crash risk with
a new safety feature, and find it gets used up by more dangerous
driving.
The White Queen, the Red Queen’s sister, says that in her youth:
Why sometimes I’ve believed six impossible things before breakfast
and counsels Alice to practice the same skill. While believing
impossible things may seem quixotic, to borrow from a different
piece of fantastical fiction, we think it is also necessary to improve
the world.
Following the learned advice of the White Queen, we believe
several impossible things:
• Access should replace congestion as the measure of transport.
• To maximize access per dollar, the decidedly sexy maintenance
and preservation of already operating networks should be the
focus of transport system operators, rather than ribbon-cuttings
and expansion. We like Jane Jacobs’ notion of ‘ribbon-tyings’ to
preserve things.
• Travelers should pay for the full cost of the roads and services
they use, including the externalities they create.
• Zoning can be eliminated if we properly price externalities. At
the very least, zoning should expire after a period of a few years,
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thus forcing a new political discussion of its merits periodically.
Zoning codes in the US are largely based on mid-20th century
industrial and social concerns. Industry is generally less noxious
at this point thanks to clean air and water regulations, and the
social norms of the 1950s are not something we should preserve.
• The planning horizon for transport projects should be reduced.
Currently, transport planning is long-term, where cities, MPOs
and DOTs plan for 25 years. This time horizon is required by law
in most cases. But in an era of technological change and pressing
social and environmental concerns, 25 years is too long.
Transport and land use policies need to be more nimble and
adaptable to changing conditions. The long-range nature of
transport planning has not obviously improved outcomes. In
fact, an argument can be made that we simply extended the
duration of projects to meet long-range requirements rather than
increase the number or scale of projects we accomplish over a
few decades. Consider that the Interstate system was largely
completed in 20 years while California’s single high speed rail
line will take a minimum of 25 years from when the voters
approved it to fully opening (if it ever gets completed).
We conclude these things are effectively impossible in today’s
world, as evidenced by their non-existence, despite decades of
policy analysis saying they should be so. They are impossible
because the current configuration of institutions does not permit
them. While we cannot expect politicians, who, like everyone,
consider themselves experts, to take courageous long-term decisions
to raise taxes on road users, it is perfectly acceptable for a public
utility to recover costs and patch systems rather than be beholden to
the sexy new piece of infrastructure. Changing institutions is not
without its own political challenges, but may be far less difficult
than asking for a fare or toll increase in every election year.
An optimistic take, and we are optimists though we often sound
come across like wet blankets thrown on the latest hype cycle, is
that the real challenge is change itself. There is a strong status quo
bias in policy. People like what they have even if they don’t like
what it does. Congestion pricing has proven most unpopular just
before implementation, but after it is put in place people tend to
like it.11 For many in the transport and land use fields, the 11 (Börjesson et al. 2012).
unknown outcomes of major institutional change are too risky, even
though without such change we will never achieve the outcomes we
want and need. If what we are doing doesn’t work, then the
solution is not to simply do more and more of it. A
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mobility-focused system will fail at promoting access. Our
mobility-focused system is a product of, and reinforces, existing
political incentives and institutional structures. We must change the
politics to change the policies.
The White Queen in Alice in Wonderland also promised “Jam
To-morrow,” and “Jam Yesterday,” but “never Jam Today.”12 In12 (Carroll 1917).
traffic, we don’t want jams, we want access. Congestion, and its
reciprocal, mobility, have far too long been the dominant measure of
transport. We argue in this and other works that we should focus
on accessibility, the ease of reaching valuable destinations, rather
than just mobility, or the speed of movement on the network, in
assessing transport and land use decisions. We want “Access today”
and “Access tomorrow,” and should have wanted “Access
yesterday,” if we had thought clearly about it.
We titled this book A Political Economy of Access to denote that
many of the problems we face to ensure access are policy issues
governed by politics. Getting the institutions right can make the
impossible possible.
Appendices

A
A Goods Framework
Excludable Non-Excludable
Rival Private  (Market)
Congesting  
(or Common Pool Resource)
Non-Rival Club  (Utility, City) Public
Figure A.1: Types of Goods.
Many things are important and essential that are largely done by
the private sector. Many things are neither important nor essential
are done by the public sector. In transport, the words ‘public’ and
‘private’ are used in ways – such as ‘public’ transport to mean mass
transit1 – that obscure these characteristics. Just because something 1 The British use the term ‘public’ school
to mean private school, as another
example of conflation of terminology.
is publicly supplied doesn’t make it a public good. What
differentiates between which sector a good or service is provided is
not essentialness, nor its importance, but rather its excludability and
its rivalry.
A good is excludable if the provider can charge for it and prevent
use without payment. A good is rivalrous if my consumption
prevents yours. These definitions sound clear, but in practice are
highly contingent on context. A good may be effectively rivalrous at
the margin when there is heavy demand, but not on average, when
demand is light. A good may be excludable in theory, but the
transaction costs of implementing excludability are not worth the
effort in some circumstances, but are in others.
This appendix explores and extends that idea, and applies it to
roads and transit.2
2 What is termed ‘transit’ or ‘mass
transit’ in the United States is often
called ‘public transport’ elsewhere. To
avoid confusion, we will use the term
transit in this chapter to refer to a mode
which moves multiple parties.
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A.1 Rivarly and excludability
As illustrated in Figure A.1 Goods that are both excludable and
rivalrous are classified by economists as private goods, and are often
provided by the private sector. Food is both important and essential,
yet most Americans get food from private vendors in the US,
ranging from the local farmer’s market to the largest Big Box store.
In contrast, goods that are neither excludable nor rivalrous are
categorized as public goods. The classic example is national defense,
which serves all members of the public whether they want it or not,
and which is paid for with taxes. We can’t just ‘not subscribe’ to
national defense. No private firm provides a nuclear defense in case
one’s property is invaded by a foreign army. Another example is
public street lighting, which benefits all road users (often to the
annoyance of the neighbors).33 (Marques and Geddes 2018).
We can of course debate the amount of public good we want.
Over-the-air broadcasting is also a public good, though it is
privately provided.4 Anyone with a receiver can get any4 It is possible to broadcast in coded
signals that require special devices to
unscramble, but this is an exception.
over-the-air channel. In that case, broadcasting is funded not by
taxes but by advertising.5 The model is switched and the viewer is5 The UK, for instance, uses taxes to
pay for the BBC, and in the US, mostly
commercial-free PBS receives limited
public support, so this model varies.
the good being sold to the advertiser, since the market for
advertising on over-the-air television is both excludable and
rivalrous (since time is rivalrous and broadcasters can sell it to
whomever they like for the market rate).
Yet very few things are purely private or purely public, which
provides little guidance for policy. In what follows we focus on other
types of goods that better fit with experience.
Goods that are excludable but not rivalrous are called club goods.
Many public utilities (those with adequate capacity for potential
demand) fall into this category.
Goods that are rivalrous but not excludable are called congesting
or common pool resources. Most transport falls into these categories.
A.2 Goods and roads
These cases are illustrated below by visiting the main layers in the
hierarchy of roads. Figure A.2 idealizes a map of an area illustrating
different layers of the hierarchy, and how they interact. The freeway
is at the top of the hierarchy, there are major arterials which have
freeway interchanges. They themselves intersect other major
arterials and minor arterials. The minor arterials connect to
neighborhood distributor roads, and those connect to neighborhood
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Traffic light
Interchange
Freeway
Major arterial
Minor
arterial
Neighborhood
distributor
Local web
(access-only
function)
Local tree
Figure A.2: Network with
topological classifications.
Source: Figure 5.2 (Levinson
2002).
traffic collectors. At the bottom of the hierarchy, roads may be
arranged like a tree, and not inter-connect.
Local roads – excludable, but not rivalrous (club
goods). At the local level,6 roads are clearly natural monopolies, as 6 Local streets are sometimes called ‘the
last mile’ or ‘the first mile’, depending
on your perspective.
local streets have high fixed costs and low costs per use, and in
most cases it does not make sense to have your house served by two
competing roads (just as you have only one electric utility, one
water utility, one natural gas utility, and so on). Many older places
have alleys or laneways serving properties from the back in addition
to the street serving from the front. One could conceive of them
being competitive. Newer developments tend to avoid construction
of this duplicative infrastructure.
Local streets have been privatized in some places, such as streets
and driveways managed by the local homeowners association, and
another example are the private street associations in cities like
Saint Louis,7 but these ‘private road associations’ are basically 7 (Foldvary 2006).
monopolies or clubs, and are not competitive, and could be thought
of as the most local level of government. This can lead to
unforeseen issues. San Francisco’s Presidio Terrace, a private road
that had been owned by the homeowners association, was sold at
auction in 2017 because the neighborhood inadvertently failed to
pay property taxes on it. The new owners were thinking of ways to
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Figure A.3: Functional
Classification
Types of Connections  Relation to Abutting Property
Limited Access 
(highway)  
Through traffic movement between 
cities and across cities 
Controlled access highways with 
ramps and/or curb cut controls
Linking  
(arterial: principal and minor) 
Traffic movement between limited 
access and local streets Direct access to abutting property
Local  
(collector and distributor road)
Traffic movement in residential 
areas  Direct access to abutting property 
profit from it, including charging residents for parking, but the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors reversed the sale.88 (Wong 2017).
Limited-access roads – excludable and rivalrous (private
goods). A limited-access highway is, by definition, limited in the
number of access points. Each of these can be controlled, either by
ramp meters or by toll gates. The evidence for this is that many of
them are. This is cost effective so long as the revenue collected from
the tolls exceeds the cost of collection, and can at least in part defray
the cost of building, operating, and maintaining the road.
In fact these limited-access roads are private in many places;
private in the sense they are long-term concessions or franchises
controlled by a private for-profit firm which has significant latitude
in how the road is operated. These places include ‘Socialist’ France
and China, but such private roads are rare in most of the ‘Capitalist’
US and UK.9 If these firms were competitive, on long trips, you9 A notable exception, and example
of full privatization, is the
Ambassador Bridge between Detroit,
Michigan and Windsor, Ontario.
http://www.ambassadorbridge.com/.
might have a choice of suppliers for the line haul part of that
journey if not the whole trip. They are competitive in that the
concession or franchise agreement is contestable, other companies
may enter the market, so the incumbent operator is not necessarily
renewed.
Rural roads – non-excludable, non-rivalrous (public
goods). Rural roads don’t get congested generally, and so can be
considered functionally non-rivalrous. They are also difficult to
exclude traffic from because the costs of collection or enforcement
would be high relative to the benefit. While they could be organized
as a club good over a large enough area, if the area is large enough
they might as well be considered public goods.
Urban linking roads – not excludable, rivalrous
(congesting goods). The most complex level of the hierarchy of
roads are those between local streets and limited-access highways.
Often signalized arterials, their operations tend to be integrated.
While one can conduct academic research thinking about the
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implications of autonomous private links,10 it is harder to imagine 10 (Zhang et al. 2008).
that operationally. But it might be possible to privatize city streets
collectively, or to have publicly owned streets managed by a private
firm under contract.
The section on auctioning11 presents a thought experiment of 11 §18.4.
traffic signals managed by private contractors with specific
incentives, where green time is auctioned to create a cash flow.
Implementing a congestion charge might be part of this.
A.3 Goods and transit
As discussed above, economics defines four types of goods: public,
private, congesting (or common pool resource), and club. Public
goods are, by this definition, neither excludable (to use it, you must
pay for it) nor rivalrous (the good is scarce and only one person can
use it at a time). What type of good is mass transit?
Urban peak hour transit – excludable and rivalrous
(private goods). Mass transit is both excludable (at the cost of
validating payment), and rivalrous (when congested). Under those
conditions it satisfies the definition of a private good. Many private
goods are privately provided, hence the name.
Urban off-peak transit, rural transit – excludable, but
not rivalrous (club goods). When transport systems are
designed to carry peak loads, they are under-capacity in the
off-peak, and thus functionally non-rivalrous. We think this is the
most common case in the United States
Urban peak, free transit – not excludable, rivalrous
(congesting goods). Sometimes transit is operated
non-excludably, for instance university campus shuttles, or an
elevator in your nearest multi-story building. Similarly, sometimes
transit operates with an honor system payment with lax (or no)
enforcement. While they may be physically excludable in principle,
the transaction costs of exclusion or enforcement don’t outweigh the
benefits.12 12 Such as proof-of-payment through
random inspections.
Urban off-peak or rural, free transit – non-excludable,
non-rivalrous (public goods). Often transit is not rivalrous,
(non-rivalry implies my consumption does not affect yours, by
increasing its cost or diminishing its quality) such as in off-peak
times. The off-peak university campus shuttle is a public good in
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Figure A.4: Types of Goods
Extended.
Excludable Non-Excludable Anti-Excludable
Rival Private  (Market)
Congesting  
(or Common Pool Resource) Rally
Non-Rival Club  (Utility, City) Public Viral
Anti-Rival 
 (Network)
Hub  
(Social Network) Social Media Memetic
practice. It is nevertheless paid for as a club good by the university
and its students, since they are the primary beneficiaries.1313 Almost no one outside the university
community would bother riding a free
intra-campus university shuttle bus, so
even it if is technically non-excludable, it
is functionally excludable in that no one
else would ride, and the people traveling
on-campus have university business.
A.4 Anti-rivalry and anti-excludability
The opposites of rival and excludable are generally taken to be non-
rival and non-excludable. Yet, that is incomplete. What is the opposite
of one: zero or minus one? Hence the emergence of the ideas of anti-
rival14 and anti-excludable. The concept of anti-excludability was first14 The term anti-rival is credited to
Steven Weber. (Weber 2004). defined in a blog post by Pierre de Vries, 15 who writes:
15 (DeVries 2005).
These definitions, however, don’t take into effect the network effects
that have become so prevalent on the web. Social networks like
Amazon reviews and del.icio.us tags are not just non-rivalrous, as
one would expect from knowledge; the more one uses them, the more
value is created.
These goods are ‘anti-rivalrous.’ Their use increases the amount
available for consumption by others.
One can play the same game with exclusiveness. An ‘anti-exclusive
good’ might be one where my giving it to you actively encourages you
to pass it along to others. Viruses are one example; another is peer-to-
peer software which someone cannot use without becoming a server
node for others.
These terms are not widely used, but are useful to think about.
Anti-rival: I benefit if others use. We usually think of
transport as a tangible good, but it is also often an anti-rival or
network good, and far more valuable the more people there are,
until congestion sets in.
Your consumption of bike lanes is much more a complement for
mine than a substitute. Your presence increases the demand for bike
lanes (and thus network coverage – through a politically
intermediated process) and spreads the fixed costs of construction
across more users (if it were in fact user financed, in practice it is a
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complement because of lobbying the government, but that’s another
story).
Your consumption of transit is a complement to mine, increasing
the likelihood there will be a bus on the route I want to travel, at the
time I want to travel, and lowering my wait time. This is dubbed the
Mohring Effect in transport, named after Herbert Mohring, who
identified this in 1972.16 The basic idea is that if 50 people want a 16 (Mohring 1972).
ride each hour, you send one bus. If 100 people want a ride each
hour, you send two buses, each a half-hour apart, and the average
rider only has to wait half as long, (reducing wait times, and over a
network, reducing transfer times) benefiting everyone. Similarly, the
more riders, the more spatial coverage that can be provided
(reducing access and egress times).
Even your consumption of driving complements mine where
network density is low, ensuring there will be a road network,
which I could not afford myself. In short, not only is transport
usually non-rivalrous in the long run, it is anti-rivalrous. Even in
the short run, significant congestion is the exception not the rule.
Anti-excludable: I spread the use of the good to others
every time I use. But how can such a good be anti-excludable?
We hypothesize the more people who walk, the more likely the
next person will be to walk, because walking invites more people to
walk, the act of walking acts as an advertisement for the act of
walking. Similarly for biking,17 riding transit, or driving a car. The 17 (Schoner et al. 2016).
more you see it, the more plausible it becomes. We feel more
comfortable walking the more pedestrians there are. We feel safer
walking. We are safer walking.18 Every pedestrian is a reminder to 18 (Murphy et al. 2017).
drivers that there are other pedestrians. Every pedestrian acts as
“Eyes on the Street” extending dictum of Jane Jacobs.19 19 Jabobs originally applied the phrase
to local proprietors ensuring safety by
keeping eyes on the street for the
neighborhood (Jacobs 1961).
The northwest corner of Figure A.4 is standard. Does it make
sense to think about the remaining five cells as de Vries suggests?
There are five cells in the table requiring names, we use the
following:
• Anti-Rival and Excludable: Hub Good. For example, Facebook,
which is excludable, but my membership makes yours more
valuable, or an airport hub, or a train station serving multiple
lines facilitating transfers.
• Anti-Rival and Non-Excludable: Media Good. For example any
broadcast activity (de Vries suggests Social Tagging) but really
any type of social media like Twitter, which seems to have a hard
time keeping people off.
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• Anti-Rival and Anti-Excludable: Memes or Memetic Goods. My
possessing an idea does not prevent you from possessing it, so it
is certainly non-rival. Unlike tangible property, ideas cannot be
easily protected. (There are of course patents and copyrights, but
those affect physical (or electronic) production, not what’s in
your head). However many ideas are better if more people
possess them, so we could class them as network goods, or
anti-rival. Similarly many ideas are so good people want to share
them. Like a juicy secret, telling someone induces it to spread
more widely, making it anti-excludable.20 Perhaps Walking or20 See also (Miller 2016).
Biking also fall here.
• Non-Rival and Anti-Excludable: Viral Good. For instance as per de
Vries, Peer-to-Peer software.
• Rival and Anti-Excludable: Rally Good. Envision a rally on a public
square (for instance to overthrow a government) which attracts
protestors, but does get so crowded people cannot participate.
B
Network Economies, Supply and
Demand
Supply
Upward Sloping 
(Scale Diseconomies) (Rival)
Downward Sloping 
(Scale Economies) (Anti-rival)
Demand
Downward Sloping 
(Network Diseconomies) (Rival)
Market   
[Net rivalrous] 
Utility  
[Complex, near non-rivalrous]
Upward Sloping 
(Network Economies) (Anti-rival)
City  
 [Complex, near non-rivalrous]
Hub 
[Net anti-rivalrous]
Figure B.1: Market-Utility-City-
Hub Classification.
Transport, like many technologies, is subject both to network
effects (the more transport there is, the more places which can be
reached; the more valuable transport is, the more transport is
provided), and diminishing returns (once everywhere is connected,
new connections are less valuable than old connections). Different
modes in different places are in different stages. Enabling current
users to go faster (save time), and farther (get better services) in the
same time are both valuable contributions of transport systems.
Some projects offer no incremental benefits along these dimensions
but offer higher quality in terms of the comfort of travel (think of a
crowded subway at rush hour versus being able to find a seat).
This appendix introduces the Market-Utility-City-Hub (MUCH)
framework for understanding supply and demand interactions
when there are economies of scale and/or network externalities.
This has special relevance in transport and urban economics, where
both properties are often found. This chapter pre-supposes
excludability.1 One could think about these issues in the realm of 1 §A.
non-excludability, and anti-excludability, but that’s for another day.
The previous appendix.2 discussed rivalry and anti-rivalry, but 2 §A.
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Figure B.2: Market-Utility-City-
Hub Supply and Demand.
did not indicate whether those were demand or supply phenomena.
In this section, we disentangle the concept of rivalry to its supply
and demand elements, as shown in Figure B.1. There are four cases:
• [A] Supply intersects demand twice: when supply is downward
sloped and demand is upward sloped (Hub), and when supply is
upward sloped and demand is downward sloped (Market).
• [B] Supply intersects demand twice: when supply is downward
sloped and demand is upward sloped (Utility), and when supply
is upward sloped and demand is downward sloped (Market).
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• [C] Supply intersects demand twice: when supply is downward
sloped and demand is upward sloped (Hub), and when supply is
upward sloped and demand is upward sloped (City).
• [D] Supply does not intersect demand.
These cases lead to four types of goods.
Type M (market or private) goods. Most of introductory
economics is explained according to a traditional view of
downward sloping demand curves and upward sloping supply
curves. As price (on the y-axis) increases, the quantity (on the
x-axis) of demand decreases. However as price increases, quantity
that is supplied increases, as more suppliers are willing to sell their
goods. If an exchange is to be realized, these curves must intersect,
which they do in the case of conventional “market goods.” We will
call this a type M good.
This is shown as the right-side equilibrium in Figure B.2(A) or
B.2(B).
Type U (utility) goods. Economics is far from silent on
economies of scale, which are an especially important property in
transport economics. Thus we can draw U-shaped supply curves,
falling on the left side of the curve, rising on the right. With scale
economies, the price per user falls with additional users because the
cost structure is dominated by fixed costs rather than variable costs.
Any system with a large physical plant and relatively low unit
costs falls into this category. Formally, a natural monopoly is an
“industry in which multi-firm production is more costly than
production by a monopoly.”3 A public utility is often a natural 3 (Baumol 1977).
monopoly. Such sectors are uncontestable in practice, since a new
firm would have to duplicate the large physical plant, and has to
split customers with incumbents to recover those fixed costs. This is
shown as the left-most equilibrium in Figure B.2(B). This is a type U
good.
While introductory economics assumed a downward sloping
demand curve, we might have an apparently upward sloping
demand curve. This would give us a parabolic-shaped demand
curve, rising on the left, falling on the right. In this case, demand
seems to increase with price.
One example of this is a prestige good. Faber College’s education
must be better, they charge $500,000 per year.4 4 Faber College was made famous in the
movie National Lampoon’s Animal House.Another example is where prices signal something else, our
research on HOT lanes showed that people apparently use price as
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a signal for time savings, and will surprisingly be more likely to use
the HOT lane when the price is higher, as they are taking that as an
indicator the other lanes are congested (though a higher price, in
fact, means the HOT lane has more traffic, independent of the other
lanes).55 (Janson and Levinson 2014).
The major case is that of network externalities – the more people
on the network the more valuable it is, so while the curve is
apparently upward sloping, really people are paying a premium for
a good with more members. Transport and communications
networks have these properties, ranging from telephone systems
(which are more valuable if more people have phones) to airlines
(which are more valuable to me if they go to more places, which
they do because there are more passengers).
Type C (city) goods. Third – we have systems that have network
externalities, but without the cost savings of economies of scale. In
other words, the economies of scale that exist get fully exploited,
and additional users drive up costs. Cities are an example, so we
will call this a type C good. The value of a city increases with more
citizens, but its costs increase as well due to scarcity of land. Cities
will grow so long as the increasing benefits with number of users
exceeds the increasing costs with number of users. That is not to say
there are no economies of scale and density in cities, for there surely
are, but those are part of a lumpy system. So for instance, does
multi-story development exhibit economies or diseconomies? On
the one hand, the developer only pays for land once, so a high rise
achieves economies on land. However, construction costs increase
with distance from the ground. Perhaps more importantly, usable
space decreases per floor with the height of the building because
of elevator shafts. A building that can be served by a single elevator
loses one elevator shaft of space per floor. Once the building requires
a second elevator, every floor loses an additional shaft of space. For
a 20 or 30 or 50 or 100 story building, this is non-trivial. The Empire
State Building has 73 elevators. This is the right equilibrium in Figure
B.2(C).
Type H (hub) goods. Finally, if we have both economies of scale
or density and network externalities, we have a system that can get
very large. All of the world’s successful networks are examples:
telephone, internet, social networks, the airline system and so on. In
the long run, free market competition or even contestability is likely
to be insufficient to enforce good behavior on the owners of such
Hub networks, who are likely to charge more than is welfare
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maximizing in order to achieve high profitability. Hence regulation,
or even public ownership, is often used. This is the left equilibrium
in Figures B.2(A) and (C). Call this a type H good.
There are of course many things which, with current technologies
and preferences, no-one is willing to pay enough, or the cost is too
high, to profitably supply. Space travel is an obvious example. This
is shown in Figure B.2(D).
It is arguable whether the left equilibria are stable, and the right
equilibria generally produce more social welfare. If we are at a right
equilibrium, the benefits from the scale economies and network
externalities may have been fully exhausted.

C
The Price of Privacy
A concern that arises with many road pricing proposals is
government tracking. While we are personally of the belief we don’t
really have privacy anymore (certainly no one with a smart phone
does),1 we can understand the desire to at least make it more 1 See (Valentino-DeVries et al. 2018).
difficult to track travelers. Installing devices in vehicles as a
government mandate is not reassuring to anyone, tin-foil hat
wearing or not.2 To be adopted, policy has to respect that. 2 Many of the concerns about red light
cameras are about privacy, rather than
road safety.
There are technical solutions to privacy issues, but implementing
these, in the face of the desire of security agencies to be able to track
individuals, will be difficult. It may turn out with cameras, mobile
phones, and other devices, we lose privacy about our whereabouts
well before road pricing is implemented. The solution may be, as
David Brin suggests, a Transparent Society,3 where everyone can 3 (Brin 1998).
watch everyone, the state does not have a monopoly on monitoring.
Based on historical experience,4 implementing tolls on existing 4 (Levinson 2002).
untolled roads is likely to be politically difficult and unpopular. A
2007 petition in the UK to then Prime Minister Tony Blair
beseeched:
“The idea of tracking every vehicle at all times is sinister and wrong.
Road pricing is already here with the high level of taxation on fuel.
The more you travel - the more tax you pay.
It will be an unfair tax on those who live apart from families and
poorer people who will not be able to afford the high monthly costs.
Please Mr Blair - forget about road pricing and concentrate on
improving our roads to reduce congestion.”5 5 The petition, now closed, can be found
at http://petitions.number10.gov.uk/
traveltax.This petition to scrap “the planned vehicle tracking and road
pricing policy” was signed by more than 1.8 million UK residents
by 2007, more than any other petition in history. It clearly informed
the following Prime Minister David Cameron’s proposed policy.
Suppose we increase the gas tax to the desired peak hour rate.
This is the politically difficult part. We then offer a discount for off-
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peak travel. This discount requires voluntarily installing in a device
in the vehicle which tracks when it is in operation, and the odometer
reading. (Not where, just when). For each hour of travel during the
peak, travelers have already paid the peak rate. For each hour of
travel in the off-peak, travelers get an off-peak discount.
People who wanted to keep their privacy would not install the
device. Privacy is not costless.
The device of course makes the system somewhat more
complicated than today’s gas tax regime, but these are standard
devices, already issued by insurance companies offering good
driver discounts. Altogether, some complication is unavoidable if
when adding a time dimension to the prices charged to travelers.
This system might raise less money than expected if everyone
installed the device and people respond to incentives and change
behavior. Based on experience with changes in gas prices, we expect
those changes are relatively small (the elasticity of demand with
respect to gas price changes is pretty low). Further, not everyone
will install the device. But changes don’t have to be large to have an
effect, and we don’t want them to be too large (otherwise the peak
is uncongested and the off-peak is congested). We could come up
with rate schedules that would be appropriate, and might have
different rates at different times (such as peak-of-the-peak, shoulder,
mid-day, and off-peak).
Another objection is out-of-state travel. Here, we are simply
computing when travel occurs and assuming all fuel is purchased in
the home state. If every state were to have such a system, this
probably has very small boundary effects. If one small state adopts
this, and its neighbors don’t, some residents might travel out of
state to purchase fuel (leading them to not adopt this). Again, we
suspect the losses will be small, though they may be measurable.
There could either be a federal mandate for such a system (which
presents the risk of locking-in a poor standard), or evolution
towards an agreement among the various states to coordinate the
pricing mechanism. If the differences in peak and off-peak rates
were small, they would not distort behavior much, and that might
be the best way to implement such a system initially, and then the
differences can be increased over time: peak prices increasing,
off-peak decreasing, until the desired load balance was achieved.
D
Governance and Performance
D.1 Introduction
The United States is a policy laboratory with 50 states that differ in
how they administer roads, and in the performance that results.
This appendix examines how road performance varies with
governance and organizational structure. It aims to provide some
insight or perspective on how roads might be better managed. The
hypothesis is that state Departments of Transportation (DOTs) that
operate in a more independent manner will have better
performance. If this is borne out, it provides preliminary support
for reconsidering the relationship of DOTs to state government.
The next section discusses the Governance of state Departments
of Transportation. Then measures of performance of state highways
are presented. This is followed by a statistical analysis of the
performance of state highways from both a financial and systems
performance perspective. The research concludes with implications
for state DOTs.
D.2 Governance
The governance of state Departments of Transportation in the United
States can be characterized across several dimensions. These include
organizational leadership, administrative structure, and institutional
model.
Organizational leadership
In general, there are two models of organizational leadership which
we find in the transport sector:
• the individual; and
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• the collegial body (a board or commission composed of multiple
members)
The board’s membership is often sought out to represent
different areas of expertise, or different spatial units (such as
Congressional Districts). These both aim to ensure multiple ideas
are heard and to account for different interests. Making sure money
is spent proportionately across the state is an important political
consideration for state governments. Multiple actors inherently
slow down decision making compared to a single actor, but help
confer legitimacy to decisions. The single actor can be nimbler, and
more consistent, but as a result the system may also be more
vulnerable to criticism, and its leadership may have a faster
turnover. This has the merits of leading to the ability to correct bad
policies and poor leadership, but that faster turnover may make it
difficult to steer the course. This is particularly a concern for an
infrastructure organization or utility, which has a relatively long
time frame (projects which take years to deliver and which last for
decades) compared to most businesses.
Which mix of board and individual body produces the best
results requires comparison of alternative models. It is typical for
organizations like corporations to have both a Board of Directors,
responsible for larger strategic decisions, and an Executive (for
instance a CEO) responsible for daily tactical decisions. Most US
State DOTs have a single executive, without a strong board,
responsible to a governor (and confirmed by a legislature, which in
some senses acts as the Board). Some state DOTs do have Boards
though, and their political strength varies on a case-by-case basis.
The line between what constitutes strategic vs. tactical decisions
varies on a case-by-case basis. The US leadership models,
ascertained by reviewing the public web sites of all 50 US state
Departments of Transportation, are summarized in Table D.1, it
should be noted that there is considerable overlap, for instance a
state may have both a strong commission, and a director or
commissioner appointed by a Governor.
The Strong Commission states are: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming.
The Advisory Board states are Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and
Washington.
Issues in the governance of some states are illustrated below.
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Leadership structure Number of States
Director apptd. by Governor 42
Advisory Board 9
Strong Commission 19
Cabinet 43
Subcabinet 1
Executive Director 10
Table D.1: Leadership
organization of state DOTs.
Arizona. Arizona has a State Transportation Board, appointed by
the Governor, which has final say on policy decisions and financing,
and which ultimately serves as an Advisory Board of Directors for
the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT). Not in the
‘Strong Commission’ Category, the Director of the ADOT is
responsible for administering the department. Members of the
Board are appointed from districts, and so represent local issues in
addition to statewide.
Arizona is one of the few (if not the only) state to have ever
developed a corporate-style financial analysis.1 The analysis 1 (Mansour-Moysey and Semmens 2001).
considers not only the normal expenses of maintaining and
operating roadways, but also considers depreciation (or
construction recovery) costs, so that the long-term expenses are also
accounted for. This was the largest cost category. Questions arise in
this kind of analysis about the lifespan of the capital investments
(the authors assumed 20 years) and the appropriate interest rate
(the authors chose commercial rates), though there is no consensus
in the literature about how to properly value roads. The authors
distinguish earned revenue (i.e. from user charges) from other
non-user charge revenue. This analysis shows that Arizona
highways were approximately break-even under the then current
(1988-1997) inflows and outflows, and thus had less profitability
than found in the private sector. It does not appear this analysis has
been repeated or is ongoing in Arizona, unlike in Australia and
New Zealand.
Texas. The governance of the Texas DOT is unique in the US. The
five Commissioners are appointed by the governor on over-lapping
six year terms (the Governor serves a four year term, and is not
term-limited). The Commissioners appoint an Executive Director.
In Texas, it is said that the Lt. Governor, who presides over the
legislature has more power than the Governor.2 2 (Lisheron 2011).
Concerns about the concentration of power are part of the
reluctance to follow the standard US cabinet system. Texas has a
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sunset bill that requires periodic reconsideration of government
agencies. The Texas House authorized a reexamination of TxDOT
after 4 years instead of the usual 12. However, there was also
reluctance to make the Transportation Commissioner elected.
In 2011, the Texas legislature considered, and rejected, proposals
from the Texas Sunset Advisory Commission3 to replace the3 The unsuccessful proposal to eliminate
the Transportation Commission from the
Texas Sunset Advisory Commission was
recommended on a 7-5 vote.
five-member Texas Transportation Commission with a single
member, both existing and rejected plans would retain appointment
by the governor.4 A proposal to elect the Commission was also4 (Wear 2011).
defeated. However, having the lieutenant governor appoint one,
and the governor to select one commissioner from a list by the Texas
House Speaker was approved.
Massachusetts. The Massachusetts DOT was radically reformed
due to a 2009 law addressing failures of governances associated
with the Turnpikes, the Big Dig, and the general poor condition of
transport in the state. The Secretary of Transportation, pitched as a
CEO, reports to a five-member Board of Directors, and the
Transportation Department includes the Registry of Motor
Vehicles.55 (Giglio 2011).
Administrative structures
Within a transport department, there are a variety of administrative
structures. Many departments are divided into spatially distinct
Districts. Further, the departments have a variety of functional
structures.
State transportation agencies can be classified as follows:66 (Fazzalaro 2007).
• Agencies Organized by Functional Activity (22 States): Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin
• Agencies Organized by Transportation Mode (16 States) Arizona,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia
• Agencies With No Readily Identifiable Public Transportation
Component Unit (5 States) Alaska, Indiana, North Dakota, Utah,
and Wyoming
• Multi-Agency Organizations (7 States) Delaware, Georgia,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Virginia
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Functional activity - based organizations have units for activities
like administration, finance, planning, engineering, operations, and
construction. Modal-based organizations are typically multi-modal
organizations, considering highways and at least one other modal
function (public transit, ports, rail, airports, motor vehicles, etc.).
Whether the Department that concerns itself with motor vehicle and
driver licensing is a police function, a transport function, or
independent depends on the state.
Institutional model
In contrast with leadership and administration, which describe how
the organization is managed internally, the institutional model
considers the placement of the organization within a wider context.7 7 (Abrams et al. 1998).
Consider four institutional models: the traditional department,
output-based management, an effective road fund, and the public
utility model (see Figure D.2). While the US is generally in the
camp of “traditional department”, and New Zealand “effective road
fund”, Australia was somewhere in between, and does not achieve
the same level of independence accorded a public utility.
There isn’t any variation across US states, so this cannot be
considered in further analysis.
D.3 Performance of state highway systems
Every year, the Reason Foundation releases a report on the
Performance of State Highway System8 using data primarily 8 (Hartgen et al. 2010).
collected from the states by the Highway Performance Management
System of the Federal Highway Administration. In the report, States
are assigned ratings based on their financial performance, system
performance, and overall performance. The measures are for
state-owned highways, and do not include locally-owned roadways,
for which there is no national database.
The equations underlying the performance are given in the report,
and are repeated here for convenience. This research uses the results
of these equations as performance measures in the next section.
System performance
There are seven system “percentage” performance measures (Rural
Interstate Poor-Condition Mileage, Urban Interstate Poor-Condition
Mileage, Rural Other Principal Arterial Poor-Condition Mileage,
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Institutional Arrangement
Task Traditional
department
Output-based
management
Effective road
fund
Public utility
Setting of
objectives
Government Government Government Government
Operating
environment
Government Government Government Government
Aggregate
expenditure
Government Government Road fund /
Governmenta
Public utility/
Regulatorb
Expenditure
allocation
Government Government/Road
agencyc
Road fund Public utility
Project appraisal Road agency Road agency Road fund/Road
agencyd
Public utility
Project delivery Road agency Road agency Road agency Public utility
Charging for road
use
Government Government Road fund /
Government
Public utility/
Regulator
a The government and road fund are jointly responsible for setting road user charges and the revenue
collected will influence aggregate expenditure levels over the long run.
b The prices charge for road use by the utility are subject to regulatory oversight which will influence
aggregate expenditure over the long run.
c The agency is paid to produce a range of outputs (projects) but has autonomy in how the revenue is
allocated subject to the constraint that it must produce the agreed outputs.
d The road controlling agency is primarily responsible for project appraisal but is subject to audit of its
appraisals by the road fund.
Table D.2: Responsibility for
undertaking key road provision
tasks. Source: Table 4.1 in
(Abrams et al. 1998). Urban Interstate Congestion, Fatality Rates, Deficient Bridges,
Narrow Lanes on Major Rural Roads)
Ris =
Mis
M¯
(D.1)
where:
Ris = Performance Ratio for measure i, state s.
Mis = Measure i for state s (such as, % of rural Interstates in poor
condition, for North Carolina)
M¯ = the weighted average of Mis across the 50 states.
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Financial performance
The measures for the the four “per-mile” financial measures
(Capital and Bridge Disbursements, Maintenance Disbursements,
Administrative Disbursements, and Total Disbursements) are
adjusted for average width:
R0is = Ris
✓
Ls
L¯
◆
(D.2)
where:
Ls = the average SHA lanes-per-mile for measure i for state s,
L¯ = the weighted average of the lanes-per-mile, over 50 states.
Overall performance
Overall performance is an average of all 11 measures.
Grand Performance Ratio for state s =
✓
1
11
◆ 11
Â
1
R0is (D.3)
This research uses both the relative measures (i.e. normalized to
be per mile, or scaled to the national average), and the underlying
measures (in unnormalized form) in the next section, to identify
what explains differences across states.
D.4 Analysis
The first question is whether there are differences between states
based on organizational form. To do this, we take the mean of the
Overall, System, and Financial Performance measures across the
key organizational structure variables. After exploratory work, the
explanatory variable that shows the most promise is
Commission-led vs. Secretary-led states.
In the commission-led states, the Secretary or Director of the
state Department of Transportation reports to a Commission. In the
Secretary-led states, the Secretary of DOT reports directly to the
Governor (except in California, where there is a more hierarchical
organization).
Recall that a lower performance score indicates better system
performance or lower expenditures per mile. The results are shown
in Table D.3. In all three cases, the performance of Commission-led
states is better than that of Secretary-led states, the differences are
statistically significant.
While this measure is suggestive, there may be some other
underlying difference which explains this. For instance,
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Table D.3: Difference of means
test of system and financial
performance.
Mean Std Dev N T-Test
Overall Performance
Secretary-led 1.26 0.137 31 11.91
Commission Led 0.886 0.0669 19
System Performance
Secretary-led 1.19 0.157 31 9.88
Commission Led 0.834 0.077 19
Financial Performance
Secretary-led 1.36 0.179 31 7.46
Commission Led 0.978 0.172 19
expenditures may be lower in rural states because of the different
nature of road use, and rural states may be more likely to have
commissions as their governance changes more slowly (and
commissions were traditional a century ago). In order to control for
these additional factors, we conduct a statistical regression to
control for multiple factors simultaneously.
We can model the expenditures on highways as depending on
two key factors, the prices or costs of inputs and on the amount of
outputs (travel) on those highways.9 This can be expressed as below:9 (Levinson and Gillen 1998).
M = f (P,Y) (D.4)
where:
M = Performance Measure (such as Expenditures for Financial
Measures and Pavement quality for System Performance).
P is a set of prices for (such as indicators for the cost of capital
and labor)
Y is a set of outputs (such as VMT)
Here we estimate such a model with current data for expenditures
(which are the key factors in Financial Performance). We also predict
measures which describe System Performance.
The hypothesis being tested is whether organizational structure
affects performance. In particular, we want to know whether having
a strong Transportation Commission governance has better
performance than states without strong commissions.
We develop several variables to test this hypothesis. The first is
we interact VMT with two dummy variables, one for
commission-led states (Commission[1, 0]), the other for secretary-led
states (Secretary[1, 0]).
VMTsecretary = VMT ⇤ Secretary[1, 0]
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VMTcommission = VMT ⇤ Commission[1, 0]
Salary is the average state salary, from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (all professions), which is aimed at providing a price index
for the cost of labor in the state.
S&PRating is the bond rating of the state from Standard and
Poor’s Bond Rating Agency converted to numerical form: AAA = 3,
AA = 2, A = 1. The Bond Agency uses + or   on top of the letters.
Here it is coded so that a + adds 0.333 and   subtracts 0.333. So for
instance AA+ = 2.33, AAA- = 2.67. This is in a sense inversely
related to the cost of capital, since states with high bond ratings
have lower interest rates.
RuralShare = VMTruralVMT . This is included to account for differences
in states with a predominantly rural road network with urban states.
Rural states have more center line miles that need to be maintained,
but also have less traffic per mile, changing the mix of services they
provide. This is intended to account for other spatial differences in
that rural states are more likely to have Transportation Commissions
rather than Secretaries leading the Departments.
Other variables were tested in preliminary analyses, and later
dropped as being statistically insignificant and economically
inconsequential. These included weather variables (Mean January
Temp, Mean July Temp, Precipitation Inches, Precipitation Days,
Snow Inches), other institutional structure variables (Presence of a
Weak Advisory Board), administrative structures (Internal
Classification of State DOT as Functional, Modal, No Public Transit,
or Multi-Agency), and whether the state is an advanced user of
Performance Measures according to the Pew Center on the States.10 10 (Pew Center on the States and The
Rockefeller Foundation 2011).The models are estimated in Cobb-Douglas (ln-ln) functional
form, which in general improved fit against linear forms. Given the
sample size (50) and the nature of the cross-section, more complex
functional forms were not seen as significant improvements.
Examining first disbursements (Table D.4) the four columns
represent Total disbursements, Administrative disbursements,
Maintenance disbursements, and Capital and Bridge disbursements.
All values are in dollars. We see that VMT is an important predictor
in all four cases. In three of the four cases, the coefficient on VMT in
secretary-led states is higher than the coefficient on VMT in
commission led states. This means those states had more
expenditures per vehicle mile traveled. Only for maintenance
disbursements was the coefficient VMT higher in commission led
states. However the differences between the two coefficients are not
statistically significant.
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Total Admin Maintenance Capital and Bridge
VMTsecretary 0.832 *** 0.81 *** 0.72 *** 0.92 ***
(0.05) (0.103) (0.086) (0.058)
VMTcommission 0.826 *** 0.80 *** 0.73 *** 0.90 ***
(0.048) (0.098) (0.082) (0.055)
Salary 1.03 * 1.96 * 2.42 ** -0.50
(0.555) (1.132) (0.948) (0.639)
S&PRating 0.15 -0.07 0.08 0.08
(0.18) (0.368) (0.309) (0.208)
RuralShare -0.02 0.06 0.45 ** 0.09
(0.124) (0.253) (0.212) (0.143)
Constant -5.56 -10.61 -13.62 16.10 **
(5.818) (11.866) (9.947) (6.706)
Adjusted R2 0.8827 0.6436 0.6433 0.8533
Notes: Beta coefficients given. (Number in parenthesis indicates standard error). Explanation of variables
in text.
* = variable is statistically significant at p < 0.1 level,
** = variable is statistically significant at p < 0.05 level,
*** = variable is statistically significant at p < 0.01 level.
Table D.4: Regression models of
disbursements. Disbursements
in dollars. All Variables in
natural log (ln) form. Disbursements per se are neither good nor bad, nor necessarily
efficient or inefficient. However producing one vehicle mile for less
money, all else equal, is efficient. We only can determine whether all
is equal in the context of outcome measures, shown on the next two
tables.
Examining next pavement condition (Table D.5), we see that VMT
is insignificant for both rural and urban Interstates, and a negative
predictor for pavement condition on rural other principal arterials.
The magnitudes are almost identical across commission and
secretary states in all three cases. States with high salaries have
worse pavement (more pavement in poor condition), and states with
better S&P ratings have better pavements. States with more rural
traffic have more rural pavement in poor condition.
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Urban Interstate Rural Interstate Rural Arterials
VMTsecretary -0.513 0.4249 -1.168 ***
(0.922) (0.402) (0.293)
VMTcommission -0.509 0.4247 -1.171 ***
(0.881) (0.384) (0.28)
Salary 10.75 12.63 *** 1.49
(10.124) (4.415) (3.225)
S&PRating -9.73 *** -5.46 *** -0.87
(3.299) (1.438) (1.05)
RuralShare 0.25 1.87 * -1.11
(2.267) (0.988) (0.722)
Constant -95.83 -130.67 *** -2.88
(106.134) (46.283) (33.806)
Adjusted R2 0.1362 0.3282 0.241
Notes: Beta coefficients given. (Number in parenthesis indicates standard error). Explanation of variables
in text.
* = variable is statistically significant at p < 0.1 level,
** = variable is statistically significant at p < 0.05 level,
*** = variable is statistically significant at p < 0.01 level.
Table D.5: Regression models
of pavement condition. Percent
poor pavement condition. All
variables in natural log (ln)
form.
Turning to other performance measures (Table D.6). We see that
VMT is an important predictor of percentage of narrow lane roads
(more VMT, more narrow lane roads), percentage of structurally
deficient and functionally obsolete bridges (more VMT fewer poor
bridges), and urban Interstate congestion (more VMT, more
congestion). In all three of these cases, commission-led states had a
lower rate of the poor performance than secretary-led states. The
only significant predictor of fatal accident rate was salary, states
with higher salaries had fewer crashes.
In short, in eight regressions where the VMT was statistically
significant, commission-led states had lower disbursements or
better performance in seven of eight cases. The likelihood of at least
seven of eight cases turning out this way (assuming that in fact the
two numbers were equal, i.e. applying the binomial theorem with
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Lane Width Crash Rate Bridges Congestion
VMTsecretary 3.47 * 0.01 -2.27 * 11.14 ***
(1.908) (0.037) (1.327) (2.402)
VMTcommission 3.21 * 0.02 -2.47 * 11.03 ***
(1.824) (0.035) (1.268) (2.296)
Salary 24.18 -2.02 *** -9.77 -2.07
(20.945) (0.41) (14.565) (26.369)
S&PRating 0.26 -0.20 0.12 -1.75
(6.825) (0.133) (4.746) (8.593)
RuralShare 7.42 0.05 -7.92 ** -15.59 **
(4.69) (0.091) (3.261) (5.905)
Constant -274.46 22.79 *** 144.89 -69.67
(219.562) (4.302) (152.681) (276.422)
Adjusted R2 0.0036 0.5636 0.1032 0.5277
Notes: Beta coefficients given. (Number in parenthesis indicates standard error). Explanation of variables
in text.
* = variable is statistically significant at p < 0.1 level,
** = variable is statistically significant at p < 0.05 level,
*** = variable is statistically significant at p < 0.01 level.
Table D.6: Regression models of
other measures. All Variables in
natural log (ln) form. n = 8 and p = 0.5) is 3.5 percent, giving us confidence that the
differences in the aggregate are meaningful.
D.5 Conclusions
This appendix examined the governance structure of American state
Departments of Transportation, and used governance structure to
explain differences in financial and system performance.
Governance structure in terms of organizational leadership, whether
the DOT was led by a Secretary who reported to the Governor or
led by a Commission proved to explain some differences in
performance. Commission-led DOTs were less costly in terms of
expenditure per vehicle mile traveled and had better performance in
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terms of pavement quality, lane width, percent of bridges in poor
condition, and urban area congestion that were secretary-led DOTs.
This gives us some hope that organizing transport agencies so
that they report to commissions rather than directly to a Governor
can somewhat affect priorities within the agency and its resulting
performance. This also provides some preliminary evidence in
support of prospective Road Enterprises.
As proposed in 11, Road Enterprises have a set of key features, 11 Levinson, D. M.
2012. Enterprising roads: Alternative
governance for America’s highways.
Technical report, Reason Foundation
among them are political independence, management led by a
governing Board who can hire and fire a chief executive officer and
makes important strategic decisions, and financial independence.
No DOT in the US has financial independence. Unlike turnpikes or
public utilities, they cannot raise rates with the approval of an
independent commission, but instead can only raise gas taxes with
the approval of the state legislature. Political independence and
good management have a wider spread among US organizations.
While no state DOT in the US achieves full Enterprise status,
Commission-led DOTs are closer, as they have the Board-Executive
model in place. Commission-led DOTs are more likely to view the
mission of transport provision differently than those where the
Secretary reports to a governor. They have more independence than
secretary-led organizations, and a better management model with
an executive reporting to a board.

E
Long-Range Funding Solutions
On June 24th, 2009 the Minnesota Department of Transportation held
a “Long-Range Funding Solutions Symposium” to examine issues
associated with the long-term funding of transport. This kind of
event is common in the transport community. David Levinson made
the following remarks (edited for clarity).
MnDOT identified $50 billion of unfunded ‘needs’ for additional
resources of which 86% are for the purpose of ‘mobility’ over the next
20 years. I am not clear as to how these needs were identified, but
several points should be kept in mind. First, this is a slow-growing
region (and outside the Metro a declining state). It has 5 million
people now, and at best is growing at about 1 percent per year.
Second, per-capita Vehicle Miles Traveled has been flat for almost a
decade, and overall VMT growth has been flat for about half a
decade. There are several reasons for this, most recently recession
and high gas prices, but the most important is market saturation. if
speeds are not growing (because we have maxed out the network
given current technologies and face diminishing marginal returns to
new road construction), and people have finite time, they choose not
to devote additional time to travel (and thus distance). Fortunately,
since the I-35W Bridge Collapse, MnDOT has adopted a “fix it first”
approach, so that system preservation, operations, and maintenance
get the largest share of the existing budget, and comprise the first
funded element of needs.
We cannot know what ‘needs’ for mobility are if we have an
unpriced (or underpriced) transport system. People will always
over-consume if they are subsidized, and people do not presently pay
for the congestion externality they impose on others. Once we have
something like marginal cost pricing (or a second-best version
thereof), we can determine which links generate more revenue than
they cost to operate and maintain, and that will signal where capacity
should be added, where the benefits of added capacity outweigh the
costs.
Another way of thinking about what $50 billion means is that
Minnesota is a state of 5 million people, so that amounts to $10,000 of
new construction for each resident of Minnesota (because this is
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above and beyond the funded part which takes care of preservation
(we hope)). Over 20 years, $10,000 per capita is $500 per year, or
about $0.50 per round trip. But that $0.50 per trip is not to pay for
existing infrastructure, that is to pay for new infrastructure those
travelers may or may not use; or if we were to charge users, we would
be looking at 10 to 100 times as much per trip, as the new capacity
built for $50 billion will serve only 10% to 1% of trips, most trips will
continue to use pre-existing infrastructure.
We could also talk about mobility vs. accessibility, and why is it
important to enhance mobility, but that is another long discussion,
refer to the Access to Destinations study for details.11 (El-Geneidy and Levinson 2006).
Attention is a scarce resource, spending time on non-starters like
$50 billion in ‘mobility’ needs detracts from real problems with
existing infrastructure.
In short, the $50 billion suggested comprises ‘Wants’ not ‘Needs.’
Second, we need to re-examine the institutional structure of
transport funding and administration. We should consider a public
utility model where a transport authority or utility with
independence from the legislation and executive branch of
government determines how much is required to maintain (and as
necessary expand) the transport system, with oversight from a Public
Utility Commission or similar. This would resemble how natural gas
and electricity and water and sewer in many places are currently
delivered. Like those, transport is a utility that has costs that users
should bear as directly as possible. The user fee notion would be
embedded into the governance structure of such a transport
authority. The British might call this a Transport Trust. We could
consider how this is organized at different levels of government
(keeping state and local separate or bringing them together?)
Third, value capture,2 has not been fairly characterized in the2 §16.
presentation made today. If we do not have road user fees, transport
creates value for land-owners.3 Since we do not have road user fees,3 If we do have marginal cost user
fees, a closed system, and invest the
revenue in transport, making some
simplifying assumptions, we would not
have additional land value associated
with investment (in the absence of
agglomeration economies)(§12.)
value is created. Several of the methods proposed by the value
capture study hold promise for financing transport systematically, not
just at the project level.
Fourth, in the short-term (next decade or so), gas taxes,(§3).
indexed and adjusted appropriately should be used to fund transport,
as they are administratively much more efficient than road user
charges. They have several advantages: foremost they are cheaper to
collect than most of the proposed VMT charges. An annual odometer
reading is certainly a similar alternative, but that does not have the
environmental benefits of discouraging motor fuel consumption and
encouraging better mileage. Ultimately as the fleet becomes
electrified, the gas tax becomes a better and better incentive to move
in that direction. If today 100% of the drivers use gas and pay for
100% of roads (which I recognize is not strictly the case at the state
level, but is simply illustrative), and next year only 50% of drivers
used gasoline, the remaining 50% would pay for all of the roads by
doubling the gas tax. That provides a somewhat stronger incentive to
switch to electricity. If the following year another 25% switch to
long-range funding solutions 415
electricity, than 75% use electric and 25% use fuel and pay the motor
fuel tax, which is now 4 times as high. Eventually this becomes
unsustainable as the last drive of a gasoline-powered car could not
possibly afford 100% of the road system’s costs, but in the meantime
the incentive works in the right direction for the environment, and
since government is always a lagging indicator, retaining the gas tax
for as long as tenable should be considered the near term solution,
with continuing research into road pricing, additional demonstration,
and deployment of select strategies like high-occupancy/toll lanes.
Fifth, cities, regions and states have turned to voter referenda4 and 4 §17.5.
propositions in many places where these are allowed. Voter referenda
typically ask voters to approve a sales tax increase to support a variety
of road and transit projects over a period of decades. These referenda
can be interpreted as a response to the reluctance of elected officials to
raise fuel taxes. For whatever reason, voters see widely shared sales
taxes as more acceptable than targeted user fees, even though sales
taxes can often be regressive (though actual regressivity can only be
determined after the money is spent).
At any rate, as I have learned today, in Minnesota transit funding
depends on the Motor Vehicle Sales Tax, so I will do my part to help
fund transit and buy a car.

Postscript: Homo Gridicus
Announcer: We now return to Knightboat: the Crime-Solving Boat.
Michael: Faster, Knightboat! We gotta catch those starfish poachers.
Knightboat: You don’t have to yell, Michael, I’m all around you.
Michael: Oh, no! They’re headed for land.
[the poachers ride onto the beach, jump on motorcycles, and speed
away]
Michael: We’ll never catch them now.
Knightboat: Incorrect: look! A canal.
Homer: Go, Knightboat, go!
Bart: Oh, every week there’s a canal.
Lisa: Or an inlet.
Bart: Or a fjord.
Homer: Quiet! I will not hear another word against the boat.5 5 (Crittendon 1995).
To achieve the libertarian, survivalist, and anarchist dream of
purely autonomous individuals acting independently, but still
maintaining modern conveniences, many technologies need to be
delivered in radically different ways. Our unplugged isolationists
could:
• Produce power on-site, without need of a grid, through wind
turbines on their own property, rooftop solar, or geothermal.
• Unplug from the telecommunications monopolies through a peer-
to-peer internet system, where everyone’s WiFi connects to their
neighbors.6 6 See, for example, LifeNet, which
provides internet connectivity
in disasters through peer-to-
peer ad hoc network sharing.
http://www.thelifenetwork.org.
• Collect and treat rainwater and use that to drink and clean,
before discharging gray water onto property, and other waste
into a septic system.
• School children at home, or in independent charter or private
schools.
What is the transport analog? Could our unplugged isolationists
effectively avoid the use of roads and still achieve their desired
accessibility? Do they even care about access to other people and
goods if they are truly autonomous?
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The first obvious answer is air transport. All we need are flying
cars, autogyros, hovercraft, or helicopters, and who cares about
roads – just use the air as a commons. Uber Elevate has released
drawing of their potential skyports.7 The problem is the much7 (Hawkins 2018).
higher energy consumption (and thus cost) required per trip. While
for long-distance trips commercial aviation consumes a similar
amount of energy on a per-passenger-distance basis as cars, energy
consumed will be proportionally much higher for shorter distance
trips.
The next obvious answer is water transport. But we run into the
problem identified by The Simpsons in the excerpt above.8 Inland8 Knightboat: the Crime-Solving Boat
was satirizing the 1982-86 TV show
Knight Rider, about an early intelligent
autonomous vehicle.
waterways are much more a tree-like network than a grid, and
outside of the The Simpsons universe, there is not always a canal.
In the end, we have to concede a certain impracticality in being
‘off-the-street-grid,’ much as our founding fathers realized in the
Postal Clause of the US Constitution, empowering Congress “To
establish Post Offices and post Roads.” Adam Smith writing a
decade earlier (1776) described the ‘The Duty of the Sovereign’,99 §1.1.
which included a commitment to roads.
There isn’t a person in the United States who doesn’t get some use
out of the roads, ... . Even people who don’t drive still benefit from
things like fire protection, ambulance services, and mail delivery – all
of which depend on roads. I suppose you could be Ted Kaczynski, but
even he had to use the US Postal Service to mail his bombs.1010 David Levinson quoted (Haugen
2012).
We are all Homo Gridicus, a species of networked people. We
all want access to something: radical anarchist and anti-technology
terrorist Unabomber Ted Kaczynski needed to access his victims.
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